–

Zennaro Giuseppe Legnami Sas di Zennaro Mauro & C., by A. Santoro and A. Cevese, avvocati,

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the Italian Government, by G. Palmieri, acting as Agent, and by G.M. De Socio and M.F. Severi, avvocati dello Stato,

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the Greek Government, by K. Boskovits and V. Karra, acting as Agents,

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the Latvian Government, by V. Soņeca and K. Pommere, acting as Agents,

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the European Commission, by F. Tomat and G. Braga da Cruz, acting as Agents,

1

This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of Articles 3 and 6 of Commission Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid (OJ 2013 L 352, p. 1).

2

The request has been made in proceedings between the Istituto nazionale per l’assicurazione contro gli infortuni sul lavoro (National Institute for Insurance against Accidents at Work, Italy) (‘the INAIL’) and Zennaro Giuseppe Legnami Sas di Zennaro Mauro & C. (‘Zennaro’), concerning the INAIL’s refusal to pay funding granted in favour of Zennaro on the ground that it would result in the EUR 200000 ceiling laid down by Article 3(2) of Regulation No 1407/2013 being exceeded over a period of three fiscal years (‘the de minimis ceiling’).

3

Recitals 3, 10, 21 and 22 of Regulation No 1407/2013 state:

4

Article 3 of that regulation, entitled ‘De minimis aid’, provides:

‘1.   Aid measures shall be deemed not to meet all the criteria in Article 107(1) of the Treaty, and shall therefore be exempt from the notification requirement in Article 108(3) of the Treaty, if they fulfil the conditions laid down in this Regulation.

2.   The total amount of de minimis aid granted per Member State to a single undertaking shall not exceed EUR 200000 over any period of three fiscal years.

…

4.   De minimis aid shall be deemed granted at the moment the legal right to receive the aid is conferred on the undertaking under the applicable national legal regime irrespective of the date of payment of the de minimis aid to the undertaking.

5.   The ceilings laid down in paragraph 2 shall apply irrespective of the form of the de minimis aid or the objective pursued … The period of three fiscal years shall be determined by reference to the fiscal years used by the undertaking in the Member State concerned.

6.   For the purposes of the ceilings laid down in paragraph 2, aid shall be expressed as a cash grant. All figures used shall be gross, that is, before any deduction of tax or other charge. Where aid is granted in a form other than a grant, the aid amount shall be the gross grant equivalent of the aid.

Aid payable in several instalments shall be discounted to its value at the moment it is granted. The interest rate to be used for discounting purposes shall be the discount rate applicable at the time the aid is granted.

7.   Where the relevant ceiling laid down in paragraph 2 would be exceeded by the grant of new de minimis aid, none of that new aid may benefit from this Regulation.

…’

5

Article 6 of that regulation, entitled ‘Monitoring’, provides:

‘1.   Where a Member State intends to grant de minimis aid in accordance with this Regulation to an undertaking, it shall inform that undertaking in writing of the prospective amount of the aid expressed as a gross grant equivalent and of its de minimis character … Before granting the aid, the Member State shall obtain a declaration from the undertaking concerned, in written or electronic form, about any other de minimis aid received to which this Regulation or other de minimis regulations apply during the previous two fiscal years and the current fiscal year.

2.   Where a Member State has set up a central register of de minimis aid containing complete information on all de minimis aid granted by any authority within that Member State, paragraph 1 shall cease to apply from the moment the register covers a period of three fiscal years.

3.   A Member State shall grant new de minimis aid in accordance with this Regulation only after having checked that this will not raise the total amount of de minimis aid granted to the undertaking concerned to a level above the relevant ceiling laid down in Article 3(2) and that all the conditions laid down in this Regulation are complied with.

4.   Member States shall record and compile all the information regarding the application of this Regulation. Such records shall contain all information necessary to demonstrate that the conditions of this Regulation have been complied with. Records regarding individual de minimis aid shall be maintained for 10 fiscal years from the date on which the aid was granted. Records regarding a de minimis aid scheme shall be maintained for 10 fiscal years from the date on which the last individual aid was granted under such a scheme.

5.   On written request, the Member State concerned shall provide the Commission … with all the information that the Commission considers necessary for assessing whether the conditions of this Regulation have been complied with, and in particular the total amount of de minimis aid … received by any undertaking.’

6

Zennaro is active in the wood and derived products sector. On 16 June 2014, it submitted an application for funding to the INAIL for the granting of financial assistance provided for in the 2013 public notice issued by the INAIL, the subject of which was ‘incentives for undertakings for implementing plans concerning health and safety at work’ (‘the public notice’).

