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Plenary sitting

A7-0345/2013

22.10.2013

RECOMMENDATION

on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community, on the one hand, and the Republic of Kiribati, on the other
(13331/2012 – C7-0036/2013 – 2012/0229(NLE))

Committee on Fisheries

Rapporteur: Isabella Lövin

Symbols for procedures

- * Consultation procedure
- *** Consent procedure
- ***I Ordinary legislative procedure (first reading)
- ***II Ordinary legislative procedure (second reading)
- ***III Ordinary legislative procedure (third reading)

(The type of procedure depends on the legal basis proposed by the draft act.)

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DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

**on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community, on the one hand, and the Republic of Kiribati, on the other
(13331/2012– C7-0036/2013 – 2012/0229(NLE))**

(Consent)

The European Parliament,

- having regard to the draft Council decision (13331/2012),
 - having regard to the draft Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community, on the one hand, and the Republic of Kiribati, on the other (13333/2012),
 - having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Articles 43(2) and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C7-0036/2013),
 - having regard to Rules 81 and 90(7) of its Rules of Procedure,
 - having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on Fisheries and the opinions of the Committee on Development and the Committee on Budgets (A7-0345/2013),
1. Consents to conclusion of the Protocol;
 2. Calls on the Commission to forward to Parliament the minutes and the conclusions of the meetings of the Joint Committee provided for in Article 10 of the Agreement, as well as the multiannual sectoral programme provided for in Article 3 of the Protocol and the corresponding annual evaluations; calls on the Commission to facilitate the participation of representatives of Parliament as observers in the meetings of the Joint Committee; calls on the Commission to submit to Parliament and the Council, within the last year of application of the Protocol and before the opening of negotiations for its renewal, a full evaluation report on its implementation, without imposing unnecessary restrictions on access to this document;
 3. Calls on the Council and the Commission, acting within the limits of their respective powers, to keep Parliament immediately and fully informed at all stages of the procedures related to the new Protocol and its renewal, pursuant to Article 13(2) of the Treaty on European Union and Article 218(10) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union;

4. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of the Republic of Kiribati.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

Introduction

The new protocol to the Fisheries Partnership Agreement (FPA) with Kiribati provides access for Spanish, French and Portuguese vessels to Kiribati waters from 16 September 2012 to 15 September 2015.

However, this rapporteur believes that in several ways, the protocol has the potential to undermine efforts by a small island developing States (SIDS) to manage the exploitation of tuna resources and to increase their revenues from them. It therefore fails to contribute to the sustainable management of tuna resources in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO).

Kiribati and the Parties to the Nauru Agreement

Kiribati has very few resources available other than fish occurring in its vast Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ). License fees to foreign vessels provide 20-30% of Government revenue.¹ The country has one of the lowest GDPs per capita of the region and is classified as a least developed ACP State.

The Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA),² of which Kiribati is a party, was set up to ensure co-ordinated fisheries management in the EEZs of its members and to increase the benefits obtained from fish resources. It is a binding Treaty-level instrument. Its members have negotiated several implementing agreements which spell out licensing *minimum terms and conditions*, such as provisions on vessel monitoring, transshipments, area closures, gear restrictions, landing obligations, observer coverage, as well as a Vessel Days Scheme (VDS). Third countries' fishing vessels operating in PNA EEZs must abide by these provisions.

PNA waters supply 50% of the world's skipjack tuna supply.

The Vessel Days Scheme

Under the VDS vessel owners can purchase and trade days fishing at sea in order to access PNA waters. According to the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), an advisory Pacific body:

“The purpose of the VDS is to constrain and reduce catches of target tuna species, and increase the rate of return from fishing activities [...] The PNA set the total number of days that can be fished in their waters combined and the apportionment of the total number of days between each country.”

The VDS includes effort allocation rules and other requirements such as a minimum fee under which no vessel day should be sold. Its implementation has led to access fees which ranged from less than US\$ 2,000/day in 2009 to a minimum fee agreed by PNA of US\$ 5,000/day in 2012, with many vessel days traded at US\$ 8,000/day. In May 2013 PNA has increased the

¹ *Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts for a future protocol. Final report.* May 2012.

² Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Papua New Guinea, Nauru, Federated States of Micronesia and Palau.

minimum fee to US\$ 6,000/day.

