We have given the title “Europe in the “arc of fire” to the yearbook dedicated to 2024 because the events we have had to face during the last several months have – unfortunately – confirmed the diagnosis made earlier: Europe is in danger.

Our geopolitical environment is deteriorating, and conflicts and crises are multiplying on our doorstep. From Ukraine to the Middle East, via South Caucasus, the Horn of Africa or the Sahel. Not forgetting, further afield but with major potential consequences for our economies, the rising tensions in the South China Sea. All of this against a backdrop where the future US commitment to European security is becoming much more uncertain.

As for the two open conflicts raging on our borders, the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East, we struggled this year in making progress towards a just and lasting settlement.

As for the two open conflicts raging on our borders, the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the conflict in the Middle East, we struggled this year in making progress towards a just and lasting settlement of each of them.

We have continued our financial, humanitarian and military support for Ukraine. We have now committed €122 billion for this purpose, including €45 billion in military support. We have also just decided to use the revenues from frozen Russian assets to guarantee this aid to Ukraine for the future. But despite all that, we have not managed to provide Ukraine with sufficient resources to protect itself from the constant air attacks on its civilian and energy infrastructures. The winter is going to be very harsh for Ukrainians, with massive power cuts. Nor have we managed to provide sufficient support to Ukraine, particularly on the ammunition side, to enable it to prevent the Russian army from continuing its advance into Donetsk, let alone take back lost territory. In the autumn, the direct intervention of North Korean soldiers on the Russian side marked a dangerous escalation, and constitutes a very worrying step towards the internationalisation of the conflict.

Russia’s war of aggression is an existential threat to the EU

I have already said it many times: Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is an existential threat to the European Union. If Vladimir Putin’s Russia were to win in Ukraine, it would inevitably pursue its imperial policy against other neighbours, particularly in Europe. And we have already seen the effects of this aggressive policy in Georgia and Moldova. Beyond Europe, if we fail to help Ukraine defend its sovereignty, the entire rules-based world order that we have sought to promote globally will be brought down.

Many have been saying over and over again since February 2022 that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was a wake-up call for Europe. But as political scientist Ivan Krastev rightly said a few weeks ago, in a debate in which I took part, there is a difference between being awake and getting out of bed to act. And it seems that many in Europe have certainly been woken up by Vladimir Putin’s aggression against Ukraine, but have not yet really got out of bed.

Many in Europe have certainly been woken up by Vladimir Putin’s aggression against Ukraine, but have not yet really got out of bed.

Yet it is all the more urgent to do so now that the commitment of the United States, not only in Ukraine but for Europe’s security as a whole, has become more uncertain for the future with the re-election of Donald Trump to the White House. We have no choice: it is imperative that we become capable of ensuring our own security. Our well-being and future cannot continue to depend on the mood of US voters in the Midwest every four years. This means, in particular, revitalising our defence industries, which have been greatly weakened by 30 years of ‘silent disarmament’ since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

Our defence budgets have already increased significantly in recent years, particularly our spending on equipment, which has risen by one third since 2022. Nevertheless, despite Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, progress has been slow to date in coordinating our supplies of military equipment: only 18 % of our purchases are currently made in a cooperative manner, whereas several years ago we had already set ourselves a target of 35 % – twice as much. What is more, our defence industry has not been able until now to keep pace with our rearmament effort, either quantitatively or qualitatively: since 2022, almost 80 % of additional military equipment has been purchased outside the EU.

Consolidating and boosting our defence industries

If we want to be able to replenish the stocks of our armed forces, support Ukraine at the necessary level, reduce our excessive external dependence and prepare for the future by developing the defence equipment of tomorrow, we urgently need to boost our defence industries.

Since 2022, we have already doubled our artillery ammunition production capacity, thanks in particular to the efforts of my colleague Commissioner Thierry Breton, but we still need to do more in this sector and duplicate this effort in others. We have a quantitative but also a qualitative problem in many domains that will be decisive for the future, like artificial intelligence and drones.

