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# **DRAFT REPORT**

on the security of energy supply in the EU  
(2025/XXXX(INI))

Committee on Industry, Research and Energy

Rapporteur: Beata Szydło

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## MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

### on the security of energy supply in the EU (2025/XXXX(INI))

*The European Parliament,*

- having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 194 thereof,
- having regard to Council Directive 2009/119/EC of 14 September 2009 imposing an obligation on Member States to maintain minimum stocks of crude oil and/or petroleum products<sup>1</sup>,
- having regard to the Commission communication of 28 May 2014 entitled ‘European Energy Security Strategy’ (COM(2014)0330),
- having regard to Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing Regulation (EU) No 994/2010<sup>2</sup>,
- having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity and amending Directive 2012/27/EU<sup>3</sup>,
- having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the internal market for electricity<sup>4</sup>,
- having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/941 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector and repealing Directive 2005/89/EC<sup>5</sup>,
- having regard to the Commission communication of 8 July 2020 entitled ‘Powering a climate-neutral economy: An EU Strategy for Energy System Integration’ (COM(2020)0299),
- having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility and repealing Regulations (EU) 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014<sup>6</sup>,
- having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/869 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on guidelines for trans-European energy infrastructure, amending Regulations (EC) No 715/2009, (EU) 2019/942 and (EU) 2019/943 and

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<sup>1</sup> OJ L 265, 9.10.2009, p. 9, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/119/oj>.

<sup>2</sup> OJ L 280, 28.10.2017, p. 1, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1938/oj>.

<sup>3</sup> OJ L 158, 14.6.2019, p. 125, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2019/944/oj>.

<sup>4</sup> OJ L 158, 14.6.2019, p. 54, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/943/oj>.

<sup>5</sup> OJ L 158, 14.6.2019, p. 1, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/941/oj>.

<sup>6</sup> OJ L 249, 14.7.2021, p. 38, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1153/oj>.

Directives 2009/73/EC and (EU) 2019/944, and repealing Regulation (EU) No 347/2013<sup>7</sup>,

- having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 18 May 2022 entitled ‘EU external energy engagement in a changing world’ (JOIN(2022)0023),
  - having regard to the Commission communication of 18 May 2022 entitled ‘REPowerEU Plan’ (COM(2022)0230),
  - having regard to the Commission communication of 18 October 2022 entitled ‘Digitalising the energy system – EU action plan’ (COM(2022)0552),
  - having regard to Special Report 09/2024 by the European Court of Auditors entitled ‘Security of the supply of gas in the EU’,
  - having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),
  - having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,
  - having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A10-0000/2025),
- A. whereas energy security is a key building block of a resilient and competitive economy;
- B. whereas the EU has scarce energy resources and imports more than 60 % of its energy, leaving it vulnerable to energy supply disruptions;
- C. whereas the EU Member States agreed in the Versailles Declaration<sup>8</sup> to reassess how to ensure the security of their energy supplies and to phase out their dependency on Russian gas, oil and coal imports ‘as soon as possible’; whereas the REPowerEU plan put forward a set of actions to stop importing Russian fossil fuels by 2027;
- D. whereas while Russian oil and coal imports have been sanctioned, Russian gas imports have remained outside of the EU’s sanctions regime amid concerns over security of supply;
- E. whereas domestic energy production and energy efficiency measures decrease reliance on external energy sources and enhance the security of energy supply;
- F. whereas the US has rolled back on climate policies, including withdrawing from the Paris Agreement;

### *New vision for energy security*

1. Considers that a comprehensive approach to energy security should take into account

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<sup>7</sup> OJ L 152, 3.6.2022, p. 45, ELI: <http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/869/oj>.

