28.12.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 487/1

Rapporteur:

Etele BARÁTH

1.1.

The EESC considers that coordinated European development-oriented governance needs to be put in place with the aim of helping to build a renewed, strong and peaceful Europe. Coordination should be stepped up, possibly by equipping governance with new organisational methods.

1.2.

Dynamic economic development should be restored through coordinated steps, and the foundations of social well-being and democracy, coexistence between different cultures and exemplary respect for the environment should be consolidated.

1.3.

The EESC emphasises that consistent application of the partnership principle is intended to facilitate stakeholder participation in planning and implementing investments from EU funds. Such participation will strengthen the collective commitment to investment and allow for greater use of expertise. It will make project implementation more efficient, increase transparency and help prevent fraud and abuse.

1.4.

What we need is a simple, accessible strategy and objectives and a single, long-term project for Europe (EU 2030-50 strategy). Confirmation is needed that the creation of an innovative, viable and inclusive Europe remains a major strategic objective for the Union. To this end, the COP 21 objectives (SDGs) should also be included in the project.

1.5.

Development programmes must be better coordinated. The design of short-, medium- and long-term programmes and tools must be based on a set of concise objectives. By ‘tools’ we mean all policy, legal, organisational and financial measures.

1.6.

In order to improve coordination, the EESC urges that the conventional European Structural and Investment (ESI) Funds, as well as market-oriented projects that also mobilise private capital under the European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI), be harnessed to serve the common European objectives. To this end, it is important to coordinate the objectives and the rules regarding their implementation.

1.7.

The EESC proposes that the main instrument for stronger central, development-oriented governance should be the European Semester, which is based on the annual growth survey and should in addition provide ways of exercising continuous influence over Project Europe and carefully monitoring its progress. The European Semester could at the same time perform the functions of systems designed to ensure a social environment that guarantees well-being.

1.8.

If the essentially economic, GDP-based performance indicator already adopted were to be flanked by an additional, results-based indicator (gross domestic result), that reflects sustainability and includes primarily social and environmental factors, it could serve as a basis for monitoring the effectiveness of development-oriented governance.

1.9.

Close coordination and the introduction of an open cooperation method between the Member States are necessary. It is necessary to make adjustments based on the experience gained to date in development processes.

1.10.

Legal and financial instruments must be consolidated. The performance of development-oriented governance will depend on a dynamic economy, more capital being mobilised, a more efficient investment system, a better-qualified workforce and the degree of innovation displayed by businesses. Its main longer-term objective is, however, to generate well-being and a renewed society, and to ensure an enhanced, sustainable environment.

1.11.

Shared, multilevel implementation is necessary. Legal and administrative instruments for development-oriented governance should be developed in parallel with ongoing reform (REFIT programme). In this regard, intermediate-level instruments — in other words, macroregional development coordination instruments — must be significantly strengthened. Moreover, the role of functional regions, cities, urban areas, conurbations, metropolitan districts and networks is becoming increasingly significant as part of Project Europe.

1.12.

One of the key elements in long-term development-oriented governance is continuity. The conditions governing the cyclical nature of policies, programming processes and budgetary forward planning must be coordinated. Development work entails ongoing analysis, monitoring and correction.

1.13.

It is vital to keep the public properly informed, to promote their involvement, to develop communication and political marketing, and to present practical results and weaknesses accurately.

1.14.

The EESC has always argued in favour of stronger democratic participation. Regarding the open method of cooperation, the involvement of the economic and social partners and NGOs should be ensured at all levels; at European level, this must go hand in hand with a more important role for the EESC.

1.15.

As already noted in its opinion of 2012 (1), the EESC supports the European Commission’s initiative to establish a European Code of Conduct on Partnership (ECCP), with the aim of providing Member States with a partnership framework for planning and implementation. The partners’ conception of Europe will help to define objectives and facilitate their identification, and will make implementation of plans more efficient.

1.16.

The EESC points out that it is necessary to go beyond the partnership rules based on proposals and best practices and largely specifying the minimum requirements that the Member State authorities will have to meet, failing which they may face penalties.

1.17.

The EESC recommends that the Member States be obliged to set up effective funding systems to build partners’ capacity. Such systems must go beyond training courses and information alone, and extend to developing partnership networks and introducing tools for effective participation.

1.18.

The EESC strongly urges the European Commission to step up cooperation with European partnership networks. The European Commission should set up a financing system that contributes to the operation of European NGO networks working in the area of regional policy, including in particular monitoring national processes and ensuring feedback.

2.1.1.

The European Union is strong, but is still facing an ongoing multifaceted crisis, as clearly illustrated by Brexit. The economic crisis of 2008 dispelled the euphoria generated by enlargement in the early 2000s and has put the catching-up process in many countries into reverse.

2.1.2.

The economic crisis, and especially the ensuing fall in investment, has shattered the previous growth-based unity between Member States and provoked worsening political, economic and social tensions. In spite of the Union’s fundamental objectives, the development gaps between Member States are widening.

2.1.3.

The pursuit of severe ‘austerity policies’ imposed on countries affected by high public and external debts and budget deficits is contributing to widening the gap between the most advanced countries and those affected by austerity. New policies are necessary to combine economic growth and budget deficit control with effective social inclusion policies.

2.1.4.

Poverty, insecure employment and unemployment have reached an unacceptable level. The lack of future prospects for young people represents a significant obstacle to a renewable future for Europe.

2.1.5.

The European Union has lost its status as an attractive destination for investors and has acquired a reputation for sluggishness. From the productive investment point of view, it is progressively losing ground to the United States and some of its own Member States, such as Germany and the United Kingdom. The countries that are lagging behind are holding up the ones that are more dynamic. The need for mutual interdependence is diminishing. In some countries, and in spite of a substantial budget surplus, the gap is widening due to the fall in productive investment, meaning that the poorest regions are falling even further behind. The reaction is slow and bound up in red tape.

2.1.6.

The Union’s fundamental achievements, such as the euro zone or the Schengen area, are today seen, against a backdrop marked by the migration crisis and terrorism, as factors for division rather than cohesion. In many countries, the EU is being used as a pretext in domestic political struggles.

2.1.7.

Regional development levels are not converging. In GDP terms, the gap between the most advanced regions and those lagging behind is of 14 to 1. Some countries, including some of the greatest beneficiaries, are using the funds allocated to them instead of their state investment instruments and facilities, with their national contributions having fallen to minimal levels, well below the initial targets. The newly-created competitiveness boards could use their instruments to make a significant contribution to the convergence of regional development levels.

2.1.8.

Ordinary people, economic and social actors and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Europe no longer have any vision of the future: they have distanced themselves from the political process and are increasingly turning inwards. They see the EU as a rigid, inflexible institution that is incapable of renewing itself.

2.1.9.

Due mainly to its weak performance and institutional arrangements regarding development, the European Union is not in a position to mobilise the resources needed to achieve its aims, which are themselves fragmented.

2.1.10.

There is no shared vision of the future, political will or governance capacity. The coordination method is and inadequate and obsolete, legal instruments have no impact or are difficult to use, participation by organisations and social support is weak, due in particular to poor communication.

2.1.11.

The Union’s long-term development strategy up to 2020 is no longer forward-looking enough and is no longer realistic, as well as being fragmented and incapable of guiding processes within existing methodological frameworks. In the meantime, consideration of the 17 main SDG objectives adopted relating to the sustainability of development has enabled the European Commission to embark on a review of the system and the tools for governance, as part of a complex, long-term strategy.

2.2.1.

Against this backdrop, the new European Commission has, with the support of the European Parliament, launched a new model for economic development. The objectives set — creating jobs and promoting growth, completing the European single market, streamlining arrangements to regulate the economy, consolidating priority EU achievements, the energy market, supporting investment in the digital market and services, giving priority to intellectual and physical networks to connect Europe and boosting environmental responsibility — can give significant, fresh impetus to the economy.

2.2.2.

The European Semester and its components together make up a system that goes beyond economic governance. The role of long-term socio-environmental objectives within the European Semester mechanism should be strengthened.

2.2.3.

The priority programme aimed at fully consolidating the euro area’s financial system is firstly unsatisfactory, and secondly is fuelling the real fear that the gap between European countries will widen still further. European-level development objectives could lessen the paralysis of a two-speed Europe.

2.2.4.

At present, two major sets of objectives and economic-financial instruments that are very different, each with its own procedure, are shaping development processes. Complementarity between these two sets needs to be strengthened from the objective coordination stage onwards.

2.2.5.

They are, firstly, the conventional European Structural and Investment Funds (ESI Funds), enshrined in the Treaties, whose purpose is to foster social, economic and territorial cohesion. They take the form of aid for investment and development, and are continuously modernised, while their nature remains unchanged. They are available thanks to redistribution of the Union budget, sourced from Member State contributions. In some cases, beneficiaries fail to appreciate the real value of these funds, arguing that they are ‘entitled’ to them. In order to facilitate the complementarity mentioned above, new rules should be adopted during the ‘mid-term’ review of the period up to 2020.

2.2.6.

The second set of instruments is the European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI), intended to implement the new ‘Juncker plan’. It is a new, market-oriented financial instrument, allowing risk capital to be supported and public, bank and private funds to be mobilised. Its amount can still be increased. The governance system put in place must become an integral part of development-oriented governance. These two funding systems must also be harmonised within each Member State.

2.2.7.

Compared with these funding systems, the other financial instruments that function effectively are diverse and are suited to their missions, but are of limited volume and tied to their specific objectives. The Project Europe frameworks could be closely and systematically coordinated.

2.2.8.

Direct means that could help to achieve the objectives, few and unconnected to each other, of the Europe 2020 strategy with a view to improving coordination, have not yet been put into practice. In the absence of such means, the question nevertheless arises as to whether the EU’s development can be adequately coordinated. Planning interactions between the different instruments should therefore also be included among the aims of the new plan for the post-2020 period.

2.2.9.

The eleven thematic objectives of the multiannual financial framework governing the ESI Funds, together with the ten main objectives of the Juncker plan — the latter only imprecisely matching the former — and their respective financial and regulatory rules ought to contribute as of now to completing the Europe 2020 strategy. The seventeen SDG sustainability criteria, which are crucial to the future, should be added. Missions under the programming process for the post-2020 period should focus on a small number of clear and concise objectives.

2.2.10.

At present, the consequence of the different mechanisms linked to the objectives, the varying time-scales and start and end dates, is still that none of the objectives are transparent and comprehensible or can easily be monitored by economic and social and civil society stakeholders. The lack of synergies or interaction between the different objectives significantly reduces the effectiveness of the instruments and of investment. The synergies between the EFSI and a renewed Europe 2020 strategy should be enhanced by drawing up a new EU strategy for 2030-2050 (Project Europe).

2.2.11.

While the Structural Funds are backed by highly bureaucratic mechanisms for preparing, implementing, monitoring and analysing, which are both centralised and decentralised, and a large number of agencies are in place at EU level to oversee implementation, the new governance mechanism of the recently-established EFSI lies outside the European Commission framework and its new organisational structure is based on needs arising from the financial and investment climate. Coordinating these two major structures requires the existence of a strategic instrument and a new governance system (2).

2.2.12.

Setting up a new development-oriented governance system could lead to closer coordination and open cooperation between the relevant partners.

2.2.13.

The institutional structure of the partnership should be strengthened and opened up to all European citizens under the right of public participation, in order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the ESI Funds. EU citizens should be ensured access to relevant information and be able to take part in planning decisions and their implementation. They should also be able to express their opinions regarding draft programmes, calls for tender and evaluation reports.

3.1.

The EESC has already addressed the question of the partnership principle and drawn up detailed proposals on this issue in several opinions.

3.1.1.

In its opinion adopted in 2010 (3), the Committee pointed out that the rules in force left too great a margin for interpreting the concept of partnership at national level, and that the European Commission should therefore play a stronger, much more pro-active role as guardian of the partnership principle It deemed it crucial for all operational programmes to provide partners with the necessary technical assistance resources in order to help strengthen their capacities. It argued in favour of a return to Community initiative programmes for social innovation and local development.

3.1.2.

In its opinion of 2012 (4), the EESC supported the European Commission’s initiative to establish a European Code of Conduct on partnership. It shared the concerns of organised civil society regarding the non-respect of the principle of partnership and suggested introducing a partnership monitoring system to be managed by the partners themselves. It proposed making the signing of partnership agreements with Member States conditional on the proper implementation as set out in the Code of Conduct and, to this end, topping up resources to the operational programmes through financial incentives. It also confirmed its recommendations on strengthening the capacity of partners.

3.2.

The legislation on cohesion policy provides for the establishment of a ‘European Code of Conduct on Partnership’ (ECCP), which includes guiding principles and best practices.

3.3.

The experience gained in establishing the ECCP has revealed that certain countries pay only lip service to the provisions of the code in their national programming processes and the transformation of the official implementing structure.

3.4.

In several countries, the partners were not given enough time to formulate an opinion regarding the relevant documents. They have not been substantially involved in the main strategic decisions, such as those regarding the setting of priorities or financial allocations. No special mechanism or tool for communication and participation has been put in place to boost active participation.

3.5.

Analyses by several NGOs (5) have shown that in a number of countries, the selection requirements for partners who are to sit on the monitoring committee have been complied with in formal terms, but that representativeness and coverage of subjects have not been ensured in all cases. Information swapping between management authorities and monitoring committee members is far from perfect.

3.6.

As a result, authorities responsible for cross-cutting matters, such as environmental ministries, do not sit on several relevant monitoring committees. The management authorities put little effort into involving civil society partners who represent cross-cutting principles when planning calls for projects or evaluating proposals.

3.7.

Steps aimed at boosting the partners’ capacity are inadequate in some countries. They are often limited to training courses and reimbursement of travel expenses, while no action has been taken on several proposals from the ECCP relating, for example, to network development and coordination, or covering the expenses of experts needed to ensure effective partner participation.

3.8.

The European Commission and the Member States have not paid sufficient attention to the use of community-led local development (CLLD) instruments during the first half of the budgetary period.

3.9.

The EESC considers that a general assessment of partnership practices needs to be carried out. This examination must include an evaluation of the introduction of planning procedures and of the official implementing structure, and assess how far the current regulatory system is capable of producing an effective partnership. Partners should be actively involved in the evaluation process.

28.12.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 487/7

Rapporteur:

Adam ROGALEWSKI

1.1.

There is a need to start a discussion on the introduction of a common occupational definition of ‘live-in’ care work in Europe, recognised as a form of homecare provision. The definition of live-in care work should cover working arrangements for workers (employed or self-employed) living in private residences where their work primarily involves provision of care services to older and disabled people. Live-in care workers, regardless of their employment or self-employment status, should be treated as part of the system of long-term care (LTC) provision. The introduction of a common occupational definition aims at recognising the existence of live-in carers in the European labour market and improving the quality of the LTC services they deliver.

1.2.

For the purpose of informing policymaking, Eurostat should gather adequate data on live-in care workers.

1.3.

The EESC calls on the European Commission to conduct research on the situation of these workers, including their numbers, nationality, migration status, cross-border mobility, effective inclusion in labour and social protection, working and social conditions and qualifications, as well as their actual and potential contribution to European economies.

1.4.

The EESC emphasises that live-in care workers should be treated in a similar way to other care workers. This means that they should enjoy similar protection, such as limits on working time (including stand-by) and protection against bogus self-employment. Employed live-in care workers must not be excluded from relevant EU and Member State employment-related regulations, including, among others: proper remuneration, health and safety protection, social security and the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining.

1.5.

Supply shortages in LTC in Europe should be positively addressed by ensuring decent pay and working conditions, reversing the lack of investment, ensuring that free movement principles are observed, removing barriers that prevent workers from exercising their labour rights and creating pathways for migrants to access regular employment.

