Question for written answer E-002220/2024 to the Commission

Rule 144

Radan Kanev (PPE), Wouter Beke (PPE), Stefan Berger (PPE), Markéta Gregorová (Verts/ALE), Bernard Guetta (Renew), Miriam Lexmann (PPE), Nicolás Pascual De La Parte (PPE), António Tânger Corrêa (PfE), Sebastian Tynkkynen (ECR), Axel Voss (PPE), Lucia Yar (Renew)

Subject: Security-related concerns regarding current EU customs scanning equipment and the Customs Control Equipment Instrument funds

Both the Draghi report on Europe's global competitiveness and the new European defence industrial strategy¹ have uncovered significant gaps in Europe's industrial capacity. These gaps have led to Europe being economically dependent on high-risk non-EU countries. This poses credible threats to the security of the EU and the wider Schengen area. One such threat is Chinese cyber warfare, including espionage and alleged data theft through China-produced scanning equipment at the EU's external borders.

- 1. Will the Commission support the development of European 'champions' and EU-based partnerships with trusted allies to provide border scanning equipment and services that are controlled and inspected by the EU?
- 2. Is it the Commission's view that the Customs Control Equipment Instrument funds could be extended to include defence products, for instance by classifying border scanning equipment as defence-related, and achieving this through transparent award procedures?
- 3. Will the Commission take steps to ensure that border and customs control scanning equipment is procured solely through transparent public tenders, restricted to EU companies and EU-based partnerships, thereby guaranteeing the security of EU and Schengen area borders as well as cybersecurity?

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https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/edis-our-common-defence-industrial-strategy_en.