[en] 75 years have passed since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The use of a weapon was contemplated to assure decrease of the cost of American lives. Two types of bombs were developed. Little Boy: gun-type weapon that used Uranium-235 and Fat Man: implosion-type that used Plutonium. On July 26, 1945, Allied leaders issued the Potsdam Declaration, as an ultimatum stating that without surrender, the Allies would attack Japan, resulting in the complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland. The Declaration was rejected. On August 6, 1945, The Little Boy was dropped on Hiroshima and on August 9, 1945, Fat Man was dropped over Nagasaki. The Pacific War ended on August 15, 1945. The bombing caused Japan surrender, thereby preventing casualties that an invasion of Japan would have involved. Opposing belief is that the bombings are fundamentally immoral, and counted as war crimes, and state terrorism. Concerning the ethical and legal justification for them, they have been the subject of debate. (author)

[en] This dissertation focuses on the current debate in international relations literature over the risks associated with the proliferation of nuclear weapons. On this subject, IR scholars are divided into roughly two schools: proliferation 'optimists,' who argue that proliferation can be beneficial and that its associated hazards are at least surmountable, and proliferation 'pessimists,' who believe the opposite. This debate centers upon a theoretical disagreement about how best to explain and predict the behavior of states. Optimists generally ground their arguments on rational deterrence theory and maintain that nuclear weapons can actually increase stability among states, while pessimists often ground their arguments on 'organization theory,' which contends that organizational, bureaucratic, and other factors prevent states from acting rationally. A major difficulty with the proliferation debate, however, is that both sides tend to advance their respective theoretical positions without adequately supporting them with solid empirical evidence. This dissertation detailed analyses of the nuclear programs in the United States, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan to determine whether countries with nuclear weapons have adequate controls over their nuclear arsenals and tissue material stockpiles (such as highly enriched uranium and plutonium). These case studies identify the strengths and weaknesses of different systems of nuclear controls and help predict what types of controls proliferating states are likely to employ. On the basis of the evidence gathered from these cases, this dissertation concludes that a further spread of nuclear weapons would tend to have seriously negative effects on international stability by increasing risks of accidental, unauthorized, or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons and risks of thefts of fissile materials for use in nuclear or radiological devices by aspiring nuclear states or terrorist groups. (author)

[en] A series of studies by the Air Force, the National Reconnaissance Office and NASA have identified the critical role played by large optics in fulfilling many of the space related missions of these agencies. Whether it is the Next Generation Space Telescope for NASA, high resolution imaging systems for NRO, or beam weaponry for the Air Force, the diameter of the primary optic is central to achieving high resolution (imaging) or a small spot size on target (lethality). While the detailed requirements differ for each application (high resolution imaging over the visible and near-infrared for earth observation, high damage threshold but single-wavelength operation for directed energy), the challenges of a large, lightweight primary optic which is space compatible and operates with high efficiency are the same. The advantage of such large optics to national surveillance applications is that it permits these observations to be carried-out with much greater effectiveness than with smaller optics. For laser weapons, the advantage is that it permits more tightly focused beams which can be leveraged into either greater effective range, reduced laser power, and/or smaller on-target spot-sizes; weapon systems can be made either much more effective or much less expensive. This application requires only single-wavelength capability, but places an emphasis upon robust, rapidly targetable optics. The advantages of large aperture optics to astronomy are that it increases the sensitivity and resolution with which we can view the universe. This can be utilized either for general purpose astronomy, allowing us to examine greater numbers of objects in more detail and at greater range, or it can enable the direct detection and detailed examination of extra-solar planets. This application requires large apertures (for both light-gathering and resolution reasons), with broad-band spectral capability, but does not emphasize either large fields-of-view or pointing agility. Despite differences in their requirements and implementations, the fundamental difficulty in utilizing large aperture optics is the same for all of these applications: It is extremely difficult to design large aperture space optics which are both optically precise and can meet the practical requirements for launch and deployment in space. At LLNL we have developed a new concept (Eyeglass) which uses large diffractive optics to solve both of these difficulties; greatly reducing both the mass and the tolerance requirements for large aperture optics. During previous LDRD-supported research, we developed this concept, built and tested broadband diffractive telescopes, and built 50 cm aperture diffraction-limited diffractive lenses (the largest in the world). This work is fully described in UCRL-ID--136262, Eyeglass: A Large Aperture Space Telescope. However, there is a large gap between optical proof-of-principle with sub-meter apertures, and actual 50 meter space telescopes. This gap is far too large (both in financial resources and in spacecraft expertise) to be filled internally at LLNL; implementation of large aperture diffractive space telescopes must be done externally using non-LLNL resources and expertise. While LLNL will never become the primary contractor and integrator for large space optical systems, our natural role is to enable these devices by developing the capability of producing very large diffractive optics. Accordingly, the purpose of the Large Aperture, Lightweight Space Optics Strategic Initiative was to develop the technology to fabricate large, lightweight diffractive lenses. The additional purpose of this Strategic Initiative was, of course, to demonstrate this lens-fabrication capability in a fashion compellingly enough to attract the external support necessary to continue along the path to full-scale space-based telescopes. During this 3 year effort (FY2000-FY2002) we have developed the capability of optically smoothing and diffractively-patterning thin meter-sized sheets of glass into lens panels. We have also developed alignment and seaming techniqu es which allow individual lens panels to be assembled together, forming a much larger, segmented, diffractive lens. The capabilities provided by this LDRD-supported developmental effort were then demonstrated by the fabrication and testing of a lightweight, 5 meter aperture, diffractive lens

