European Parliament resolution of 5 July 2018 on the political crisis in Moldova following the invalidation of the mayoral elections in Chișinău (2018/2783(RSP))

P8_TA(2018)0303 RC-B8-0322/2018

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Moldova, and in particular that of 21 January 2016 on Association Agreements / Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine(1) (AA/DCFTA),

–  having regard to the Association Implementation Report on the Republic of Moldova of 3 April 2018,

–  having regard to its legislative resolution of 4 July 2017 on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council providing macro-financial assistance to the Republic of Moldova(2),

–  having regard to the Joint Statement by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission laying down political preconditions for granting macro-financial assistance to the Republic of Moldova annexed to the legislative resolution of 4 July 2017,

–  having regard to the vote of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova of 20 July 2017 adopting changes to the electoral system,

–  having regard to the OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission recommendations of 19 July 2017,

–  having regard to the statements of 21 June 2018 by the chair of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, its rapporteur on Moldova and the Euronest Co-Chair, as well as the statements by the European External Action Service of 20 June 2018 and 27 June 2018 on the validation of the election of the Mayor of Chișinău,

–  having regard to Article 2 of the Association Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Moldova, which states that ‘respect for … democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms ... shall form the basis of the domestic and external policies of the parties and constitutes an essential element of this Agreement’,

–  having regard to Rules 135(5) and 123(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas Andrei Năstase won the early mayoral elections in Chișinău, after a two-round contest on 20 May and 3 June 2018, receiving 52,57 % of the vote and defeating Ion Ceban, who obtained 47,43 %;

B.  whereas the international observers of the mayoral elections in Chișinău recognised the results and the competitive nature of the contest;

C.  whereas on 19 June 2018 a Chișinău court voided the results of the mayoral elections, on the grounds that both candidates had addressed voters on social media on election day, after the legal end of campaigning; whereas none of the contenders in the electoral process asked for the annulment of the elections;

D.  whereas on 21 June 2018 an appeal court in Chișinău upheld the decision of the lower court, concluding that social media communications with voters had illegally affected the outcome of the elections;

E.  whereas on 25 June 2018 the Supreme Court of Moldova upheld the decisions of the lower courts to invalidate the results of the mayoral elections in Chișinău;

F.  whereas on 29 June 2018 Moldova’s Central Election Commission confirmed the Supreme Court’s decision to invalidate the mayoral elections in Chișinău;

G.  whereas the ‘get out the vote’ invitation, which the courts considered as amounting to pressure and undue influence on voters, has been a common practice in previous elections in Moldova and had never led to their cancellation;

H.  whereas this development risks derailing the country’s adherence to European values and principles and further undermines the already weak trust of Moldovan citizens in the state institutions; whereas Moldovan political parties have declared that this sets a dangerous precedent for future elections and thousands of people have been protesting against the decision of the courts in Chișinău;

I.  whereas the international community, including the European Union and the US Department of State, has criticised the decision, underlining that the will of the voters needs to be respected;

J.  whereas the EU and Moldova have undertaken the joint commitment to advance their political association and economic integration, a process that implies the adoption and implementation of structural and other substantial reforms by the country in line with the provisions of the AA/DCFTA and the Association Agenda, and also entails a commitment by Moldova to safeguard European values, including respect for human values and freedoms, democracy, equality and the rule of law;

K.  whereas the invalidation of the elections is a disturbing and significant sign of the continuing deterioration of the application of democratic standards in Moldova, particularly recalling that an independent and transparent judiciary is a key pillar of democracy and the rule of law; whereas this invalidation demonstrates the increasing proclivity towards authoritarian and arbitrary rule and the significant decrease of trust of the people in their authorities and institutions;

L.  whereas the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, contrary to the negative recommendations of the OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission, adopted a controversial change in the electoral law in July 2017, which raised concern over the risk of undue influence on candidates, the of single-member constituencies, excessive thresholds for parliamentary representation in the proportional component and the risk of inadequate representation of minorities and women; whereas the Venice Commission also underlined that the existing polarisation around this legislative initiative was not a sign of meaningful consultation and broad consensus among key stakeholders;

