

Kaja Kallas

High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission

Confirmation hearing due to be held on Tuesday 12 November, at 9.00.

European Parliament committee responsible: Foreign Affairs (AFET)

Kaja Kallas served as the prime minister of Estonia from 2021 to 2024. In 2024, she was awarded the Walther Rathenau Prize in recognition of outstanding lifetime achievement in foreign policy.

Having joined the Estonian Reform Party in 2011, Kallas has been its leader since April 2018. From 2011 to 2014, she was a member of the Estonian Parliament (12th Riigikogu) and served as chair of its Economic Affairs Committee (2011). She was also a member of the 14th Riigikogu (2019 to 2021).

As a Member of the European Parliament from 2014 to 2018, Kallas belonged to the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE, now Renew Europe) political group. During this term, Kallas was Vice-Chair of Parliament's Delegation to the EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Association Committee.

Kallas was born in 1977 in Tallinn. She graduated from the University of Tartu in 1999 with a degree in law and pursued postgraduate studies at the Estonian Business School in 2007. Before entering politics, Kallas worked as an attorney at law.



Kaja Kallas, Estonia.

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This is one of a set of briefings designed to give an overview of issues of interest relating to the portfolios of the Commissioners-designate. All these briefings can be found at: https://epthinktank.eu/commissioner_hearings_2024.



Fundamentals of the portfolio

Since 2009, when the [Lisbon Treaty](#) entered into force, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) has also been Vice-President of the European Commission (VP). This facilitates coordination and ensures coherence in EU foreign policy, as the Commission has key international responsibilities in areas such as trade, development, EU enlargement and neighbourhood policy, humanitarian aid, security and defence. The external dimensions of internal EU policies (such as environment, industrial and energy policy) are also gaining importance in the EU's external action. As part of her new mandate as HR/VP, as described in the [mission letter](#) from Commission president-elect Ursula von der Leyen, Kaja Kallas has been asked to prepare regular College of Commissioners' debates on foreign policy issues.

The legal basis of the portfolio is [Article 17](#) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) – which refers to the HR as a member of the European Commission – and [Article 18](#) TEU, which refers to the post, role and appointment of the HR. Title V TEU (Articles 21–46) sets out general provisions on the EU's external action and specific provisions on common foreign and security policy (CFSP), and provisions on common security and defence policy (CSDP). Declarations 13 and 14 annexed to the Treaty maintain that the CFSP and CSDP provisions do not affect 'the responsibilities of Member States for formulation and conduct of their foreign policy'. The Treaty gave the EU legal personality, but unanimous decision-making and the limited roles of the Commission and the European Parliament reflect the continuing intergovernmental nature of the CFSP and CSDP.

As outlined in the [political guidelines for the 2024–2029 European Commission](#), ensuring EU security, prosperity and democracy will be the key priority of the new College. Amidst increased geostrategic rivalries and instability, Kaja Kallas's mission as HR/VP will be wide-ranging and challenging. It will include overseeing foreign and security policy on behalf of the EU, building consensus among the Member States, shaping a strategic approach towards the EU's neighbours, and coordinating the work on a European defence union. Among her tasks is to develop, together with the Commissioners in the relevant thematic areas, a new pact for the Mediterranean, a comprehensive EU Middle East strategy, a new partnership with Africa, a renewed approach to the Sahel, and cooperation with the Indo-Pacific region, Latin America and the Caribbean. Kallas will also head the [European Defence Agency](#) and the [EU Institute for Security Studies](#), and represent the EU at international forums such as the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Kallas will supervise the Commission services related to the CFSP and the CSDP, as well as the European External Action Service (EEAS) and some 145 [EU delegations](#) around the world. Kallas will also chair the [Foreign Affairs Council](#).

