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*Plenary sitting*

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**B10-0196/2024**

25.11.2024

## **MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION**

to wind up the debate on the presentation by the Commission President-elect of the College of Commissioners and their programme

pursuant to Rule 129(6) of the Rules of Procedure

on election of the Commission  
(2024/2877(RSP))

**Marieke Ehlers, Jordan Bardella, Sebastiaan Stöteler, Jean-Paul Garraud, Tamás Deutsch, Csaba Dömötör, Tom Vandendriessche, Gerolf Annemans, António Tânger Corrêa, Vilis Krištopans, Paolo Borchia**  
on behalf of the P/E Group

**B10-0196/2024**

**European Parliament resolution on election of the Commission  
(2024/2877(RSP))**

*The European Parliament,*

- having regard to Article 17(7) of the Treaty on European Union and Article 106a of the Euratom Treaty,
  - having regard to European Council Decision (EU) 2024/1862<sup>1</sup> of 27 June 2024 proposing Ursula von der Leyen as candidate for President of the Commission,
  - having regard to the political guidelines for the next Commission presented by the candidate for President of the Commission on 18 July 2024,
  - having regard to its decision of 18 July 2024<sup>2</sup> electing Ursula von der Leyen President of the Commission,
  - having regard to European Council Decision (EU) 2024/2086 of 24 July 2024 appointing the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy<sup>3</sup>,
  - having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2024/2517, taken by common accord with the President-elect of the Commission, of 19 September 2024 adopting the list of the other persons whom the Council proposes for appointment as Members of the Commission<sup>4</sup>,
  - having regard to the hearings of the Commissioners-designate held by the parliamentary committees responsible from 4 to 12 November 2024, and to the evaluations of the Commissioners-designate after the hearings,
  - having regard to the presentation in plenary on 27 November 2024, by the Commission President-elect, of the College of Commissioners and their programme,
  - having regard to Articles 234, 244, 245 and 247 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
  - having regard to the Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission<sup>5</sup>,
  - having regard to Rule 129(6) of, and Annex VII to, its Rules of Procedure,
- A. whereas the Commission plays a crucial role in ensuring the effective functioning of the

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<sup>1</sup> OJ L, 2024/1862, 1.7.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/1862/oj>.

<sup>2</sup> OJ C, C/2024/6132, 22.10.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6132/oj>.

<sup>3</sup> OJ L, 2024/2086, 26.7.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/2086/oj>.

<sup>4</sup> OJ L, 2024/2517, 23.9.2024, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/2517/oj>.

<sup>5</sup> OJ L 304, 20.11.2010, p. 47, ELI: [http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree\\_interinstit/2010/1120/oj](http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/2010/1120/oj).

EU and serves as the guardian of the Treaties, with the Commissioners being nominated by the Council and confirmed by Parliament;

- B. whereas Parliament's role of assessing candidates' aptitude in the Commissioners-designate hearings is crucial to ensure accountability and transparency in the Commission's functioning;
  - C. whereas the Council has the exclusive competence to nominate and appoint the candidates for the posts of Commissioner and, while Parliament's hearings serve as an important element of scrutiny, this process should not be politicised or misused to undermine the appointment procedure defined in the Treaties;
  - D. whereas Parliament, in carrying out its role of confirming or rejecting the Commissioners, must base its decisions on professional standards, expertise and merit, rather than on partisan political interests or tactics;
  - E. whereas in practice, the 2024 Commissioners-designate hearings have become excessively politicised, often diverting attention away from the qualifications and competence of the candidates to party-political considerations and ideological conflicts, undermining the spirit of institutional balance and cooperation among the EU institutions;
  - F. whereas the current procedure, in which an absolute majority is sufficient for the election of the Commission President, may not fully reflect the need for broad political consensus on this key appointment;
1. Strongly condemns the fact that the 2024 Commissioners-designate hearings did not focus on the professional preparedness and aptitude of the candidates but became the subject of political pacts and back-room deals; points out that this calls into question the credibility and *raison d'être* of the entire evaluation process; expresses concern that a significant number of Commissioners-designate have been approved despite their poor performance and lack of experience in their respective portfolios, and that this undermines the Commission's credibility for the next five years;
  2. Stresses that the Council has the exclusive right to nominate candidates for the position of Commissioner, and that Parliament's role in scrutinising these nominations should be consistent with the principles of institutional balance, democratic pluralism and bona fide cooperation;
  3. Believes that the Commission President's practice of asking the Member States to propose two candidates violates the prerogatives of the Member States and the Council; calls on the Commission President to refrain from pressurising the Member States to reconsider their nominations for political or gender-related reasons;
  4. Expresses its strong criticism of the Commissioners-designate hearings for becoming excessively politicised and undermining the procedural integrity and impartiality of the nomination process; urges all MEPs to refrain from engaging in partisan tactics and to focus on the competence, qualifications and vision of the candidates;
  5. Commits to ensuring that Parliament's oversight role is used to assess the candidates on

their ability to serve the EU and its citizens, rather than on political rivalry; expresses its strong disapproval, in this regard, of the decision by the majority of political groups to postpone the evaluation meetings of certain Commissioners-designate to an unspecified date and to conduct meetings behind closed doors where not all political groups are represented; considers that this undermines transparency and accountability, which form the cornerstone of democracy and the rule of law;

6. Regrets that the assessment of the candidates partly hinged on political agreements unrelated to the role of Parliament in the assessment of the Commissioners-designate, and that this undermines the credibility and transparency of the process as a whole; notes that this is a serious breach of its internal democratic process, transparency and its own Rules of Procedure;
7. Stresses that each Member State has the right to nominate its own candidate; insists that Parliament should not allow its biases against certain national governments to dictate its decision on the appointment of the Commissioners, nor should it use the hearings process as a tool of political pressure;
8. Believes that the Commission's drafting of a declaration of absence of conflicts of interest for its own Commissioners-designate could constitute, in itself, a conflict of interest; calls on the Commission to delegate the drafting of a declaration of absence of conflicts of interest to Parliament's Committee on Legal Affairs, in order to increase the effectiveness and legitimacy of the preliminary scrutiny process;
9. Commits to a review of its Rules of Procedure in order to adopt a clear and transparent set of criteria for the hearings and evaluations of the candidates for the Commission, to safeguard the integrity of the process and focus on the professional qualities of the candidates, rather than their political affiliations;
10. Considers that, since Parliament is called upon to assess the aptitude of the Commissioners-designate and not their political affiliations, the required threshold for their election should be a two-thirds majority at both committee and plenary level; considers that the same should apply *mutatis mutandis* when the Commission President is elected;
11. Proposes that the outcome of the evaluation meetings is made public to ensure the democratic legitimacy of the procedure;
12. Urges the Member States to facilitate a broader discussion on the reform of the procedure for the nomination and appointment of the Commission President and the College of Commissioners; invites the Commission to reflect on ways to foster greater transparency in the delineation and determination of the portfolios of the respective Commissioners;
13. Rejects the Commission President's political guidelines, which represent a troubling continuation of overreach and centralisation that disregards the outcome of the 2024 European elections as well as the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality;
14. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council of the European Union, the President of the European Commission and the national

parliaments of the Member States.