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*Plenary sitting*

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**B10-0134/2024**

21.10.2024

## **MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION**

to wind up the debate on the statement by the Commission

pursuant to Rule 136(2) of the Rules of Procedure

on the People's Republic of China's misinterpretation of UN Resolution 2758  
and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan  
(2024/2891(RSP))

**Markéta Gregorová, Ville Niinistö, Maria Ohisalo, Hannah Neumann,  
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on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

**European Parliament resolution on the People's Republic of China's misinterpretation of UN Resolution 2758 and its continuous military provocations around Taiwan (2024/2891(RSP))**

*The European Parliament,*

- having regard to its recommendation of 21 October 2021 to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on EU-Taiwan political relations and cooperation<sup>1</sup>,
- having regard to its resolution of 7 June 2022 on the EU and the security challenges in the Indo-Pacific<sup>2</sup>,
- having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the situation in the Strait of Taiwan<sup>3</sup>,
- having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2023 on EU-Taiwan trade and investment relations<sup>4</sup>,
- having regard to its recommendation of 13 December 2023 to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning EU-China relations<sup>5</sup>,
- having regard to the joint communication of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 16 September 2021 on the EU strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific (JOIN(2021)0024),
- having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security, approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 24 March 2022,
- having regard to NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept,
- having regard to the statement by the spokesperson of the European External Action Service of 14 October 2024 on China's latest military drills,
- having regard to the G7 Foreign Ministers' statement of 3 August 2022 on preserving peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait,
- having regard to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 25 October 1971 on the restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China

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<sup>1</sup> OJ C 184, 5.5.2022, p. 170.

<sup>2</sup> OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 32.

<sup>3</sup> OJ C 125, 5.4.2023, p. 149.

<sup>4</sup> OJ C, C/2024/4174, 2.8.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4174/oj>.

<sup>5</sup> OJ C, C/2024/4188, 2.8.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4188/oj>.

in the United Nations,

- having regard to Article 7 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) of 9 May 1992,
  - having regard to Rule 5 of the Standing Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
  - having regard to Article 4 of the Constitution of the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol),
  - having regard to Article 8 and Article 18, paragraph (h), of the Constitution of the World Health Organization (WHO),
  - having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
- A. whereas the statutes of most international organisations tasked with addressing global issues including climate change, the preservation of human health and the suppression of transnational crime, such as the WHO, the UNFCCC, Interpol and the ICAO, provide opportunities for non-state entities to participate without infringing on the rights of member states;
- B. whereas the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has made instrumental use of UN Resolution 2758 as a legal basis for its position that Taiwan is part of the PRC and a foundational element of its One China principle; whereas UN Resolution 2758 does not include the words ‘Republic of China’ or ‘Taiwan’, but only states that the PRC will represent ‘China’ at the UN, and does not make any determination regarding the status of Taiwan; whereas, however, the PRC continues to misinterpret UN Resolution 2758 to block Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organisations;
- C. whereas the EU and Taiwan are like-minded partners that share the common values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law; whereas the EU remains decisively committed to its One China policy;
- D. whereas following the Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s annual speech on 10 October 2024, the PRC, on 14 October 2024, conducted a comprehensive military exercise across the Taiwan Strait, amounting to the fourth round of large-scale war games in just over two years;
- E. whereas the median line, which was set up in a decades-old tacit agreement between both sides of the Taiwan Strait, was designed to reduce the risk of conflict by keeping the military aircraft from both sides of the Strait at a safe distance and thus prevent fatal miscalculations; whereas the PRC’s People’s Liberation Army violated the median line only four times between 1954 and 2020, but now routine incursions reflect Beijing’s intent to irreversibly reset long-standing benchmarks;
- F. whereas on 14 October 2024, China also deployed 17 vessels from its coast guard, which was a larger deployment than in a previous exercise held in May this year, when coast guard vessels had been deployed for the first time; whereas four formations of Chinese coast guard ships patrolled the island and briefly entered its restricted waters;

whereas the very frequent deployment of coast guard ships by the PRC in the Taiwan Strait, in what they consider ‘law enforcement’ missions, sends a clear message of sovereignty from the PRC, keeps constant pressure on Taiwanese authorities and causes a dangerous increase in the risk of collisions, in what is one of the most concrete indications of China’s intention to erode the status quo;