Priorities and challenges

Expectations/public opinion

Responding to an April 2024 [Eurobarometer survey](#), EU citizens wanted to see greater EU involvement in all policy areas relating to foreign affairs, peace and security. Respondents set great store by the values of peace and democracy. Looking to the future, they put defence and security (37%) among their top priorities for reinforcing the EU's global position, followed by energy issues and food security (both at 30%). While 40% of respondents considered that the EU's role in the world had increased in importance, 35% thought it had stayed the same and 22% that it had diminished. Just over half of respondents [supported](#) EU enlargement. Russia's invasion of Ukraine was seen as a threat to EU security by 79% of respondents, and 75% agreed that by standing against Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the EU was defending its intrinsic values. That said, 81% of respondents considered that the war in Ukraine had serious financial consequences.

Forging a common foreign and security policy

The HR/VP mission letter also notes the need for decisions to be taken 'in a faster and more efficient way' and suggested more frequent use of qualified majority voting (QMV) on matters related to the CFSP. Currently, the Council [votes unanimously](#) on such matters, except for certain clearly defined cases that allow for a qualified majority. Unanimous decision-making has limitations, as seen in crucial decisions regarding EU support for Ukraine, because they require Member States to negotiate a [deal](#) at every stage of the decision-making process. At its [Sibiu meeting](#) in May 2019, the European Council endorsed the idea of broadening the scope of QMV in CFSP by using Article 31(3) TEU (the 'passerelle clause', which allows the European Council to authorise by unanimity the Council to use QMV for CFSP). A 2023 EPRS [cost of non-Europe report](#) identified challenges, such as a return to national power politics or 'strategic vetoes', and also outlined alternative policy options, ranging from constructive abstention to progressive use of the 'passerelle clause'.

Facing budgetary challenges

Increased external policy engagement requires a broad range of instruments and appropriate budgetary resources. However, the [mid-term review of the multiannual financial framework \(MFF\)](#), along with the [challenging task](#) of raising funds in support of Ukraine, has stretched the EU's 2021–2027 budget to its limits. The Commission has proposed additional contributions from Member States or other sources, such as income from/backed by frozen Russian assets. Furthermore, the annual reports of the European Court of Auditors (ECA) regularly note high margins of error in the spending of EU funds in third countries, or, as in the case of the [Facility for Refugees in Turkey](#), 'delayed implementation and insufficient measurement of impact'. The 2023 ECA annual report, [published](#) on 10 October 2024, specifically mentioned challenges of 'increased financial exposure [of the EU], and growing financial risks due to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine'.

Some of the new priorities for the future, such as security and defence, along with enlargement, will require a significant increase in funding. The auditors also warn of the growing financial risks the EU budget is facing due to a record amount of debt. Finally, a challenge for the HR/VP and the Commission will be to fully respect Parliament's oversight capacity. Parliament has often been [critical](#) of the Commission's actions. For instance, it has asked the Commission to provide [clarifications](#) on the disbursement of EU funds to third countries whenever it applies the urgent procedure under [Article 213 TFEU](#), which does not require proper parliamentary scrutiny or the application of the comitology process.

Supporting Ukraine's security and reconstruction

Together with the Commissioner for Enlargement, Kallas will coordinate support for Ukraine's EU accession, security and reconstruction. The [3rd Rapid damage and needs assessment report](#) released in February 2024 estimates that as of 31 December 2023, the total cost of reconstruction and recovery in Ukraine would be US\$486 billion over the next decade. Agreed funds made available by the EU include the [Ukraine Facility](#), which mobilises €50 billion to ensure support in 2024–2027. Some €13.8 billion has already been disbursed, leaving €36.2 billion available.

On 21 May 2024, the Council [gave](#) the go-ahead to direct 'extraordinary revenues' (interest gained on principal) sourced from immobilised ('frozen') Russian state assets held under EU jurisdiction to the Ukraine Assistance Fund and the Ukraine Facility. Some 90 % of these revenues will be used to support Ukraine's self-defence through the [European Peace Facility](#), and 10 % to support its reconstruction through the [Ukraine Facility](#). Furthermore, new loans worth some US\$50 billion to Ukraine were agreed upon at the June 2024 [G7 meeting in Puglia](#). These loans would be secured by revenue stemming from interest earned from immobilised Russian assets held in the G7 jurisdictions (some [US\\$260 billion](#) are held in the EU's jurisdiction, mostly by the Belgian securities custodian Euroclear). The G7 agreement is not yet fully implemented, as the US is [unwilling](#) to join the initiative before the presidential elections of 5 November.