1.6.

The EESC calls on the European Union to work closely with Member States to coordinate supply and mobility of live-in care workers as part of an approach to improve the overall capacity of the sector to deliver quality care. Specific measures should include:

Moreover, it should be noted that the Commission’s proposal for the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) does not contain any reference to the situation of live-in care workers. The inclusion of their social rights should be considered in the further preparation of the EPSR, on which the EESC is currently drawing up an opinion.

1.7.

Member States should ensure that the rights of care recipients and workers, including live-in care workers are protected. Specific measures should include:

1.8.

The EESC stresses that financial support for care recipients relying on live-in care workers needs to be met through adequate long-term and sustainable public investment.

1.9.

Trade unions, employers and civil society organisations need to be involved in policy planning at Member State and EU levels. Social and civil dialogue should be promoted with all stakeholders at all levels.

1.10.

The EESC should play an active role in promoting the development of European policies aiming to support carers, care recipients and their families by, amongst other things, organising a conference on the future of live-in care work in Europe.

2.1.

Labour market shortages in the healthcare sector are a ‘ticking bomb’. There is an ongoing crisis (3), and labour shortages will increase unless appropriate policy responses are pursued. As early as 1994, care was defined as a strategic sector by the European Commission. In 2010, the European Commission warned that a supply shortage of two million healthcare workers would emerge by 2020 if urgent action was not taken to redress supply shortfalls of up to one million workers in LTC (4).

2.2.

Live-in care workers represent a numerically significant yet marginalised section of the LTC workforce. They are highly mobile and positioned at the bottom of the labour hierarchy within the sector. Live-in care workers are often excluded from LTC sector planning considerations at European and Member State levels.

2.3.

The exact number of live-in care workers is uncertain due to a lack of data; they are often overlooked in data collection systems. In the context of a poorly recognised and remunerated care workforce, live-in care workers have for too long remained invisible to policymakers.

2.4.

Live-in care workers are present across all Member States. Many are migrants from third countries while others are European citizens working in their home countries or abroad. Some work irregularly as undocumented migrants and some are engaged in circular or temporary migration. Many work in precarious labour conditions including bogus self-employment.

2.5.

As there is currently no occupational definition of livein care workers, their situation is equated to that of domestic workers (5). According to the ILO, domestic work, including care work, accounts for between 5 % and 9 % of all employment in industrialised countries (6).

2.6.

Some Member States have moved forward with formalisation and inclusion of undocumented migrant care workers by signing ILO Convention No 189.

2.7.

The EESC has already contributed to policymaking on long-term care by drawing up opinions on the labour rights of domestic workers (7), on the need for social investment (8) and on long-term social care and deinstitutionalisation (9). The present opinion builds on those positions, focusing on the distinctive situation of livein care workers.

3.1.

Homecare is rapidly expanding, influenced by a growing preference for care in the home, the prohibitive costs of residential care for many people and the lack of adequate investment in care sector infrastructure.

3.2.

Austerity measures undertaken in most Member States reduced existing limited infrastructure and labour supply of LTC. The EESC believes that investment in LTC needs to be embraced positively as an economic opportunity and as a priority area for job creation, social support for families and gender equality. Investment in the sector enhances workforce participation rates and provides a possible way out of the economic crisis (10).

3.3.

Workforce shortages are prevalent in care occupations in many Member States. Recruitment of both regular and undocumented live-in care workers alleviates shortages in LTC. Southern European care systems, in particular, rely heavily on live-in care workers. In Italy, migrant live-in care workers represent about three-quarters of the home care workforce (11).

3.4.

Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries are also affected by the labour shortages in the care sector as well as by rising demand for care in Western Europe. For instance, Poland supplies many live-in care workers to other countries, despite a depleted domestic care workforce. These shortages are met with the arrival in Poland of workers from the Ukraine and other countries outside the EU.

3.5.

Despite growing awareness of the importance of the care sector for economic prosperity, the contribution of live-in care work to the European economy is unmeasured and should be addressed by Europe-wide research.

3.6.

Many European women are trapped in the so-called ‘sandwich’ position, expected to look after their parents as well as their children. They increasingly rely on paid care to do this work. In a world of globalised care labour, the consequence is the rise of global care chains (12). Migrant care workers who move for work reasons often need to find carers for their own family members and employ carers who are drawn from other, often poorer, contexts.

4.1.

The low status of live-in care workers is a product of gender assumptions that care work is low-skilled ‘women’s work’. It is also sustained by the structural marginalisation of migrant women. In various labour surveys, domestic workers are classed as low-skilled or unqualified. However, significant numbers of live-in care workers possess skills and qualifications resulting from years of experience or from unrecognised formal training and certification programmes. Live-in care workers are often required to demonstrate care experience and to have qualifications before they are hired, and yet their working conditions do not reflect these.

4.2.

Many live-in care workers experience unregulated working arrangements and many work irregularly. They are often excluded from exercising their labour rights and face exploitation. Conditions can be similar to modern slavery: workers can be isolated, subjected to violence or abuse, forced to work 24/7 and not provided with basic living conditions such as private personal space. Others work as bogus self-employed people. In many cases, labour and other state inspectorates, as well as trade unions, have no access to care-givers in their workplaces (i.e. private homes).

4.3.

Measures for the regularisation and legalisation of live-in care workers must be supported to ensure legal pathways into the care sector. Such an approach is not without precedent: in Spain and Italy, some 500 000 undocumented domestic workers have been regularised since 2002 (13). Labour migration policies that enable third-country nationals to work regularly in the care sector, with equal treatment and the right to change employer, must be developed.

4.4.

Live-in care workers are one of the most highly mobile sections of the LTC workforce. Live-in care workers from CEE countries tend to be middle-aged women with family obligations of their own (14). It is common for CEE care workers to work for up to three months at a time in Western European countries and then return to their home countries.

4.5.

Migration of qualified live-in care workers to host countries represents a significant workforce drain for countries of origin. When the qualifications of workers are not recognised in the host countries, this constitutes a social and economic loss at a time of overall labour shortages in the European and global health care sectors.

4.6.

All these conditions reflect the fact that the rights of live-in care workers are not adequately protected under the existing legal frameworks at European and Member State levels.

4.7.

Live-in care workers should be encouraged and supported by Member States to avoid working irregularly.

5.1.

Care recipients and their families face difficulties in finding care workers. In the majority of cases, recruitment of care workers occurs through informal networks of family or friends. There is often little guarantee of the quality of care delivered by carers recruited under such circumstances. Families are often faced with a situation of having no clear guidelines on how to employ carers legally.

5.2.

Care recipients and their families should receive relevant support from the state. In the short-term this should include an information campaign and continuous support in matters regarding employment and welfare rights of live-in care workers. In the long-term, Member States should take steps to ensure supervision and the presence of an intermediary to assist care recipients in finding live-in care workers.

5.3.

Care recipients and their families should be provided with a range of support services, according to the needs of the care recipient and the family, which can include home care services on a part-time or full time basis. All care arrangements must ensure decent conditions for those employed or self-employed.

5.4.

Care recipients and their families should also be encouraged to be more aware of the needs of live-in care workers and to treat them as workers who deserve respect and rights. Care work is highly demanding, both physically and emotionally. Live-in care workers should be provided with proper accommodation and private space, and, in the case of employed carers, limits on their working time, including standby, must be respected.

5.5.

At the same time, the rights of care recipients to adequate care should be respected. This is particularly the case with vulnerable groups and those with special needs, such as those with dementia.

6.1.

A large number of small enterprises including labour hire agencies are increasingly active in the live-in care sector, operating alongside a highly unregulated informal sector.

6.2.

The care sector can contribute to the creation of decent work in private households and growth in the European economy. Only quality jobs can guarantee the quality of the care service provided.

6.3.

Lack of regulation relating to the cross-border employment of live-in care workers allows some enterprises to offer lower prices for the same work, which contributes to social dumping. This is particularly apparent in Polish or Slovak agencies sending live-in carers to Western Europe (15). The persistence of this situation of unfair competition is detrimental to workers, employers and the European economy.

7.

7.1.

Community-based organisations, faith groups (16) along with public and private employers play a pivotal role in delivering care at various levels. Many community-based organisations contributed to the regularisation of migrant live-in carers (17).

7.2.

However, in many Member States, support for care is inadequate. The recent economic crisis has resulted in under-investment in care services across Europe, leading to negative trends such as deteriorating care quality and working conditions.

7.3.

Organisations of care providers should be properly funded to meet the needs of growing demand for care. Given their experience, they need to be involved in a genuine social and civil dialogue resulting in a set of industry regulations on how care should be organised and delivered.

8.1.

Sweden is a good example of quality care provision involving all stakeholders. This system relies on a high level of public support financed by taxation (18). Voucher systems, such as those implemented in France and Belgium, have contributed to formalisation of domestic work, and, in some cases, have improved the working conditions of workers in household services. In the case of Belgium, care work is excluded from this system (19).

8.2.

Austria has developed a system of self-employed live-in carers in order to meet the needs for long-term care and set legal requirements regarding quality and framework conditions for service provision. In 2015 further improvements in quality standards and transparency were adopted. This system is widely used by the Austrian population; it is however criticised by Austrian trade unions as undermining employment standards.

8.3.

Since best practice models for quality care provision are not always fully transferable to all Member States, a holistic approach at all levels, which is inclusive of all stakeholders, should be coordinated at European level.

8.4.

The EESC believes that the European Union should monitor the supply and mobility of live-in care workers within Europe, and promote approaches to improve the overall capacity of the sector to deliver quality care and create decent jobs.

8.5.

Care labour supply shortfalls in Europe need to be placed at the top of the EU policy agenda. Attention needs to be drawn to live-in care workers who are largely overlooked in current policy paradigms.

28.12.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 487/14

Rapporteur:

Lutz RIBBE

1.1.

The EU’s biodiversity policy is a classic example of a policy of unkept promises at European and national level, despite the fact that the policy has correctly identified the problems and put in place the necessary tools.

1.2.

The EESC draws particular attention to the Commission’s comments on the importance of protecting biodiversity, which it compares to climate protection. This is not just about conserving animal and plant species: it concerns the very conditions of human existence.

1.3.

The EESC calls for consistent and immediate implementation of the Birds and Habitats Directives. The same goes for the Water Framework Directive, whose consistent and immediate implementation would in the EESC’s view make a considerable contribution to improving biodiversity protection.

1.4.

The Member States must finally determine actual financial needs arising from the implementation of EU law, and the Commission must make the necessary funding available. Financing of Natura 2000 through Community funds and primarily the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) can be considered to have failed in many respects, and the EESC therefore calls for a separate budget heading to be introduced under which financing for the Natura 2000 network must be made available.

1.5.

The EESC calls for coherence to be ensured between all policy areas that have implications for biodiversity protection. In this connection, the EESC would hope that the mid-term review of the ‘ecological focus areas’ and a possible mid-term review of the CAP are already being used to ensure that the CAP is in future used in a more targeted way to achieve the biodiversity objectives. In the EESC’s view this would currently require a change in the scope and quality of the ecological focus areas.

1.6.

The strengthening of Green Infrastructure is explicitly welcomed. Here, the Committee calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop and implement a consistent Green Infrastructure strategy. The EU should also make the trans-European networks for green infrastructure (TEN-G) an investment priority. Here too there is an urgent need for earmarked resources.

1.7.

The inconsistencies in EU policies have been noted and criticised on numerous occasions by Commission departments, the Environment Council, the European Parliament, the CoR and the EESC, and there has been no substantial change in this respect in recent years. However, if the EU’s own proposals for solving biodiversity problems are not taken seriously and implemented, it is hardly surprising that a) the desired outcomes are not being achieved and b) disappointment is spreading among interested parties and in society.

1.8.

In hindsight, the EU’s various biodiversity strategies and biodiversity programmes from 1998, 2001, 2006 and 2010, each of which accurately described the problems and set out appropriate tools, must therefore be regarded as largely futile, since they were not able to deliver on the political promise and to end the biodiversity loss caused by society.

1.9.

The EESC therefore observes once again — as in a large number of its previous opinions on EU biodiversity — that it is political will that is lacking, not legal foundations. No change in the current legal basis is needed.

2.1.

After it was noted in the 1998 Biodiversity Strategy (1) that ‘the rich biodiversity of the European Union has been subject to slow changes over the centuries, due to the impact of human activities’ and that ‘the scale of this impact has accelerated dramatically in the last few decades’, in 2001 clear goals were set out in the Sustainable Development Strategy (‘Gothenburg Agenda’) adopted by the European Council, namely to halt the loss of biodiversity in the EU by 2010 and to take action to restore habitats and natural ecosystems.

2.2.

To implement these goals a Biodiversity Action Plan (2) was issued in 2001, followed by a further Biodiversity Action Plan in May 2006 (3); however, in terms of content, the latter was barely distinguishable from the former.

2.3.

In March 2010, the heads of state or government were forced to admit that they would not meet the commitment they had made in 2001, despite the various action plans which the EESC had deemed to be appropriate and constructive.

2.4.

On the basis of the Commission Communication Options for an EU vision and target for biodiversity beyond 2010  (4), a further, new EU biodiversity strategy to 2020  (5) was consequently adopted, which in turn essentially only restated the old recommendations and instruments of the previous action plans and postponed to 2020 the target originally set for 2010.

2.5.

It was optimistically declared in that document that ‘the EU 2020 biodiversity strategy … [sets] the EU on the right track to meet its own biodiversity objectives and its global commitments’.

2.6.

The EESC also expressed its views on the strategy (6) and criticised it: among other things, it expressed considerable concern that ‘politicians have not yet found the strength or the will to implement measures which have been acknowledged to be necessary for years, although the communication repeatedly makes the point that society and the economy will benefit equally from a stringent biodiversity policy. Not even the EU’s central nature conservation directives have been fully implemented by the Member States — 19 or even 32 years after their entry into force.’

2.7.

At the time the EESC felt it was ‘not clear how the lack of political will can be remedied’. The Committee concluded: ‘In this sense the biodiversity strategy now submitted does not represent real progress. The debates on the communication which have so far taken place in the Council of Ministers show that we are still a long way from integrating biodiversity policy into other policy areas’.

2.8.

The Committee already believed that it was of utmost importance to link the forthcoming policy reform processes (e.g. in fisheries, agricultural, transport, energy and cohesion policy) closely with the biodiversity strategy. However, it still identified large deficits in this area and therefore concluded that ‘the Commission must take its own biodiversity strategy more seriously!’.

2.9.

After just four years, the claim set out in the new EU biodiversity strategy — about having identified the right track and finally halting biodiversity loss — has little credibility. This can be seen very clearly from the mid-term review of the Biodiversity Strategy (7).

3.1.

The strategy itself contains a total of six clearly defined targets and 20 measures. The mid-term review comments on the targets as follows:

3.1.1.

Target 1 (Halt the deterioration in the status of all species and habitats covered by EU nature legislation and achieve a significant and measurable improvement in their status …): although some progress has been made, it has been too slow to meet the target. In particular, there has not been sufficient progress with completing the Natura 2000 network for marine areas, guaranteeing effective management of Natura 2000 sites, and providing the necessary funding to support the Natura 2000 network. And even if the Natura 2000 network for terrestrial habitats is now ‘largely’ complete, in 2012 only 58 % of Natura 2000 sites had management plans in place or in development.

3.1.2.

Target 2 (By 2020, ecosystems and their services are maintained and enhanced by establishing green infrastructure and restoring at least 15 % of degraded ecosystem): the measures taken so far have ‘not yet halted the trend of degradation of ecosystems and services’.

3.1.3.