7

The procedure for the call for projects, governed by that public notice, lays down four stages: (i) telematic transmission of applications; (ii) sending of documentation finalising the application; (iii) verification by the INAIL of the data transmitted and acceptance of the application; and, finally, (iv) examination and preparation of a report enabling the financial assistance to be actually paid. During the latter stage, the undertaking was required to submit a ‘de minimis’ declaration showing that it was eligible for financial assistance in respect of the amount applied for. In the absence of such eligibility, aid already granted would have to be revoked.

8

By decision of 30 October 2014, the INAIL notified Zennaro that the project was accepted for an amount of EUR 130000, with the possibility of obtaining advance funding, which was effectively requested, of EUR 65000 subject to the prior presentation of a bank guarantee.

9

However, it became apparent in the course of the procedure that, on 1 August 2014, Zennaro, together with other undertakings in temporary association, had been accepted by the Regione Veneto (Veneto Region, Italy) for further financial assistance amounting to a total of EUR 64 483.91, which was paid to it. Furthermore, that company had also obtained other public funding for an amount of EUR 18 985.26. The referring court states that the addition of those two sums to the amount of EUR 130000 accepted by the INAIL amounted to a sum of EUR 213 469.17 and resulted in the de minimis ceiling being exceeded.

10

By letter of 12 June 2015, Zennaro asked the INAIL whether, in order to avoid that ceiling being exceeded, it was appropriate either to reduce the amount of financial assistance at the stage at which the report was prepared or to present a variation of the project with the aim of reducing the amount of the proposed project and, consequently, the amount of financial assistance.

11

Having received no reply to that letter, Zennaro, by email of 12 August 2015, opted for the second solution, submitting to the INAIL a variation of the project which reduced its total cost to EUR 171 386.40 and, consequently, lowered the amount of financial assistance to EUR 111 401.16.

12

By decisions of 5 October and 18 November 2015, the INAIL, while finding the variation of the project admissible from a technical perspective, took the view that it could not allow Zennaro to receive that funding, ruling out the possibility of granting it in part, unless the company forwent completely the previous funding. In the second decision, the INAIL thus stated that ‘financial assistance may be paid only on condition that the undertaking forgoes previous financial assistance granted by another body’.

13

Zennaro then brought an action before the Tribunale amministrativo regionale per il Veneto (Regional Administrative Court for Veneto, Italy) for annulment of the decision of 18 November 2015.

14

By certified email of 27 April 2016, Zennaro sent the INAIL documents showing that it had forgone the financial assistance paid by the Veneto Region, in the amount of EUR 15000, paid over to the other members of the temporary association, thus establishing that the State aid received did not exceed the de minimis ceiling.

15

By decision of 6 June 2016, the INAIL confirmed that, because of the amount of financial assistance applied for, it could not proceed to pay it, since the sum of the three types of public funding would then exceed the de minimis ceiling and partial payment of the financial assistance would be contrary to Article 3(7) of Regulation No 1407/2013. While taking note of evidence of the forgoing of the previous regional financial assistance and of redistribution to the other members of the temporary association, the INAIL disputed the relevance thereof, stating that ‘it does not appear that this undertaking has forgone and repaid the financial assistance previously received to the body which paid it and [that] its redistribution between the members of the temporary association is irrelevant’. For those reasons, the INAIL sought repayment of the funding advance of EUR 65000 already paid, failing which enforcement of the bank guarantee would be sought.

16

On 26 June 2016, Zennaro also sought, by means of additional pleas, annulment of the INAIL’s decision of 6 June 2016.

17

By judgment of 7 September 2016, the Tribunale amministrativo regionale per il Veneto (Regional Administrative Court for Veneto) upheld Zennaro’s action in the light of the opinion expressed by the Directorate-General for Competition of the European Commission (DG COMP) in reply to a question which Zennaro had put to it on the interpretation of Article 3(7) of Regulation No 1407/2013. In its reply, DG COMP stated that the financial assistance could be proportionately reduced by the public body responsible for paying it, so as to comply with the de minimis ceiling, and that it was for the national authorities to choose the preferred option, both solutions – the proportionate reduction and the complete rejection of the financial assistance – being theoretically consistent with that regulation.