Commission President-elect Ursula von der Leyen has [announced](#) that the EU will move ahead alone, by providing a €35 billion macro-financial assistance (MFA) in the form of a loan to Ukraine, secured with revenue from frozen Russian assets. This MFA loan was [approved](#) by the Council on 9 October, and is being [discussed](#) by Parliament's Committee on International Trade (INTA) under the co-decision procedure.

The HR/VP will also work with the Commissioner for Financial Services and the Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security, to strengthen the strategic nature of financial and trade sanctions. Nevertheless, [legal and political debates](#) about the use of immobilised sovereign assets continue, as the 2004 UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Property ([UNCSI](#)) in its Article 21(1)(c) provides that the property of the central bank or other monetary authority of the state is deemed to be 'immune from all measures of constraint'.

Strengthening the EU's security and defence

The EU has committed to stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes. According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), as of 31 July 2024, Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine had claimed a total of 35 160 [civilian casualties](#). Once a new Member State joins the EU, it benefits from the EU's mutual defence clause, set out in [Article 42\(7\) TEU](#), and this holds true for Ukraine as well. This article commits Member States to aid fellow Member States that fall victim to armed aggression 'by all the means in their power'. Some analysts [suggest](#) that Article 42(7) TEU carries a higher degree of legal obligation than its equivalent, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (NATO), under which each party has an obligation of mutual defence 'as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force'. However, it is not clear how the [activation](#) of Article 42(7) TEU would work in [practice](#), especially in the case of kinetic warfare. Furthermore, the [joint security commitments of the EU and Ukraine](#), signed on 27 June 2024, include an extraordinary consultations mechanism in the event of future aggression. Territorial disputes in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia will undoubtedly encumber Moldova's and Georgia's efforts to join the EU and create further constraints in the case of their EU accession.

To remain an influential global power, the EU needs to do more to enhance its military operations and capabilities. This includes the implementation of the decisions on the [rapid deployment battlegroups](#), a flagship initiative proposed by the [Strategic compass for security and defence](#) approved in March 2022, in alignment with the military integration proposed in the [global strategy for security and foreign policy](#). [Maritime security and naval operations](#) remain crucial instrument for a successful EU foreign policy, especially in regions such as the Middle East and the [Red Sea](#), where the situation remains fragile. A significant challenge will be to ensure coherent development and synergies between the external aspects of the CSDP and recent internal policy initiatives such as the [European defence industrial strategy](#) (EDIS). Some experts also question the adequacy of the proposed funding and the feasibility of meeting non-binding targets such as the goal of having 50 % of procurement come from the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) by 2030. Fragmentation and limited collaboration within the EDTIB are [exacerbated](#) by EU Member States' reliance on non-EU defence equipment.

Promoting peace in the Middle East and North Africa region

The situation in the broader Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is very volatile, given the complex, inter-related challenges with regard to political stability, economic development, migration and security. In addition to perennial conflicts in Libya, Somalia and Syria, a terror attack by Hamas and Hezbollah on Israel launched on 7 October 2023 [killed](#) over 1 200 people in Israel. Israel's [military response](#) is disproportionately affecting the civilian Palestinian population, further disrupting the distribution of humanitarian aid in Gaza, and leading to more internal displacement, exposure to famine and human suffering. According to August 2024 [estimates](#) by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, some 40 000 Palestinian civilians have lost their lives in Gaza.

With a broadening war threatening to engulf the MENA region, the EU, along with international partners, can continue to support multilateral security, economic and social initiatives in line with recent UN positions, such as the [resolution](#) on Israeli actions in occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and the internationally agreed two-State solution. Together with the Commissioner for the Mediterranean, the HR/VP will also have to coordinate a new pact for the Mediterranean, and a comprehensive EU Middle East strategy. Finally, the EU could develop further bilateral agreements and partnerships similar to the [strategic partnership](#) with Egypt, signed in 2024, and the [memorandum of understanding](#) with Tunisia, signed in 2023. Radical Islam [remains](#) a challenge for both the EU and the MENA region's security and could be tackled in close association with the MENA partners, fostering reconciliation and peaceful coexistence.