Target 3 (Increase the contribution of agriculture and forestry to maintaining and enhancing biodiversity): there has been ‘no significant overall progress’. And further: ‘The continuing decline in the status of species and habitats of EU importance associated with agriculture indicates that greater efforts need to be made to conserve and enhance biodiversity in these areas. The common agricultural policy (CAP) has an essential role to play in this process in interaction with relevant environmental policies’. Although there are now a number of instruments in this area, these also need to be taken up by the Member States ‘on a sufficient scale’. Only if these are deployed ‘more broadly’ will the EU still be able to reach its targets by 2020. Overall, ‘much stronger efforts are needed’.

3.1.4.

Target 4 (Ensure the sustainable use of fisheries resources): while ‘significant progress has been made in setting the policy framework’ … ‘policy implementation has been uneven across the EU and major challenges remain to ensure that the objectives are achieved according to schedule. Just over 50 % of MSY-assessed stocks were fished sustainably in 2013’. A negative trend can still be noted in all (!) European seas.

3.1.5.

Target 5 (Combat invasive alien species): this is the only target for which the EU is ‘on track’ and expects that the 2020 target can be achieved.

3.1.6.

Target 6 (Help avert global biodiversity loss): ‘… progress is insufficient in reducing the impacts of EU consumption patterns on global biodiversity’ and ‘… existing efforts may not be sufficient to meet the Aichi Biodiversity Targets by the deadlines’.

3.2.

This very sobering mid-term review was issued just at the time when the European Commission was considering substantially revising the most important EU directives on nature protection, namely the 1979 Birds Directive and the 1992 Habitats Directive.

3.3.

The expert reports (8) accompanying the Fitness Check of the Birds and Habitats Directives confirm what the EESC has been repeating insistently for years: the legal framework is adequate and cannot be blamed for the failure to meet the biodiversity protection targets. Critical shortcomings are non-implementation of measures, the lack of a nature protection budget and the inconsistency of EU policy in this area.

4.1.

The EESC reiterates its point that in the EU, ‘when it comes to maintaining biodiversity there is no shortage of laws, directives, programmes, model projects, political declarations or recommendations, but there is a lack of implementation and concerted action at all political levels’. This view is borne out not just by the evaluation study, but also by the conclusions of the Environment Council of 16 December 2015 (9), which did not differ fundamentally from those of the 2011 Environment Council. As long as the directives are not implemented fully, as long as sufficient financial resources are not made available or used, and as long as other EU policies are not consistently geared to biodiversity needs, it will not be possible to achieve the desired results.

4.2.

New strategy papers or action plans and/or the review of the legal framework do not change this, rather they feign policy-making activity, which is bound to lead to nothing if the actual problems of non-implementation are not remedied.

4.3.

In order to be successful in maintaining biodiversity, a number of approaches are necessary.

4.4.1.

The Natura 2000 network is absolutely crucial for ‘traditional’ nature conservation, such as the preservation of rare flora and fauna and unique biotopes (e.g. bogs, dry habitats, remains of semi-natural forest). It is based primarily on the 1992 Habitats Directive and the special protection areas for birds introduced under the 1979 Birds Directive.

4.4.2.

With the adoption of the Habitats Directive in particular, both the Member States and the Commission made two pledges:

4.4.3.

The network was supposed to have been completed in 1995, more than 20 years ago. The designation of most sites has now been carried out, with 18 % of the land area of the EU designated as Natura 2000 sites, however designation alone is not enough. Many sites still do not enjoy permanent legal protection and only slightly more than half have management plans. Yet until it is clear for the general public and administrations, and in particular for landowners and land users, what is now permitted or prohibited, there can be no successful nature conservation, nor will it be possible to guarantee compensation for any potential restrictions on use.

4.4.4.

It is telling that the Council of Environment Ministers on 19 December 2011 encouraged the Member States — and thereby itself — ‘to complete, in a timely manner, the establishment of the Natura 2000 network, develop and implement management plans or other equivalent instruments … thereby establishing a solid basis for strategic planning with a view to subsequent implementation of the MFF 2014-2020’. What should actually have been finished twenty years ago was in 2011 once again called for in a ‘timely manner’ — and to this day has not been completed!

4.4.5.

Thus, on 16 December 2015 the Environment Council again urged the Member States and thus in turn itself to ‘complete the establishment of the Natura 2000 network’.

4.5.1.

The Commission, the Environment Council and the European Parliament (11) quite rightly emphasise that biodiversity policy is not only about the protection of animal and plant species and habitats, but also concerns people’s production bases and livelihoods. Just one of many examples of this are pollination services provided by insects such as bees or butterflies, whose economic value — not only for agriculture — is immeasurable. However, the Commission had to concede that: ‘Europe’s ecosystem services are judged to be of mixed status or degraded — i.e. no longer able to deliver the optimal quality and quantity of basic services such as crop pollination, clean air and water …’ (12).

4.5.2.

Pollinators or decomposers, but also many other species, and their services, cannot be conserved by focusing solely on the designation of protected areas. The EU’s biodiversity policy must therefore also establish requirements across the board, as well as for protected areas; and in this respect consistency with land-use policy plays a key role.

4.5.3.

It is quite right for both the Commission and the Council to keep emphasising the significance of for example the agriculture sector, most recently in the mid-term review: The Council ‘notes with concern that agriculture is one of the most prominent pressures on terrestrial ecosystems and that there has been no measurable improvement in the status of agriculture-related habitats and species covered by the Habitats Directive until 2012 and regrets the significant declines of farmland birds, grassland butterflies and pollination services, which underline continuing pressures from the agricultural sector mainly due to intensification and abandonment of agricultural land’ (13).

4.6.1.

In the EU Biodiversity Strategy to 2020, it was stressed the strategy is ‘an integral part of the Europe 2020 Strategy’ (14); however, the concepts ‘biodiversity’, ‘habitats’, ‘nature conservation’ or ‘protection of species’, and ‘protection of the diversity of genetic resources’ or ‘ecosystem’, do not feature even once in the Europe 2020 Strategy. Only ‘diversity of species’ is touched on briefly in two places, under the theme of ‘resource efficiency’. For the EESC it is therefore completely incomprehensible that the European Commission could make such a claim, and its actual policy also bears out the exact opposite.

4.6.2.

And yet, given that the EU’s 2001 Sustainable Development Strategy no longer plays any real role in policy terms, the Europe 2020 strategy would be precisely the right framework for addressing the problem. The EESC has frequently called on the economics and finance ministers to reflect on the economic significance of biodiversity loss (15). This has still not happened.

4.6.3.

As the objectives of the EU nature protection directives and the EU biodiversity strategy also reflect internationally agreed goals — e.g. the Aichi targets under the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) or the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) — there is an urgent need for biodiversity policy to be fully incorporated into the SDG implementation strategy or into a new EU sustainable development strategy.

4.6.4.

However, so far biodiversity policy has continued to be viewed by many Commission departments and some EU Councils of Ministers more as a competing policy area that partially blocks or hampers economic development and also ties up funding.

4.6.5.

But the fact is undeniable: there are conflicts between different types of resource use, and occasionally interference with the ecosystem is prohibited, for example by the nature protection directives. However, this is precisely the role of nature conservation, namely for government action to ensure that there is a balance between economic use and preservation of natural resources. In this sense, there is no difference between nature conservation and other policy areas where the free play of market forces is subject to regulatory measures.

4.6.6.

The absence of any real consistency between classical economic policy and environmental policies is nothing new. As far back as 2006, the EESC lamented ‘the huge gulf that has grown up between ideal and reality’ and the fact that public ‘planning decisions and support schemes are often instrumental in imperilling biodiversity still further’ (16).

4.6.7.

A key reason for this trade-off is the tension between individual interests, in particular economic interests, and the public interest. The EU’s message to date has suggested a commitment to biodiversity protection in the public interest. In that case, the consistent course of action would be to determine, and enforce, constraints to contain economic interests that compromise biodiversity protection.

4.7.1.

The EESC has already addressed the relationship between agriculture, the common agricultural policy and biodiversity on several occasions, noting that the gradual but large-scale and continuing decline in biodiversity is happening despite the fact that farmers are overwhelmingly complying with prevailing law. In other words, it is happening within the limits of the law, when employing supposedly good agricultural practice. This situation cannot be changed by reforming nature protection law, but only through changes in utilisation practices combined with a revised agricultural funding policy. The EESC refers here to its own-initiative opinion on Reform of the common agricultural policy in 2013  (17), which describes in detail the changes it deems necessary.

4.7.2.

The Commission is very aware of the importance of farming, noting that ‘the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is the policy tool having the most significant impacts on biodiversity in rural areas. … One of the setbacks as regards biodiversity was the abolition of compulsory set-aside’ (18). Thus agricultural policy still often conflicts with biodiversity policy, even though parts of the CAP, especially the agri-environmental programmes under the second pillar, demonstrate how these contradictions can be addressed.

4.7.3.

Set-aside was introduced in the mid-1980s, not to improve the ecological stability of farmland but to reduce surpluses. With the CAP reform of 2013, the idea of farming some agricultural land less intensively was revisited. ‘Ecological focus areas’ became mandatory in the context of ‘greening’ the CAP. However, there was a heated debate surrounding a) the scope and b) what was to be understood by ecological focus.

4.7.4.

Now, for example, the cultivation of leguminous plants or cash crops fall under the definition of ‘ecological focus’. While the increase in the number of areas where leguminous or cash crops are cultivated is in principle to be welcomed, these measures will not make any real contribution to improving biodiversity. And the fact that the use of pesticides is to some extent permitted in ecological focus areas is diametrically opposed to the intention of greening agricultural policy: pesticides do not help to increase biodiversity but rather limit it.

4.7.5.

The Commission should carry out, as soon as possible, an initial assessment of the impact of the measures adopted, particularly since ‘greening’ has become one of the main justifications for maintaining agricultural payments from the EU budget.

4.7.6.

Moreover, following these assumptions, the horizontal policies of the EU, in particular with regard to RDI, should also take account of and pay particular attention to the contribution that research, development and innovation applied to agriculture can make to improving biodiversity in the EU.

4.8.1.

The Habitats Directive has a critical technical flaw: although its Article 10 explicitly refers to the importance of contiguity of landscape features, there is no binding mechanism that would lead to a consistent biotope network system in Europe. In its Communication on Green Infrastructure, the Commission outlines how these deficits can be rectified through appropriate investment in maintaining and restoring Green Infrastructure, on both a large and small scale. In view of this, it is very important that a consistent strategy for Green Infrastructure should be adopted and implemented. A central plank of this strategy should be a methodological framework and financing instrument for trans-European biodiversity networks (TEN-G). This applies for both large-scale measures and small-scale measures, e.g. in agricultural landscapes.

4.9.1.

In many Member States and candidate countries, serious destruction of nature is still taking place. To name but a few examples:

4.9.2.

In Romania, the area covered by primeval forest at the time of EU accession was more than 2 000 km2. Almost all of this area consists of designated Natura 2000 sites. Since then, large-scale clear-felling in Romania’s old-growth forests has been documented, causing irreplaceable loss of European natural heritage.

4.9.3.

River ecosystems in the Balkans, and in particular in the Western Balkan countries, are by far the richest in Europe. Around one third of the rivers in the successor states to the former Yugoslavia and in Albania have a natural dynamic and may still be described as natural rivers. The documented plan for more than 2 700 (!) hydro-electric power plants, at least one third of them in protected areas, poses a serious threat to the biodiversity and the natural dynamic of all rivers in the Balkans. Public funding is being used to finance these projects. The biodiversity of almost all rivers has already been massively damaged in almost all the EU Member States, so that now considerable sums will have to be raised to renature them, including through implementation of the EU Water Framework Directive.

4.9.4.

Numerous species of birds listed in Annex 1 of the Birds Directive and which are protected within the EU are being recklessly hunted in the candidate countries in the Balkans; bird hunting is also often an unresolved issue in many Member States. The shooting of Eurasian spoonbills, cranes, pygmy cormorants and ferruginous ducks, to name just a few species, will weaken the breeding population of these species in the EU.

4.10.1.

A further problem touched on in both the mid-term review and the Council conclusions is that of funding, including funding for the Natura 2000 network. A Commission Communication of 2004 (19) addressed the issue of funding for the network, including a) the amount of resources required and b) the question of which funding source should be used to provide them. At that stage an estimated annual figure of EUR 6,1 billion was mentioned; it was decided not to set up a specific budget line or to expand the Life programme but instead to use mainly the second pillar of the CAP and other EU-funds.

4.10.2.

The EESC had doubts about the amounts declared at the time and felt it was ‘absolutely essential to present more precise cost calculations as quickly as possible’. It has doubts, ‘for example, over whether the sums indicated in respect of the new Member States (EUR 0,3 billion, as opposed to EUR 5,8 billion for EU-15) will be sufficient’ (20).

4.10.3.

Nothing has happened in this regard to date: the same amount is still under discussion. The Member States responsible and the Commission have so far failed to clarify the situation.

4.10.4.

At the time, the EESC pointed out the risk that financing Natura 2000 measures from the second pillar could lead to competition with other rural development measures (21). This has been borne out in two respects: firstly, payments from the second pillar were reduced by 30 % in the 2007-2013 financing period compared with the previous financing period and, secondly, as the European Court of Auditors and the Environment Council quite rightly pointed out, ‘Member States did not always recognise the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) as a possible instrument for promoting biodiversity, while its potential for financing Natura 2000 was not sufficiently realised’ (22).

4.10.5.

The European Commission (23) has therefore had to concede that the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development remains the most important Community funding source for Natura 2000 and biodiversity in the EU, but that ‘only 20 % of the total financing needs for managing protected areas including the Natura 2000 network in Europe are being met’.

4.10.6.

Thus it is imperative that the exact financing need for implementing the EU nature protection directives be established and that the correct resources — specifically earmarked under a special budget heading (e.g. an extended LIFE budget) — be made available.

4.11.1.

The shortcomings in the implementation of the EU’s biodiversity strategy, particularly Natura 2000, can in part be attributed to a lack of civil society involvement and participation in the various protected areas. The designation of protected areas should be regarded in the first instance as an administrative act, to be carried out in full compliance with the principles of the rule of law; however, the management plans should be developed and implemented with the close involvement of landowners, land users, conservation organisations and local authorities. In many cases things have not been done in this way, which has often led to mistrust and hostility towards EU biodiversity policy.

28.12.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 487/24

Rapporteur:

Tellervo KYLÄ-HARAKKA-RUONALA

1.1.

The Paris Agreement is a welcome global commitment to mitigate climate change. The task ahead is to ensure that the agreement is ratified, implemented and developed further. In this opinion the EESC sets out its views on the main approaches for the long-term path to a carbon-neutral world as called for by the Agreement.

1.2.

The huge global challenges require a major shift in the European Union’s approach. Instead of focusing solely on its own greenhouse gas emissions, the EU should consider how it can contribute to achieving the greatest climate benefits from a global perspective. The EESC thus calls on the European Commission to put together a long-term strategy on how to grow and maximise the global ‘carbon handprint’ (1) of the EU.

1.3.

The EU should also be ambitious in striving for win-win-win solutions with regard to economic, social and environmental aspects. The EESC therefore urges the Commission to frame the climate strategy in a way that helps strengthen the EU economy and enhance the well-being of its citizens, while mitigating climate change.

1.4.

Global commitment is essential to achieving meaningful climate impacts and avoiding carbon, investment and job leakage. The EESC calls on the Commission to continue engaging in active climate diplomacy, with the aim of enhancing broad implementation of the Agreement and encouraging major economies to raise their commitments to a similar level of ambition as the EU. The EESC also calls on the Commission to integrate climate considerations into all areas of external policy, notably in the areas of trade and investment, and development cooperation.