M.  whereas according to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, in Moldova human rights defenders and journalists are victims of stigmatisation campaigns and face politically motivated criminal charges or are threatened whenever they defend people with dissenting voices, while journalists’ access to information is restricted;

N.  whereas in October 2017, due to insufficient progress in reforming the judiciary in Moldova and the country’s failure to fulfil EU conditions, the EU took the decision to withhold a payment of EUR 28 million within the EU justice reform programme;

1.  Expresses its deep concern at the decision to invalidate the results of the elections for Mayor of Chișinău by the Supreme Court of Moldova, taken on dubious grounds and in a non-transparent way, which has significantly undermined the integrity of the electoral process;

2.  Recalls that credible, transparent, fair and inclusive elections are the cornerstone of any democratic system, maintaining the impartiality and independence of the judiciary against any kind of political influence, as well as being the bedrock of trust in the political system of the country, and that political interference in the judiciary and in the conduct of elections is contrary to the European standards to which Moldova has subscribed, notably as part of the EU-Moldova Association Agreement;

3.  Expresses strong solidarity with, and shares the demands of, the thousands of people protesting in the streets of Chișinău and demanding that the Moldovan authorities take appropriate measures to ensure that the results of the Chișinău mayoral elections, as also recognised by national and international observers and reflecting the will of the voters, are respected; calls on the authorities to guarantee the right to peaceful protest;

4.  Urges the Moldovan authorities to guarantee the functioning of democratic mechanisms, insists that both the executive and the judicial branch of power mutually respect the separation of powers, fully endorse democratic principles and obey the rule of law;

5.  Expresses its grave concern over the further deterioration of democratic standards in Moldova; recognises that the decision of the courts, which have already been cited many times as politically influenced and driven, is an example of state capture and reveals a very deep crisis of the institutions in Moldova; regrets that, despite numerous calls by the international community, the authorities continue to undermine the trust of the people in the fairness and impartiality of state institutions;

6.  Considers that following the decision to invalidate the mayoral elections in Chișinău, the political conditions for the disbursement of macro-financial assistance (MFA) have not been met, recalling that a ‘pre-condition for granting MFA is that the beneficiary country respects effective democratic mechanisms, including a multi-party parliamentary system and the rule of law and guarantees respect of human rights’;

7.  Urges the Commission to suspend any foreseen disbursements of MFA to Moldova; believes that any decision on future disbursements should only take place after the planned parliamentary elections and on condition that they are conducted in line with internationally recognised standards and assessed by specialised international bodies, and that the MFA conditions have been met;

8.  Demands that the Commission suspend budgetary support for Moldova, using the precedent of July 2015 when such suspension took place in the aftermath of the banking crisis; considers that the mechanism for suspension of EU budgetary support should be adopted as a reaction to the invalidation of the mayoral elections in Chișinău, and that it should include a list of conditions to be implemented by the Moldovan authorities, which should include the validation of the elections in Chișinău and concrete results-oriented and exhaustively transparent investigations, as well as asset recovery and the prosecution of perpetrators, in the case of banking fraud;

9.  Calls on the Moldovan authorities to address the recommendations of the OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission on electoral reform;

10.  Reiterates its concerns over the concentration of economic and political power in the hands of a narrow group of people, the deterioration of the rule of law, of democratic standards, and of respect for human rights, the excessive politicisation of state institutions, systemic corruption, insufficient investigation of the 2014 banking fraud, and limited media pluralism; expresses its concern at the lack of independence of the judiciary, and particularly the cases of selective justice being used as a tool to exert pressure on political opponents; calls on the Moldovan authorities to reform the judicial system, including nominating new judges, so as to prevent the judiciary from intervening in the electoral and political process or in any other way undermining the democratically expressed will of the people of Moldova;

11.  Is concerned that political opponents and their lawyers are being persecuted by the Moldovan authorities through fabricated accusations and criminal proceedings, and warns that in doing so the authorities are violating the rule of law and the rights of political opponents and lawyers;

