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*Plenary sitting*

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**B9-0320/2023**

5.7.2023

## **MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION**

to wind up the debate on the statements by the Council and the Commission  
pursuant to Rule 132(2) of the Rules of Procedure

on the state of the EU-Cuba PDCA in the light of the recent visit of the High  
Representative to the island  
(2023/2744(RSP))

**Manu Pineda, Giorgos Georgiou, João Pimenta Lopes, Sandra Pereira**  
on behalf of The Left Group

**B9-0320/2023**

**European Parliament resolution on the state of the EU-Cuba PDCA in the light of the recent visit of the High Representative to the island (2023/2744(RSP))**

*The European Parliament,*

- having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,
- having regard to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966, in particular Article 1 thereof,
- having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966,
- having regard to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights of 2011,
- having regard to the principles laid down in the UN Charter,
- having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights treaties and instruments,
- having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 77/7 of 3 November 2022 entitled ‘Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the United States of America against Cuba’,
- having regard to the United States’ so called Monroe Doctrine, which remains the heart of American diplomacy on the American continent and justifies its expansionism and interference,
- having regard to the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Cuba, of the other part<sup>1</sup> (the EU-Cuba Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement),
- having regard to the joint press statements by High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell and the Cuban Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo after the EU-Cuba Joint Council of 26 May 2023,
- having regard to its previous resolutions on Cuba, in particular those of 15 November 2018<sup>2</sup>, of 28 November 2019<sup>3</sup>, of 10 June 2021<sup>4</sup>, of 16 September 2021<sup>5</sup> and of 16 December 2021<sup>6</sup>,

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<sup>1</sup> OJ L 337I, 13.12.2016, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> OJ C 363, 28.10.2020, p. 70.

<sup>3</sup> OJ C 232, 16.6.2021, p. 17.

<sup>4</sup> OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 113.

<sup>5</sup> OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 104.

<sup>6</sup> OJ C 251, 30.6.2022, p. 120.

- having regard to its position of 5 July 2017 on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the Union, of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Cuba, of the other part<sup>7</sup>,
  - having regard to Rule 132(2) of its Rules of Procedure,
- A. whereas the US economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed on Cuba constitutes a violation of the human rights of the Cuban people that qualifies as an act of economic warfare, hindering the development of the Cuban people and the full achievement of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs);
  - B. whereas the US blockade against Cuba has lasted since February 1962; whereas this blockade is justified by the US administration as ‘the only foreseeable way to reduce domestic support was through disenchantment and discouragement based on dissatisfaction and economic difficulties [...] Any means to weaken the economic life of Cuba must be used quickly [...]: refuse to give credit and to supply Cuba to lower real and monetary wages with the aim of causing hunger, despair and the overthrow of the government’; whereas as such, it can be seen as a crime against humanity;
  - C. whereas the consequences of the US economic, commercial and financial blockade have worsened severely, including during Cuba’s fight against the COVID-19 pandemic; whereas the blockade has been reinforced, in particular since the beginning of the pandemic by former US President Donald Trump, who added 243 additional coercive measures against Cuba, notably the suspension of Western Union services throughout the country, making it almost impossible for relatives abroad to send foreign currency and hindering the country’s access to vital medicines and medical equipment; whereas these measures have been maintained by the Biden administration;
  - D. whereas a few days before the end of his mandate in January 2021, former US president Donald Trump added Cuba to the list of countries sponsoring international terrorism on the pretext of Cuba having welcomed the Colombian peace agreements and for having refused to extradite the leaders of the National Liberation Army (ELN), as requested at the time by the Duque government, even though this was contrary to international law; whereas the extradition request was withdrawn by the new Colombian Government; whereas since the end of 2022, under the leadership of Gustavo Petro, the Colombian Government has been negotiating with the ELN; whereas a ceasefire agreement was reached in Havana on 9 June 2023;
  - E. whereas the inclusion of Cuba on the list of countries sponsoring international terrorism has led to new sanctions, not only restricting assistance and foreign trade with the US and imposing significant financial limitations, but also negatively impacting commercial relations with foreign operators, especially European ones, and has been used to justify the reactivation of Titles III and IV of the Helms-Burton Act; whereas the US-imposed Helms-Burton Act violates several principles of international law and the rules of the multilateral trade and commerce system; whereas the extraterritorial application of the US blockade goes against the sovereignty of other countries, including Member States; whereas this blockade has led to titanic fines of

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<sup>7</sup> OJ C 334, 19.9.2018, p. 235.