1.5.

In terms of practical measures, the EU can most successfully contribute to combating climate change by exporting technologies and solutions for reducing emissions and increasing carbon sinks, and by producing world-market products with lower emissions than those of its competitors. The EESC therefore calls for a strong boost for innovation — from research to market entry — so as to place the EU at the global forefront of climate solutions. Particular attention should be paid to the potential of SMEs.

1.6.

Regarding the internal dimension of climate policy, the EU should aim to be a Climate Union that is action-oriented, effective and cohesive in its domestic measures.. Every effort must now be focused on implementing the decisions made so far, where both the Commission and the Member States have their own roles.

1.7.

Furthermore, the EESC calls on the Commission to base the long-term strategy on an integrated approach. The path forward should be developed as part of related single market ‘unions’, particularly those in the area of energy, transport, digitalisation, industry, agriculture, capital and innovation. Special attention should also be paid to the challenges of sustainable food systems, and the role of carbon sinks.

1.8.

In implementing the objectives set by the Paris Agreement, maximum use should be made of market mechanisms. A global pricing system for carbon emissions would be a neutral and effective way of bringing all market players on board. The EESC encourages the Commission to actively explore different routes and steps and to engage with other countries on moving towards global carbon pricing.

1.9.

The road from Paris to a carbon-neutral economy is extremely challenging. To manage the transition in a just and controlled way, and to help businesses and citizens adapt to the changes and develop new solutions and skills, proper adjustment measures have to be introduced as part of the climate strategy.

1.10.

It is civil society partners that will bring about the shift to a carbon-neutral economy through their action on the ground, while the role of political decision-makers is to provide them with an enabling environment and funding, including awareness-raising on all available funding opportunities. A multi-level governance approach has to be developed to facilitate civil society climate action and to remove obstacles to it. The EESC expects to be fully involved in the development of this multi-stakeholder infrastructure, as well as in the preparation of the EU’s long-term climate strategy.

2.1.

The outcome of the Paris climate conference (COP21) was a global deal to put the world on track for limiting global warming to well below 2 oC and pursuing efforts to further limit the temperature increase to 1,5 oC above pre-industrial levels. This will require a huge decrease in global emissions and calls for radical change in societies.

2.2.

The global challenges ahead require a radical shift in the EU’s approach to mitigating climate change. It is critical that the EU mount considerable efforts to make an effective global impact. The EU should therefore strive to increase its ‘carbon handprint’ instead of just decreasing its ‘carbon footprint’.

2.3.

Global commitment is essential to solving the climate problem and avoiding carbon, investment and job leakage. The EU showed leadership ahead of and during the Paris conference, and it should continue in this spirit for the upcoming Conferences of the Parties. In its climate diplomacy, the EU should focus on the countries with the largest greenhouse gas emissions, but also on its toughest competitors and most promising partners from an economic perspective. Climate and economic diplomacy should thus go hand in hand.

2.4.

The biggest emitters are China, the United States and the EU, accounting for over 25 %, about 15 % and about 10 % of world emissions respectively. The EU’s share of emissions is projected to decrease to about 5 % by 2030. Therefore, in order to exert maximum influence on climate change mitigation, the EU must make every effort to encourage other parties to raise their ambition level.

2.5.

On a practical front, the EU can most successfully contribute to global climate change mitigation by exporting low-carbon solutions, as well as by producing world-market products with lower emissions than those of its competitors.

2.6.

Besides the USA, China and other rapidly developing countries have also become important suppliers of low-carbon technologies. Over the last five years, the EU has experienced a marked slump in some sectors in both export and domestic markets, while it has lost its previous position as a global leader in technology. Although the Juncker Commission has expressed the wish to lead the world in renewable energy, this goal is currently a distant prospect.

2.7.

A new and additional boost is thus urgently needed to position the EU at the forefront of climate solutions once again. The global opportunities cover a wide range of technologies, products, services and expertise, as well as overall production and consumption models. The exportation of knowhow on carbon sinks, such as sustainable forest management and afforestation, should also be seen as an opportunity to make a global impact.

2.8.

The EESC welcomes the fact that the Commission has joined the Mission Innovation Initiative of the world’s leading economies, who have committed to doubling their funding for clean energy research and development over the next five years.

2.9.

Effective trade and investment policy is an essential tool to deliver low-carbon solutions and promote progress towards a global carbon neutral economy. To ensure a positive outcome, climate issues must be an integral part of negotiations on trade and investment agreements. The aim should be to eliminate barriers to trade in climate-friendly products, technologies and solutions; the Environmental Goods Agreement would have a significant role to play here. Joint solutions are also needed to avoid trade distortions caused by differences in climate policies and requirements in different regions.

2.10.

As for development policy, the current target of USD 100 billion per year pledged by developed countries for financing climate measures was extended at COP21 until 2025 and a practical roadmap was called for to achieve the target. Individual countries also made financial pledges. It is important that the promises be kept and funds used in an economically, environmentally and socially responsible way. Awareness-raising campaigns are needed to provide information on access to funding for civil society players, particularly in developing countries, as proposed by the EESC in the context of the EU-Africa Strategy.

2.11.

Technological cooperation also has a role to play in development policy. Here, intellectual property rights (IPR) must be adequately protected as they are crucial for innovation. It is also important to ensure that the solutions provided reflect the conditions in developing countries and — in the spirit of partnership — help them adopt low-carbon growth without hindering their development. Moreover, capacity building is needed to assist developing countries in climate change mitigation and adaptation.

2.12.

As a general rule, climate considerations should be mainstreamed in all external EU policies, with the aim of enhancing implementation of the Paris Agreement globally.

3.1.

To provide a solid basis for becoming a strong global actor, the EU should aim to be a Climate Union that is fully effective, cohesive and credible in its domestic measures. It must be first and foremost a union of action. Every effort must now be focused on implementing the decisions made so far, where both the Commission and the Member States have their own roles to play.

3.2.

Because climate change mitigation applies to all sectors of the economy the Climate Union must rely on an integrated approach. Further climate measures should thus be developed as part of related ‘unions’ such as the Energy Union, the Single European Transport Area, the Single Market for Goods and Services, the Digital Single Market, European Industrial Policy, the Common Agricultural Policy, the Capital Markets Union and the Innovation Union. An optimal approach must also be found to link EU climate policy and national implementation.

3.3.

The EU should fulfil its climate commitments in a way that strengthens its economy and enhances the well-being of citizens. Climate policy should not be seen as just balancing economic, social and environmental factors, but win-win-win solutions must be strived for. To this end, efforts are needed to boost low-carbon growth making full use of the opportunities provided by for instance digitisation, clean technologies, the bio-economy and the circular economy.

3.4.

As well as globally, substantial low-carbon investments are also needed within the EU. Climate aspects need to inform the financing criteria of public investment programmes, including the use of EU funds. Public-private cooperation, as well as the role of the European Fund for Strategic Investments and the European Investment Bank, are of the utmost importance. The EESC welcomes the launch of the European Investment Project Portal and of the European Investment Advisory Hub, and stresses that the project thresholds must not exclude smaller projects.

3.5.

As for the private sector, low-carbon investments have the same prerequisites as any investment. To be able to make full use of the opportunities and business potential provided by climate change mitigation, an encouraging, competitive and stable business environment is essential.

3.6.

In order to position itself at the global forefront of climate technologies and solutions, the EU has to invest in an environment conducive to innovation, covering research, development, piloting, demonstration, and finally market entry and expansion internationally. Particular attention should be paid to the innovation potential and the international market entry of SMEs. To this end, it has to be ensured that access to finance does not pose an obstacle for SMEs.

3.7.

Since most greenhouse gas emissions originate in energy production, energy lies at the heart of the transition. Key measures include replacing fossil fuels with low-carbon energy sources and improving energy efficiency in all sectors and activities. The increasing electrification of society — where fossil fuels are being replaced — can contribute remarkably to reducing emissions. One of the major challenges and opportunities is the development of electricity storage solutions.

3.8.

With regard to the decarbonisation of transport, particularly road transport, a wide variety of measures needs to be introduced. Electricity and alternative energy sources, advanced biofuels, improved energy efficiency of vehicles and logistics, increased use of low-carbon transport modes, co-modality and public transport, as well as land-use planning, have a role to play in the transition. With regard to shipping and aviation, the EESC calls for ambitious global outcomes in the framework of the IMO and ICAO.

3.9.

Success in decarbonisation also requires the development of products and production methods. The greatest opportunities lie in finding, innovative business models and developing new low-carbon products with the main focus on the service and function they provide. The potential of all sectors and players should be harnessed, and policy-makers should not ‘pick winners’, for example supporting certain sectors, techniques or products.

3.10.

Agriculture and forestry are linked to climate change in several ways. As well as reducing emissions, sequestration of carbon dioxide plays an essential role in climate change mitigation. This highlights the significance of sustainable use of forest resources and proper soil management. On the other hand, agriculture and forestry face significant challenges in adapting to climate change. Intensive research and development work is therefore needed in relation to resilience and adaptation, and to the role of soil as a carbon sink.

3.11.

The connection between climate change and food security is vitally important in a context of fast population growth. To respond to the vast challenges of both food security and climate change mitigation, more sustainable food systems are needed, while preventing carbon and job leakage.

3.12.

Digitalisation is across-cutting element of de-carbonising society. Automation, robotics and the internet of things make industrial processes and logistics more efficient. Smart energy grids, smart mobility, smart buildings and smart communities involve citizens in decarbonisation and enable consumers to become ‘prosumers’, while digital platforms provide an option for sharing products and services.

3.13.

All in all, citizens have a vital role to play in the transition to a carbon-neutral economy. More sustainable consumption patterns and lifestyle changes, e.g. in relation to diet, shopping, mobility and hobbies, can bring about remarkable results. Awareness-raising, product information and education are tools that can be used to help citizens make enlightened choices.

3.14.

Regarding more specific measures for moving towards a carbon-neutral future in the abovementioned key areas, the EESC has issued several relevant opinions during the past few years (2).

3.15.

The transition towards a carbon-neutral economy inevitably means that there will be winners and losers. It is therefore imperative to manage the transition in a just and controlled way. Proper measures are needed to assist businesses and citizens in adjusting to the new situation. Increasing costs and skills shortfalls are the main threats to be tackled. Targeted financial assistance, based on identification of the most vulnerable sectors and groups of people, is a relevant option here. Efforts should in the main, however, be focused on seeking new solutions and developing skills.

4.1.

Market mechanisms should be utilised as far as possible when implementing measures to achieve the goals and objectives set by political decision-makers under the Paris Agreement. In order to boost climate action in a neutral and efficient way, it is important to strive for global pricing of greenhouse gas emissions. Accordingly, to enable the pricing system to work properly, contradictory or overlapping energy subsidies should be phased out.

4.2.

Different kinds of carbon pricing systems, mainly carbon taxation and emissions allowance cap- and trade schemes are already in use in several countries and regions. Measures to link the various systems are also being considered.

4.3.

As for the EU emissions trading scheme, the price of emissions allowances has stayed unexpectedly low, because the supply of allowances has clearly exceeded demand, and overlapping subsidies have affected the market. The emissions cap ensures that the emissions reduction target is met but the system does not provide an incentive to invest in low-carbon energy. This would require an increase in the price of carbon, while ensuring that measures are taken to avoid carbon leakage.

4.4.

A well-functioning and fair global carbon-pricing system would level the playing field for export businesses in world markets and thus decrease the risk of investment and job leakage. In addition, it would eliminate the competitive advantage of imported goods that are cheaper due to lower climate requirements. Furthermore, it would direct financial flows to developing countries. Significant efforts should therefore be made to establish an appropriate global regime. The Committee points out that it is has also advocated — essentially as an interim solution — a ‘border carbon adjustment’ mechanism until such a global regime is in place (3). However, due attention should be paid to the challenges and risks of such mechanisms.

4.5.

In order to explore the prerequisites for and consequences of a proper pricing system, different options should be carefully assessed. The following routes and steps should, as a minimum, be explored:

5.1.

Civil society has a major role to play at global, European, national and local levels in the transition towards a carbon-neutral world. Businesses, workers, consumers and citizens are the ones who actually bring about change through their own action on the ground, while the policymakers should provide them with an enabling and encouraging operating environment.

5.2.

A lot of progress is being made in markets: A growing number of private and institutional investors are taking ‘carbon risk’ of their investment targets into account, and climate-related private capital funds have been established. Many companies are renewing and developing their operations and product portfolios to respond to the climate-conscious demands of customers and shareholders. New business ecosystems are being built across sectors and between big companies and SMEs.

5.3.

At COP21 a significant strand of activities highlighted the role of sub-national authorities, the private sector and other civil society players in achieving climate objectives and driving new partnerships. The Global Climate Action Agenda needs to maintain momentum and further boost this kind of activity.

5.4.

As proposed by the EESC (4), a coalition of policymakers, administration and civil society should be established, to stimulate and increase awareness of non-state climate action at various levels, to provide a forum for structured dialogue, and to remove obstacles standing in the way of action. The EESC expects to be fully involved in developing this kind of coherent multi-stakeholder infrastructure.

5.5.

As for civil society cooperation with other regions, in particular the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) (5) and the Mediterranean, the climate issue — in conjunction with the food security challenge — is high on the EESC agenda.

5.6.

The EESC is also keen to partner with the Commission in preparing the EU’s long-term climate strategy on how to move towards a carbon-neutral world.

28.12.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 487/30

Rapporteur:

Philippe DE BUCK

Co-rapporteur:

Tanja BUZEK

1.1.

The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations are entering a critical year in 2016. The EU and US chief negotiators stated their commitment to accelerating the talks with the aim of reaching an ambitious and comprehensive political agreement that identifies the possible ‘landing zones’ in all areas before the end of the current US administration. The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) therefore decided to draw up an own-initiative opinion on specific key issues of the TTIP.

1.2.

This opinion does not comment on the possible final agreement that will result from the negotiations between the EU and the US. It is nevertheless important to assess to what extent the positions of European organised civil society, as expressed in particular in previous EESC opinions, have been taken into account in the EU proposals currently available to the public. This will allow the basis for a strengthened partnership between the European Commission and European civil society in developing EU trade policy to be established.

1.3.

The EESC, stressing its institutional role, therefore makes the following recommendations.

1.4.1.

The TTIP negotiations are creating new momentum for increased regulatory cooperation with higher expectations. Therefore the Committee notes with satisfaction that the proposed Chapter includes the pursuit of public policy objectives and a high level of protection in a number of identified fields. The EESC also welcomes the explicit clarification that the function and purpose of the institutional structure for regulatory cooperation is to provide support and advice to decision-makers under democratic control and that it will neither have the power to adopt legal acts nor will replace any domestic regulatory procedures.

1.4.2.

However the Committee asks for a clearer definition of ‘burdensome’ regulations and stresses that regulations that safeguard consumer, labour and environmental rights should not be considered as ‘burdensome’ per se.

1.4.3.

The EESC also calls for the Chapter on good regulatory practices not to limit parties’ right to regulate or introduce procedures equivalent to the US notice-and-comment process.

1.4.4.

In addition, the EESC asks the European Commission to clarify the arrangements for representative stakeholders’ involvement, in particular the social partners and civil society representatives.

1.5.1.

The EESC considers that the proposals on standardisation, technical regulations, marking and labelling must be considered as important offensive interests of the European Union. It takes note of the important provisions regarding transparency. However, it calls for:

1.5.2.

Regarding the SPS Chapter, the EESC takes note that it is based on the WTO SPS Agreement, which includes the precautionary principle. However, the EESC calls for further reassurances that EU food legislation will not be changed and that the EU will keep its restrictions on hormones, growth promoters and genetically modified organisms.

1.6.1.

The EESC recognises the importance of trade facilitation, in particular for small firms, and welcomes the European Commission’s proposed Chapter. It calls, however, for further simplification of customs procedures and for clarification of the rules regarding penalties and responsibility for breach of customs legislation.

1.7.1.

The EESC welcomes the meaningful commitments made by the EU in the Chapter on services and reiterates its calls for increased market access at federal and state level, for enhanced regulatory cooperation — in the recognition that market access depends also on it — and its request to preserve public services in accordance with the TFEU. The EESC also reiterates that audio-visual services are not part of the mandate and should therefore not be included in any commitments. It also supports the European Commission’s decision to put negotiations on financial services market access on hold until US negotiators clearly agree to launch discussions on regulatory cooperation, aiming at increasing levels of protection and financial stability in that sector. The EESC also calls for explicit and detailed wording on a broadly defined public services exemption to ensure that all public services that are subject to outsourcing or are funded by state, private for-profit, or non-profit organisations, would be excluded from the deal.

1.8.1.

The EESC welcomes the comprehensive and detailed scope of the Commission proposal on trade and sustainable development. It recalls, however, that the actual value of these provisions depends primarily on the possibility of effectively enforcing them. The EESC calls for an effective enforcement mechanism and a strong monitoring mechanism via civil society. The EESC is not able to comment on the enforcement measures for the sustainable development chapter of TTIP as the textual proposals for enforcement have been delayed. It is important that the Commission engages with civil society and social partners over these proposals in order to ensure they are designed in a way that is effective in practice. The EESC reserves the option of commenting on these elements when they are made publicly available.

1.9.1.

The EESC welcomes the proposal aiming to reform the investment protection system and the objective of establishing a permanent multilateral investment court that replaces private arbitration tribunals. However, the EESC still sees some critical points of concern as listed in point 8.8 that should be addressed. It also asks the European Commission to draw up an impact assessment covering both the cost and the functioning of the new investment court system.

2.1.

Since the launch of the TTIP negotiations in June 2013, the EESC has played an important role in formulating the positions of organised EU civil society by drawing up opinions on specific aspects of the TTIP negotiations (1), on investment protection and investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) (2) and on the impact of the TTIP on SMEs (3). In the meantime, the Commission has published its important Communication ‘Trade for All’ (4) that provides the conditions for the upcoming trade and investment treaties. The EESC has supported the approach outlined in the Communication in its opinion (5). The Committee is also striving, in cooperation with the other EU institutions, to contribute to an informed civil society debate on the TTIP through a number of TTIP-related activities. These include the organisation of hearings and visits of EESC members to the United States.

2.2.

The EESC takes note that the TTIP negotiations are being conducted in a more transparent way than previous trade and investment negotiations: they are the first for which the mandate of the Council and the EU’s positions and several textual proposals have been published. An Advisory Group was set up that brings together experts representing a broad range of interests — consumers, trade unions, business, environment and public health — to provide EU trade negotiators with high quality advice in the areas being negotiated. However, the EESC regrets, due to its institutional role, not to have been formally included in this specific TTIP Advisory Group (6). The European Commission has created a TTIP-dedicated webpage that includes factsheets and reading guides, EU position papers (which set out and describe the European Union’s general approach to a topic), EU textual proposals (which are the European Union’s initial proposals for legal texts on topics in the TTIP), and the EU offer for market access in relation to services. The EESC appreciates the proposal of the European Commission to create a Civil Society Forum which will be composed of representatives of independent civil society organisations, including participants in the domestic advisory groups to conduct a dialogue on the implementation and application of the agreement.

2.3.

The present opinion builds on the findings of the previous opinions calling for the benefits of the TTIP to be evenly spread among the business community (including SMEs), workers, consumers and citizens, and making safeguarding the high standards in force in the EU a precondition for the agreement to be accepted. The EESC considers it important to comment on already published EU positions and textual proposals for a selected number of chapters in order to examine to what extent they are in line with those preconditions, and to identify the main points of interest and concern for European civil society. In particular, the EESC has chosen to focus its analysis on the proposals for regulatory cooperation, including good regulatory practices (made publicly available on 21 March 2016), technical barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) (both made publicly available in January 2015), customs and trade facilitation (made available in January 2015 and amended in March 2016), services (made public in July 2015), sustainable development (made public in November 2015) and investment (made public in November 2015). This opinion considers documents published by 14 July 2016.

2.4.

It should be noted that the European Commission published on 14 July 2016 a proposal on the institutional set up of the agreement (7), which includes the creation of Domestic advisory groups (DAGs), composed of civil society representatives and competent to advise the parties on the application of the agreement. The Committee welcomes the fact that the mandate of DAGs is widened to cover any issue of interest under the agreement, but regrets however that the joint meeting of the two DAGs to be convened on their own initiative is not explicitly mentioned in the EU proposal and that the Civil Society Forum can only be convened by the Joint Committee. The meetings of the Civil Society Forum shall allow the members of the two DAGs to work on joint recommendations to the Parties.

2.5.

In this respect, the EESC deeply regrets that when negotiations are eventually conducted on the basis of consolidated texts, the high level of transparency achieved so far will be seriously undermined, unless the US agrees to make these texts available to the public or at least to the EU Advisory Group. Therefore the EESC calls on the Commission to continue to make its best efforts to raise this matter with its counterpart.

3.1.

Regulatory cooperation is one of three pillars of the TTIP — the others being market access and rules — and is comprised of four elements: horizontal aspects (which includes a section on ‘regulatory coherence’ or ‘good regulatory practices’ on the one hand, and a section on ‘regulatory cooperation’ among regulators on the other hand), technical barriers to trade (TBTs), food safety and animal and plant health (SPS), and sectoral annexes. The objective of this section is to comment on the first of these elements — horizontal aspects — while the following section will address TBTs and SPS.

3.2.

Regulatory cooperation has been identified as one of the TTIP’s core objectives, as it could play an important role in facilitating trade and investment as well as improving the competitiveness of small firms in particular. Small and medium-sized enterprises, in particular, expect new opportunities to open up, given that they do not possess the resources to navigate different regulatory environments on both sides of the Atlantic, unlike large firms. At the same time, greater compatibility of regulatory regimes would create opportunities for large enterprises to take advantage of economies of scale between Europe and the US.

3.3.

Efforts towards regulatory cooperation are not new (8). The TTIP negotiations are creating new momentum for increased regulatory cooperation with higher expectations. The EESC considers that it is not easy to estimate the benefits deriving from increased regulatory cooperation, mainly because they will vary depending on the degree of cooperation to be agreed upon during negotiations. The draft interim technical report prepared by the European Commission on sustainability impact assessment estimates that 76 % of the TTIP’s impact will result from regulatory cooperation, whereas 24 % of its total effect will come from tariff reduction (9).

3.4.

However, the EESC considers it important that protection is put in place to ensure that the process of regulatory cooperation is not used to undermine social, labour, consumer and environmental standards, but rather aims to improve them. If those conditions are met, benefits would not only be economic but might also facilitate the regulators’ task in achieving public policy objectives.

3.5.

Safeguarding the EU’s high levels of protection was a fundamental point for the EESC. The current proposal of Article x1b of the Chapter on regulatory cooperation covers the pursuit of public policy objectives and a high level of protection of, inter alia, public health; human, animal and plant life and health; health and safety; working conditions; animal welfare; the environment; consumers; social protection and social security; personal data and cybersecurity; cultural diversity; and financial stability.

3.6.

However, the EESC is concerned this may be undermined by Article x1d which states an objective to ‘reduce unnecessarily burdensome […] regulatory requirements’ (10). The EESC is concerned that such language might be interpreted as considering regulations that safeguard consumer, labour and environmental rights to be ‘burdensome’ per se.

3.7.

Therefore, the EESC wants to strongly reaffirm the statements that safeguarding existing high standards is a fundamental requirement and that besides the aim of enhancing trade opportunities, regulatory cooperation should also improve safety, health and the economic and social well-being of people on both sides of the Atlantic. Therefore this commitment should be reaffirmed in very clear and detailed language in the final agreement. The EESC is concerned about the EU proposal on good regulatory practices. Regulatory cooperation should be about improving the dialogue between regulators, not influencing each other’s rule-making processes. The EESC asks the European Commission to clarify the good regulatory practices section of its proposal.

3.8.

In this sense, the EESC considers that the current proposal for the Chapter on good regulatory practices, which notes that parties will be required to examine ‘non-regulatory alternatives (including the option of not regulating) […] that would achieve the objective of the regulatory act’, should not be considered as limiting the parties’ right to regulate. For the sake of greater certainty, the text of the agreement should clarify that this provision shall not limit the parties’ right to regulate. It also notes that Article 6 of the proposal on stakeholders’ consultations should not be considered equivalent to the US notice-and-comment process.

3.9.

For the EESC, the development of trade must therefore retain its status of being a central objective. It is important that the TTIP negotiations support the removal of unnecessary barriers to trade (11).

3.10.

The EESC welcomes the fact that the current Commission proposal explicitly clarifies that the function and purpose of the institutional structure aims to provide support and advice to decision-makers under the democratic control of the European Parliament and the Council of the EU (12). The ordinary law-making process must not be undermined and delays or regulatory chill must be prevented. The EESC welcomes the proposed Article 1, which reaffirms the right both to regulate and to set the levels of protection. However, it is crucial the proposal defines the composition and the rules of proceedings of the different committees and groups. The EESC calls on the European Commission to ensure coherence and consistency between the horizontal regulatory cooperation chapters, the TBT, SPS chapters and the sectoral annexes.

3.11.

Dialogue that takes place at the beginning of the regulatory process increases the chance of identifying policy solutions that include cross-border considerations, and shall be provided for. Stakeholders’ involvement via a transparent process, which is a core principle of a good rule-making process within the European Union, must be clearly detailed in the Commission proposal. In order for regulatory cooperation to achieve inclusive outcomes and proposals for regulators, there shall be a structured and balanced engagement of stakeholders, and in particular, businesses, consumers, environmental interest groups, and workers.

3.12.

In order for specific progress to materialise, early consultations on regulatory activity between the EU and US regulators shall be provided. Discussions at an early stage in the policy-making process are expected to increase the potential for delivering interoperable rules in the future and allowing market participants to comply with both regimes simultaneously. However, regulators must consider the dialogue and the reply to comments from their counterparts or interested persons as voluntary, in order to avoid any regulatory chill effect.

3.13.

The EESC asks the European Commission to clarify the arrangements for both the abovementioned dialogue and for representative stakeholders’ involvement, in particular the social partners and civil society representatives. There must be a clear guarantee that relevant stakeholders will be able to contribute to a transparent dialogue by means of a well-defined procedure that mandates equal treatment and avoids delays in the regulatory process. On the EU side, the transparency register should be considered when it comes to defining the relevance and representativeness of stakeholders.

4.1.

The EESC is pleased that the WTO agreement on TBTs is integrated as it stands in the proposal. Furthermore, the proposed TBT Chapter addresses technical requirements (technical regulations and standards) and conformity assessment requirements. The EESC is of the view that the proposals on standardisation, technical regulations, marking and labelling must be considered as important offensive interests of the European Union. It is important that these proposals are not used to question regulations necessary for health and safety as well as social protection.

4.2.

The EESC takes note of the important provisions on transparency: it reiterates the obligation to notify measures to the WTO, provide information to the other party, offer an opportunity for written comments and provide replies to such comments. It also provides for the publication of all applicable technical regulations, new or existing, by means of a registry, as well as of standards referenced in technical regulations (as the vast majority of standards are used by the industry but are not ‘referenced’ — used — by regulators in technical regulations).

4.3.

Concerning standardisation, the EESC welcomes the cooperation between the standardisation bodies as well as the limited mutual acceptance principles. However the EESC has taken note of the concerns expressed by CEN/Cenelec on the risks of mutual recognition of voluntary standards in the TTIP. The EESC asks the Commission to consider the proposals of the EU standards bodies and to make sure that EU interests are safeguarded. Even the guarantee that all relevant stakeholders could contribute to the development of new standards is important.

4.4.

The US and EU standardisation systems are very different from one another. In particular, the principle ‘one product, one standard, accepted everywhere’ that represents a pillar of the EU single market is not found in the United States. In Europe, when a new standard is adopted, conflicting national standards are withdrawn; in the US, different standards coexist on the market making it difficult for SMEs to understand which one would best suit their product lines. To increase transparency and facilitate small companies, it is essential that a helpdesk is established on the US side that would provide a support service to EU companies willing to export to the US market. These are often small companies with limited resources but with a high level of specialisation in a niche market that is the basis of their competitiveness.

4.5.

The EESC regrets that key areas like electrical safety, electromagnetic compatibility, machinery and telecommunications, where the EU has a clear offensive interest, are identified as priority areas for future consideration: these areas should feature among the referenced specific outcomes on conformity assessment resulting from the negotiations.

4.6.

The EESC likewise regrets that in the section on marking and labelling, no priority areas are identified for future work and there are no placeholders either for the timeline of the future review of marking and labelling requirements or for including the outcomes resulting from negotiations in particular sectors.

4.7.

The proposed SPS Chapter builds on the WTO Agreement on SPS and comments on the EU textual proposal tabled for discussion with the US in the negotiating round of 29 September-3 October 2014 and made public on 7 January 2015.

4.8.

The WTO SPS Agreement, which covers the application of food safety, animal and plant health regulations, includes the Precautionary Principle (Article 5(7)), which is now also enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty. This must not be up for negotiation and should therefore not be part of the agreement. The EESC thus strongly welcomes the assurances given by the EU that the TTIP will not change existing food legislation; that the EU will keep its restrictions on hormones and growth promoters in meat; and that the TTIP will not change EU law on genetically modified organisms.

5.1.

As trade in goods covers a large portion of transatlantic trade, any effort to improve customs procedures will have a strong impact on bilateral trade, in particular for small firms.

5.2.

The EESC welcomes the additional proposals aiming at facilitating customs procedures, in particular: the establishment of a single window on both sides of the Atlantic, enhanced coordination on international standards, and the development of a trade facilitation partnership programme; data harmonisation and alignment, committing to an assessment of what data should be aligned; expanding the responsibilities of the Joint Customs Cooperation Committee to act as the ‘Specialised Customs Committee’ in a number of areas still to be defined and advance rulings.

5.3.

The EESC calls on the European Commission to clarify the elements that are particularly important to EU firms and that are not yet clear in the available text, such as the de minimis value, the removal of all additional fees, and the issue of penalties and responsibility for breaches of customs legislation.

6.1.

In its service offer, the EU offers meaningful commitments in sectors that are key to fostering Europe’s competitiveness and growth (digital and telecom), accelerating the integration of global value chains (transport, courier services, business services, and professional services) or touch on key economic sectors (construction, retail, energy).

6.2.

The EESC also notes with satisfaction that the EU proposal puts forward a framework to facilitate a fair, transparent and consistent regime for the mutual recognition of professional qualifications by the parties and sets out the general conditions for the negotiation of mutual recognition agreements, which are of major importance to secure better market access for EU service providers.

6.3.

The EESC reiterates three main aspects connected to services: the need to increase market access both at the federal and state level; the recognition that market access depends also on enhanced regulatory cooperation; the request to preserve the specificity of public services in accordance with the TFEU.

6.4.

The EESC underlines that the Commission should ensure that, in terms of services, the TTIP goes beyond existing agreements such as GATS and TISA and that specific agreements should be concluded to eliminate many discriminatory barriers that exist in the USA.

6.5.