That is why, in spring 2024, we prepared and presented, with the European Commission, the first-ever European defence industry strategy. But we still need to find the means to implement it. The Draghi report puts the effort required at €500 billion over the next 10 years. To mobilise these resources, we first need to remove the existing obstacles to private financing of defence industries and enable the European Investment Bank to provide greater support for defence projects. But this will not be enough: significant amounts of European public money will also be needed.

The existential threat posed to Europe by the aggression of Putin’s Russia would, in my view, clearly justify issuing European common debt to deal with it and support our defence and our defence industry.

Can we wait until 2028 and the next European multiannual financial framework to start supporting our defence industry more substantially than we do today? I do not think so. As we decided in the face of the major emergency represented by the COVID-19 pandemic, the existential threat posed to Europe by the aggression of Putin’s Russia would, in my view, clearly justify issuing European common debt to deal with it and support our defence and our defence industry. I am well aware of how politically sensitive the subject is, but at a time when the US commitment to European security is becoming more and more uncertain, I do not see any possible alternative that is equal to the needs.

In the new Commission, there will be a dedicated Commissioner for Defence. In practice, however, it will be more a Commissioner for the defence industry, which indeed needs better coordination and an active boost. For this effort to be effective, this Commissioner will have to work in close cooperation with the HR/VP  who is in charge of EU security and defence policy. It is indeed essential to coordinate precisely what we do on the demand side of European armies, managed by the HR/VP via the European Defence Agency in particular, and on the supply side, via the specific industrial policy of the Commission.

As far as the Middle East conflict is concerned, the fighting has continued, while moving towards a just and lasting settlement to this century-old conflict remains more elusive than ever. Throughout the year, we have consistently called for a ceasefire and the unconditional release of the hostages, and we have increased our humanitarian support to Gaza.

Regarding the Middle East conflict, we have not made a real difference. The fighting has continued, while moving towards a just and lasting settlement to this century-old conflict remains more elusive than ever.

But in the end, we have not made a real difference. We failed to prevent the civilian death toll from rising month by month, to prevent the humanitarian situation in Gaza from becoming catastrophic, to prevent tensions from escalating in the West Bank and the Palestinian Authority from teetering on the brink of collapse, to prevent Israel from taking catastrophic decisions for the Palestinians by severing all ties with UNRWA, to prevent the war from spreading in the region with the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and the successive Iranian strikes and Israeli retaliation. We could not, in particular, avoid the fourth invasion of Lebanon, accompanied by widespread destruction and a massive exodus of people in a country that was already on the verge of collapse.

At the end of 2024, it is hard to be optimistic about the future of the Middle East. Support for a two-state solution has weakened across the region. Both sides are now dominated by those who believe that only a military solution can bring peace. But this is an illusion: war and violence can only fuel an endless spiral of revenge, with ever more deadly confrontations.

Europe could and should play a greater role in the Middle East conflict

I am absolutely convinced that Europe could and should play a greater role in both stopping the current conflict and achieving a negotiated peace in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. We are the leading provider of international aid to the Palestinian people, through our support for UNRWA and the Palestinian Authority. We are also Israel’s leading trade, investment and people-exchange partner under an association agreement that is the most extensive we have in the world. Some of our Member States are also major suppliers of arms to Israel. In other words, if we wanted to influence the players in this conflict to bring about a ceasefire and resume peace negotiations, we have the means of doing so, even if we are obviously not as powerful as the Americans in this region.

But for the time being, we have essentially given up using these levers because of our deep divisions on this very sensitive issue. In any of the UN General Assembly votes on Gaza and the Middle East issue, the EU Member States have been divided between three different positions. The consequences of this failure and of our resulting passivity could be very serious for the Union. This conflict is already heightening tensions within our own societies, as illustrated by the disastrous events in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, in November 2024. It could trigger a new wave of refugees seeking to reach Europe and threaten our fossil fuel supplies, which, since the start of the war of aggression against Ukraine, have been even more dependent than before on the stability of that part of the world.