18

Thus, according to that court, ‘the interpretation given by the [INAIL] of Article 3(7) of Regulation No 1407/2013, as to the inadmissibility of the reduction of the funding in the amount of the part of the financial assistance exceeding the ceiling set by that regulation at EUR 200000, although theoretically consistent with the EU rules on de minimis aid, in order to be properly applicable in the present case, should have been expressly provided for in the [public notice]’, in particular with the objective of protecting the participants’ legitimate expectations. It thus took the view that the restrictions relied on by the INAIL were, on the contrary, unforeseeable in the light of the criteria set out in the public notice and could ‘be rebutted in the light of a less restrictive interpretation of the EU rules from a formal point of view and more consistent with the objective [of the public notice] “of encouraging undertakings to implement projects to improve health and safety levels at work”’.

19

The INAIL brought an appeal against that judgment before the Consiglio di Stato (Council of State, Italy).

20

Relying in particular on a combined reading of Article 3(2), (4) and (7) of Regulation No 1407/2013, the INAIL submits that de minimis aid must be deemed granted at the moment the legal right to receive it is conferred on the undertaking, irrespective of whether or not it is actually paid. Those provisions contain mandatory requirements that are directly applicable in the national legal order. Consequently, compliance with the de minimis ceiling must be verified at the time the financial assistance is granted, that is to say, in this case, at the stage at which the application is accepted. Any rectifications by the applicant should therefore be introduced at that stage.

21

Zennaro disputes the interpretation advocated by the INAIL. First, it submits that the provisions of the public notice are the only ones applicable since it is clear from Article 3(4) of Regulation No 1407/2013 that it is for the ‘applicable national legal regime’ to determine when ‘the legal right to receive the aid is conferred on the undertaking’. Secondly, it submits that Article 6(5) of that regulation, which concerns the obligation of a Member State to communicate to the Commission any information which the latter considers necessary, covers all aid actually received by the undertaking, not only that granted on the basis of the first granting measure. Thirdly and finally, it considers that the rules on de minimis aid were adopted not to penalise undertakings but to reduce the administrative burden in the case of aid of a limited amount, and that the strict interpretation proposed by the INAIL would lead to punitive applications contrary to the spirit of those rules.

22

The referring court takes the view that both interpretations proposed by the parties to the main proceedings may be accepted. On the one hand, the interpretation relied on by the INAIL is more favourable to the smooth running of the procedure, in that the conditions of access to financial assistance are examined only at the time when the application is accepted. On the other hand, the interpretation put forward by Zennaro allows for broad conditions of access to financial assistance, including for competitors that, not yet having the certainty that they will be accepted, do not have the option of amending their applications so as not to exceed the ceiling. The handling of possible changes to the applications for funding would be more difficult to implement if it were carried out at the stage at which applications are examined since it would have an effect on the classification order established until then.

23

As regards the relevant provisions of Regulation No 1407/2013, the referring court notes, first of all, that Article 3(4) thereof, according to which aid is deemed ‘granted at the moment the legal right to receive the aid is conferred on the undertaking … irrespective of the date of payment of the … aid’, in the first place, does not appear to be irreconcilable with a procedural scheme under which a first acceptance stage is followed by a more detailed examination, at the end of which the right to financial assistance may ultimately be deemed ‘granted’. In the second place, that provision states that the case of aid ‘granted’ is to be understood ‘under the applicable national legal regime’, which suggests that that regime may correspond to different procedural schemes, which are not predetermined. Next, it points out that, under Article 6(3) of the regulation, aid is paid after compliance with the ceiling has been checked, which may also lead to the conclusion that it is only after such a check that the right to receive financial assistance is definitively ‘conferred’. Finally, it follows from the wording of the last sentence of Article 6(1) of that regulation, in particular from the reference to ‘other de minimis aid received’, that the declaration must list all aid received. According to the referring court, it is necessary to determine whether the decision to forgo previous financial assistance must necessarily occur before it is actually paid.

24

In those circumstances, the Consiglio di Stato (Council of State) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling:

25

By its first question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Articles 3 and 6 of Regulation No 1407/2013 must be interpreted as meaning that an undertaking, the Member State of establishment of which intends to grant it de minimis aid that, because of existing previous aid, would raise the total amount of aid granted to that undertaking to a level above the de minimis ceiling, may opt, until such aid is actually paid, to reduce the funding required or to forgo, in full or in part, previous aid already received, so as to not to exceed that ceiling.