Since 2008, the relevant Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (RFMO), the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) mandate the use of the VDS as the mechanism to regulate fishing effort by third countries' fleets in the EEZs of PNA members.¹ Therefore, even though the EU is not a member of the PNA, the EU is bound to respect the VDS since it is a Contracting Party to the WCPFC.

EU obligations in respect of Small Island Developing States

The UN Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA), ratified by both the EU and Kiribati, calls on States to cooperate “*to enhance the ability of developing States, in particular the least-developed among them and small island developing States, to conserve and manage straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks*”.²

The UNFSA Review Conference, in May 2010, further called to “*encourage the identification of strategies that further assist developing States, in particular the least developed and small island developing States, in realizing a greater share of the benefits from the catch of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks and in strengthening regional efforts to sustainably conserve and manage such stocks*”. The UN General Assembly, further supports these goals.³

Article 208 of the TFEU obliges the EU to take into account the objectives of development cooperation in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries.

Main provisions in the new protocol

The new three year protocol grants access to 10 EU fishing vessels (4 purse seiners and 6 longliners) with a reference tonnage of 15,000 tonnes of highly migratory species per year. Currently only the purse seiners are using the protocol.

Of a total financial contribution of €1,325,000 for the two years of the protocol, €975,000 correspond to access to resources and €350,000 to supporting Kiribati's sectorial fisheries policy.

Critically important, though, is the fact that the protocol fails to incorporate the VDS and imposes no limit on effort deployed in Kiribati other than the number of vessels. Yet Kiribati had made clear at the start of the negotiations that they intended to base it on the VDS.⁴ This is also recognized in the ex-post evaluation of the previous protocol. The EU and Kiribati are thus contravening the major fisheries management measure adopted by both the PNA and the WCPFC.

1 CMM 2008-01, paragraphs 11 and 17; CMM 2011-01, paragraphs 1 and 2; CMM 2012-01, paragraph 12.

2 Article 25. Forms of cooperation with developing States, paragraph 1(a). UNFSA.

3 See paragraph 157 of UNGA Resolution 66/68.

4 “*In the preparation for the negotiations, both parties expressed their initial positions on this issue. Kiribati informed the EU that they will base their approach on the Vessel Days Scheme.*” Agreed records of the Joint Committee meeting on the Implementation of the Protocol to the Fisheries Partnership Agreement EU/Kiribati. Nadi, Fiji, 30 May 2012.

Potential loss of revenue by Pacific Island States

Many PNA members perceive access fees set unilaterally outside the agreed VDS framework – as is done by the EU-Kiribati agreement - as a threat to the scheme that they have carefully developed in recent years to negotiate minimum access fees in order to increase their chances to obtain fair revenue.

The lack of adherence of the new protocol to the VDS may be depriving Kiribati and the region from income. In relation to the cost of access under the previous protocol, its ex-post evaluation states that “*the average payment over 2007 to 2011 was €3,350/US\$4,675 a day, i.e. close to the current PNA benchmark price of US\$ 5,000 a day.*”¹ However, such average is explained only by the high catch rates in 2007. In any other year, the figures are significantly lower: in 2011, Kiribati received from the EU the equivalent to US\$ 3,559 per vessel day and only US\$ 2,308 in 2009 (see **table 1**). PNA countries have just agreed a new benchmark of US\$ 6,000 a day in May 2013. Such minimum benchmark could be reviewed in coming years. But many transactions are completed well above that benchmark, at prices which can reach US\$ 8,000.

By insisting on remaining outside the VDS, the EU is maintaining a relatively low access fee that distorts the regional market for access to the tuna fishery.

The need to regulate effort in the region

Overcapacity and excessive fishing effort are key issues to be addressed in all regions, and the Western and Central Pacific is no exception. In this regard, the EU should actively support current regional efforts to address overcapacity and limit fishing effort. Access based on either tonnage caught or vessel numbers does not adequately reflect total fishing effort, particularly of the EU fleet which comprises very large vessels. In that respect, a well-defined and enforced vessel day scheme would have the potential to provide the means to prevent further increases in effort in the region.

The VDS should provide for an adequate weighting to reflect the size of the vessels involved. As EU purse seiners are amongst the largest in the world they would have to adjust their vessel days by a multiplying factor. If such weighting factor is considered, the price of access currently paid by EU vessels would have to increase to reflect their high catching power.