<sup>8</sup> See <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/54773/20220311-versailles-declaration-en.pdf>.

the physical dimension, the affordability of supplies and sustainability, and should place emphasis on the geopolitical dimension;

2. Emphasises that the current geopolitical situation underscores the need to revise the understanding of energy security, recognising that the ‘peace dividend’ is over and that the resilience of energy systems, broadly understood, is now a strategic imperative;
3. Stresses that as the energy system continues to decarbonise, the share of renewables increases and electrification advances, the issues of the right market model, integration of flexibility sources and sufficient dispatchable capacity will be crucial;
4. Highlights that energy security cannot work without adequacy; draws attention to the volumes of fossil fuel-based electricity generation that are at risk of economic decommissioning and notes that ‘the scarcity issues tend to shift from the peripheral areas of Europe in 2025 to the central parts of the continent by 2033’<sup>9</sup>; stresses the urgent need to integrate capacity mechanisms into the energy market design to promote investment in flexible generation and storage so as to ensure a stable and cost-effective energy supply in systems dominated by renewable energy sources;
5. Stresses that decarbonisation must take into account the specificities of Member States, the needs of their industries and the vulnerability of their citizens in order to ensure a just transition that maintains energy security by balancing climate ambitions with economic and social realities;
6. Notes the need for a broader approach to flexibility and storage that incorporates molecules and heat; highlights the potential of district heating systems that can use thermal storage to reduce the temperature of the loop and incorporate waste heat, solar and other alternatives;
7. Stresses that the impact of climate change on generation assets, networks and consumption patterns should be better integrated into the modelling and preparedness of energy infrastructure;
8. Emphasises that technological neutrality plays a key role in enhancing the security of energy supply while fostering sustainability and economic efficiency;
9. Commends the Draghi report<sup>10</sup> which highlights the need to establish a long-term strategy for natural gas that should guide infrastructure development, international partnerships and legislation; notes, with concern, that inconsistent policies on natural gas have weakened the trading position of EU companies, leaving them exposed to global spot market prices and creating a gap between what the EU has contractually secured and what will be imported over time;
10. Stresses that nuclear energy has an important role to play in an integrated energy system with increasing penetration of renewables; underlines the need to support the development of a new generation of nuclear technologies that will contribute to building

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<sup>9</sup> European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E), ‘European Resource Adequacy Assessment’, December 2023.

<sup>10</sup> See [https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report\\_en](https://commission.europa.eu/topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en).

a competitive technological supply chain in the EU so as to ensure open strategic autonomy;

11. Recognises that increasing domestic production, including in less developed sectors, such as geothermal, biomethane and marine energy, is crucial to strengthening energy security and should be pursued in a way that reflects regional diversity and the needs of local industries; notes the need to increase natural gas production in the EU and the European Economic Area;
12. Notes that infrastructure bottlenecks impede the benefits of sector integration and aggravate the threats to energy security; underlines the importance of investing in new energy networks and optimising existing infrastructure;
13. Emphasises the need to invest in the protection of energy infrastructure against military and cyber attacks; notes, with concern, that small distributed energy resources connected to the internet, such as inverters, are not covered by cybersecurity legislation, and that if they are manufactured in non-EU countries, they could give those countries control over EU electricity grids;
14. Urges the Member States to address security risks associated with foreign investment in and acquisitions of energy infrastructure;
15. Stresses that energy security should include the supply of key technologies and critical raw materials; calls for increased support for the EU's grid manufacturing industry;
16. Highlights that the EU should prioritise partnerships with like-minded energy suppliers, such as the European Economic Area;

### ***Phase out of Russian energy supplies***

17. Expresses concern that the EU is increasing its reliance on Russian gas as it imported 30 % more natural gas from Russia in May 2024 than in September 2022;
18. Stresses that the roadmap for phasing out Russian energy imports must pave the way for their definitive end as soon as possible, including nuclear and related technologies;
19. Expresses concern that official data does not provide a complete picture of Russian energy imports, as relabelled Russian oil and gas continue to enter the EU market; notes with regret that this often happens with the tacit approval of EU Member States;
20. Agrees that an adequate assessment of the level of Russian energy imports is a prerequisite for phasing out this dependence; welcomes the proposals for transparency and traceability mechanisms, as the effective implementation of sanctions depends on compatible control mechanisms in all Member States;
21. Calls on the Commission to develop a legislative mechanism to ensure the transparency and traceability of natural gas originating in Russia and exported to the EU as liquefied natural gas and by pipeline, and eventually to cover oil imports; considers that the mechanism would require cooperation between various services, including EU competition services and national customs authorities with enhanced criminal

investigation powers; stresses the need for dissuasive penalties for sanctions evasion;