The contrast between our passivity in the face of events in the Middle East and our strong commitment to supporting Ukraine against the Russian aggression is very often perceived as the expression of a double standard.

Above all, the contrast between our passivity in the face of events in the Middle East and our strong commitment to supporting Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression, even if it remains insufficient, is very often perceived outside Europe as the expression of a double standard: non-EU citizens often believe that for us the life of a Palestinian child is not worth as much as that of a Ukrainian child. This is obviously not true: the vast majority of Europeans absolutely do not think this way. But the reality of our actions on the one hand and our inaction on the other can give such an impression, which is widely exploited against us by Russian propaganda and disinformation in the countries of what is now known as the Global South. And this does not just concern Muslim countries. I have been struck by the vigour with which this criticism is regularly levelled at us in Latin America or sub-Saharan Africa.

We must avoid the consolidation of the ‘rest against the West’

There is a serious risk that this conflict could help to solidify a coalition of the ‘rest against the West’, as unfortunately illustrated in October by the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia. We have also seen such a risk materialise in the Sahel region in recent months. After 11 years of presence in the region, our last cooperation mission had to leave Mali last spring.

Of course, it is still too early to assess what the foreign policy of Donald Trump’s second presidency will be, but in a way, the United States could afford a truly isolationist policy. It is independent in terms of fossil fuel production, has plenty of raw materials on its territory and has only two neighbours, Canada and Mexico. This is not the case for the European Union. We could not at all afford a combination of the existential threat posed by Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian and imperialist regime in the East of Europe and a widespread hostility from our neighbours in the southern Mediterranean and sub-Saharan Africa.

Europe’s leaders naturally tend to focus mainly on the internal problems facing our economies and societies and the reactions they provoke among Europe’s citizens. And of course nobody can blame them for that. But we need to ensure that this does not lead to actions that could damage our relations with the rest of the world. That would be a mortal danger for the future of the European Union.

It is on the contrary my job to improve these relations, and I have continued to work relentlessly in that direction throughout this year. Even if the results have not been sufficient at this stage in the Ukrainian conflict or in the Middle East, as I have just pointed out, they have been more positive elsewhere in 2024.

During my whole mandate, I have worked hard to develop our other transatlantic relationship and to bring the European Union closer together with Latin America and the Caribbean. And I am satisfied that this year, after 19 years of negotiations, we should be able to finalise the trade agreement between the EU and Mercosur, with the necessary adjustments to better protect the environment and fight climate change. This is about much more than just trade; it is above all a geopolitical issue. Europe has long-standing and close ties with this part of the world; however, over the last few decades we have rested on our laurels. And other global players have taken advantage of this to become privileged partners of this part of the world.

The world’s centre of gravity is shifting to Asia

Similarly, even though the Russian war of aggression and the conflict in the Middle East continue to focus our attention, we have never lost sight of the fact that the world’s centre of gravity is shifting towards Asia and the Indo-Pacific, and that the European Union had to become more involved in this part of the world, even if it is far away from our borders. North Korea’s direct involvement alongside Putin’s Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine has just reminded us how closely linked all the crisis theatres are in this globalised world.

The EU was not born as a defence alliance but it can and must become a global security partner in areas such as maritime security, the fight against cyber threats or foreign information manipulation and interference.

Against this backdrop, this year I pursued our commitment to strengthening our links with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations during a visit to Vientiane in Laos in July, and in November we were able to conclude two new security and defence partnerships, the first outside Europe, with Japan and South Korea. The European Union was not born as a defence alliance but, in the current context, it can and must become a global security provider and a security partner in areas such as maritime security, the fight against cyber threats or foreign information manipulation and interference.

My term of office is coming to an end in a few days. In 2019, during my confirmation hearing, I told the Members of the European Parliament that my priority would be for Europe to learn to ‘speak the language of power’. I am well aware that this learning process is still far from complete. But I have worked for that to the best of my ability over the last five years, and I am very grateful to have had this opportunity to serve the citizens of the EU.