Kiribati's lack of compliance with PNA rules on VDS

In 2012 Kiribati exceeded its allocated days under the VDS by almost 80%.² Those days, under VDS rule, should have been purchased from other PNA parties, which would then have been able to obtain revenue in their turn. This was not done. Fishing by EU vessels in Kiribati waters has certainly contributed to Kiribati exceeding its allocation of days under the PNA and the fact that the EU fleet is not coming under the VDS greatly complicates the management of fishing activities in the Kiribati EEZ.

¹ Ex-post evaluation of the current protocol to the FPA between the EU and Kiribati, and ex-ante evaluation with analysis of impacts for a future protocol. Final report. May 2012.

² According to internal documents presented at the last PNA Ministerial meeting.

EU's lack of compliance with WCPFC effort limits on the high seas

While the EU Commission has blamed the PNA for lack of transparency and having exceeded the applicable fishing effort limits, it should be noted that the EU has also failed to comply with WCPFC rules to limit fishing effort. As it can be seen in **table 2** the EU purse seine fleet broke the high seas effort limits established through CMM 2008-01 consistently from 2007 to 2011.

Impact of the EU Purse Seine fleet on tuna resources in the region

Despite having only four vessels currently operating in the WCPO, the impact of EU catches cannot be considered negligible. EU purse seiners are amongst the biggest and most powerful purse seiners in the world and they are highly dependent on drifting FADs (see **table 3**). Their operations result in significant catches of juvenile bigeye tuna. The most recent stock assessments conducted by the WCPFC Scientific Committee in 2012 indicate overfishing of bigeye tuna.

The EU flagged purse seine fleet, with only four vessels, accounted for 15.5% of the bigeye tuna caught by all the purse seiners operating in the WCPO in 2010. There are significant concerns about the catches of silky sharks in purse seine fisheries associated to FADs. These figures are in sharp contrast with EU claims of leading attempts to manage the impacts of FADs in tuna RFMOs and the protocol fails to incorporate measures to decrease the impacts of the use of FADs.¹

Conclusion: building the basis for a positive involvement of the EU in the Western Pacific

The Western and Central Pacific Ocean account for almost 60% of the world's tuna catches. Sound fisheries management in this region has therefore global relevance. As an active fishing player and a prominent market, the EU cannot afford to undermine its position by ignoring relevant arrangements in the region such as the PNA, in particular its VDS, which has been incorporated into the WCPFC.

It appears that the EU-Kiribati agreement is the only bilateral agreement in the region that is not based on the VDS. The multilateral access agreement with the US has also been based on the VDS as of 15 June 2013. Finally, the EU's agreements with the Solomon Islands and the Federate States of Micronesia never entered into force since they failed to incorporate the VDS.

This rapporteur regrets that bilateral negotiations outside a well-established regional framework may result in benefits for a few ship-owners, while undermining regional efforts to improve the management of tuna fisheries as well as the benefits derived by SIDS from the fishery. This rapporteur wishes to encourage the Commission to make every effort possible to cooperate with the region to improve the VDS in order to ensure that fishing effort in the region stays within sustainable limits and coordinate efforts in order to achieve better control

¹ "Given the high level of juvenile bigeye tuna catches taken in the FAD fishery by the EU fleet the evaluation also recommends that direct measures should be included in the protocol to mitigate against this problem."

and facilitate the implementation of the Port State Measures Agreement in the region.

The failure to base the protocol on the VDS appears to be a serious breach of the rules of the WCPFC, the relevant RFMO. In addition, it distorts the market for access rights and potentially deprives both Kiribati and the region of much-needed revenue¹. The European Commission maintains that the VDS suffers many defects, not least its alleged lack of transparency. However, it would be far preferable for the EU to attempt to improve the VDS as a party to it, rather than hammering it from outside, where it is vulnerable to the criticism of failure to apply the internationally agreed norms.

This rapporteur recommends that this protocol be rejected and that the Commission negotiates a new protocol which fully respects the provisions of the WCPFC and the PNA, of which Kiribati is a party.

¹ The European Parliament expressed its wish that bilateral fisheries agreements should ensure that EU shipowners pay a fair and market-based portion of the costs when acquiring access rights. Paragraph 43, Report on the external dimension of the Common Fisheries Policy. September 2012.