26

It should be noted, first, that Articles 3 and 6 of Regulation No 1407/2013 must be placed back in the overall context of that regulation, the purpose of which is to allow derogations, for State aid of a limited amount, from the rule that all aid must, prior to implementation, be notified to the Commission (see, to that effect, judgment of 28 February 2018, ZPT, C‑518/16, EU:C:2018:126, paragraphs 50 and 51).

27

It follows that both Article 3 of that regulation, the purpose of which is to define the de minimis aid that derogates from the principle of prohibition of aid laid down by the Treaty, and Article 6 thereof, which concerns the monitoring carried out by the Member States when such aid is granted, must be interpreted strictly.

28

Secondly, the interpretation of a provision of EU law requires account to be taken not only of its terms, but also of the context in which it is set and the objectives pursued by the act of which it forms part (see, to that effect, judgment of 9 October 2019, BGL BNP Paribas, C‑548/18, EU:C:2019:848, paragraph 25 and the case-law cited).

29

In the first place, with regard to the terms used in the provisions of Regulation No 1407/2013 at issue, it is important to point out, first, that Article 3(7) thereof provides that ‘where the relevant [de minimis] ceiling … would be exceeded by the grant of new de minimis aid, none of that new aid may benefit from [Regulation No 1407/2013]’. It is clear from the wording of that provision that the moment at which it is necessary to assess whether cumulation with other de minimis aid exceeds the de minimis ceiling is that of the ‘grant’ of the aid.

30

Moreover, it is also apparent from the wording of Article 3(4) of Regulation No 1407/2013 that de minimis aid is deemed ‘granted at the moment the legal right to receive the aid is conferred on the undertaking under the applicable national legal regime, irrespective of the date of payment of the de minimis aid to the undertaking’.

31

In that regard, in accordance with settled case-law, it is for the referring court to determine, on the basis of applicable national law, when that aid must be considered to be granted (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 March 2013, Magdeburger Mühlenwerke, C‑129/12, EU:C:2013:200, paragraphs 40 and 41, and of 6 July 2017, Nerea, C‑245/16, EU:C:2017:521, paragraphs 32 and 33).

32

To that end, the referring court must take account of all the conditions laid down by national law for the grant of the aid in question (see to that effect, judgments of 21 March 2013, Magdeburger Mühlenwerke, C‑129/12, EU:C:2013:200, paragraph 41).

33

Consequently, in this case, it is for the referring court to determine the date on which the aid at issue in the main proceedings was granted, based on the provisions of the public notice and, where appropriate, the applicable national rules (see, to that effect, judgments of 21 March 2013, Magdeburger Mühlenwerke, C‑129/12, EU:C:2013:200, paragraph 40, and of 6 July 2017, Nerea, C‑245/16, EU:C:2017:521, paragraph 32).

34

It must be made clear in that regard that, while the determination of the date on which aid is granted may vary depending on the nature of the aid in question, as long as aid is not awarded under a multi-annual scheme, it cannot, in accordance with the Court’s case-law, be considered to be granted on the date on which it is paid (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 December 2011, France Télécom v Commission, C‑81/10 P, EU:C:2011:811, paragraph 82).

35

Secondly, as regards the provisions of Article 6 of Regulation No 1407/2013 concerning the monitoring carried out by the Member States to ensure that the rules on cumulation are complied with, it must be noted that Article 6(2) of that regulation, which provides that, where a Member State has set up a central register of de minimis aid containing information on all aid granted by its various authorities, Article 6(1) of that regulation ceases to apply, is not applicable to the case in the main proceedings. The central register of de minimis aid was not put in place by the Italian Republic until 12 August 2017, that is to say, on a date subsequent to the application for aid at issue.

36

Moreover, with regard to Article 6(1) and (3) of Regulation No 1407/2013, those provisions provide that ‘before granting the aid, the Member State shall obtain a declaration from the undertaking concerned … about any other de minimis aid received … during the previous two fiscal years and the current fiscal year’ and, in all language versions other than the Italian language version, that ‘a Member State shall grant new de minimis aid … only after having checked that this will not raise the total amount of de minimis aid granted to the undertaking concerned to a level above the relevant [de minimis] ceiling’. It is thus clear from those provisions that the monitoring carried out by the Member States to ensure that the rules on cumulation are complied with must take place ‘before granting the aid’.