Redefining EU-Russia relations and trade

The [Strategic Compass](#) identifies Russia as 'a long-term and direct threat for European security', a perception further underpinned in the [NATO Strategic Concept](#) (June 2022). Russia's war of aggression in Ukraine has been met with a resolute [EU response](#). As a result, the June 1994 [Partnership and Cooperation Agreement](#) – the legal basis for EU-Russia relations – has been [suspended](#). Nevertheless, the EU [continues](#) to support civil society, human rights defenders and independent media in Russia and to maintain trade relations. Despite the fact that between the first quarter of 2022 and the second quarter of 2024, the value of EU imports from Russia [fell by 87 %](#), EU [strategic autonomy](#) is challenged by (inter-)dependence on Russian products and commodities, such as oil, gas, uranium and fertilisers. Russia is the EU's second largest supplier of [liquefied natural gas](#) (LNG) with 17 % of total supplies, second only to the United States (47%). Despite restrictions and sanctions, the EU doubled its purchases of Russian [nuclear fuel](#) in 2023 compared with 2022 (from €280 million in 2022 to €686 million in 2023). In [physical terms](#) this represents an increase from 314 tonnes of nuclear fuel to 573 tonnes. These trade relations are nevertheless conditional, as on 11 September 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin [threatened](#) to limit exports of uranium, titanium and nickel in retaliation for Western sanctions.

Maintaining the transatlantic community of values and interests

In a fragile geopolitical context marked by internal and external divisions, the transatlantic community, based on common values and interests, risks being pressured following the US presidential elections on 5 November. The first Harris–Trump [presidential debate](#) on 11 September revealed [differing views on geopolitical issues](#), which will also affect US–EU relations. These differences include the resolution of the war in Ukraine and the situation in the Middle East, relations with China, the international regulation of emerging technologies such as AI and social platforms, and trade-related matters. Presidential candidate Donald Trump [favours](#) an isolationist foreign policy and opposes aid for Ukraine. Republican vice-presidential nominee J-D Vance [suggested](#) that the peaceful settlement of war in Ukraine could include establishing a demilitarised zone in Ukraine and the effective secession of territories currently controlled by the Russian Federation. Presidential candidate Kamala Harris's policy [manifesto](#) suggests continuation of the current administration's approach. Regardless of the outcome, an update of the 2020 new bilateral [agenda](#) proposed by the Commission after Joe Biden's election will need to be revisited in light of subsequent developments.

Working with Commissioners

Key to the EU's CFSP approach is the requirement for the HR/VP to coordinate and work together with a range of other relevant members of the College. Kallas will have to work with the Commissioners for Enlargement; the Mediterranean; Preparedness and Crisis Management; Defence and Space; Trade and Economic Security and International Partnerships. Kallas will also have to work with the Executive Vice-President for Prosperity and Industrial Strategy on matters such as economic security and statecraft and the conceptualisation of a new economic security doctrine. A challenge for Kallas will therefore be to ensure smooth cooperation within the College and across the institutional architecture of the EU's external action.

European Parliament

Treaty basis and European Parliament competence

The Lisbon Treaty states that Parliament must be consulted on the main aspects of and decisions related to the CFSP and kept informed about the evolution of policies. Parliament can address questions or make recommendations to the Council or the HR/VP and is required to hold a debate twice a year on progress on implementing the CFSP and CSDP (Article 36 TEU). The exclusion of legislative acts from the CFSP rules out any formal power for Parliament in the adoption of CFSP decisions. However, Parliament can influence the conduct of CFSP through its budgetary powers, including its right to amend the draft CFSP budget.

CFSP-related international agreements concluded by the EU require Parliament's consultation and consent (Article 218 TEU). The Treaties also require that Parliament be immediately and fully informed at all stages of international negotiation processes in which the EU participates, including trade negotiations (Article 207(3) TFEU). Parliament not only has veto power over association and cooperation agreements with third countries and regions but also over financial protocols with third countries, trade agreements and the ratification of international agreements on issues that are internally regulated through the ordinary legislative procedure, such as environmental issues.

