



Plenary sitting

B10-0191/2024

25.11.2024

MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION

to wind up the debate on the statements by the Council and the Commission
pursuant to Rule 136(2) of the Rules of Procedure

on reinforcing EU's unwavering support to Ukraine against Russia's war of
aggression and the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and
Russia
(2024/2940(RSP))

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B10-0191/2024

European Parliament resolution on reinforcing EU's unwavering support to Ukraine against Russia's war of aggression and the increasing military cooperation between North Korea and Russia (2024/2940(RSP))

The European Parliament,

- having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine, Russia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea),
 - having regard to the Charter of the United Nations, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols thereto, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
 - having regard to all United Nations Security Council resolutions on North Korea, in particular Resolutions 1874 and 2094,
 - having regard to the statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU of 25 October 2024 on reports of the DPRK sending troops to Russia,
 - having regard to the EU statement of 20 November 2024 at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors on the Application of safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
 - having regard to the joint statement by the foreign ministers of Finland and Germany of 18 November 2024 on the severed undersea cable in the Baltic Sea,
 - having regard to the joint declaration of 19 November 2024 by the foreign ministers of Germany, France, Poland, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom in Warsaw,
 - having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
- A. whereas over a thousand days have passed since the Russian Federation, on 24 February 2022, launched another continuous and unprecedented assault as part of its unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the Russian aggression against Ukraine started in 2014 with the occupation of parts of the Donbas region and the occupation and illegal annexation of Ukraine's Autonomous Republic of Crimea; whereas according to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, there was almost daily artillery shelling and small arms fire on a low level by Russian military personnel along the line of contact between 2014 and 2022;
- B. whereas Russia's forces continue to conduct systematic and indiscriminate attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure in Ukraine; whereas heavy and intense bombardments combined with ground fighting have continued throughout 2024; whereas waves of Russian attacks on energy infrastructure disrupting power and water supplies have seriously limited access to essential services for civilians, healthcare

facilities and schools, with longer-term implications anticipated and the situation expected to worsen over the course of the winter;

- C. whereas on 17 November 2024 Russia launched a massive attack against civilian infrastructure and residential areas using around 120 missiles and 90 drones, killing and wounding many; whereas some of the strikes were aimed at electricity substations, which are critical to the operation of Ukraine's nuclear power plants; whereas on the same day, the IAEA reported that power lines from four substations to three nuclear power plants had been cut and that output had been reduced in six of the nine nuclear reactors on the three sites;
- D. whereas one of the major threats to Ukrainian critical infrastructure, civilian populations and defence forces is bombardment by large numbers of glide bombs, which can be launched by Russian aircraft from great distances that make them difficult for Ukrainian air defences to defend against;
- E. whereas Russia still has an advantage in the air and in troops on the ground as it currently fields some 520 000 troops in Ukraine and plans to raise this number to 690 000 by the end of 2024; whereas Ukraine is experiencing severe and growing personnel shortages; whereas the Ukrainian, South Korean and US authorities have reported that around 11 000 North Korean troops have arrived in Russia to take part in Russia's aggression against Ukraine; whereas reports indicate that these soldiers are already taking part in battles in Russia's Kursk region; whereas according to media reports, North Korea may actually deploy as many as 100 000 troops;
- F. whereas North Korea and Russia have recently signed and ratified the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which requires both countries to use all available means to provide immediate military assistance if either is attacked; whereas the treaty also commits the two countries to actively cooperate in their efforts to establish a 'just and multipolar new world order' and strengthen cooperation on atomic energy, space, food supply, trade and economy;
- G. whereas Russia is rapidly increasing its own military production, with military spending reaching around EUR 140 billion in 2024; whereas Russia is also using Belarus's ammunition stockpile and artillery shells and ballistic missiles from North Korea, as well as Iranian drones and missiles; whereas Iran has transferred shipments of Fath-360 close-range ballistic missiles to Russia; whereas the EU, France, Germany and the United Kingdom have introduced new sanctions against Iran in response;
- H. whereas media reports indicate that Russia's armed forces have recruited hundreds of Yemeni men to fight in Ukraine; whereas according to further reports, Moscow is providing assistance to the Houthis, including targeting data for missile launches and possibly sales of advanced Russian anti-ship missiles;
- I. whereas US President Joe Biden has recently decided to lift some restrictions on the use of longer-range missiles by Ukraine against legitimate military targets in Russia; whereas it has been reported that restrictions on the use of ATACMS missiles, with a maximum range of around 300 km, have been lifted for Russia's Kursk region; whereas according to media reports, the US administration took the decision in response to the deployment of North Korean troops, with the aim of deterring North Korea from

sending more troops;

- J. whereas media reports also indicate that France and the UK have lifted some restrictions on the use of Storm Shadow/Scalp missiles against legitimate military targets in Russia that are within the 250 km range of that weapon;
- K. whereas there continues to be a low level of military aid both in terms of quality and quantity and a delay in actual delivery of weapons and ammunition to Ukraine after delivery decisions are taken; whereas a significant number of the systems that Ukraine was supposed to receive after the decision taken at the NATO Summit have not yet been delivered;
- L. whereas, at the February 2024 meeting of EU defence ministers, Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Josep Borrell announced that Member States had undertaken to send at least EUR 21 billion of military aid to Ukraine during 2024;
- M. whereas Hungary is blocking both the newly established EUR 5 billion Ukraine Assistance Fund (UAF) set up in March 2024 within the European Peace Facility (EPF) and the eighth tranche of EPF reimbursements for Member States that have been delivering military aid to Ukraine for nearly two years;
- N. whereas the Hungarian prime minister and foreign minister have abused their Council Presidency by travelling to Moscow and engaging in diplomatic talks with an aggressor state; whereas Hungary has repeatedly vetoed, delayed or watered down various rounds of EU sanctions on Russia, directly contributing to the ability of the Russian state to maintain its war economy;
- O. whereas on 18 November 2024 the 1 200 km cable connecting Helsinki to the German port of Rostock stopped working; whereas a 218 km internet link between Lithuania and Sweden's Gotland island went out of service on 17 November 2024; whereas European authorities suspect the Chinese-flagged ship Yi Peng 3 of being responsible for the damage to both undersea cables; whereas the Danish navy has stopped the vessel in its territorial waters and several European authorities are investigating the incident;
- P. whereas the re-election of Donald Trump to the White House has raised serious concerns about an unpredictable future US policy towards Russia and a reduction in US political support and military aid to Ukraine;
- Q. whereas President Zelenskyy presented Ukraine's Peace Formula in September 2022, outlining 10 requirements for a just peace for Ukraine and for restoring the rules-based order; whereas as a follow-up to this, a first Summit on Peace in Ukraine was held in Switzerland in June 2024 and attended by more than 90 states; whereas Ukraine announced plans for a second Summit on Peace to which Russia would be invited, but Moscow immediately rejected the invitation; whereas earlier this year, President Zelenskyy presented Ukraine's Victory Plan, outlining steps that will create conditions to strengthen Ukraine's position for ending the war on favourable terms for Ukraine and improving global peace and stability;
- 1. Condemns in the strongest possible terms Russia's continued war of aggression against

Ukraine, as well as the involvement of Belarus in this war, and demands that Russia immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and compensate Ukraine for the damage caused to its people, land and infrastructure;

2. Expresses its undivided solidarity with the people of Ukraine, fully supports Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, and underlines that this war constitutes a serious violation of international law; stresses that the ultimate goal remains the achievement of a just and lasting peace in Ukraine on Ukraine's terms, ensuring the safety and dignity of the Ukrainian people within a peaceful and stable Europe;
3. States its firm support for Ukraine's Peace Formula and Victory Plan as the best basis for a just, comprehensive and lasting peace for the people of Ukraine and the wider region; stresses that the EU and its Member States, alongside its NATO and non-NATO partners, possess the means to achieve the goals outlined in those two strategies;
4. Calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to proactively support Ukraine's Peace Formula and Victory Plan as a matter of utmost urgency, and to develop, without further delay, a clear strategy with specific goals, identify the tools and actions needed to achieve those goals in the coming months and years, and ensure that the EU plays a central role in achieving a just, comprehensive and lasting peace for Ukraine;
5. Stresses, in this regard, the importance of global support for Ukraine's Peace Formula and Victory Plan; urges the Commission, the VP/HR and the Member States to engage with countries in the Global South in this context and to prepare the ground for holding the second Summit on Peace;
6. Urges the VP/HR and the Member States to forcefully address the direct and aggressive involvement of North Korea in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine; believes that the deployment of North Korean combat troops on the European continent is an unacceptable and unprecedented escalation by Russia, which has to be met with the strongest possible response; considers North Korea's deployment of troops and transfer of arms to Russia, in particular ballistic missiles, an egregious violation of UN Security Council resolutions and a unilateral hostile act by North Korea threatening European security; stresses the need for the EU and its Member States to promptly engage with China on the matter as North Korea remains highly dependent on its neighbour;
7. Calls on all EU and UN Member States to do their utmost to ensure the implementation of all UN Security Council resolutions regarding North Korea and to proactively block any routes for North Korea to obtain financing, materials or knowledge for its illegal weapons programmes;
8. Condemns recent acts in the Baltic Sea that have damaged European critical infrastructure; stresses the urgent need to investigate these grave incidents and release information about the perpetrators and their intentions; underlines that several representatives of European governments believe that this recent incident constitutes a grave act of sabotage; calls on the VP/HR and the Member States to respond with measures impacting bilateral relations with the state actors responsible, notably China

and Russia, if evidence proves their involvement;

9. Welcomes the signing of the joint security commitments between the EU and Ukraine and calls on the Commission and the Member States to act swiftly to implement the commitments effectively, and to synchronise these efforts with an EU strategy on the implementation of Ukraine's Peace Formula and Victory Plan; supports, in this regard, the proposal by VP/HR Borrell to establish an EU military support coordination cell in Kyiv, directly under the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine;
10. Underlines that insufficient or delayed deliveries of weapons and ammunition risk undermining efforts made so far and therefore urges the Member States to substantially increase and significantly accelerate their military support as a matter of the utmost urgency, in particular the provision of weapons, including TAURUS missiles, and ammunition in response to clearly identified needs; emphasises that a significant number of the systems that Ukraine was supposed to receive after the decision taken at the NATO Summit have not yet been delivered; welcomes the recent decisions to use longer-range missiles to target legitimate military targets on Russian territory; urges Member States and international partners to withdraw all limitations imposed on Ukraine's use of Western arms for legitimate military targets in Russian territory, which contradict Ukraine's rights under international public law;
11. Deeply deplores the declining financial volume of bilateral military aid to Ukraine from Member States, despite strong statements made at the beginning of this year, which are now being contradicted by recent governmental decisions and the severe problems with the overall functioning of the EU's key mechanism (EPF) to incentivise bilateral military aid to Ukraine; notes that financial resources deriving from frozen Russian assets should be considered additional and cannot replace funding for Ukraine from existing state budgets;
12. Echoes VP/HR Borrell's assessment of Hungary's unacceptable blockade of up to EUR 6.6 billion of EPF funds, which are supposed to reimburse parts of bilateral military aid and have now been partially frozen for over a year and a half; calls for the Member States, the President of the Commission, and the VP/HR to do their utmost to overcome Hungary's veto as a matter of urgency; reiterates the need to suspend Hungary's voting rights in line with the procedure laid down by Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union; calls on the Council to activate the passerelle clauses to introduce qualified majority voting on matters concerning the common foreign and security policy; stresses that if the EPF Ukraine Assistance Fund and previous reimbursement tranches remain blocked until the next European Council, the EU must urgently and immediately establish a new format to allow those Member States that are willing and able to provide military aid to Ukraine to do so, and to restore the EU's credibility in that role, or to reimburse national contributions in order not to hamper the smooth financing of bilateral aid on a purely national basis;
13. Calls for the EU and its Member States to redouble their efforts to ensure the right quantity and quality of military support for Ukraine, ensure the right timing of delivery and rights of use and address global production bottlenecks affecting Ukraine's domestic arms production, in order to concretely enable Ukraine to re-establish its territorial integrity; calls, in particular, on those Member States that are not living up to

their own commitments regarding the production of defence products and direct support for relevant production capacities to engage in joint ventures with Ukraine or directly place orders in Ukraine; calls on the Member States to accelerate direct investments in scaling up Ukraine's military industrial capacity, following the model used by Denmark; calls for the EU to include this model in the Ukraine Assistance Fund;

14. Reiterates its previous position that all EU Member States and NATO allies should collectively and individually commit to supporting Ukraine militarily with no less than 0.25 % of their gross domestic product annually; stresses that this commitment is needed now more than ever following the re-election of Donald Trump to the White House;
15. Expresses its conviction that a lasting peace is only possible if there is certainty that Russia will not prepare and launch another assault after the cessation of hostilities; calls in this context for discussions about Ukraine's future NATO membership to be accelerated and intensified;
16. Calls on the Council to maintain and extend its sanctions policy against Russia and Belarus, while monitoring, reviewing and enhancing its effectiveness and impact; stresses that the impact of existing sanctions, as well as financial and military support for Ukraine, will continue to be undermined as long as the EU allows Russian fossil fuels to be imported; is deeply concerned about China and other countries deemed to be helping Moscow's war effort;
17. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the authorities of Russia and North Korea, and the United Nations Security Council.