Volt Typhoon is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored actor that has been active since at least 2021. Volt Typhoon typically focuses on espionage and information gathering and has targeted critical infrastructure organizations in the US including Guam. Volt Typhoon has emphasized stealth in operations using web shells, living-off-the-land (LOTL) binaries, hands on keyboard activities, and stolen credentials.[1][2][3]
Name | Description |
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BRONZE SILHOUETTE |
Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Enterprise | T1087 | .002 | Account Discovery: Domain Account |
Volt Typhoon has run |
Enterprise | T1560 | .001 | Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility |
Volt Typhoon has archived the ntds.dit database as a multi-volume password-protected archive with 7-Zip.[3] |
Enterprise | T1059 | .001 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell |
Volt Typhoon has used PowerShell including for remote system discovery.[1][2] |
.003 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell |
Volt Typhoon has used the Windows command line to perform hands-on-keyboard activities in targeted environments including for discovery.[1][2][3] |
||
Enterprise | T1584 | .004 | Compromise Infrastructure: Server |
Volt Typhoon has used compromised PRTG servers from other organizations for C2.[3] |
.008 | Compromise Infrastructure: Network Devices |
Volt Typhoon has compromised small office and home office (SOHO) network edge devices, many of which were located in the same geographic area as the victim, to proxy network traffic.[1][2] |
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Enterprise | T1555 | Credentials from Password Stores |
Volt Typhoon has attempted to obtain credentials from OpenSSH, realvnc, and PuTTY.[2] |
|
Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System |
Volt Typhoon has stolen the Active Directory database from targeted environments and used Wevtutil to extract event log information.[2][3] |
|
Enterprise | T1074 | Data Staged |
Volt Typhoon has staged collected data in password-protected archives.[1] |
|
.001 | Local Data Staging |
Volt Typhoon has saved stolen files including the ntds.dit database and the |
||
Enterprise | T1573 | .001 | Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography |
Volt Typhoon has used a version of the Awen web shell that employed AES encryption and decryption for C2 communications.[3] |
Enterprise | T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application |
Volt Typhoon gained initial access through exploitation of CVE-2021-40539 in internet-facing ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus servers.[3] |
|
Enterprise | T1070 | .004 | Indicator Removal: File Deletion |
Volt Typhoon has run |
.007 | Indicator Removal: Clear Network Connection History and Configurations |
Volt Typhoon have inspected server logs to remove their IPs.[3] |
||
Enterprise | T1570 | Lateral Tool Transfer |
Volt Typhoon has copied web shells between servers in targeted environments.[3] |
|
Enterprise | T1654 | Log Enumeration |
Volt Typhoon has used |
|
Enterprise | T1036 | .005 | Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location |
Volt Typhoon has used legitimate looking filenames for compressed copies of the ntds.dit database and used names including cisco_up.exe, cl64.exe, vm3dservice.exe, watchdogd.exe, Win.exe, WmiPreSV.exe, and WmiPrvSE.exe for the Earthworm and Fast Reverse Proxy tools.[2][3] |
.008 | Masquerading: Masquerade File Type |
Volt Typhoon has appended copies of the ntds.dit database with a .gif file extension.[3] |
||
Enterprise | T1588 | .002 | Obtain Capabilities: Tool |
Volt Typhoon has used customized versions of open-source tools for C2.[1] |
Enterprise | T1003 | .001 | OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory |
Volt Typhoon has attempted to access hashed credentials from the LSASS process memory space.[1] |
.003 | OS Credential Dumping: NTDS |
Volt Typhoon has used ntds.util to create domain controller installation media containing usernames and password hashes.[1][2][3] |
||
Enterprise | T1069 | .001 | Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups |
Volt Typhoon has run |
.002 | Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups |
Volt Typhoon has run |
||
Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery |
Volt Typhoon has enumerated running processes on targeted systems.[1][3] |
|
Enterprise | T1090 | Proxy |
Volt Typhoon has used compromised devices and customized versions of open source tools such as Fast Reverse Proxy (FRP), Earthworm, and Impacket to proxy network traffic.[1][2] |
|
.001 | Internal Proxy |
Volt Typhoon has used the built-in netsh |
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Enterprise | T1012 | Query Registry |
Volt Typhoon has queried the Registry on compromised systems, |
|
Enterprise | T1018 | Remote System Discovery |
Volt Typhoon has used multiple methods, including Ping, to enumerate systems on compromised networks.[1][3] |
|
Enterprise | T1505 | .003 | Server Software Component: Web Shell |
Volt Typhoon has used webshells, including ones named AuditReport.jspx and iisstart.aspx, in compromised environments.[3] |
Enterprise | T1518 | Software Discovery |
Volt Typhoon has queried the Registry on compromised systems for information on installed software.[2] |
|
Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery |
Volt Typhoon has discovered file system types, drive names, size, and free space on compromised systems.[1][2][3] |
|
Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery |
Volt Typhoon has executed multiple commands to enumerate network topology and settings including |
|
Enterprise | T1049 | System Network Connections Discovery |
Volt Typhoon has used |
|
Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery |
Volt Typhoon has executed the PowerShell command |
|
Enterprise | T1078 | .002 | Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts |
Volt Typhoon has used compromised domain accounts to authenticate to devices on compromised networks.[1][3] |
Enterprise | T1497 | .001 | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks |
Volt Typhoon has run system checks to determine if they were operating in a virtualized environment.[1] |
Enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation |
Volt Typhoon has leveraged WMIC including for execution and remote system discovery.[1][2][3] |