***Revision of security of supply framework***

22. Considers that the security of supply architecture should reflect the cross-sectoral integration of the energy system, the new geopolitical landscape and the profound changes in supply routes;
23. Calls on the Commission to include in the security of supply architecture a framework for diversification, requiring each Member State to prepare an exit plan for Russian energy sources, and to monitor the preparation of exit plans at the level of their national companies;
24. Condemns the calls for a return to Russian energy imports as part of the peace settlement in Ukraine; warns against the EU falling back into dependency on an unreliable supplier and calls on the Commission to develop safeguards against this, such as a countersignature by the Commission on any potential contracts with Russia or the mandatory use of the AggregateEU platform for this type of purchase;
25. Stresses the need for greater cooperation on the resilience of energy infrastructure to both climate impacts and human-caused threats; considers that new energy assets should be ‘resilient by design’, including to possible military threats;
26. Notes the need to accommodate the integration of renewable and low-carbon gases, such as biomethane and hydrogen;
27. Considers that the new security of supply framework could be broadened to reflect a new way of looking at the security of energy supply, based not only on energy sources, but also on the ability to produce different types of energy domestically;
28. Stresses the need to include affordability risks in national risk assessments;
29. Emphasises that energy security is increasingly becoming a shared responsibility of the Member States; notes the need for stronger coordination, including on the withdrawal of generation capacity from the system, as this affects the availability and affordability of energy in neighbouring countries; calls for transparency on the implementation of national risk-preparedness measures to increase trust between the Member States; notes the need for greater alignment on protected consumer categories to allow coordinated consumer load-shedding plans to be defined;
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30. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

## EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

In the Versailles Declaration, Member States agreed that the new situation requires a thorough reassessment of how the EU should ensure the security of energy supply. The update should reflect the technological changes that have taken place in recent years and the progress made in the cross-sectoral integration of the energy system. It should also reflect changes in the geopolitical situation. This is not limited to Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and the profound changes in supply routes and the EU's increased dependence on Liquefied Natural Gas imports, but should also take into account broader geopolitical developments in the world. We need to analyse the new US administration's decision to take a step back on climate policy, including withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, and see what the consequences are for our economy, for the existing competitiveness gap between the US and the EU, and whether this requires a reassessment of our policies, including in the field of energy and climate.

The reassessment would be incomplete without taking into account the lessons learned and acknowledging the shortcomings of existing policies. This applies to the EU's unstable and ambivalent policy towards natural gas, which has undermined the trading position of EU companies, leaving them unable to conclude long-term contracts, partly due to the legal limitation of gas contracts to 2049, leaving Europe exposed to global spot market prices and creating a dangerous gap between what the bloc has contractually secured and what will be imported over time. The above also applies to the existing approach to nuclear energy, which has been treated as an elephant in the room of EU policy for years. This has gradually changed in recent years, with the result that Commissioner Dan Jorgensen has been given the task in his mission letter of facilitating the deployment of small and modular reactors in the EU. The role of nuclear power should be further reassessed as it has an important role to play in an integrated energy system with increasing penetration of renewables, providing flexible load following and frequency control, allowing very rapid changes in output and underpinning security of supply in Member States. EU energy policy should be firmly based on the principle of technological neutrality, which is crucial for security of supply as it allows for a diverse mix of energy sources and innovations - from renewables to nuclear and low-carbon fuels - to increase resilience, reduce dependence on specific suppliers and ensure a stable and adaptable energy system in the face of geopolitical and market uncertainties.

The Rapporteur expresses her concern that the short-sightedness and self-interest of some EU Member States in securing cheap energy imports for their economies, against the warnings of other countries, has taught the whole continent, at enormous cost, the dangers of dependence on an unreliable energy supplier such as Russia. The report stresses that the lessons of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine must be at the heart of future EU action. EU energy sanctions against Russia should be fully implemented and further strengthened. This is required not only by our obligations to Ukraine, which is the first line of defence of the European continent against an aggressive, revisionist and imperialist Russia. It is also required by the resilience of our energy systems, which must not fall back into the trap of energy dependence on Russia and its inevitable future blackmail. For this reason, the Rapporteur calls for the adoption of a phase-out plan that should pave the way for the definitive end of all energy imports from Russia, including in nuclear and related technologies. The text also emphasises the need to ensure transparency and traceability of Russian energy imports into the EU, as a clear picture of what and how much is actually being



imported should be a prerequisite and a basis for future measures guiding the EU's phasing out of Russian imports. The Rapporteur believes that the forthcoming revision of the security of supply architecture should be used as an opportunity to include in its framework an obligation for each Member State to prepare an exit plan for Russian energy sources and to monitor the preparation of exit plans at the level of national companies. This should be used in the future to prevent other dependencies, as we cannot have a situation where we move from dependence on one country to total dependence on another.