[en] Biological agents are unique class of microorganisms which can be used to produce the disease in large populations of humans, animals and plants. If used for hostile purposes, any disease-causing microorganism could be considered a weapon. The use of biological agents is not a new concept and history is replete with examples of biological weapon use. Before the twenty century, biological warfare took on three main forms by deliberate poisoning of food and water with infectious material, use of microorganisms or toxins in some form of weapon system, and use of biologically inoculated fabrics. Four kinds of biological warfare agents are bacteria, viruses, rickettsiae, fungi. These are distinguished by being living organisms, that reproduce within their host victims, who then become contagious with a deadly multiplier effect, bacteria, viruses, or fungi or toxin found in nature can be used to kill or injure people. Biological agents may be used for an isolated assassination, as well as to cause incapacitation or death to thousands. These biological agents represent a dangerous military threat because they are alive, and are therefore unpredictable and uncontrollable once released. The act of bioterrorism can range from a simple hoax to the actual use of biological weapons. Biological agents have the potential to make an environment more dangerous over time. If the environment is contaminated, a long-term threat to the population could be created. This paper discusses common biological agents, their mode of action in living organisms and possible impact on the environment. (author)

[en] This summer 2020 marks a sad commemoration: the 75. anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan. Pierre Papon, who has a book coming out in mid-September on the role of science in the democracies, looks back at this event which saw human beings drop the first atomic bomb, occasioning between 155,000 and 250,000 mainly civilian deaths, depending on the various estimates. After reminding us of the premonitory writings of H.G. Wells on the discovery and use of an atom bomb, and of the Manhattan Project, which led to the development of nuclear weapons, Papon underscores the reaction both in the scientific community and also from thinkers like Albert Camus to the use of those weapons. He looks back too at the decisions taken by states over the years to restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons, but many questions remain in that regard about the motivations of - and measures taken by - the nuclear powers to achieve lasting arms control

[en] In view of the threat to Canadian domestic targets presented by the asymmetric use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) weapons of mass destruction (WMD), this thesis examines whether the Canadian Forces (CF) has capability deficiencies in managing the consequences of such an attack. Research included an examination of the post Cold War strategic environment, the state of the art in CBRN technology, current concepts and experience in managing the consequences of major disasters and responsibilities at the municipal, provincial and federal levels of government. The methodology used included scenario based planning to develop circumstances where WMD might be used domestically, and decomposition to break down the scenarios into events and potential CF roles and tasks. The current CF structure was used to determine the probable CF response, which included the ability of CF units to perform the required tasks, the CF response time and the ability of the CF to sustain the operation. (author)

No abstract available

[en] A series of exercises and targeted meetings held by the European Safeguards Research and Development Association (ESARDA) Verification Technologies and Methodologies Working Group and the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) Nonproliferation and Arms Control Technical Division provided valuable insight into how a systems approach could help identify nonproliferation and arms control verification requirements. International experts from nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states, with a wide-range of expertise in nuclear safeguards, arms control verification, radiation detection, political science, and defense studies, participated in the discussions. It was demonstrated that with a systems approach, it is possible to design a transparent state-level systems framework to define arms control verification objectives, processes, and timescales for an effective verification regime based on the strategic goals of a treaty, while taking into account restrictions from different security environments. This approach was also shown to be an effective mechanisms for international and technical engagement on such complicated issues. Possible future research activities could include: (1) increased efforts to link the material and weapons sectors of the nuclear weapons complex; (2) further attention on how to satisfy the competing needs for effective verification and protection of national security; (3) greater consideration on how to define the treaty-controlled items so that declarations can be verified effectively; (4) continued testing of a systems approach to analyze the pros and cons of possible verification regimes, to conduct a form of sensitivity analysis and provide feedback and a better understanding of confidence levels that could be achieved; and (5) possible ideas of how to engage in substantive dialogue in a broad international environment, such as the on-going International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), while taking into account the range of weapons and verification experience and the need to uphold NPT Article VI.

[en] Limiting the number of warheads is a good beginning, but getting to the end state calls for new thinking. Six specific steps can start us down that path

[en] In September of 2009, a Tri-Lab team was formed to develop a set of metrics relating to the NNSA nuclear weapon surveillance program. The purpose of the metrics was to develop a more quantitative and/or qualitative metric(s) describing the results of realized or non-realized surveillance activities on our confidence in reporting reliability and assessing the stockpile. As a part of this effort, a statistical sub-team investigated various techniques and developed a complementary set of statistical metrics that could serve as a foundation for characterizing aspects of meeting the surveillance program objectives. The metrics are a combination of tolerance limit calculations and power calculations, intending to answer level-of-confidence type questions with respect to the ability to detect certain undesirable behaviors (catastrophic defects, margin insufficiency defects, and deviations from a model). Note that the metrics are not intended to gauge product performance but instead the adequacy of surveillance. This report gives a short description of four metrics types that were explored and the results of a sensitivity study conducted to investigate their behavior for various inputs. The results of the sensitivity study can be used to set the risk parameters that specify the level of stockpile problem that the surveillance program should be addressing.