12.  Regrets the fact that following the 2014 banking fraud, during which a total of around USD 1 billion was stolen from the Moldovan financial system, the authorities made very little progress in conducting a thorough and impartial investigation into the matter; urges that determined efforts be undertaken with a view to recovering the stolen funds and bringing those responsible to justice, irrespective of their political affiliation; believes that this is indispensable to rebuild the trust of Moldovan citizens in the institutions and restore the credibility of the authorities;

13.  Calls on the Moldovan authorities to respect international principles and best practices and guarantee an enabling environment for civil society; expresses its concern, in particular, at the inclusion in the current draft legislation on NGOs, now being discussed in parliament, of provisions that might curb foreign funding for Moldovan NGOs;

14.  Calls on the Moldovan Parliament to consult civil society and independent media before the final adoption of the new Audiovisual Code, and to reject its ‘dual destination reform’; expresses its concern as to whether independent, local and opposition media in Moldova, which among other things lack sufficient resources, will be able to implement the new Code’s requirements regarding obligatory local content;

15.  Calls on the EEAS and the Commission to closely monitor developments in all these areas and to keep Parliament duly informed;

16.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR), the European External Action Service, the Council, the Commission and the Member States, the President, Prime Minister and President of Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, the OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission.

(1) OJ C 11, 12.1.2018, p. 82. (2) Texts adopted, P8_TA(2017)0283.

European Parliament resolution of 5 July 2018 on Somalia (2018/2784(RSP))

P8_TA(2018)0304 RC-B8-0323/2018

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Somalia, in particular that of 15 September 2016(1),

–  having regard to its resolution of 18 May 2017 on the Dadaab refugee camp(2),

–  having regard to the statement of 30 October 2017 by the Spokesperson of the European External Action Service on the attack in Somalia, as well as to all previous statements by the Spokesperson,

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 3 April 2017 on Somalia,

–  having regard to the joint EU-Africa Strategy,

–  having regard to the Cotonou Agreement,

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

–  having regard to the UN Human Rights Office Report ‘Protection of Civilians: Building the Foundation for Peace, Security and Human Rights in Somalia’ of December 2017,

–  having regard to the EU-Somalia National Indicative Programme for Federal Republic Somalia 2014-2020,

–  having regard to UN Security Council Resolution of 15 May 2018 extending the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM),

–  having regard to UN Security Council Resolution of 27 March 2018 on Somalia, as well as to all its previous resolutions,

–  having regard to the briefing of 15 May 2018 by the UN Special Representative for Somalia to the UN Security Council,

–  having regard to the UN Security Council press statements of 25 January 2018, 25 February 2018 and 4 April 2018 on Somalia,

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 25 June 2018 on the Horn of Africa, of 17 July 2017 on addressing the risks of famine and of 3 April 2017 on Somalia,

–  having regard to the UN Secretary General reports of 26 December 2017 and 2 May 2018 on Somalia,

–  having regard to the communiqué of the UN‑Somalia Security Conference of 4 December 2017,

–  having regard to UN Human Rights Council Resolution of 29 September 2017 on Assistance to Somalia in the field of human rights,

–  having regard to the AMISOM statement of 8 November 2017 announcing its intention to initiate a phased withdrawal of troops from Somalia starting in December 2017, with the intention of a full withdrawal by 2020,

–  having regard to the joint statement by four UN human rights experts on 4 May 2016, in which they expressed alarm at the growing persecution of trade unionists in Somalia,

–  having regard to the conclusions and recommendations specified in the 380th Report of the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association of November 2016, as approved by the ILO governing body for Case No 3113,

–  having regard to Rules 135(5) and 123(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas al-Shabaab have perpetrated numerous terrorist attacks on Somali soil; whereas on 14 October 2017 Somalia experienced its worst ever terrorist attack, in which at least 512 people are officially recorded to have died and 357 to have been injured; whereas al-Shabaab and other terrorist groups affiliated with Islamic State have continued to perpetrate terrorist attacks against the internationally recognised Somali Government and against civilians;

