

**Question for written answer E-002794/2024  
to the Commission**

Rule 144

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Subject: The role of TikTok in the Romanian presidential election

On 24 November 2024, far-right extremist politician Călin Georgescu won the first round of the Romanian presidential election. Media reports described this victory as a ‘TikTok win’. Questions arise as to whether TikTok is in breach of the Digital Services Act.

Notably, TikTok’s systemic risk assessment report failed to identify elements that were observed before the election, such as coordinated inauthentic behaviour to influence recommender systems, political content blended into entertainment-focused accounts and influencers being paid to promote political messages while being asked not to disclose this fact. Also, illegal content related to the promotion of historical fascist figures was not taken down.

Finally, measures in the guidelines on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes appear to have been ignored, such as the detection and disruption of manipulation of the service, adapting content moderation processes and algorithmic systems, preventing misuse of advertising systems, and ensuring that users can identify whether content contains political advertising.

1. If the Commission conducts an investigation into this matter, which types of breaches will it focus on?
2. Does the Commission intend to start an investigation, under Article 34 of Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 (Digital Services Act), into mechanisms that systematically lead to disinformation being disseminated quicker than information, since such mechanisms constitute a systematic risk to public discourse and elections?

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