37

That interpretation is not invalidated by the fact that, in the Italian language version alone of Article 6(3) of the regulation, it is stated that a Member State does not ‘pay’ (eroga) new aid, whereas all the other versions use a verb which corresponds, in Italian, to the verb ‘grant’ (concedere). According to settled case-law, where there is divergence between the various language versions of an EU legislative text, the provision in question must be interpreted by reference, inter alia, to the general scheme of the rules of which it forms part (judgment of 14 May 2019, M and Others (Revocation of refugee status), C‑391/16, C‑77/17 and C‑78/17, EU:C:2019:403, paragraph 88 and the case-law cited). Recitals 21 and 22 of that regulation – which refer, in essence, to Article 6(1) and (3) – use, in the Italian language version, the terms ‘aiuti concessi’ (aid granted) and ‘prima di concedere’ (before granting). Consequently, the discrepancy between the language versions of Article 6(3) of Regulation No 1407/2013 is the result of a mistranslation of the Italian language version of that provision.

38

In the second place, as regards the context of which Articles 3 and 6 of Regulation No 1407/2013 are a part, it must be held that that regulation contains no provisions pursuant to which applicant undertakings may, if necessary, amend their applications for aid by reducing the amount thereof or by forgoing previous aid, so as to comply with the de minimis ceiling.

39

Therefore, since, in accordance with Article 3(4) of that regulation, the granting of aid is governed by the applicable national rules, the Member States enjoy broad discretion when determining the procedure for granting such aid.

40

In that regard, it should be noted that recital 21 of the regulation states that, in accordance with the principle of cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU, Member States must facilitate compliance with State aid rules ‘by establishing the necessary tools in order to ensure that the total amount of de minimis aid granted to a single undertaking under the de minimis rule does not exceed the overall permissible ceiling’.

41

In the third place, as regards the objectives of Regulation No 1407/2013, it should be noted that the de minimis legislation is intended to reduce the administrative burden on undertakings, the Commission and the Member States (see, to that effect, judgment of 7 March 2002, Italy v Commission, C‑310/99, EU:C:2002:143, paragraph 94), based on the principle, recalled in recital 3 of the regulation, that aid in an amount not exceeding the de minimis ceiling does not have any effect on trade between Member States and is not such as to distort competition.

42

In the light of those objectives, the power of the Member States to grant applicant undertakings the right to amend their applications for aid until such aid is granted, by reducing the amount of the funding applied for or by forgoing previous aid already received, does not undermine the conduct of the procedure for examining their applications, since monitoring of the conditions for obtaining aid relating to compliance with the de minimis ceiling occurs only upon granting the aid. Therefore, contrary to Zennaro’s and the Italian and Greek Governments’ contentions, the fact that it is impossible for those undertakings to amend their applications for aid after new aid has been granted cannot in itself constitute a ‘penalisation’ of the undertakings in question.

43

In the light of all the foregoing, the answer to the first question is that Articles 3 and 6 of Regulation No 1407/2013 must be interpreted as meaning that an undertaking, the Member State of establishment of which intends to grant it de minimis aid that, because of existing previous aid, would raise the total amount of aid granted to that undertaking to a level above the de minimis ceiling, may opt, until such aid is granted, to reduce the funding required or to forgo, in full or in part, previous aid already received, so as not to exceed that ceiling.

44

By its second question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Articles 3 and 6 of Regulation No 1407/2013 must be interpreted as meaning that an undertaking requesting aid may amend its application for aid by reducing the funding required or by forgoing previous aid already received, so as not to exceed the de minimis ceiling, even though the legislation of the Member State in which it is established does not so provide.

45

This question calls for an answer that is intrinsically linked to the answer to the first question. On the one hand, as stated in paragraph 38 above, Regulation No 1407/2013 contains no provision pursuant to which applicant undertakings may, if necessary, amend their applications for aid by reducing the amount thereof or by forgoing previous aid, so as to comply with the de minimis ceiling, and therefore imposes no obligation on the Member States to that effect. On the other hand, as is apparent from paragraphs 42 and 43 above, Member States may allow applicant undertakings to amend their applications for aid, so as to avoid that the grant of new de minimis aid raises the total amount of aid granted to a level above the de minimis ceiling, where such changes are made before the de minimis aid is granted.

46

Consequently, the answer to the second question is that Articles 3 and 6 of Regulation No 1407/2013 must be interpreted as meaning that Member States are not required to allow applicant undertakings to amend their applications for aid before it is granted, so as not to exceed the de minimis ceiling. It is for the referring court to assess the legal consequences of the fact that undertakings do not have the option of making such changes, it being understood that they may be made only at a date prior to that on which the de minimis aid is granted.

47

Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are not recoverable.

On those grounds, the Court (Eighth Chamber) hereby rules: