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having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia and Ukraine,

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having regard to the statements on Ukraine by the European Parliament’s leaders of 16 and 24 February 2022,

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having regard to the declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the EU of 24 February 2022 on the invasion of Ukraine by the armed forces of the Russian Federation,

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having regard to the statement by the President of the European Council and the President of the Commission of 24 February 2022 on Russia’s unprecedented and unprovoked military aggression against Ukraine,

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having regard to the recent statements by the President of Ukraine and the President of the Commission on the situation in Ukraine,

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having regard to the G7 statement of 24 February 2022,

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having regard to the European Council conclusions of 24 February 2022,

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having regard to Article 39 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

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having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine (1),

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having regard to the statement by the heads of state or government of the European Council of 10 March 2022 on the Russian military aggression against Ukraine,

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having regard to the statement of the G7 Agriculture Ministers’ Meeting of 11 March 2022 on the invasion of Ukraine by armed forces of the Russian Federation,

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having regard to the Versailles Declaration issued by the EU Heads of State or Government during the informal meeting held on 10 and 11 March 2022,

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having regard to the Commission communication of 12 November 2021 on the contingency plan for ensuring food supply and food security in times of crisis (COM(2021)0689),

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having regard to Rule 132(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.

whereas, in line with the UN Charter and the principles of international law, all states enjoy equal sovereignty and must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state;

B.

whereas the Russian Federation launched an unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022;

C.

whereas food production and access to food should not be used as a geopolitical weapon;

D.

whereas the Council has adopted an initial series of sanctions against Russia, including targeted individual sanctions, economic and financial sanctions and trade restrictions, and continues to prepare further sanctions in close coordination with transatlantic allies and other like-minded international partners;

E.

whereas this situation and the legitimate sanctions imposed on Russia will lead to a significant cumulative disruption of global agricultural, fisheries and aquaculture markets, in addition to the COVID-19 crisis and recent significant input cost increases, particularly in relation to the grains and vegetable oil markets given that Ukraine and Russia account for approximately 30 % of world trade in wheat, 32 % of barley, 17 % of corn and over 50 % of sunflower seed oil and 20 % of sunflower seeds, and in terms of access to fertilisers and the inputs required for fertiliser production;

F.

whereas the Black Sea ports are among the civilian infrastructure damaged, resulting in a complete blockage of trade by sea and preventing exports of vital agricultural products to different regions, including the EU;

G.

whereas following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and subsequent sanctions, the Commission and Member States took several measures to counter the negative effects on EU agriculture, fisheries and aquaculture markets;

H.

whereas war on the ground in Ukraine is preventing the internal movement of goods, particularly food, feed and other agricultural products, and has also led to the suspension of oilseed crushing operations and the introduction of export licensing requirements for some crops, which has resulted in serious food scarcity in Ukraine, a lack of stocks available for shipping to other countries and the consequent and imminent risk of geopolitical instability;

I.

whereas the conflict has involved the targeting of critical agricultural infrastructure, including for transportation and storage, which is having significant regional impacts; whereas bombardment, shelling and cluster bombs in war situations damage agricultural land and maim those intending to return to work that land, rendering it unusable for years to come while demining is carried out and ordnance is detected and defused or destroyed;

J.

whereas the 2022 harvest in Ukraine cannot take place as farmers and agricultural workers have fled for their lives or are defending their country, and agricultural holdings are too severely damaged for this year’s production to take place as normal;

K.

whereas Ukraine accounts for 11 % of the world’s wheat market, 16 % of its barley, 15 % of its maize, 16 % of its rapeseed, 50 % of its sunflower seed oil, 9 % of trade in sunflower seeds and 61 % of its sunflower cake; whereas for Russia, these figures are 20 % (wheat), 16 % (barley), 2 % (maize), 3 % (rapeseed) and 20 % (sunflower cake);

L.

whereas Ukraine has become an important supplier to the EU, being the primary supplier of maize (on average 9,2 megatonnes — 57 % of supplies), rapeseed (2 megatonnes — 42 % of European imports by volume), sunflower seeds (0,1 megatonnes — 15 %) and sunflower cake (1,3 megatonnes — 47 % of imports), and to a lesser extent wheat (1 megatonne — 30 % of imports); whereas Russia is also, but to a lesser extent, an important supplier to the EU of wheat (0,5 megatonnes — 11 %), but mainly of rapeseed cake (0,2 megatonnes — 50 %), sunflower cake (0,9 megatonnes — 34 %) and sunflower seeds (0,3 megatonnes — 35 %);

M.

whereas even before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, global agricultural markets saw a rise in prices, due partly to climate effects and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic; whereas rising energy prices in Europe are having a significant impact on the agricultural, fisheries and aquaculture sectors, with increased fertiliser prices and higher energy costs for farmers;

N.

whereas since the beginning of the conflict, there has been a sharp increase in world prices for agricultural products (between + 5 % and + 10 % depending on the product), bringing them closer to the prices of the 2007-2008 marketing year;

O.

whereas the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that the global supply gap that would result from a sudden and steep reduction in grain and sunflower seed exports by the two countries could push international food and feed prices well above their already elevated levels;

P.

whereas the EU not only imports wheat, but also exports it, especially to the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, to which around 6 million tonnes of wheat are exported annually; whereas these countries rely, first of all, on Russia and Ukraine, and then on the EU;

Q.

whereas the objectives of the common fisheries policy and the common agricultural policy (CAP) include, among others, supplying the EU market with foods of high nutritional value, reducing the EU market’s dependence on food imports, and ensuring that food reaches consumers at reasonable prices; whereas the COVID-19 pandemic and now the Russian invasion of Ukraine have made it even more apparent that the EU needs to strengthen its food security and reduce its dependence on inputs imported from single or too few suppliers from outside the EU;

R.

whereas on 9 March 2022, the Commission held the first meeting of the newly established European Food Security Crisis Preparedness and Response Mechanism to discuss food security, the impact of the increases in energy and input prices and the impact of the war in Ukraine; whereas this mechanism aims to increase preparedness to crises by improving coordination and exchanging best practices;

S.

whereas the EU is heavily reliant on Russian fossil fuels; whereas some 90 % of the gas used in the EU is imported, with Russia providing 45 % of those imports at various levels to EU Member States in 2021; whereas Russia was also Europe’s largest supplier of oil at 27 %, more than three times the next largest (Norway); whereas this external dependence on energy directly affects agricultural production;

T.

whereas energy, input and food prices are all rising as a result of the conflict, meaning that more and more people will be at risk of poverty (in addition to the 97 million currently at risk); whereas social measures to help producers and consumers deal with these effects are therefore needed;

U.

whereas food security does not only mean the availability of food supplies, but also includes, according to the FAO, the right to food and the accessibility of healthy nutrition for all;

V.

whereas the impacts on food security of the unprovoked and unjustifiable Russian war of aggression have exacerbated the already severe situation caused by COVID-19, the exceptional droughts in the south of the EU, climate change and biodiversity loss; whereas this crisis has both direct and indirect effects on the agri- and aquatic food sectors;

W.

whereas the EU must not only become more independent in strategic areas such as defence or energy supply, but must also be able to ensure food security at all times by increasing resilience in sectors where the EU is highly dependent on imports; whereas the Ukraine crisis proves once again that food security cannot be taken for granted; whereas European food production should be considered as a strategic sector;

X.

whereas the EU is founded on the principles of solidarity and if the EU does not act now, it is the most vulnerable who will suffer the greatest consequences;

Y.

whereas this crisis has both direct and indirect effects on the agri- and aquatic food sectors, with its direct effects linked to the interruption of commercial exchanges with Russia and Ukraine, and its indirect effects linked to the volatility of prices and production costs;

Z.

whereas the increased price of energy, fuel, fertilisers, raw materials and agricultural products is having a major impact on the agri-food and aquatic food sectors, causing a severe increase in production costs, which is jeopardising production continuity and may lead to supply chain disruptions;