Tables

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Average
Tonnes caught	8,671	12,269	10,625	12,268	13,247	11,416
Days in Kiribati	90	269	460	350	278	309
Tonnes per day	96	46	23	35	35	47
Total payment/day (€)	10,461	4,802	2,451	3,690	3,677	5,016
Adjusted days (1.5)	135	404	690	525	567	464
Total payment/adjusted day (€)	6,989	3,206	1,637	2,464	2,455	3,350
Total payment/adjusted day (\$)	9,435	5,066	2,308	3,006	3,559	4,675

Flag	CMM 2006-01	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
China	420	508	232	334	261	1000	13	9
Chinese Taipei	1,913	1,262	1,244	1,506	1,341	1,365	96	76
Ecuador	0	0	0	49	150	39	53	37
El Salvador	14	0	0	104	130	97	63	52
European Union	103	30	315	173	311	241	366	339
FSM	387	222	86	168	123	334	6	3
Indonesia	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500
Japan	1,859	1,768	1,493	1,209	1,704	2,080	111	67
Kiribati	42	46	53	22	19	191	114	205
Marshall Islands	400	402	158	155	290	168	71	32
New Zealand	346	98	289	208	196	210	68	26
Papua New Guinea	1,130	1,271	404	670	592	804	78	23
Philippines	452	306	150	26	73	20	2	0
Republic of Korea	1,249	1,082	742	1,398	1,513	1,728	208	65
Solomon Islands	17	17	15	5	0	0	0	0
Tuvalu	0	0	0	0	0	36	4	5
USA	1,037	767	533	798	1,566	1,773	400	583
Vanuatu	593	369	401	379	215	103	37	27
Total	10,461	8,648	6,615	7,704	8,984	10,689	2,190	2,049

Table 3. Types of sets by the different purse seine fleets operating in the WCPO					
	Free school	Log	Drifting FAD	Anchored FAD	Other
Korea	63%	18%	19%	0%	1%
Taiwan	42%	40%	18%	0%	0%
Japan	41%	42%	16%	0%	0%
USA	14%	9%	77%	0%	0%
New Zealand	27%	4%	69%	0%	0%
Vanuatu	50%	20%	22%	9%	0%
China	58%	8%	33%	1%	0%
Philippines	28%	30%	9%	32%	0%
Spain (EU)	11%	0%	89%	0%	0%
Ecuador	11%	1%	88%	0%	0%
El Salvador	13%	0%	87%	0%	0%
Total DWFN	48%	28%	22%	2%	0%
FSMA and Domestic	43%	25%	24%	7%	1%

25.6.2013

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON DEVELOPMENT

for the Committee on Fisheries

on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion of the Protocol setting out the fishing opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community, on the one hand, and the Republic of Kiribati, on the other (13331/2012 – C7-0036/2013 – 2012/0229(NLE))

Rapporteur: Norbert Neuser

SHORT JUSTIFICATION

Kiribati is a remote Pacific nation made up of 33 widely dispersed islands (21 inhabited). While the total land area is only 726 km², the related exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is the largest EEZ of the Pacific islands countries.

Kiribati is a democratic republic; its economy faces significant constraints common to other islands atoll states. Its GDP is expanding by an estimated 2-3% per annum. GDP per capita is one of the lowest of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) nations at 1,047 euros, and Kiribati is classified as a least developed ACP state. Challenges to economic development include size, remoteness and geographical fragmentation, infertile soils, limited exploitable resources and an expanding population. Kiribati's Development Plan 2008-2011 focused on improving the economic environment in the outer islands, strengthening access to health services and addressing climate change.

Kiribati relies heavily on licence fees from distant water fishing nations that provide 23-30% of government revenue and remittances from Kiribati citizens employed abroad, mainly as seafarers. Fishing is also an important subsistence activity, with over 80% of households involved in fishing. The fishing sector contributes around 10% to GDP.

While Kiribati benefits from regional development initiatives, fisheries remain outside the 10th EDF Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme for Kiribati. Fisheries-specific support is instead provided through the sectoral policy support component of the fisheries partnership agreement in force. While there is presently no trade in fishery products between Kiribati and the EU, the country has future aspirations in trading fresh tuna loins.

Assessment of the proposal for a new Protocol

The main features of the proposed new Protocol go along the lines of the expired 2007-2012 Protocol. The ex-post assessment commissioned by the Commission to an external contractor shows the strengths and weaknesses of the previous protocol and is therefore useful to assess the current proposal.