B.  whereas, on 1 April 2018, al-Shabaab led a car‑bomb attack on an African Union peacekeeper base in Bulamarer and nearby villages; whereas, on 25 February 2018, two terrorist attacks occurred in Mogadishu, killing at least 32 people;

C.  whereas Somali Government security forces unlawfully killed and wounded civilians as a result of internal fighting between government forces at an aid distribution site in Baidoa in June 2017; whereas civilian populations have also been targeted during clashes by regional forces and clan militia, especially in the Lower Shabelle, Galguduud and Hiran regions;

D.  whereas, according to the report of the UN Human Rights Office and the UN Assistance Mission to Somalia (UNSOM), covering the period from 1 January 2016 to 14 October 2017, 2 078 civilian deaths and 2 507 injuries have occured in Somalia; whereas the majority thereof are attributed to al-Shabaab militants; whereas a significant proportion of those deaths have been caused by clan militias, state actors, including the army and the police, and even the African Union Mission to Somalia;

E.  whereas Somalia has experienced two decades of civil war; whereas since 2012, when a new internationally backed government was installed, the country has made significant progress towards peace and stability; whereas, while al-Shabaab has suffered heavy losses from counter-terrorism operations in recent years, UN reports indicate that the ISIS/Daesh faction in Somalia has grown significantly;

F.  whereas, on 8 February 2017, Somalia held its first free elections since the internationally backed government was installed; whereas the electoral system represented progress in terms of participation but displayed only limited electoral features; whereas the government committed to switching to a unweighted electoral system based on universal suffrage for the elections in 2020/2021;

G.  whereas the mandate of the African Union Mission to Somalia was extended until 31 July 2018; whereas, according UN Security Council Resolution 2372/17, numbers of uniformed AMISOM personnel should be reduced to 20 626 by 30 October 2018; whereas AMISOM personnel have been accused of human rights abuses, sexual violence and misconduct during their service;

H.  whereas freedom of expression, which is a fundamental pillar of any functioning democracy, continues to be severely limited in Somalia; whereas journalists, human rights defenders, civil society activists and political leaders continue to face threats on a daily basis; whereas al-Shabaab continues to intimidate, arrest, detain without due process and even kill; whereas the authorities rarely investigate such cases; whereas Somalia has, according to the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), emerged in eight consecutive years as the most deadly country in Africa for journalists and other media practitioners to operate and exercise their fundamental right to freedom of expression;

I.  whereas the rights to free association and unionisation are vital for the development of any functioning democracy; whereas the Federal Government of Somalia effectively does not allow the formation and existence of independent unions; whereas trade union and workers’ rights activists in Somalia face intimidation, reprisals and harassment on a daily basis; whereas stigmatisation and smear campaigns against unionists are commonplace in Somalia;

J.  whereas the International Labour Organisation (ILO) has adjudicated a freedom of association violation complaint against the Somali Government; whereas the ILO directed the government to ‘recognise the leadership of the National Union of Somali Journalists (NUSOJ) and the Federation of Somali Trade Unions (FESTU) under Mr Omar Faruk Osman without delay’;

K.  whereas UN human rights experts publicly stated that ‘Somalia is not fulfilling its international human rights obligations and the situation for trade unions keeps on worsening despite specific recommendations made by the International Labour Organisation’s Governing Body, urging the Somali Government to refrain from any further interference in the unions registered in Somalia, with particular reference to the NUSOJ and FESTU’;

L.  whereas human rights abuses are widespread in Somalia; whereas those responsible for them are mostly non-state actors – al-Shabaab militants and clan militias – but also state actors; whereas there have been extrajudicial executions, sexual and gender-based violence, arbitrary arrests and detentions and abductions; whereas according to the UN Human Rights Office, the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) of Somalia routinely violates international human rights law; whereas it often operates in an extrajudicial manner and its powers are too broad;

