RAPORT referitor la propunerea de decizie a Parlamentului European şi a Consiliului de instituire a Comitetului consultativ european pentru guvernanţă statistică

privind propunerea de decizie a Parlamentului European şi a Consiliului de instituire a Comitetului consultativ european pentru guvernanţă statistică

(COM(2006)0599 – C6‑0348/2006 – 2006/0199(COD))

(Procedura de codecizie: prima lectură)

Parlamentul European,

–   având în vedere propunerea Comisiei prezentată Parlamentului European şi Consiliului (COM(2006)0599)[1],

–   având în vedere articolul 251 alineatul (2) şi articolul 285 din Tratatul CE, în temeiul cărora propunerea a fost prezentată de către Comisie (C6‑0348/2006),

–   având în vedere articolul 51 din Regulamentul său de procedură,

–   având în vedere raportul Comisiei pentru afaceri economice şi monetare (A6‑0327/2007),

1.  aprobă propunerea Comisiei astfel cum a fost modificată;

2.  solicită Comisiei să îl sesizeze din nou, în cazul în care intenţionează să modifice în mod substanţial această propunere sau să o înlocuiască cu un alt text;

3.  încredinţează Preşedintelui sarcina de a transmite Consiliului şi Comisiei poziţia Parlamentului.

• [1]  Nepublicată încă în JO.

This directive proposes the setting up of a European Statistical Advisory Board. It aims to address two issues: Robustness of the European Statistical System and public confidence in that system.

The European Statistical System consists of the national statistical offices of member states and Eurostat. Statistics are used for many purposes, including by the ECB for economic analysis. In the event of erroneous statistical data from Member States, this will in turn cause error in the output statistics of Eurostat. In order to minimise such risk a code of practice on statistical procedures has been compiled and is in the process of being implemented by the statistical offices of Member States and Eurostat. Adherence to the code of practice by national statistical offices will be checked by peer review in which the statistical office of each Member State is reviewed for its adherence to the code by the statistical office of another Member State and Eurostat.

The proposed function of the Board is to have an oversight of how well the code of practice is being applied and to propose modifications or additions should a need become evident from the overview. Eurostat will de facto have an overview because it will have been involved in all the peer reviews: the provision of a Board provides an additional oversight that is external to the European statistical system of the national offices and Eurostat.

A second function of the Board is to review Eurostat's implementation of the code of practice. Theoretically this could be done, mirroring the reviews of the national offices, by pairs of national statistical offices. However introducing the external element into Eurostat's review introduces potential for new insight into the peer reviews conducted by Member States and Eurostat.

The question arises as to how much checking the Board should be able to do of the national Statistical Offices. On the one hand, Eurostat data is only as good as the input data from national offices. However the code of practice and peer review with Eurostat as the common party in all the reviews is the mechanism that has been set up to check the national offices. The Board then reviews Eurostat's application of the code of practice in order to complete the final link in the review process of individual office procedures. Following that the Board can then examine all the reports on the reviews of the national offices and its own report of Eurostat in order to draw conclusions on the operation of the system as a whole and of the application of the code of practice. For this to work it is essential that the peer review documentation includes substantial reports of the checks and conclusions. It is understood this is presently the procedure although not over so many questions as are in the code of practice. It is important that introducing more questions does not reduce the level of reporting on individual aspects.

At present I have not proposed extending the oversight of the Board into investigations within the national statistical offices on the basis that this should be covered by the peer review. However, most Member States have advisory bodies or committees, or are introducing such bodies, that include representatives of users and providers of statistical information and it seems appropriate that a dialogue with those bodies on relevant issues should be encouraged and also with the European Statistical Advisory Committee which is being established contemporaneously with the Board. I am also proposing that the effectiveness of the Board is reviewed after three years at which stage the Board should be able to indicate whether they consider there is a need for any further access or information.

With regard to peer review of the code of practice, it seems correct that Eurostat should have a comparable review to a peer review by the Board. However, since reviews of procedures are necessarily dynamic matters, it is also proper for the Commission to be able to respond to findings of the Board before they are made public. Hence I propose that a draft report is transmitted to the Commission, with an opportunity to respond, before submission to the Council and Parliament. I do not agree that the Board should report as a formal matter to the Commission, it must be independent.

The supervisory Board of Eurostat is composed of the Heads of the statistical offices of Member States. Hence the only institution that is independent of the statistical system is the Parliament. For this reason it is important that the Parliament plays a role in the appointments. I have taken the view that the Council and Parliament should be responsible for the formal appointment of the Board and receive the formal report of the Board. This establishes that the Board is independent of the Commission. For similar reasons I also consider that the chairperson should not be someone from, or recently from, a Member State statistical office.

The Board has to be seen to be independent of Eurostat and so while they may well propose suitable individuals for consideration, it must be possible for the Parliament and Council to choose others. In practice the selection could be by consensus, but formally I propose that the appointments be by the Council and Parliament after consultation with the Commission.

There are no proposals for remuneration of the members of the Board and it could be suggested that payment from the Commission budget undermines the independence of the board. However the job may also be onerous and time consuming and without remuneration substantially restricts those ready to undertake such a commitment. Likely appointees may include those with experience in national or international statistical offices and also academics. It is certainly necessary to have a mix of complementary skills. In view of the tasks I suggest giving consideration to whether the number of Board Members needs to be more than five. With only five an illness or inability to give time due to other duties could be damaging to the function of the Board. Hence I propose that the number be increased to 7 and I suggest that ideally it should include a representative from an international body such as the ECB or OECD.

For reasons of independence the maximum term of office on the Board should be limited; ideally members should serve a term of 3 years renewable once to a maximum of 6 years. For reasons of continuity appointment should be staggered, which does mean than on set up, or in the event of a replacement, a shorter initial term of appointment for some members will be needed.

Additionally, the Board will need to have a strong and independent secretariat.

There are some restrictions relating to secrecy and that the Commission can request certain matters not to be made public. This is a request that should be justifiable and not used routinely.

Finally, the Commission proposed that there should be a 'quality label'. This is primarily to help establish public confidence. It seems premature for that to be established at the outset, especially in the context of my proposal for a review after three years. Therefore I suggest that the review also addresses the matter of introduction of a quality label.

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