

**Question for written answer E-000093/2025**

**to the Commission**

Rule 144

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Subject: Protecting the Bundestag elections – threat of X manipulating votes

X is not a neutral platform, given that its owner, Elon Musk, is actively campaigning for one of the parties standing in the elections, the AfD, which has in part been categorised as unconstitutional in Germany. During the US election campaign, Musk's own X account, and republican accounts, gained a much higher reach after he joined the election campaign. There is reason to suspect that X's management artificially created this reach by manipulating the site's algorithm. We, the undersigned, believe that Musk's personal involvement in the German Bundestag election campaign, his soon-to-be key position in the US Government and his power to influence the political agenda in Germany by controlling X's algorithm pose a systemic risk to public discourse and elections as set out in Article 34 of the Digital Services Act (DSA) and that urgent interim measures need to be taken by the Commission to protect the Bundestag elections.

1. Does the Commission agree that X currently poses a threat to public discourse and elections in Germany?
2. What immediate measures will it take to protect the 2025 Bundestag elections and other elections in future?
3. Is it planning longer-term investigations and measures under the DSA against X's recommendation algorithm?

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