M.  whereas, however, the political situation is unstable and governance remains weak, thereby impeding progress on justice and security-sector reform; whereas, according to Transparency International, Somalia is the most corrupt country in the world;

N.  whereas military courts continue to try a broad range of cases, including for terrorism‑related offences, in proceedings falling far short of international fair trial standards; whereas, by the third quarter of 2017, at least 23 individuals had been executed following military court convictions, the majority of whom on terrorism-related charges; whereas, on 13 February 2017, seven defendants, including a child, were sentenced to death in Puntland for murder, based largely on confessions obtained under coercion by the Puntland Intelligence Services; five were executed in April the same year;

O.  whereas foreign interests further complicate the political landscape; whereas, in terms of the wider confrontation between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia, on the one hand, and Qatar, on the other, the Federal Government of Somalia has sought to remain neutral; whereas, in retaliation, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have ceased their regular budgetary support payments to Somalia, which further weakens the government’s ability to pay the security forces;

P.  whereas children are among the greatest victims of the conflict in Somalia; whereas there have been numerous cases of child abductions and recruitment by terrorist groups; whereas they have been treated as enemies by the Somali security forces and there have been frequent killings, maiming, arrests and detentions;

Q.  whereas a Human Rights Watch report of 21 February 2018 points to the violations and abuses ­– including beating, torture, confinement and sexual violence – suffered since 2015 by hundreds of children held in government custody due to their terrorism-related activities; whereas, in Puntland, children have been sentenced to death for terrorism offences;

R.  whereas after years of drought, flooding caused by the recent record rainfalls has displaced 230 000 people, over half of whom are estimated to be children; whereas they join the roughly 2,6 million people across the country who have already been affected by drought and conflict;

S.  whereas a significant number of the civilian casualties recorded were caused by clan militia; whereas the main trigger of clan conflicts are disputes over land and resources, compounded by an ongoing cycle of retaliation; whereas such conflicts have been exacerbated by the scarcity of resources and by droughts; whereas such conflicts are exploited by anti-government elements to further destabilise areas;

T.  whereas food insecurity continues to represent a grave problem for the Somali state and population; whereas, according to the Commission’s Directorate‑General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, about half of Somalia’s 12 million inhabitants are food insecure and in need of humanitarian assistance; whereas an estimated 1,2 million children are estimated to be acutely malnourished, of whom 232 000 will suffer life-threatening severe acute malnutrition; whereas many parts of the country have not fully recovered from the 2011-2012 famine; whereas droughts exacerbate food insecurity problems in Somalia;

U.  whereas several Somali refugee camps exist in Kenya, including the Dadaab camp, which alone holds around 350 000 refugees; whereas, in light of the failure of the international community to provide adequate support, the Kenyan authorities intend to reduce these camps by pushing for returns to Somalia;

V.  whereas international humanitarian actors are key to combating food insecurity and to providing humanitarian assistance; whereas they have made a major contribution to averting a humanitarian disaster in Somalia; whereas there have been attempts to divert humanitarian aid towards funding warfare;

W.  whereas since 2016 the EU has progressively increased its annual humanitarian support to Somalia, in particular in response to the severe drought affecting the country, allocating EUR 120 million to humanitarian partners in 2017; whereas the international humanitarian response plan is only funded up to 24 %;

X.  whereas the EU has provided EUR 486 million through the European Development Fund (2014-2020), focusing on state- and peace-building, food security, resilience and education; whereas the EU is also supporting AMISOM through the African Peace Facility; whereas the 22 000‑strong African Union peacekeeping force troop, AMISOM, has brought a certain degree of stability to parts of Somalia; whereas parts of the country remain under the control of, or threat from, the radical al‑Shabaab Islamist movement, or are controlled by separate authorities, as is the case in Somaliland and Puntland;

1.  Condemns all terrorist attacks against the Somali population, perpetrated by both by al‑Shabaab and other extremist terrorist groups; asserts that there can be no legitimate reason for engaging in terrorist activity; calls for those responsible for terrorist attacks and for violations of human rights to be brought to justice in accordance with international human rights law; expresses its deepest sympathies with the victims of terrorist attacks in Somalia and with their families and deeply regrets the loss of lives; reminds the Somali authorities of their obligation to guarantee human rights and protect the civilian population in all circumstances;