The EESC stresses a particular issue that the Commission should take into account and that concerns unbalanced market access: US companies can benefit from the EU single market whereas EU companies face a fragmented US market as a large number of service sectors are regulated at state level. The EESC draws the attention to the fact that the continued visa requirement imposed by the United States on nationals of some EU Member States, when US citizens do not require a visa to travel to the EU, represents a discriminatory treatment of EU citizens that is detrimental to the bilateral relationship.

6.6.

On specific sectors, the EESC wants to make the following comments:

6.7.

Concerning public services, the EESC opinion ‘Trade for All’ stated that protection of public services in trade agreements ‘can best be done by the use of a positive list with regard to both market access and national treatment’. However, the current EU offer on services in the TTIP adopts an unprecedented ‘hybrid’ approach to listing services, which could leave substantial uncertainty.

6.8.

In Annex III on market access, a positive list is provided with the same wording as in the EU’s GATS Schedule where ‘public utilities exist in sectors such as related scientific and technical consulting services, R & D services on social sciences and humanities, technical testing and analysis services, environmental services, health services, transport services and services auxiliary to all modes of transport. Exclusive rights on such services are often granted to private operators, for instance operators with concessions from public authorities, subject to specific service obligations. Given that public utilities often also exist at the sub-central level, detailed and exhaustive sector-specific listing is not practical’ (13). However, the public utility clause, enabling to keep monopolistic structures, has several shortcomings, including the fact that the scope does not cover limitations such as economic needs tests or quotas. The EESC wants to stress that the public utilities exemption must apply to all modes of supply.

6.9.

The EESC calls for explicit and detailed wording on the public utilities exemption in Annex III to ensure that all public services that are subject to outsourcing or are funded by state, private for-profit or non-profit organisations would be excluded from the deal.

6.10.

Although the standstill and ratchet clauses do not apply to Annex II, the EESC is concerned that negotiations may result in the EU’s reservations currently listed in this Annex being moved to Annex I, therefore preventing liberalisation from being rolled back. In this respect, the EESC supports the statement of the advisory report of the Dutch Social and Economic Council that ‘Governments must remain free to declare certain services — according to their own preferences — to be “of general public interest”’ (14).

6.11.

The EESC is also concerned that government regulation in any service not listed adequately in Annex I and Annex II will be exposed to potential challenges by the US government through state-to-state dispute proceedings for breaches of national treatment or most favoured nation commitments, or through the investment court system.

6.12.

The EESC regrets that compared to other chapters, services market access is neglected and calls on the Commission to step up its efforts to remove the remaining market access barriers in the US. The United States continues to impose a total ban in terms of shipping. There are equity caps such as 25 % in aviation transport and 20 % in telecoms, and significant behind the border barriers such as in telecoms and satellites. There is a very long list of citizenship requirements e.g. in banking, insurance and accounting. Residency requirements exist for legal, accounting, engineering, and insurance services. Local presence requirements exist, for instance, for legal, accounting, and insurance, as well as a legal form requirement in insurance, etc.

7.1.

The TTIP offers the parties an opportunity to foster sustainability through trade and to go beyond any other trade agreement concluded by either party with regard to sustainability objectives. In its opinions REX/390 and REX/449 (15), the EESC called for the inclusion of a robust trade and sustainable development Chapter, defined as an essential component of the agreement, and therefore welcomes the comprehensive and detailed scope of the Commission proposal. However, the EESC believes that the actual value of these provisions depends primarily on the possibility of eventually and effectively enforcing them.

7.2.

The opinion REX/390 stated that a strong joint civil society monitoring mechanism must be an essential component of any agreement. The EESC therefore fully supports the statement of Commissioner Malmström that effective enforcement mechanisms are needed in the sustainable development Chapter (16). The EESC equally supports the recommendations of the advisory report of the Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands and the French Economic and Social Council on ‘the ability to impose effective sanctions on the parties where necessary’ (17).

7.3.

The EESC commends the European Commission’s far-reaching commitment to high labour and environmental standards. The EESC welcomes that the right to regulate and to set high levels of protection has been reaffirmed in the preamble of the agreement and in a stand-alone article in the sustainable development Chapter.

7.4.

The EESC had called for a reaffirmation of the parties’ commitment to effectively implementing and enforcing their labour legislation, and of their obligations arising from their membership in the ILO. The EESC therefore welcomes the inclusion of binding provisions on the protection of core labour standards such as freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining by forming and joining trade unions, the elimination of forced or compulsory labour, the effective abolition of child labour, and equality and non-discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. Moreover, the EESC welcomes the additional inclusion of the parties’ commitment to ensure decent working conditions, and health and safety at work. In order to make these sustainable development provisions binding, a ‘three step approach’ needs to be implemented with government consultations, domestic advisory groups and expert panels involving the ILO and the general dispute settlement provision of the agreement.

7.5.

As regards environmental aspects, the inclusion of a provision on trade in connection with the environmentally sound management of chemicals and waste aligns well with the concerns of civil society. The EESC therefore approves the inclusion in the agreement of provisions aiming to prevent or minimise adverse effects on human health and the environment in relation to chemicals and waste. Likewise the EESC welcomes the parties’ commitment to sustainable forest management and the mutual recognition of the significant negative impact of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.

7.6.

Cooperation between the parties on trade-related aspects of labour and environmental policies is a welcome provision in the proposal. The EESC supports the recognition of the importance of cooperation in promoting decent work in global supply chains and in elaborating strategies and policies to promote the contribution of trade to resource efficiency, the green economy and the circular economy (18).

7.7.

The objective of protecting labour rights and the environment through a code of conduct, standard schemes, labelling, certification, verification and other related corporate policies is supported by the EESC.

7.8.

Responsible business conduct such as corporate social responsibility can further strengthen sustainability objectives. The EESC supports the inclusion in the sustainability Chapter of explicit references to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the UN Global Compact, ISO 26000, the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (MNE Declaration), and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.

7.9.

The EESC takes note that the EU textual proposal does not include elements related to dispute settlement, which will be developed at a later stage, and reserves the option of commenting on these elements when they are made publicly available.

7.10.

To support the implementation of the parties’ commitment to promoting international trade in such a way as to contribute to the objective of pursuing sustainable development, the EESC favours an enforcement mechanism built on social dialogue. The EESC welcomes the Commission’s proposals for the establishment of domestic advisory groups comprising a balanced representation of civil society groups representing a balance of business, worker, consumer, environment and public health interests that can submit views or recommendations on the implementation of TTIP (19). Experience with agreements in force shows that to ensure the effectiveness of such monitoring mechanisms, it is important that the recommendations delivered by the monitoring bodies result in investigation by EU institutions and are linked with a process of enforcement.

8.1.

The EESC takes note that the Commission has tabled a textual proposal for an investment court system that introduces a procedural reform that establishes a new system to replace the ISDS. It is comprised of two parts, the substantive investment protection provisions and the functioning of the system that settles disputes between investors and states. It also includes an introductory section that provides definitions specific to investment protection.

8.2.

As requested in opinion REX/390, more detailed definitions are provided on the ‘right to regulate’, ‘indirect expropriation’ and ‘fair and equitable treatment’. These are the conditions that need to be met in order to regulate a dispute settlement procedure between a state and an investor. These clarifications serve the party’s right to regulate in the public interest over the protection of the investor.

8.3.

The EESC stresses that the definitions in the agreement, in particular the right to regulate, should be clear and should guarantee the right of the state to maintain and introduce high standards, in particular for social, environmental and consumer protection while guaranteeing an adequate and legitimate protection of investors from protectionism and discrimination. The EESC welcomes that a stand-alone article has been included in the body of the agreement in addition to its preamble. The right to regulate in the area of social protection should explicitly mention collective agreements, including tripartite and/or generalised (erga omnes) agreements, in order to exclude them from being made subject to interpretation as a breach of an investor’s legitimate expectation. Working and wage conditions set in the context of collective agreements may not be considered as a non-tariff barrier to trade.

8.4.

The EESC acknowledges, however, that the most significant changes have been made to the procedural aspects of dispute settlement. The arbitration system has been transformed into a judicial system with a tribunal where ad hoc arbitrators appointed by the disputing parties are replaced by judges from a permanent roster that will be appointed by the parties to the Agreement. These changes make it a more institutionalised system. The EESC calls on the parties to make sure that as soon as the treaty is ratified the investment court system is fully operational and that the judges enjoy democratic legitimacy and are appointed in a way that eliminates the risk of a politicised court system, as well as the risk of conflicts of interest.

8.5.

The EESC is pleased to underline that a strict code of conduct is introduced to ensure impartiality and to prevent conflicts of interests. An ‘appeal tribunal’ is also set up to judge the tribunal’s awards, addressing what were legitimate criticisms of ISDS. Furthermore, transparency is ensured as UNCITRAL rules would apply to disputes.

8.6.

While the EESC welcomes the improvements that have been made with the aim of reforming the system, the EESC still sees critical points of concern that need to be addressed.

8.7.

The EESC acknowledges, moreover, that concerns regarding the implementation of the new system remain, and vary according to the stakeholders. The EESC asks the Commission to further consider these concerns in its continuous efforts to improve the system for resolving investment disputes.

8.8.

Some of these concerns can be summarised as follows:

The EESC calls for the Commission to engage civil society and the European legal community to address these concerns.

8.9.

In addition, some stakeholders question the need for a separate investment arbitration system in properly functioning and highly developed domestic legal systems (21).

8.10.

In conclusion, the EESC considers that the European Commission’s proposal for the ICS is a step in the right direction but must be further improved in a number of areas in order to function as an independent international judicial body. The Committee regrets that the system was proposed without a full and proper consultation process and prior to an impact assessment covering both the costs of the system and its functioning, and calls upon the Commission to draw up such an impact assessment.

28.12.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 487/41

Rapporteur:

Ioannis VARDAKASTANIS

Co-rapporteur:

Jarmila DUBRAVSKÁ

1.1.

The adoption of the UN 2030 agenda for sustainable development marks a historic shift towards a new paradigm by addressing economic, social and environmental disparities in a universal and integrated way. All countries need to translate and implement the agenda, regardless of their income level. This unique agenda fully reflects the European values of social justice, democratic governance and the social market economy, as well as environmental protection. It is therefore a great opportunity for the EU to leverage those values and approach implementation of the agenda in an overarching way. The EESC calls on the EU to lead by example in this very challenging process worldwide.

1.2.

The EESC welcomes the European Union’s commitment to implementing the sustainable development goals (SDGs). However, the EESC is concerned that a year has passed since the adoption of the UN 2030 agenda without the EU having taken concrete and forward-looking measures to mainstream the SDGs in its policies and programmes, and without having initiated a wider consultation with civil society.

1.3.

The EU faces crucial political, social, economic and structural challenges in all areas of the economy and society. Inequalities, unemployment — especially youth unemployment — social exclusion and poverty, gender inequalities, discrimination and marginalisation of vulnerable groups in European societies are eroding the foundations of the EU itself. In many Member States the financial crisis has further exacerbated the problem, which is becoming a human and social rights crisis.

1.4.

The UN 2030 agenda should be turned into a proactive, transformational and positive narrative for Europe, and that process must be driven by a strong political will and determination to shape a sustainable European Union by shifting our economies towards resilient and competitive, resource-efficient, low-carbon and socially inclusive development. This forward-looking narrative would also help overcome the unprecedented lack of trust of EU citizens in the EU project and in particular win young people’s support for it. The EU should use the UN 2030 agenda in this way to present EU citizens with a new vision for Europe: the social contract of the 21st century.

1.5.

The EESC calls for an overarching and integrated strategy for a sustainable Europe 2030 and beyond, providing the necessary long-term time horizon, policy coordination and coherence for implementation of the UN 2030 agenda. This strategy should be based on an interinstitutional agreement between the Commission, the Council and Parliament in order to create a robust basis for further political action. Current European strategies, such as the Europe 2020 strategy, which pushed aside the EU sustainable development strategy from 2001 as the previous overarching strategy, and President Juncker’s 10 priorities do not — in the EESC’s view — provide a way of fully addressing the challenge of SDG implementation in the EU.

1.6.

The aforementioned overarching strategy must include specific targets for SDG implementation, review and monitoring mechanisms, as well as action plans with the necessary legislative and policy instruments, awareness-raising activities — e.g. a Eurobarometer survey on the SDGs — and a plan for mobilising financial resources. The process leading to this strategy should be launched by the Commission with its forthcoming communication, and the design phase of the strategy should provide for broad consultation of civil society, governments, parliaments and local authorities. The EESC is available to support this process as a facilitator.

1.7.

The Commission’s exercise to map the EU’s internal and external policies against the 17 SDGs is a necessary step. The EESC calls on the Commission to complement this with a detailed gap analysis with respect to the 17 SDGs in order to identify areas where the EU should undertake prior and immediate action.

1.8.

The EESC has identified the following key policy areas for transformational change towards sustainable development and recommends that the Commission establish appropriate flagship initiatives, including transparent action plans and milestones, taking into account the recommendations in 4.3 of this opinion:

1.9.

The EESC calls on the Commission to mainstream the SDGs in all relevant policies. The mid-term reviews to be undertaken in 2014-2020 should be used for that purpose. Future MFF periods will provide an excellent opportunity to fully mainstream the SDGs in EU spending programmes.

1.10.

It is particularly important to mainstream the UN 2030 agenda in the external action of the European Union. The Commission should fully adapt areas of key significance — such as trade and development policies, global environmental policies and climate action, humanitarian aid, disaster risk reduction, technology transfer and human rights promotion — so as to proactively push implementation of the UN 2030 agenda. The EESC also calls on the Commission to fully integrate and apply the UN 2030 agenda in the European Consensus for Development and regrets that this has not been sufficiently incorporated into the EU global strategy on foreign and security policy.

1.11.

The EESC asks the Commission to assess and improve horizontal and vertical policy coordination for an effective implementation of the UN 2030 agenda. Better governance is a key enabler of sustainable development. The European Semester should be developed into an appropriate governance framework for vertical coordination of SDG implementation with the Member States. The EESC underlines that participation, transparency, monitoring and review, accountability and citizen ownership should be among the main features and characteristics of better governance.

1.12.

Eurostat should draw up and apply a set of indicators and benchmarks, as developed by the UN, in order to facilitate the review, monitoring, accountability and transparency of the SDG implementation process and to provide the EU institutions, the Member States and all stakeholders with hard statistical data broken down by individual SDG and by target.

1.13.

The EESC notes with appreciation that four EU Member States were amongst the 22 countries presenting the first voluntary reviews on SDG implementation at the UN High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development in 2016. The EESC calls on the EU to lead by example and be the first region to present a voluntary review at the HLPF in 2017. The EESC would be available to organise the contribution from civil society.

1.14.

The EU should move to a multi-stakeholder-led approach in SDG implementation, by including all actors and civil society organisations based on the principles of participation, accountability and partnership. The EESC itself has already presented a specific initiative for the multi-stakeholder European Sustainable Development Civil Society Forum. The Commission should proactively explore and develop an SDG Charter Initiative to foster the creation of strong partnerships at national, EU and international level.

2.1.

In September 2015 world leaders adopted the UN agenda Transforming our world: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, establishing a set of sustainable development goals (SDGs) to end poverty, protect the planet, ensure protection of human rights and guarantee prosperity for all. Each goal has specific targets to be achieved over the next 15 years.

2.2.

The EU will have a key role in the implementation of the SDGs in Europe. In its work programme for 2016 the Commission has announced a new initiative, Next steps for a sustainable European future, with the aim of implementing the SDGs in the EU’s internal and external policies (1).

2.3.

As an initial step the Commission is carrying out an internal ‘mapping’ exercise in order to identify which existing EU policies already address the challenges set by the SDGs. The Commission has asked the Committee to contribute to that process with the present exploratory opinion. In order to take on board the broader debate in European civil society, the Committee has taken into account the results of two major conferences on SDG implementation held at the EESC in 2016, as well as other major conferences (2).