USD 11 billion for 38 banks, including the French group BNP Paribas; whereas most European banks (including ING and BNP Paribas) have since then refused to transfer money to the island, making investments and solidarity actions extremely complicated;

- F. whereas the important tourism sector collapsed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and has still not recovered, because of the war in Ukraine and the energy crisis; whereas the Cuban people have recently faced serious economic and social difficulties in their daily lives; whereas there is a serious shortage of fuel, which is also causing significant delays in the distribution of food; whereas the energy crisis has led to daily periods of mandatory power cuts;
- G. whereas the vagaries of the weather (particularly since Cyclone Ian) and the impossibility of buying spare equipment to replace broken machinery are causing the situation to deteriorate rapidly; whereas in December 2022, the government succeeded in signing a deal with Türkiye to send seven floating thermoelectric power stations to restore continuous electricity to the island by the end of the year; whereas however, this solution was only temporary, and power cuts resumed in the first half of 2023;
- H. whereas material difficulties have led to an unprecedented migratory crisis; whereas an estimated 500 000 people emigrated in 2022, of whom around 300 000 entered the United States ‘illegally’;
- I. whereas in May 2023, the Third Cuba-EU Joint Council was hosted in Havana on the third cycle of the implementation of the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement (PDCA) between Cuba, the EU and its 27 Member States, which was signed on 12 December 2016 and has been in force, provisionally, since 1 November 2017;
- J. whereas according to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, ‘The III Joint Council confirmed the progress achieved in the fulfilment of the objectives defined in the PDCA and also its validity as a guideline and driver for the development and deepening of mutually beneficial relations’;
- K. whereas during his visit to the island in May 2023, Josep Borrell stated that ‘despite all the limitations and restrictive measures of the American blockade, which does not make things any easier, we are Cuba’s main trading partner’; whereas he announced a EUR 14 million fund to help promote small businesses in Cuba, a sign of the EU’s ‘willingness to accompany Cuba in its process of economic and social reform in a relationship of mutual respect’;
- L. whereas the validity and usefulness of all the political and sectoral dialogues have been established in the PDCA, without establishing a hierarchy between them; whereas different follow-up actions have now been scheduled, notably the planned visit of the EU Special Representative for Human Rights to Cuba in November 2023;
- M. whereas this Parliament resolution comes at a very special time for Cuba and Latin America, as the vote will be just a few days before the summit between the EU and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), which will take place in Brussels on 17 and 18 July 2023; whereas the Spanish right and extreme right have strongly pushed for this resolution in the context of new parliamentary elections in Spain on 23 July 2023; whereas the US and its allies from the extreme right in Europe

are trying to use the pretext of the current situation in Cuba to further destabilise the country and re-establish the so called ‘common position’, which was a regime of sanctions unique in the world;

- N. whereas UN General Assembly Resolution 77/7 of 3 November 2022 was approved for the 30th consecutive time this year (as it has been every year since 1992 with the exception of 2020 owing to the pandemic), with 185 countries voting in favour,
1. Expresses full solidarity with the people of Cuba regarding the ongoing challenges they face in their economic and social development in the current difficult economic situation due to impositions by foreign powers;
  2. Rejects any attempt to exploit the difficult economic situation of the Cuban people in order to interfere in internal affairs; highlights that, according to Article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966, ‘[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’ without foreign interference; urges the EU and its Members States therefore to respect international law;
  3. Urges the immediate lifting of the economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the US, as well as all other unilateral coercive measures, which are the main cause of this difficult situation; calls for the immediate removal of Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism in order to put an end to the country’s difficulties in accessing the international financial system that this listing entails;
  4. Recognises that the economic and social situation in Cuba is becoming critical due to the consequences of the pandemic, the energy crisis and especially the reinforcement of the sanction regime by the US; calls therefore for an increase in aid to and cooperation with Cuba;
  5. Highlights the fact that, with the withdrawal of the extradition request by the Government of Gustavo Petro and the conclusion of the temporary ceasefire between the ELN and the Colombian Government on 9 June 2023, there is no longer a pretext on which to keep Cuba on this list;
  6. Denounces the consequences for EU citizens and enterprises of the extraterritorial application of the US economic, commercial and financial blockade and Titles III and IV of the Helms-Burton Act and calls on the US authorities to immediately end this practice; calls on the Commission to develop measures to counter the effects of this policy in collaboration with other countries;
  7. Calls for an immediate dismantlement of the naval base and military prison in Guantánamo Bay, the withdrawal of all US forces from Cuban territory and the restoration of Cuba’s territorial integrity; calls on the US authorities to guarantee respect for the human rights of prisoners remaining in Guantánamo Bay, including their right to a fair trial;
  8. Calls for EU-Cuba relations to be strengthened on the basis of dialogue and cooperation on common challenges, such as climate change or the full achievement of the UN

SDGs;

9. Welcomes and stresses the importance of the PDCA as a key tool to promote understanding and mutually beneficial relations between the EU and Cuba; welcomes the expected start of the fourth implementation cycle of the PDCA in November 2023, with political dialogues on human rights and disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control;
10. Stresses Cuba's importance in multilateral forums, in particular since January 2023 and the Cuban presidency of the G77; highlights the efforts made by the Cuban Government and the Cuban people in order to achieve the UN SDG and the country's important role in promoting them;
11. Commends Cuba for the significant role it played in the global fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, in particular for its development of five candidate vaccines, three of which have been certified; commends the brigades of doctors and nurses for saving lives around the world, including in the EU;
12. Regrets that this resolution comes just before the EU-CELAC Summit, which can be seen as a sign of disrespect and which may damage the relationship between the EU and Latin American countries; condemns the instrumentalisation of human rights for political purposes with the goal of interfering in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cuba by several political forces in the EU and within the European Parliament; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to continue to pursue an independent policy based on dialogue and cooperation and not to replicate the confrontational approach of the US;
13. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the parliaments and governments of the Member States, the Government and the National Assembly of the Republic of Cuba, the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly, and the Latin American sub-regional entities, including the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States.