AA.

whereas Russia is Europe’s sixth-largest trade partner in terms of value of EU agri-food exports (2); whereas the trade disruptions and imposed sanctions will require mitigation measures, including the establishment of alternative markets for EU agricultural products;

AB.

whereas food crises can be provoked by speculation on food commodities;

AC.

whereas Russia is a leading exporter of synthetic nitrogen fertilisers and its components, and Belarus is a significant exporter of potash-based fertilisers; whereas nitrogen fertiliser prices are heavily dependent on natural gas prices, a product for which Russia holds major market positions; whereas Russia announced a suspension of exports of mineral fertilisers on 4 March 2022 as a result of its invasion of Ukraine;

AD.

whereas in addition to the EU’s heavy dependence on imports of fertiliser from Russia, the EU’s reliance on imports of fossil-based energies for the production of fertiliser and on potash from Belarus will lead to a significant disruption in supply at a time when fertiliser prices have increased by 142 % over the last year and energy and fertilisers account for 20 % of farmers’ production costs (3); whereas gas accounts for 60 % to 80 % of the production costs of key nitrogen fertilisers (4); whereas high gas prices have already led to the temporary closure of some fertiliser industry facilities; whereas there are already cases where fertiliser companies have rejected orders from farmers due to the lack of raw materials;

AE.

whereas there are many fertiliser products derived from organic sources of nutrients and these products are currently not utilised as replacements for chemical fertilisers; whereas increasing their use could be a solution to reduce the EU’s dependence on chemical fertilisers in line with the objectives of the Green Deal; whereas the use of processed manure, biocharcoal and frass, in particular, could reduce fertiliser costs for farmers;

AF.

whereas the price of fuel has increased considerably in the EU, and has reached a historic high in many Member States; whereas continuation on this trajectory will lead to an unsustainable economic situation for farmers and fishers, such as fishing vessels finding it impossible to go to sea and earn more than the cost of fishing operations;

AG.

whereas the EU fisheries, aquaculture and processing sectors provide high-quality seafood products, playing an important role in ensuring global food security; whereas the fisheries sector has long helped to provide European consumers with high-quality products that meet high nutrition and food safety standards, and is now among the global leaders in terms of sustainability;

AH.

whereas the proper functioning of the European single market is a precondition for ensuring food security; whereas the Hungarian Government has recently decided to ban all grain exports as a consequence of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in violation both of its Treaty obligations and of EU solidarity;

AI.

whereas the impact on consumer food prices needs to be considered in the context of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, which already contributed to price increases before the start of the war; whereas the cost of food in the EU was 4,7 % higher in January 2022 than in the same month of the previous year (5); whereas many Member States, and central and eastern European countries in particular, are facing even higher food price increases;

AJ.

whereas the depletion of animal feed stocks will have severe consequences for many breeding farms; whereas several Member States have signalled that, at current rates, they run the risk of exhausting stocks of animal feed by Easter;

AK.

whereas there are important synergies to be achieved and maintained beyond the current crisis, such as sustainable agricultural practices that enhance soil quality, thereby improving productivity and other ecosystem functions and services, including carbon sequestration and water quality regulation; whereas the way the EU produces and consumes food, beverages and other agricultural products should be consistent with EU policies and commitments, including the UN Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement, to ensure a solid balance between the three pillars of sustainability;

AL.

whereas it is essential to address the problem of food waste at all stages of the supply chain in the short term in order to reduce pressure on the food supply in Europe, particularly as 88 million tonnes of food are wasted in the EU each year, with associated costs estimated to be EUR 143 billion; whereas addressing food waste through measures to achieve the EU food waste reduction target of 30 % by 2025 and 50 % by 2030 compared to the 2014 baseline, as well as through measures to remove unnecessary legislative obstacles to the reprocessing of waste into organic fertilisers, would have an immediate positive impact on food security in the EU;

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