Parliament adopts annual reports on the CFSP and the CSDP, and on a wide range of bilateral and multilateral issues. It acts as co-legislator on foreign policy financial instruments such as the [Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance](#) (IPA), the [Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument](#), and the [Guarantee Fund for External Action](#) (GFEA). The GFEA also contributes to the [European external investment plan](#), which addresses the root causes of migration and security-related issues. Implementation of the interinstitutional agreement on budgetary discipline ([2013/C 373/01](#)) improved CFSP consultation procedures concerning financial aspects.

Parliament is also co-legislator with the Council in the area of defence industrial policy (initiatives in this area include the adoption of the Act in Support of Ammunition Production and the recently proposed European defence industry programme) and economic security (examples of these efforts include the Anti-Coercion Instrument, the Foreign Direct Investment Regulation and the Foreign Subsidies Regulation).

The 2010 Declaration on Political Accountability, sought to ensure that in the relationship between the HR/VP and Parliament, the HR would build on existing consultation, information and reporting engagements. In its most recent [annual resolution on the CFSP](#), Parliament highlighted the need to update the 2010 Declaration on Political Accountability 'as the framework for relations between the EEAS and Parliament', pointing not least to Parliament's 'complementary role' in EU diplomacy.

Although Parliament's formal role in foreign policy is limited, it has major powers over the adoption of international agreements, and budgetary powers. Parliament has inter-parliamentary delegations for relations with parliamentary assemblies from third countries, regions and international organisations. Together, these constitute the tools of [parliamentary diplomacy](#). Along with institutional partners such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Parliament also takes part in international election observation missions.

Since 2010, Parliament has had budgetary oversight of the European diplomatic service and influenced its activities, in particular by requiring more systematic attention to human rights and action to promote democracy. Parliament has defended the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and respect for human dignity, as part of the guiding principles of its foreign policy. Parliament has also supported some new EEAS initiatives, such as the [European Diplomatic Academy](#), launched in 2023-2024 to provide training for young diplomats from the EU Member States, Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Türkiye and the Western Balkan countries. Parliament has also expressed its strong position on the rule of law and human rights through the [Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought](#), which has been crucial in supporting human rights activists since 1988.

Recent developments

Supporting Ukraine in its defence against Russia's aggression has been a key geopolitical goal of the EU in recent years. In its [conclusions](#) of 27 June 2024, the European Council reconfirmed its support for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders. On 24 June, the Council adopted its [14th package](#) of sanctions against Russia. The introduction of this package was initially delayed due to disagreements between Member States on the scope of certain measures, particularly anti-circumvention efforts. The package amends [Council Regulation \(EU\) 269/2014](#) on individual sanctions and [Council Regulation \(EU\) 833/2014](#) on sectoral sanctions. On 12 September, the Council decided to prolong sanctions until 15 March 2025. On 8 October, the Council [adopted](#) a new sanctions regime in response to hybrid threats from Russia.

Between 2022 and 2024, the [mobilisation](#) of funds under the EPF to support the Ukrainian armed forces reached €6.1 billion; military assistance by the EU and Member States totalled around €28 billion. In November 2022, the EU launched its military assistance mission in Ukraine ([EUMAM](#)) for a period of two years. It also [allocated](#) €860 million from its budget to address the humanitarian consequences of the war, both for those within the country and for refugees. The EU also activated the [temporary protection mechanism](#), which not only gave refugees a secure status and access to education, medical care and work in EU Member States but also effected [temporary trade liberalisation](#) under the EU-Ukraine association agreement. As mentioned above, a document on [joint security commitments between the EU and Ukraine](#) was signed in June 2024.

On **enlargement**, the Commission adopted a [revised methodology](#) for accession negotiations in February 2020. In its [conclusions](#) of June 2022, the European Council retained a [gradual approach](#) to accession, giving countries access to some EU single market benefits before formal accession. The Commission's November 2023 growth plan for the Western Balkans included a [proposal](#) for a €6 billion [Reform and Growth Facility](#) for 2024–2027. The Council [adopted](#) the plan in May 2024.