The Rapporteur condemns calls for a return to Russian energy imports as part of a peace settlement in Ukraine. This would undermine the commitments made in the Versailles Declaration and undermine all aspects of the Union's security. Given that gas imports are not (yet) sanctioned by the EU, the Rapporteur calls on the Commission and Member States to put in place much needed safeguards against the import of gas volumes that threaten the security of the Union. These safeguards could take the form of a required countersignature by the Commission on any potential contract with Russia or the mandatory use of the AggregateEU platform for this type of purchase.

The Rapporteur emphasises that the geopolitical situation underscores the need to revise the understanding of energy security. This requires reconceptualising that the "peace dividend" is over and that resilience of energy systems, broadly understood, is now a strategic imperative. Member States urgently need to cooperate and invest in protecting their critical infrastructure against man-made threats, both cyber and military. We need to learn the lessons from a war in Ukraine and Russia's deliberate attacks on its energy infrastructure assets and increase the preparedness of our energy systems.

Climate change poses significant risks to energy infrastructure, as rising temperatures, extreme weather events and changing rainfall patterns threaten the reliability and resilience of energy systems. Heat waves can reduce the efficiency of power plants and transmission lines, while droughts can limit hydropower generation and the availability of cooling water for thermal and nuclear power plants. More frequent storms, floods and wildfires can damage critical infrastructure, leading to power outages and costly repairs. These challenges require urgent adaptation measures, such as strengthening networks, decentralising energy production and integrating climate resilience into infrastructure planning. Strengthening the energy system against climate impacts is an essential element of a policy to ensure a stable, secure and sustainable energy supply in a rapidly changing environment. We must therefore ensure that all new energy infrastructure is "resilient by design" and provides a high level of protection against climate and man-made threats.

The Rapporteur would like to draw attention to the fact that the increasing complexity of the energy system, driven by the integration of variable renewable energy, decentralised production, digitalisation and the electrification of key sectors, requires greater policy coordination between Member States in order to ensure stability, efficiency and security of supply. As energy flows become increasingly interconnected across borders, unilateral action can often lead to inefficiencies, market distortions and supply risks. This should not be limited to network infrastructure and emergency response mechanisms, which are essential to prevent congestion, increase flexibility and optimise the use of resources across regions. As has been shown, national decisions to remove generation capacity from the system, such as the closure of nuclear power plants, can have a major impact on the availability and affordability of energy in neighbouring countries, to the extent that some of them are considering insulating

their markets from EU energy system influence. Energy security is increasingly a shared responsibility of Member States and these decisions require closer coordination.

Securing a stable and diversified energy supply is essential for economic resilience, industrial competitiveness and social stability. Domestic energy production, improving energy efficiency and strengthening the infrastructure for alternative sources, such as hydrogen and biomethane, are essential to reduce dependence and increase resilience. Strong trade partnerships, especially with like-minded countries, are essential for energy security as they diversify sources of supply, reduce dependence on individual suppliers, increase market stability and facilitate access to critical energy resources and technologies needed for a resilient and sustainable energy system. A secure energy system not only protects economies from geopolitical shocks, but also supports long-term climate goals, enhancing both sustainability and strategic autonomy.

**ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS  
FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT**

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the draft report:

<b>Entity and/or person</b>
SolarEdge
Trina Solar
Forum Energii
ACER
CEWEP - Confederation of European Waste-to-Energy Plants
Edison
EUTurbines
EUgine
Cefic - European Chemical Industry Council
ENTSO-G
ENTSO-E
Urenco
PKEE - Polish Electricity Association
PGE
COGEN Europe
Gas Infrastructure Europe
Offshore Norway
Fluxys

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament's Data Protection Notice No 484 (<https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do>), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.