3.1.

The Committee welcomes the Next steps for a sustainable European future initiative in the Commission’s work programme for 2016 as a new approach to ensure Europe’s economic development and social and environmental sustainability beyond the 2020 timeframe and to implement the SDGs in EU internal and external policies in an integrated manner (3). However, there are concerns that there might be a lack of political will and commitment, since so far not much has been done to put the agenda into action.

3.2.

In a situation where the EU project is under pressure and many citizens are losing faith in it, the EU should use the SDGs to develop a positive transformational narrative for a sustainable Europe, connecting the long-term perspective with specific political measures in the short- and mid-term. Sustainability is a ‘European brand’ (4): the UN 2030 agenda reflects European values and the European model of social justice and democratic governance. It therefore offers an excellent opportunity to define a new positive and convincing narrative and vision for the EU.

3.3.

The UN 2030 agenda has been endorsed by all EU Member States and the EU as a whole. It is time now for a clear political commitment at the highest political level affirming that the EU has embraced this new agenda as a vision and overarching framework for moving towards a Sustainable Development Union (5).

3.4.

Implementing the SDGs is not just about development or the environment. The SDGs address the main challenges of transforming our economies and societies, also in the developed world. Their implementation in the EU requires a new model of development that is economically more sustainable, socially more inclusive and environmentally more viable over the long term, and that ensures that the resources of our planet will be shared fairly with a growing world population. There is a need to turn our economies around (6). The new concept of development should imply a new definition of prosperity for the EU and a new set of indicators. The SDGs should be used as levers to enable and accelerate the long-term transition to a resilient and competitive, resource-efficient and socially inclusive EU economy.

3.5.

The launching by the Commission of a roadmap for the renewal of the European Consensus on Development gives the impression that the Commission intends to first focus on the implementation of the new agenda in development policies. This kind of prioritisation is not in line with the integrated approach of SDGs that requires overarching and integrated implementation strategies covering external and internal policies.

3.6.

In order to set up a governance framework for implementing the SDGs the EU will have to extend its planning horizon far beyond 2020. An overarching and long-term strategy for a sustainable Europe with a time horizon of 2030 and beyond (7) should translate the SDGs into EU internal and external policies, addressing specifically European challenges and combined with transparent roadmaps and action plans for legislative and policy initiatives and a detailed timeline up to 2030. The European Parliament has called for a similar approach (8).

4.1.1.

Defining an EU political strategy and roadmap for achieving the SDGs requires more than just mapping of existing EU policies. Mapping current EU policies to individual SDGs does not allow an assessment of whether the SDGs can be achieved in the EU without further action. Existing policies might not be effective, they might be undermined by other policies or there might be other obstacles. Mapping of policies must therefore be combined with a gap analysis identifying the real gaps in EU policy with respect to the 17 goals of the UN 2030 agenda and related targets.

4.1.2.

In this context, the EESC welcomes the Strategic Notes on ‘Sustainability Now!’ drawn up under the aegis of Karl Falkenberg, former director-general of DG Environment, which set out in no uncertain terms the reforms that the EU needs to make under the UN 2030 agenda, using examples from just a few policy areas.

4.1.3.

A comprehensive SDG gap analysis for the EU is still lacking. However, a recently published SDG Index and Dashboard and other assessments carried out in EU Member States demonstrate that the SDGs are an ambitious agenda also for high-income countries (9), mainly due to the way those countries produce, deliver and consume products and services and the resulting negative impact on the environment. The key challenges for EU countries are SDG 12 on responsible consumption and production, SDG 13 on climate action, SDG 14 and SDG 15 on ecosystem conservation, the targets for sustainable agriculture and nutrition in SDG 2, as well as SDG 9 on industry, innovation and infrastructure, where an investment gap has been identified.

4.1.4.

The other challenges are the ‘people-centred’ SDGs, in particular SDG 10 on reducing inequalities, SDG 8 on decent work and employment and SDG 1 on poverty, as well as SDG 5 on gender equality and SDG 4 on education.

4.1.5.

Many OECD countries are failing to achieve the SDG 17 target on financial contributions to development cooperation.

4.1.6.

As a universal agenda, the SDGs also aim to reduce the detrimental social and environmental impacts of high-income country economies in third countries. There has been less measurement of this aspect to date, but it is an important challenge for EU countries.

4.2.1.

The Committee believes that mapping of EU policies should look first at the policy tools that are of strategic importance for EU policy-making and implementation. Initial assessments indicate that these tools do not measure up to the challenge of SDG implementation in the EU (10). None of these strategies has the time horizon of the UN 2030 agenda.

4.2.2.

Under the Barroso Commission, the EU 2020 strategy was declared to be the EU’s overarching strategy, thus superseding the EU sustainable development strategy. While it does, in principle, cover the three dimensions of sustainable development, it is a relatively short-term strategy with a clear European focus. It does not address the international perspective; nor does it describe the impacts of EU domestic policies on other parts of the world and its external policies, including development cooperation. It has therefore never been up to the challenge of replacing the former sustainable development strategy. Two SDGs are not covered: SDG 2 on food and agriculture and SDG 16 on governance, and others are only partially covered, e.g. SDG 6 on (water) and SDG 11 on cities.

4.2.3.

Among President Juncker’s 10 priorities, two SDGs do not feature at all, namely SDG 14 on oceans and SDG 15 on biodiversity, while others are only partially covered, e.g. SDG 4 on education, SDG 6 on water, SDG 11 on cities and SDG 12 on sustainable consumption and production.

4.2.4.

A narrower set of priorities was chosen in the Five Presidents’ Report, which focuses on economic, financial, monetary and fiscal issues, and includes governance as a fifth topic. The report contains some references to SDG areas, such as energy, employment, social inclusion and health systems.

4.2.5.

The European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) has attracted projects in sectors that seem to align with certain SDG implementation challenges: energy (40 %), environment and resource efficiency (12 %), social infrastructure (3 %) (11).

4.2.6.

A number of SDGs — in particular SDG 3 on health, SDG 5 on gender, SDG 10 on inequality and SDG 11 on cities — are inadequately addressed under the thematic investment priorities of the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF).

4.2.7.

With the brand new EU global strategy on foreign and security policy, the EU has a wider framework through which to embrace the UN 2030 agenda in areas such as trade, development, democracy, human rights, humanitarian aid, disaster risk reduction, technology transfer and climate action. The strategy does, to a certain extent, address the SDGs that relate to the need to ensure that prosperity is shared globally. It also states that the SDGs will inform the future post-Cotonou Agreement, and that they are a driver for the review of the European Consensus for Development.

4.3.1.

Based on an analysis of the real gaps and trends in the EU’s performance towards the goals and targets, the Commission should identify policy areas of key importance for the transformational changes required. Policy action should focus on these key areas, with appropriate flagship initiatives, including transparent action plans and milestones. The EESC, also taking into consideration its previous work in these fields, regards the following key policy areas as essential.

4.3.2.1.

One of the key objectives of SDGs is to keep development paths within the planet’s limits, be that in relation to climate, resource consumption, air and water quality or terrestrial and marine biodiversity protection. This requires developed regions such as Europe to fundamentally reduce the environmental footprint of the economy based on a shift in production, consumption and society towards a low-carbon and circular economy. The transition is an opportunity for the EU to modernise its economy — thus increasing its competitiveness and resilience — and for it to improve the quality of life and well-being of its citizens.

4.3.2.2.

Roadmaps have been introduced with the seventh environmental action programme, the 2030 climate and energy framework and the action plan for the circular economy. However, progress on the ground clearly has to be accelerated (12). Consistency with other policy areas must be improved and the implementation gaps in many Member States addressed by fully integrating the low-carbon and circular economy transition into the European semester (13). The seventh EAP and the circular economy action plan need strong implementation mechanisms and active coordination with other policy areas within the Commission in order to ensure an effective outcome (14). Improved dialogue and alliances with civil society, including businesses and trade unions, are necessary to move forward. Active employment policies must provide for a just transition (15). Climate policy has to be based on the principle of ‘climate justice’, ensuring that the burdens and benefits of climate change — in terms of its impacts on human rights, poverty and equality — are shared fairly and that it is not the most vulnerable groups who suffer.

4.3.2.3.

It has to be ensured that markets support the economic transition and prices reflect the true external costs of climate emissions and natural resource use (16). Existing commitments to remove environmental harmful subsidies have to be put into practice and environmental tax reform promoted more vigorously. New designs for decentralised clean energy markets where consumers also become producers have to be scaled up. Similarly, a decentralised sharing economy enables consumers to move towards the circular economy model. The emerging collaborative economy entails a conceptual shift with respect to labour and will be a major source of jobs. Consumers’ and workers’ rights and fair competition in this new sector will have to be ensured (17).

4.3.3.1.

The core concerns of the SDGs are ending poverty and ensuring that everybody can fulfil their potential in dignity and equality. In this, the SDGs reflect Europe’s values and social model. However, the gap between the rich and the poor in Europe has been widening in the past decades, and the last 8 years of recession and financial crisis, austerity policies and, in certain areas, the lack of structural reforms have raised more unemployment and poverty rates, exacerbated additional inequalities and put more pressure on social protection, affecting the most vulnerable groups in particular.

4.3.3.2.

Achieving the SDGs requires the EU to shift the economic paradigm towards a more inclusive model of development which distributes existing wealth more fairly and also increases economic and financial resilience (18). In order to create employment and economic development the EU has to create a favourable investment environment, combined with a well-functioning internal market, international competitiveness and increased domestic demand.

4.3.3.3.

The SDGs should be a reason to reaffirm the Europe 2020 strategy targets on poverty reduction, employment and education, and to think about more efficient ways of achieving them. Key social objectives — such as decent employment, poverty eradication, inequality reduction and social investment — must be put on an equal footing with macroeconomic considerations in the European Semester (19). The first Commission proposal of the European Pillar of Social Rights contained no reference at all to the SDGs. Integration of SDGs should be considered in the further preparation of the European Pillar of Social Rights. The Committee is currently drawing up an opinion on the Pillar in which its view will be authentically expressed.

4.3.3.4.

The EU should invest in a more coherent and systematic approach to combating social exclusion, marginalisation and poverty — one which focuses on vulnerable groups, whose approach is based on human rights and which also addresses gender discrimination. The Directive on equal treatment needs to be adopted (20).

4.3.3.5.

In addition to the challenges of unemployment and the ageing population welfare systems must be adapted to new challenges, in particular those caused by new forms of employment, which offer new employment opportunities but can lead to precarious work and in-work poverty. The job creation potential of key economic transitions — such as the digital, the low-carbon and the circular economy — has to be tapped (21). Employment standards and a European minimum income will help to ensure territorial and social cohesion, and redistribution of wealth and income in a fair way (22) taking into account the competences of the Member States and the EU in these issues. The huge employment potential of social investment should be mobilised by both public and private actors (23). In order to ‘leave no one behind’, it is necessary to invest in qualitative and inclusive education, and in high-quality, affordable and integrated services to support individuals in need.

4.3.3.6.

Social enterprises support labour market integration while supplying affordable products and services for societal purposes, e.g. services in a decentralised low-carbon and circular economy. They should be supported with incentives for start-ups in the social economy and by an enabling regulatory environment (24).

4.3.4.1.

Food — the way it is grown, produced, consumed, traded, transported, stored and marketed — represents the fundamental connection between people and the planet, and is the path to inclusive and sustainable economic growth (25). The SDGs, in particular goals 2 and 12, provide a crucial framework for joint action to feed the world sustainably by 2030. A transition is greatly needed to more sustainable food systems encompassing all stages from production to consumption. Producers need to grow more food with less environmental impact, while consumers must be encouraged to shift to nutritious and healthy diets with a lower carbon footprint.

4.3.4.2.

The reform of the CAP has introduced a combination of measures, which can be considered as a step in the right direction (26). A transition to sustainable food systems requires a comprehensive food policy integrated with a broad-based bio-economy strategy, not just an agricultural policy. Based on recognising the interdependence of food production and consumption, a suitable European policy approach has to be developed charting a course towards sustainability, health and resilience (27).

4.3.4.3.

In this context, an answer needs to be found, inter alia, to the question raised in the Falkenberg report of whether, for example, European agriculture’s orientation towards exports is compatible with the objective of strengthening food production in developing countries.

4.3.4.4.

The EU will have a key role to play in the delivery of target 12.3 of halving per capita global food waste. While close to 800 million people around the globe are hungry, figures show that a third of food produced for human consumption is lost or wasted globally — 100 million tonnes in the EU alone (28). The EESC welcomes the Commission’s plan to create a stakeholder platform to help frame the necessary measures and to share best practice on food waste prevention and reduction (29).

4.3.5.1.

Transforming the economy into a more sustainable model will require a major shift in investment. It is estimated that achieving the SDGs globally would require around USD 3 trillion (30) of investment from both public and private sources. A holistic plan is needed for mobilising financial resources at EU and Member State level. The various EU funding programmes and initiatives need to be brought together.

4.3.5.2.

The EU must gear public investment in developing countries more efficiently towards achieving integrated sustainable development and must integrate SDG indicators in the public funding of development projects. Even more importantly, the EU must encourage and scale up private sector investment in these areas.

4.3.5.3.

But also within the EU the SDGs require significant investment in modernisation of infrastructure and sustainable businesses. First assessments on SDG implementation in the EU show serious gaps in investment in industry, innovation and infrastructure (31).

4.3.5.4.

There is a clear business case for sustainability. To make full use of this opportunity, the EU should create a favourable business environment that encourages innovation, entrepreneurship and sustainable investment. Some businesses have already started, but upscaling and replication of successful sustainable business experiences are paramount. Voluntary approaches such as Corporate Social Responsibility can contribute positively to this transition. They must be complemented by additional measures, such as measures increasing transparency, developing competences, facilitating partnerships and guiding the reporting of companies. The Commission should assess whether multi-stakeholder alliances with the private sector would be a useful instrument at EU level.

4.3.5.5.

EU funding programmes must be aligned with the SDGs. Initiatives such as the Juncker Plan, as well as financial institutions and public investment banks, will play a decisive role. The challenge here is to reallocate capital. The Capital Market Union offers a window of opportunity to promote sustainable investment (32). The mid-term review of the MFF will be an opportunity to mainstream SDGs in the major EU funds. Long-term investment has to be incentivised and obstacles removed (33).

4.3.6.1.

In a globalised economy, trade has a crucial impact on sustainable development within the EU and worldwide. Across various SDGs trade is therefore regarded as an important means of implementing the UN 2030 agenda. With its ‘Trade for All’ communication, the Commission has launched an ambitious action plan for more responsible trade and investment to safeguard social and environmental standards in trade and promote sustainable development (34). Implementation of the SDGs will have to be systematically and effectively linked to that action plan and the results monitored.

4.3.6.2.

Ambitious chapters on trade and sustainable development should be included in all EU trade and investment agreements and effectively implemented and enforced. The sustainable development dimension in the WTO framework needs to be strengthened (35). The best way of securing social, labour and environmental standards in free trade agreements is to ensure much greater involvement of civil society throughout negotiations and the process of implementation and monitoring (36).

4.3.6.3.

The Commission should adopt a strategy promoting decent work in global supply chains (37). Support must be provided for multi-stakeholder initiatives to promote due diligence in global supply chains.

4.4.1.

In support of activities in key policy areas, the EU needs to assess and improve horizontal and vertical policy coordination for effective implementation of the UN 2030 agenda. Better governance is a key enabler of sustainable development (38), and better coordination is a key approach to achieving policy coherence.

4.4.2.