- G. whereas full-scale military exercises by the PRC have also been coupled with cyberattacks against Taiwanese authorities and other grey-zone activities such as cognitive and legal warfare and disinformation, aimed at discouraging the Taiwanese population, eroding Taiwanese legitimate sovereign rights and, ultimately, instilling the belief that reunification is inevitable;
- H. whereas on 16 October 2024, the authorities of the PRC stated ‘We are willing to strive for the prospect of peaceful reunification with the utmost sincerity and endeavour, but we will never commit ourselves to renouncing the use of force,’ reiterating Xi Jinping’s landmark speech at the opening of the Chinese Communist Party’s 20th Party Congress in October 2022; whereas Xi Jinping also referred to permanent military pressure in the Taiwan Strait as ‘new normality’; whereas Chinese diplomats even threatened ‘re-education’ of Taiwanese people after reunification;
- I. whereas the PRC has been behaving aggressively across a vast area of the Indo-Pacific and exerting varying degrees of military or economic coercion, which has led to disputes with neighbours such as Japan, India, the Philippines and Australia;
  - 1. Strongly reiterates its commitment to the EU’s One China policy and to maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, in the whole Indo-Pacific region and beyond;
  - 2. Expresses the view that UN Resolution 2758 does not establish the PRC’s sovereignty over Taiwan; underlines how Taiwan has proven to be a very reliable partner in dealing with the many challenges of our time and supports Taiwan’s participation in meetings, mechanisms and activities of relevant international organisations, particularly the WHO, the UNFCCC, Interpol and the ICAO; calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote Taiwan’s inclusion in such international forums in accordance with their statutory rules;
  - 3. Strongly condemns the PRC’s practice of regularly resorting to comprehensive military exercises in the Taiwan Strait; is very concerned by the increasing, unwarranted mobilisation of the PRC coast guard, which confirms that the PRC considers the waters around Taiwan as its own and increases the risks of accidents; considers this to be yet another worrying confirmation that China is deliberately jeopardising the status quo in the Taiwan Strait;
  - 4. Is very concerned at the adoption of guidelines for punishing ‘diehard “Taiwan independence” separatists for conducting or inciting secession’ jointly announced by the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the ministries for public security and state security and the justice ministry in June 2024, which could lead to harsh punishments for the crime of secession, up to and including the death penalty; strongly condemns the sentencing of one Taiwanese activist to nine years in prison in September this year, after his arrest while in the PRC in 2022, as well as the constant

- harassment of Taiwanese people working and living in the PRC;
5. Expresses concern at the expectation that China will become more aggressive militarily in the Taiwan Strait, as well as in the Indo-Pacific region more broadly;
  6. Urges the PRC authorities to restore full respect for the Taiwan's Strait median line and to put a stop to all other grey-zone actions against Taiwan;
  7. Remains resolutely opposed to any unilateral change in the Taiwan Strait and against the will of Taiwanese citizens; remains equally strongly opposed to the threat or use of force, and stresses that any attempt by Beijing to subjugate Taiwan would come at an extraordinarily high price for the PRC;
  8. Commends Taiwan for the remarkable democratic journey it has undertaken over the last 30 years, solidly anchored upon freedoms, the rule of law, democratic institutions and free and fair elections; highlights the recognition of same-sex marriage by Taiwan in 2019, the first such recognition in Asia; strongly encourages Taiwan to keep working towards the abolition of the death penalty;
  9. Welcomes the very responsible reactions by the Taiwanese political elite to provocations by the PRC and expresses its great respect for the whole of Taiwanese society for its extraordinary resilience and strength;
  10. Welcomes the latest annual speech by President Lai Ching-te, who also appealed to China to work with him for peace; considers this to be an encouraging sign of movement towards stronger unity within the Taiwanese political spectrum; highlights that Taiwanese sovereignty is supported across the whole political spectrum and finds its best expression in the conducting of free and fair elections and in the maturity of Taiwanese democracy;
  11. Stresses that the EU and Taiwan are like-minded partners and share common values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, thereby making Taiwan a strategically important partner for the EU in the Indo-Pacific region;
  12. Acknowledges that the 'One Country, Two Systems' principle does not provide any credible prospect for the preservation of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; stresses the need to further develop EU-Taiwan relations with the preservation of peace and democracy at their core;
  13. Highlights the importance of coupling dialogue with deterrence; stresses the need, hence, to identify a fully-fledged and multidimensional strategy that would ensure that any unilateral change in the status quo in the Taiwan Strait would come at a prohibitively high cost to the PRC;
  14. Welcomes the posting of a liaison officer at the European Economic and Trade Office in Taiwan to coordinate joint efforts to tackle disinformation and interference as a first important step towards deeper EU-Taiwan cooperation, and calls for the EU to further deepen cooperation with Taiwan in this key area;
  15. Stresses the need to strengthen the focus on the PRC's grey-zone activities against

Taiwan and to renew EU support for the resilience of Taiwanese society and democracy as a whole; encourages, with this in mind, increased scientific, cultural and political interaction at the highest level possible, as well as the deepening of parliamentary diplomacy and visits; prioritises the creation of a common civic space with Taiwan by fostering exchanges and common activities with Taiwanese civil society and media organisations; underlines the importance of the people-to-people dimension of this cooperation;

16. Stresses the crucial role of Taiwan in the global supply chain of key high-tech sectors, notably semiconductors; welcomes the recent investment projects by Taiwanese companies in some Member States and underlines the importance for Taiwan's security of continuing to deepen its investments in the EU; calls on the Commission and the Member States to start working on a resilient supply chain agreement with Taiwan or other bilateral agreements to deepen the economic relationship; highlights the potential for cooperation on foreign direct investment screening policy and on tackling economic coercion and retaliation;
17. Reiterates the importance of respecting international law, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea with its provisions on the obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means, and on maintaining freedom of navigation and overflight;
18. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the member states of the United Nations, and the Government and Legislative Yuan of Taiwan.