Accession negotiations with Montenegro and Serbia are well under way. While the EU agreed in principle to open negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia in 2022, on 25 September 2024, EU ambassadors [agreed](#) to start negotiations with Albania on 15 October, while postponing the decision on North Macedonia. In March 2024, the European Council decided to [open accession negotiations](#) with Bosnia and Herzegovina 'once the necessary degree of compliance with the membership criteria is achieved'. At present, the most critical task in the region is to complete the comprehensive agreement within the [Belgrade-Pristina dialogue](#), which held its [11th high level meeting](#) in Brussels on 26 June 2024. Türkiye, still a candidate country, [remains](#) a 'key partner' eligible for EU financial support. However, falling democratic standards and a very low alignment rate of 10 % with the EU positions on foreign and security policy (2023), compared with 8 % in 2022, have put accession negotiations on ice.

On 28 February 2022, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy [announced](#) Ukraine's request for 'immediate accession through a new special procedure'. [Moldova](#) and [Georgia](#) later made the same request. After receiving 'positive [opinions](#)' from the Commission, on 23 June 2022 EU leaders [decided](#) to grant Ukraine and Moldova 'candidate country' status, and Georgia 'pre-candidate country' status. Ukraine [qualified](#) for EU candidate country status, and the first intergovernmental conference took place on 25 June 2024, officially kicking off accession negotiations. In December 2023, EU leaders [agreed](#) to open accession negotiations with Moldova. Georgia received 'candidate country' status, but its adoption of the 'foreign agents' law [prevented](#) the opening of accession negotiations. On 20 October, presidential elections and an EU referendum are [expected](#) in Moldova.

In the **MENA region**, following the terrorist attacks against Israel on 7 October 2023, the EU adopted [sanctions](#) against Hamas, Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad in January 2024. The EU increased its [humanitarian aid](#) to Gaza and activated a [maritime corridor](#) to facilitate its delivery. As announced in von der Leyen's 2023 State of the Union address, [partnership with Africa](#) remains a key priority for

the EU. Following the adoption of the [Joint Vision for 2023](#), which included a [global gateway Africa-Europe investment package](#), support for the green and digital transition, security, as well as partnerships on migration, are key Commission objectives. In July 2023, the Council gave its [green light](#) to move towards the signature of the Post-Cotonou Agreement. In December 2023, the EU and Kenya [signed](#) an economic partnership agreement including binding provisions on trade and sustainable development. The EU-Angola Agreement was [signed](#) in November of the same year.

In the context of **security and defence** the gradual building of a true [European defence union](#) is central. Following the adoption of a new [EU maritime security strategy](#) and [European space strategy for security and defence](#) in March 2023, the Commission also [adopted](#) a European defence industrial strategy ([EDIS](#)) and proposed a European defence industry programme ([EDIP](#)) to ensure the timely availability and supply of defence products. EDIS complements NATO, which continues to serve as the foundation of collective defence for its members. It builds on the [defence investment gap analysis](#) and on the experience in managing the European Defence Fund and other instruments. The Commission has [proposed](#) allocating €1.5 billion to the EDIP over the 2025-2027 period.

On **trade**, in 2021, the [EU-US Trade and Technology Council](#) was established as a forum for the two parties to coordinate approaches to trade and technology issues. The EU and India resumed trade negotiations and in 2023 launched the [EU-India Trade and Technology Council](#). In March 2023, the EU [resumed](#) trade negotiations with Thailand. In April 2023, the Commission [initiated](#) negotiations for digital trade agreements with Singapore and South Korea. In June 2023, the Commission [adopted](#) a new agenda for relations between the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean. In July 2023, it [presented](#) the modernised EU-Chile agreement to the Council for its signature. Again in July that year, the EU and [New Zealand signed](#) a comprehensive trade deal. Several [economic partnership agreements](#) with Global South countries were signed and are awaiting the ratification process, among them the [Mercosur Free Trade Agreement](#) between the EU and Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, agreed upon in principle in June 2019. The ratification process of the Mercosur Free Trade Agreement is still [blocked](#) at EU Member State level, dashing hopes of finalising the deal at the upcoming G20 summit in Brazil in November 2024.

FURTHER READING

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