The EU needs to improve the coherence of its policies and consistently gear them to balanced sustainable development. The existing ‘policy coherence for development’ mechanism for mainstreaming development policy considerations in other areas should be scrutinised, strengthened and reconceptualised into an instrument providing ‘policy coherence for sustainable development’ and linked with other horizontal coordination efforts.

4.4.3.

The Commission should also consider how the ‘better regulation’ tools can be used to contribute to achievement of the SDGs. The impact assessment guidelines should be reviewed accordingly, e.g. by introducing a sustainability criterion into impact assessments for new legislation.

4.4.4.

In order to mainstream SDGs in all relevant policy sectors, the Commission should use the guiding principles of the UN 2030 agenda as a framework for reviewing EU legislation and policy-making, in particular with reference to a human-rights-based approach and the principle of ‘leaving no one behind’.

4.4.5.

Based on the global SDG indicators and complemented by appropriate European indicators, the EU must establish a system of SDG monitoring and review which is coordinated with monitoring in EU Member States and links up to global monitoring at HLPF level.

4.4.6.

SDG indicators should also be introduced in existing processes of policy monitoring and evaluation. This applies in particular to the European Semester as the central EU governance mechanism, which has to be adapted to SDG implementation.

4.4.7.

Strengthening the role of sustainability indicators in the legislative budget allocation process would be an important lever in the implementation of sustainable development. Conditionality criteria in the European Structural and Investment Funds should be adapted to SDG implementation.

4.4.8.

Support should be provided for the initiative of the European Sustainable Development Network (ESDN) to establish a peer-learning platform between Member States.

4.4.9.

The EU itself should take the initiative and present a voluntary review to the 2017 session of the HLPF, as the first regional organisation to do so. In addition, the EU should issue annual reports setting out how EU internal and external action contributes to SDG implementation in the annual thematic focus area of the HLPF (39). Civil society should be fully included in the preparation and presentation of the voluntary review and the thematic reports via the European Sustainable Development Forum.

5.1.

The UN 2030 agenda requires a shift to a multi-stakeholder governance model, with a greater role for civil society. SDGs can only be implemented if civil society and other stakeholders take an active role and acquire ownership. Civil society must be involved from local, regional and national level to EU and HLPF level, at every stage through to implementation.

5.2.

For the EU and its Member States, the EESC suggests setting up a European Sustainable Development Forum to get a broad range of civil society organisations and stakeholders involved in implementation of the SDGs in the EU, and in its ongoing monitoring and review (40). A first task of this forum should be to facilitate civil society dialogue in the process, leading to an overarching EU strategy for sustainable development.

5.3.

The Commission should put in place a specific programme and funding line to support the capacity-building of civil society organisations so that they can participate fully in this process. Existing capacity-building programmes need to be more explicitly opened to CSOs working on domestic issues that are doing ‘bridging’ work in relation to the internal and external components, in SDG mainstreaming and in governance issues.

28.12.2016   

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 487/51

Rapporteur:

Christian MOOS

Co-rapporteur:

Denis MEYNENT

1.1.

The Slovak presidency has asked the EESC to give its opinion on ‘future proof legislation’. This new concept comes in the wake of other specific requests addressed to the Commission and the co-legislators with the aim of ensuring that legislation is more in line, in particular, with EU competitiveness and takes account of the specific nature of SMEs and micro-enterprises, aspects that the EESC has commented on several times before.

1.2.

The EESC notes that efforts are being made to improve the quality of European legislation and that these efforts should be stepped up.

1.3.

The EESC believes that high-quality, simple, comprehensible and consistent legislation ‘is an essential factor in integration, not a burden or cost to be reduced’, as it is key to generating sustainable economic growth, boosting innovation, making companies — including SMEs — more competitive and creating more high-quality jobs.

1.4.

The ‘innovation principle’, as defined in chapter 2, is also in line with the thinking behind the REFIT programme. The EESC recalls the tenets of the ‘Better regulation’ programme, which have already been defined and applied, and stresses that this new principle must not take precedence over them; it must be applied intelligently and carefully, particularly with regard to social protection and the environment, health and consumer protection.

1.5.

The EESC suggests that the potential of the ‘innovation principle’ should continue to be studied by sharing best practices.

1.6.

Innovation is one of the conditions required for sustainable growth in Europe. A legislative framework favourable to innovation is needed, although there is no straightforward relationship between innovation and the regulatory framework; administrative measures, tax measures, an investment plan and other such initiatives are needed in addition to legislative measures in order to support and develop innovation.

1.7.

European legislation should always aim to create a legal framework that enables businesses and citizens to benefit from the advantages of the internal market and to avoid unnecessary administrative burdens. European legislation is future proof if it is proactive and forward-looking; the EESC is in favour of legislation that can adapt. It considers that future proof legislation must be based on the Community method.

1.8.

It is essential to avoid needless regulatory costs. Regulatory costs must be proportional to the benefits they generate.

1.9.

The EESC believes that all legislation must be the outcome of public political discussions. The role of civil society and of the social partners is very important here, and an appropriate framework for quality social and civic dialogue is needed, with due regard given to the views expressed.

1.10.

The EESC notes that it is not only the content of legislation but the legislative process itself that must be future proof, so as to meet the needs of businesses and citizens.

1.11.

Each piece of future proof legislation must remain true to its original objective — always in compliance with the objectives set out in the Treaties — and be able to be enacted flexibly in national legislation. It should not go into too much detail, instead limiting itself to providing a framework, which should be properly transposed at national level in a timely manner, after consulting the social partners and representative civil society organisations and giving due regard to their positions. The use of sunset clauses should be further analysed.

1.12.

The EESC is in favour of clarifying the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality which are sometimes used as arguments by opponents of legislative initiatives, without sufficient substantiation of their underlying reasoning.

1.13.

Civil society should serve as a sounding board for future proof legislation. The EESC is well placed to act as intermediary between the legislator and civil society organisations and the social partners.

1.14.

The EESC stresses the importance at national and European levels of impact assessments, including the SME test, for all legislative or non-legislative measures, so that political decisions are informed and based on specific data. Impact assessments are there to help political decision-making: they cannot replace it.

1.15.

The EESC asks that it be consulted when the Commission, the Parliament and the Council come to an agreement on the withdrawal of legislative proposals as it is important to assess the material and immaterial consequences of such withdrawals.

1.16.

The EESC is of the view that the Council must become more transparent and that a future reform of the treaties should attempt to improve the consistency of the Council’s decisions. The rights of the Parliament must be strengthened.

1.17.

The EESC considers it necessary to make more use of enhanced cooperation while not allowing this to weaken the institutions.

1.18.

The EESC stresses the importance of its participation in the consultative processes that need to accompany the deepening of the EMU. The European Parliament, as well as the consultative bodies, need to be better integrated into the European Semester cycle.

1.19.

The EESC supports a trilogue fast-track legislative procedure in emergencies only.

2.1.

The Slovak presidency has asked the EESC to give its opinion on future proof legislation and to consider how the EU can improve legislation so that it is better tailored to the needs of the economy and society at this time of rapid change. The presidency asked how regulatory costs for businesses could be kept at a reasonable level without neglecting the objectives of the treaties.

2.2.

European legislation is future proof if it is proactive and forward-looking and provides the maximum legal clarity and certainty. The EESC is therefore in favour of legislation that can adapt and that is also able to look ahead.

2.3.

Regulations are also necessary if the political objectives of the treaties are to be met. The European Union is a social market economy and some rules therefore entail costs for businesses, such as in the field of health and safety at work. Social peace in Europe is safeguarded by striking a balance between economic and social objectives. Future proof legislation must respect this balance and promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, as well as solidarity among Member States.

2.4.

The EESC supports and emphasises the need to strengthen the legitimacy of European legislation through better regulation, but it stresses that understanding what is future proof must not lead to a depoliticisation of the legislative process. It believes that all legislation must be the outcome of political discussions. In this regard, the major role of civil society and the social partners within the social dialogue must be taken into account.

2.5.

European legislation is future proof if citizens see it as legitimate. It must be founded in representation, consensus and participation and be able to bring outcomes or solutions to collective problems.

2.6.

So that European policies can deliver better results, the EESC believes that the European legislative process should be reviewed within the framework of the Treaty of Lisbon and, if necessary, as part of a new treaty. It is indeed precisely this aspect of future proof legislation that the EESC wishes to highlight, namely its quality, legitimacy, transparency and inclusiveness.

2.7.

The EESC notes that it is not only the content of legislation but the legislative process itself that must be future proof, so as to meet the needs of businesses and citizens. In other words, it boils down to the question of democracy at European level.

2.8.

The political will of elected representatives and the choices they make are therefore crucial. Each piece of legislation can be analysed in the light of its capacity to translate this political will into reality and can be judged on its democratic integrity. The EESC therefore suggests studying not only the content of legislation but also the legislative process.

2.9.

This new concept of ‘future proof legislation’ is linked to other initiatives that aim to improve legislation. The EESC has expressed its views on the ‘Better regulation’ programme and the REFIT programme (1) in several opinions (2). It wishes to mention once again its opinion on a proactive approach to legislation (3).

2.10.

The implementation of the ‘Better regulation’ and REFIT programmes — REFIT having been launched by the European Commission in 2012 in order to measure the administrative burden of regulatory provisions in force and, where applicable, to eliminate them — are key priorities of the presidency trio (the Netherlands, Slovakia and Malta) from January 2016 to June 2017. Obviously the idea of future proof legislation falls naturally within the scope of these programmes.

2.11.

The EESC notes that efforts are being made to improve the quality of European legislation and emphasises the need for these efforts to be stepped up. The EESC has noted the Commission’s communication of 19 May 2015 (4) and the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making of 13 April 2016 (5), while observing that it was not involved with the latter.

2.12.

The EESC believes that high quality, simple, comprehensible and consistent legislation, guaranteed by the Commission, Parliament and the Council, is a vital precondition for generating sustainable economic growth and stimulating innovation, the competitiveness of businesses — including SMEs and microenterprises — and the creation of good quality jobs. It is also important to fully implement the Small Business Act in all areas.

2.13.

European legislation ‘is an essential factor in integration, not a burden or cost to be reduced. On the contrary, when proportionate it is an important guarantee of protection, promotion and legal certainty for all European stakeholders and citizens’ (6).

2.14.

The EESC recalls the importance of the principles that have already been established in order to ensure appropriate legislation. These include the principles of correct implementation within deadlines, subsidiarity and proportionality, the precautionary principle, predictability, ‘think small first’, the external dimension of competitiveness and the internal market test.

2.15.

Currently, a new aspect of legislation — the innovation principle — seems to be becoming a priority for the Council. This principle, which entails taking into account the impact on research and innovation in the process of developing and reviewing regulation, is one of the many criteria for evaluating Commission legislative proposals in technical, technological and scientific domains. It should however be applied intelligently and carefully, particularly in the areas of social and environmental protection, health and consumer protection.

2.16.

As can be seen in the EU Competitiveness Council conclusions (7), ‘the “Innovation Principle” should be applied, which entails taking into account the impact on research and innovation in the process of developing and reviewing regulation in all policy domains’. This is also reflected in the Slovak presidency’s request, as well as in a recent CEPS study (8), which suggests that overly strict rules are likely to hold up investment and slow down innovation. This interpretation is also in line with the thinking behind the REFIT programme.

2.17.

The EESC believes that use of this new principle must be carefully defined in advance.

2.18.

In the EESC’s opinion, the ‘innovation principle’ should have the same weight as the other criteria mentioned in point 2.14 and used by the Commission to analyse the impact of a legislative proposal. A balance should therefore be struck between the innovation principle and the other criteria and care should be taken to ensure that it does not take precedence over them.

2.19.

The EESC suggests to the Slovakian presidency that the potential of the innovation principle should continue to be studied by sharing best practices. The EESC calls on the Commission to use this as a basis to draw conclusions regarding the opportunities and impact of this new approach.

2.20.

European legislation should always aim to create a legal framework that enables businesses and citizens to benefit from the advantages and freedoms of the internal market — i.e. to promote Europe’s innovative drive. This means avoiding unnecessary administrative burdens; meanwhile, poorly designed, obsolete or burdensome rules should be revised or abolished.

2.21.

The EESC believes that regulatory costs should be proportional to the benefits they generate. Needless administrative costs and burdens must be avoided for the sake of the businesses, individuals and administrations responsible for applying regulation. What matters is that a regulation’s net benefit and added value outweigh its costs for businesses and society as a whole.

3.1.

The EESC stresses that the concept of ‘future proof legislation’ needs to be better defined. It needs to be respectful of the values and objectives of the European Union in accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the Lisbon Treaty. Thus the innovation principle, which is one of the priorities of the Slovak presidency (9) and therefore closely linked to the new concept of future proof legislation, needs to take on this responsibility.

3.2.

Innovation is one of the conditions required for sustainable growth in Europe. Whether at European or national level, all legislation should protect companies from unnecessary burdens, particularly SMEs, which have fewer resources. Innovation and competitiveness are the basis for the success of the European social market economy. Innovation needs a high-quality regulatory framework. Legislation and innovation interact in a complex way. This interaction must not be viewed in purely quantitative terms of more or fewer legislative provisions (10).

3.3.

The EESC is of the view that the use of sunset clauses in European legislation should be further analysed so as to avoid future bureaucratic hurdles.

3.4.

Each piece of future proof legislation must remain true to its original purpose, always be consistent with the objectives of the treaties and be able to be flexibly enacted in national legislation, in compliance with the principles mentioned above. It should not go into too much detail, instead limiting itself to providing a framework that can be supplemented, if necessary, either by non-legislative instruments or by national regulators, the social partners and self-regulatory schemes (the latter always under the control of the legislator at the appropriate level).

3.5.

The EESC is in favour of a clarification of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Compliance with subsidiarity, or rather with the division of competences, is of paramount importance for the smooth functioning of the EU as a common legal area. These two principles are, however, sometimes used as arguments by opponents of legislative initiatives, without sufficient substantiation of their underlying reasoning. The criteria that determine the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality need to be clarified. The European Union legal area must be unified and indivisible.

3.6.

The EESC considers that the legislative process at European level must be examined first in order to improve the quality of legislation. There are many initiatives that aim to improve the legislative process, but the stakeholders in this process do not agree on how this should be done. The EESC refers to the Commission guidelines in its ‘Better Law-making’ programme (19 May 2015) and the Interinstitutional Agreement (December 2015/16, April 2016), the Brok-Bresso report (February 2016), the Hübner report (March 2016), the Giegold report (end May 2016) and in particular to the Small Business Act (February 2011). It also draws attention to the proposals of Member States’ governments and parliaments, to initiatives such as European Movement International (EMI) and the Union of European Federalists (UEF), as well as to the contributions of research institutes and think tanks.

3.7.

Civil society organisations are of great importance in the development of European public opinion. Europe needs a less fragmented public opinion to serve as a sounding board for future proof European legislation. As the representative body of civil society organisations in Europe, the EESC is well placed to facilitate a consensus between various civil society stakeholders at all levels, and also in the Member States. More specifically, it is an important intermediary between the legislator and civil society organisations and the social partners.

3.8.

The EESC is aware of the importance of impact assessments, especially for SMEs. They must be taken into account in the legislative process but cannot however replace the political process.

3.9.

Simplifying laws that are difficult to understand and sometimes even to enforce, and abolishing regulations that have become redundant, can benefit citizens and economic players, thereby contributing to an environment that encourages growth and the creation of more good quality jobs (an ‘enabling environment’). Nevertheless, the EESC asks that it be consulted when the Commission, the Parliament and the Council come to an agreement on the withdrawal of legislative proposals. In this context, it is important to evaluate the material and immaterial consequences of such withdrawals and to inform the EESC of them.