2.  Underlines that the elimination of the root causes of terrorism such as insecurity, poverty, human rights violations, environmental degradation, impunity, a lack of justice and oppression would contribute immensely to the eradication of terrorist organisations and activity in Somalia; asserts that underdevelopment and insecurity form a vicious cycle; calls, therefore, on international actors, including EU development programmes, to engage in security-sector reform and capacity-building initiatives to ensure coherence between their development and security policies in Somalia; calls for the EU to continue to support the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia through the Mutual Accountability Framework and the Security Pact;

3.  Encourages the Federal Government of Somalia to continue its peace- and state‑building efforts towards the development of strong institutions which are governed by the rule of law and able to provide basic public services, and towards ensuring security, freedom of expression and freedom of association; welcomes the fact that al-Shabaab was unable to impede the 2016-2017 electoral process; calls on the Federal Government of Somalia to ensure that an electoral system based on unweighted universal suffrage is in place ahead of the elections in 2020‑2021; recalls that lasting stability and peace can only be achieved through social inclusion, sustainable development and good governance based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law;

4.  Calls on the Federal Government of Somalia to step up its efforts towards cementing the rule of law in the whole of the country; argues that impunity is a major cause of the self-perpetuating cycle of violence and the worsening human rights situation; requests that the Somali authorities transfer future civilian cases under military court jurisdiction to the civilian courts for prosecution; calls on the Somali President to immediately commute pending death penalty sentences as a first step towards placing a moratorium on all death sentences; believes that only the rule of law can eradicate impunity; calls on the government and international actors to continue working towards the establishment of an independent judiciary, the institution of independent and credible investigations of crimes committed against Somali journalists, the eradication of corruption, and the building of accountable institutions, especially in the security sector; welcomes, in this context, the launching last year by the government, in cooperation with the UN and the EU, of a nationwide judicial training curriculum;

5.  Deplores state and non-state actors’ violations of the freedom of expression in Somalia; is concerned by the autocratic approach of the present administration and some of the regional state administrations, resulting in the arrest of political opponents and peaceful critics; considers any intimidation, harassment, detention or killing of journalists and civil society activists as absolutely unacceptable; requests that the Somali authorities stop using NISA to intimidate independent journalists and political opponents; calls on the government and the EU, as part of its rule of law activities in Somalia, to ensure that NISA is regulated with effective oversight mechanisms; asserts that freedom of expression and thought is indispensable for the development of a strong and democratic society; calls on the Federal Government of Somalia to ensure that the right to freedom of expression is fully respected; calls on the Somali Government to review the penal code, the new media law and other legislation in order to bring them into line with Somalia’s international obligations regarding the right to freedom of expression and the media;

6.  Expresses concern about certain foreign interests that further complicate the political landscape; notes, in terms of the wider confrontation between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, on the one hand, and Qatar, on the other, that the Federal Government of Somalia has, in its attempt to remain neutral, been deprived of regular budgetary support payments by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which further weakens the government’s ability to pay the security forces; urges the UAE to cease forthwith all acts of destabilisation in Somalia and respect Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity;

7.  Strongly condemns the grave violations of freedom of association and freedom of expression against Somalia’s free and independent trade unions and in particular, the longstanding repression against the NUSOJ and the FESTU, and insists on the end of ongoing investigations and closure of the case taken by the Office of the Attorney General against Mr Omar Faruk Osman, Secretary-General of the NUSOJ for organising, without the approval of the Ministry of Information, of a celebration of World Press Freedom Day;

8.  Denounces the Somali state’s repression of trade unionists; calls on the Somali state to put an end to all forms of repression against unionists; insists that the government allow the formation of independent trade unions; firmly believes that trade unions are indispensable for guaranteeing workers’ rights in Somalia; asserts that independent trade unions could significantly contribute to the improvement of the security situation in Somalia;

