Skip to main content
We gratefully acknowledge support from the Simons Foundation, member institutions, and all contributors. Donate
arXiv logo
Cornell University Logo

Computer Science > Cryptography and Security

arXiv:1710.06080v1 (cs)
[Submitted on 17 Oct 2017 (this version), latest version 5 Jun 2019 (v2)]

Title:Measuring Information Leakage in Website Fingerprinting Attacks

Authors:Shuai Li, Huajun Guo, Nicholas Hopper
View PDF
Abstract:Tor is a low-latency anonymity system intended to provide low-latency anonymous and uncensored network access against a local or network adversary. Because of the design choice to minimize traffic overhead (and increase the pool of potential users) Tor allows some information about the client's connections to leak in the form of packet timing. Attacks that use (features extracted from) this information to infer the website a user visits are referred to as Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks. We develop a methodology and tools to directly measure the amount of information about a website leaked by a given set of features. We apply this tool to a comprehensive set of features extracted from a large set of websites and WF defense mechanisms, allowing us to make more fine-grained observations about WF attack and defense mechanisms.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:1710.06080 [cs.CR]
  (or arXiv:1710.06080v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1710.06080

Submission history

From: Shuai Li [view email]
[v1] Tue, 17 Oct 2017 03:55:24 UTC (482 KB)
[v2] Wed, 5 Jun 2019 00:56:03 UTC (1,074 KB)
Full-text links:

Access Paper:

  • View PDF
  • Other Formats
view license
Current browse context:
cs.CR
< prev   |   next >
new | recent | 2017-10
Change to browse by:
cs

References & Citations

DBLP - CS Bibliography

listing | bibtex
Shuai Li
Huajun Guo
Nicholas Hopper
export BibTeX citation

Bookmark

BibSonomy logo Reddit logo

Bibliographic and Citation Tools

Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?)
Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?)
Litmaps (What is Litmaps?)
scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?)

Code, Data and Media Associated with this Article

alphaXiv (What is alphaXiv?)
CatalyzeX Code Finder for Papers (What is CatalyzeX?)
DagsHub (What is DagsHub?)
Gotit.pub (What is GotitPub?)
Hugging Face (What is Huggingface?)
Papers with Code (What is Papers with Code?)
ScienceCast (What is ScienceCast?)

Demos

Replicate (What is Replicate?)
Hugging Face Spaces (What is Spaces?)
TXYZ.AI (What is TXYZ.AI?)

Recommenders and Search Tools

Influence Flower (What are Influence Flowers?)
CORE Recommender (What is CORE?)

arXivLabs: experimental projects with community collaborators

arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website.

Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them.

Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.

Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)