As regards fishing possibilities, the proposed protocol provides for 4 purse seine and 6 long-line fishing authorisations. The annual amount for the access to Kiribati EEZ is set at EUR 975 000 equivalent to a reference tonnage of 15 000 tonnes of tuna per year. An amount of EUR 350 000 is allocated for sectoral fisheries policy.

The annual amount paid by the EU (thus excluding additional fees paid by the shipowners) for the access to Kiribati EEZ remains stable at EUR 65 per tonne, but the amount allocated for the sectoral fisheries policy almost double, from EUR 62 400 a year in the previous protocol to EUR 116 666 a year in the proposed one.

The ex-post assessment shows some areas of concern of the previous protocol, including: the failure of the Joint Committee meetings to take place until 2011; the slow payments in recent years for the financial support for the sectoral policy; the failure by Kiribati to supply inspection certificates and observer reports to shipowners; and the lack of any real impetus towards joint enterprises or local landings for processing.

The Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA)

Your rapporteur is deeply concerned about the non-respect of the proposed Protocol with some provisions in the PNA, which is a binding regional agreement signed by eight developing Pacific island countries, including Kiribati, with the main objective of coordinating and harmonising the management of their fisheries, upon which they are highly dependent.

The PNA has agreed to several implementing protocols and arrangements which lay out agreed conditions to be applied to all foreign fishing vessels fishing in the EEZs of PNA members. These include conditions such as catch retention provisions, FAD closures, 100% observer coverage, or the mandatory use of the Vessel Day Scheme (VDS), an effort management mechanism developed by the parties. The VDS provides for Party Allowable Effort days allocated to PNA countries, and agreed that a minimum fee of US\$ 5000 per fishing day that shall be applied to foreign fishing vessels from 2012 onwards.

The fact that the protocol agreed between the EU and Kiribati does not comply with the VDS is causing important tensions, both between the EU and some Pacific island countries and between Kiribati and the other Pacific island countries, with the latter voicing concerns about the EU acting in bad faith and breaking regional solidarity.

Your rapporteur is of the view that Pacific island countries' cooperation in the management of the tuna fisheries taking place in their waters must be encouraged and not undermined. Tuna is almost the only resource these islands economies benefit from. For this reason, the joint management and conservation of tuna resources is of paramount importance to their very

survival. This implies that fisheries agreements signed by third countries, including the EU, with these countries should fully respect the provisions of regional and sub-regional agreements and arrangements.

By signing the proposed protocol with the EU, Kiribati would be infringing the PNA. At the same time, the EU might be acting against the principles of policy coherence for development and undermining its own credibility as a cooperation actor in the whole region by not ensuring that its fisheries policies are consistent with those agreed by the signatories of the PNA, thus sapping regional integration.

Therefore, your rapporteur proposes that Parliament decline to give its consent to the conclusion of this Protocol. He calls on the Commission to re-negotiate the Protocol incorporating the provisions of any regional and sub-regional agreement or arrangement binding on Kiribati.

The Committee on Development calls on the Committee on Fisheries, as the committee responsible, to propose that Parliament decline to give its consent.

RESULT OF FINAL VOTE IN COMMITTEE

Date adopted	24.6.2013
Result of final vote	+: 16 -: 5 0: 0
Members present for the final vote	Thijs Berman, Michael Cashman, Leonidas Donskis, Charles Goerens, Catherine Grèze, Mikael Gustafsson, Eva Joly, Michał Tomasz Kamiński, Norbert Neuser, Bill Newton Dunn, Maurice Ponga, Jean Roatta, Keith Taylor, Patrice Tirolien, Anna Záborská
Substitute(s) present for the final vote	Kriton Arsenis, Agustín Díaz de Mera García Consuegra, Fiona Hall, Edvard Kožušník, Krzysztof Lisek, Csaba Óry, Patrizia Toia
Substitute(s) under Rule 187(2) present for the final vote	Luigi Berlinguer

23.1.2013

OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETS

for the Committee on Fisheries

on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion of the Protocol between the European Union and the Republic of Kiribati, setting out opportunities and financial contribution provided for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Community, on the one hand, and the Republic of Kiribati, on the other (COM(2012)0468 – C7 0000/2012– 2012/0229(NLE))

Rapporteur: François Alfonsi

SHORT JUSTIFICATION

On the basis of relevant Council mandate, the Commission on behalf of the European Union negotiated with the Republic of Kiribati in view of renewing the Protocol to the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Kiribati. Following these negotiations, a new Protocol was initialled on 3 June 2012, which covers a period of three years starting from 16 September 2012.