9.  Urges the Federal Government of Somalia to respect and uphold the international rule of law, and to accept and implement fully the decisions of the ILO on case 3113;

10.  Commends the work of UNSOM in all aspects and on monitoring human rights in Somalia, in particular, as well as the UN Security Council’s decision to extend its mandate until 31 March 2019; commends the efforts made by the African Union to bring back a certain degree of stability to Somalia and to organise the transitional political process; calls for better EU monitoring and capacity-building to ensure accountability for abuses by AMISOM, especially given the fact that the EU is responsible for the bulk of its funding; urges AMISOM to fully implement its mandate to protect the civilian population;

11.  Deplores the recruitment of child soldiers in Somalia as an abhorrent war crime; believes that children are one of the most vulnerable groups in the conflict; calls on all armed groups to put an end immediately to this practice and release all children currently enrolled; calls on the state to treat them as victims of terrorism and war rather than perpetrators, and calls for the EU to assist the Somali Government in its rehabilitation and reintegration efforts; urges the Somali authorities to end the arbitrary detention of children suspected of being unlawfully associated with al-Shabaab; urges all actors in Somalia to abide by the objectives of the Optional Protocol to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, and encourages the Federal Government of Somalia to ratify it without delay;

12.  Welcomes the selection of the commissioners to the newly established Independent National Human Rights Commission of Somalia, and calls on the Somali Government to appoint the Commission without any further delay; is deeply alarmed at the reports of human rights abuses committed by Somali security forces, including killings, arbitrary arrests and detention, torture, rape and abductions; calls on the authorities to ensure that all violations are fully investigated and that perpetrators are brought to justice; calls on the government and for the EU to enhance the technical expertise of Somalia’s Criminal Investigation Department (CID) to carry out thorough and effective investigations that respect rights; calls on domestic and foreign troops which intervene in the fight against al‑Shabaab to act in accordance with international law; calls on the Somali Government to follow through with commitments to end forced evictions of internally displaced people, including in the country’s capital, Mogadishu;

13.  Praises the Somali Government for launching the review process of the Somali provisional constitution, following a three-day national constitutional convention in May 2018 which will lead to the permanent constitution of Somalia; urges the Somali Government to finalise the Somalia National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) as part of the country’s Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS), supported by AMISOM;

14.  Condemns as a horrific war crime gender-based and sexual violence against women, men, boys and girls, with women and girls particularly affected; calls on the state to step up its efforts to protect vulnerable groups in society; welcomes, in this context, the launching last year by the government, in cooperation with the UN and the EU, of a nationwide judicial training curriculum; reiterates its paramount concern over women’s rights; calls on the relevant authorities to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment; condemns the illegalisation of homosexuality in Somalia and the criminalisation of LGBTI people;

15.  Deplores the dire humanitarian situation that is threatening the lives of millions of Somalis; recalls that the death toll in the 2011 famine was exacerbated by insecurity and the actions of extremist militants from al-Shabaab to hinder food aid deliveries to areas of south-central Somalia that, at the time, were under its control; urges the EU, its Member States and the international community to step up their assistance to the Somali population, to improve the living conditions of the most vulnerable and to tackle the consequences of displacement, food insecurity, epidemics and natural disasters; condemns all attacks against humanitarian actors and peacekeepers in Somalia; calls for EU aid to be aligned with internationally agreed development effectiveness principles in order to achieve the recently approved Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs);

16.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice‑President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the African Union, the President, the Prime Minister and the Parliament of Somalia, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the United Nations Security Council, the United Nations Human Rights Council, and the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly.

(1) OJ C 204, 13.6.2018, p. 127. (2) Texts adopted, P8_TA(2017)0229.