Under Articles 43(2) and 218(6)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the European Parliament can either consent or decline to consent.

The new Protocol is in line with the objectives of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement aiming at strengthening the cooperation between the European Union and the Republic of Kiribati and promoting a partnership framework in which to develop a sustainable fisheries policy and responsible exploitation of fishery resources in the Kiribati's EEZ in the interests of both Parties.

The two Parties have agreed to cooperate with a view to implementing Kiribati's sectoral fisheries policy and to that end shall continue the policy dialogue on the relevant programming.

The new Protocol provides for a total financial contribution of EUR 4.428.000 which amounts to EUR 1.456.000 and EUR 1.516.000 respectively per year for the whole period. This amount corresponds to: a) EUR 975.000 per year for the access to the Kiribati's EEZ, and b) EUR 350.000 per year, corresponding to the additional envelop paid by the EU to support of Kiribati's fisheries policy.

Type of expenditure	2013	2014	2015	TOTAL
Preservation and management of natural resources	1 325 000€	1 325 000€	1 325 000€	3 975 000€
Administrative expenditure	131 000€	131 000€	191 000€	453 000€
TOTAL	1 456 000€	1 456 000€	1 516 000€	4 428 000€

The Committee on Budgets reiterates its earlier calls for the Commission to:

- check every year whether Member States whose vessels operate under the Protocol to the Agreement have complied with reporting requirements. Where this is not the case, the Commission should refuse to grant their requests for fishing licences for the following year;
- report annually to Parliament and the Council on the results of the multiannual sectoral programme described in Article 7 of the Protocol, as well as on compliance by the Member States with reporting requirements;
- submit, before the Protocol expires or before negotiations for its possible replacement begin, to Parliament and the Council an ex post evaluation of the Protocol, including a cost-benefit analysis.

The Committee on Budgets calls on the Committee on Fisheries, as the committee responsible, to propose that Parliament gives its consent.

RESULT OF FINAL VOTE IN COMMITTEE

Date adopted	23.1.2013
Result of final vote	+: 31 -: 2 0: 0
Members present for the final vote	Marta Andreasen, Zuzana Brzobohatá, Jean-Luc Dehaene, José Manuel Fernandes, Eider Gardiazábal Rubial, Salvador Garriga Polledo, Ingeborg Gräßle, Lucas Hartong, Monika Hohlmeier, Anne E. Jensen, Ivailo Kalfin, Sergej Kozlík, Jan Kozłowski, Alain Lamassoure, Giovanni La Via, Claudio Morganti, Jan Mulder, Juan Andrés Naranjo Escobar, Nadezhda Neynsky, Dominique Riquet, Potito Salatto, Alda Sousa, László Surján, Derek Vaughan, Angelika Werthmann
Substitute(s) present for the final vote	François Alfonsi, Edit Herczog, Paul Rübig, Peter Šťastný, Georgios Stavrakakis, Theodor Dumitru Stolojan, Gianluca Susta, Nils Torvalds

RESULT OF FINAL VOTE IN COMMITTEE

Date adopted	17.10.2013
Result of final vote	+: 18 -: 3 0: 0
Members present for the final vote	Kriton Arsenis, Chris Davies, Carmen Fraga Estévez, Pat the Cope Gallagher, Dolores García-Hierro Caraballo, Marek Józef Gróbarczyk, Iliana Malinova Iotova, Werner Kuhn, Isabella Lövin, Gabriel Mato Adrover, Guido Milana, Crescenzo Rivellini, Ulrike Rodust, Raúl Romeva i Rueda, Struan Stevenson, Isabelle Thomas, Jarosław Leszek Wałęsa
Substitute(s) present for the final vote	Jim Higgins, Antolín Sánchez Presedo
Substitute(s) under Rule 187(2) present for the final vote	Maria Da Graça Carvalho, María Auxiliadora Correa Zamora, George Lyon, Francisco José Millán Mon, Bart Staes