European Parliament resolution of 5 July 2018 on Burundi (2018/2785(RSP))

P8_TA(2018)0305 RC-B8-0333/2018

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Burundi, notably those of 9 July 2015(1), 17 December 2015(2), 19 January 2017(3) and 6 July 2017(4),

–  having regard to the revised Cotonou Agreement, in particular Article 96 thereof,

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

–  having regard to the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

–  having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,

–  having regard to the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance,

–  having regard to UN Security Council resolutions 2248 (2015) of 12 November 2015 and 2303 (2016) of 29 July 2016 on the situation in Burundi,

–  having regard to the oral briefing by the UN Commission of Inquiry on Burundi (UNCI) to the UN Human Rights Council of 27 June 2018,

–  having regard to the first report of the UN Secretary-General on the situation in Burundi, published on 23 February 2017, and to the statement by the President of the UN Security Council on the political situation and ongoing violence in Burundi, which strongly urged the government and all parties to immediately cease and reject such violence,

–  having regard to the UN Security Council press statement of 13 March 2017 regarding the situation in Burundi and to the statement by the President of the UN Security Council of 5 April 2018 condemning all violations and abuses of human rights in Burundi,

–  having regard to the report of the UN Independent Investigation on Burundi (UNIIB), published on 20 September 2016,

–  having regard to the resolution adopted by the UN Human Rights Council on 30 September 2016 on the human rights situation in Burundi,

–  having regard to the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (Arusha Agreement) of 28 August 2000,

–  having regard to the declaration on Burundi by the African Union summit of 13 June 2015,

–  having regard to the Decision on the Activities of the Peace and Security Council and the State of Peace and Security in Africa (Assembly/AU/Dec.598(XXVI)), adopted at the 26th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union held on 30 and 31 January 2016 in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia),

–  having regard to the Decisions and Declarations of the Assembly of the African Union (Assembly/AU/Dec.605-620(XXVII)), adopted at the 27th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union held on 17 and 18 July 2016 in Kigali (Rwanda),

–  having regard to the resolution of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 4 November 2016 on the human rights situation in the Republic of Burundi,

–  having regard to the declaration on Burundi by the East African Community (EAC) summit of 31 May 2015,

–  having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2016/394 of 14 March 2016 concerning the conclusion of consultations with the Republic of Burundi under Article 96 of the Partnership Agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP), of the one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part(5),

–  having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2015/1755 of 1 October 2015(6) and Council Decisions (CFSP) 2015/1763 of 1 October 2015(7) and (CFSP) 2016/1745 of 29 September 2016(8) concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Burundi,

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 16 March, 18 May, 22 June and 16 November 2015 and 15 February 2016 on Burundi,

–  having regard to the statements by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR), Federica Mogherini, of 28 May 2015, 19 December 2015, 21 October 2016 and 27 October 2017,

–  having regard to the statement of 8 June 2018 by the Spokesperson of the VP/HR on the situation in Burundi,

–  having regard to the declaration of 8 May 2018 by the VP/HR on behalf of the EU on the situation in Burundi ahead of the constitutional referendum,

–  having regard to the statement of 6 January 2017 by the Spokesperson of the VP/HR on the banning of the Iteka League in Burundi,

–  having regard to Rules 135(5) and 123(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas Burundi has been facing a political, human rights and humanitarian crisis since April 2015, when President Nkurunziza announced that he would run for a disputed third term, which was then followed by months of deadly turmoil with 593 people killed according to the International Criminal Court (ICC), and, according to the UNHCR, 413 000 people having fled the country since then, and 169 000 people having been internally displaced; whereas 3,6 million people in the country are in need of humanitarian assistance according to the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA);

B.  whereas the constitutional changes voted for during the referendum include the expansion of Presidential powers, the reduction of the powers of the Vice-President, the appointment of the prime minister by the President, the introduction of a simple majority procedure to pass or change legislation in parliament, the ability to review the quotas implemented by the Arusha Agreement, and the prohibition from participating in government of political parties with less than 5 % of the votes, all of which endanger the Arusha Agreement;

C.  whereas violence and intimidation against political opponents across the country escalated ahead of the constitutional referendum on 17 May 2018, with the enforced disappearance and intimidation of opponents of the aforementioned constitutional revision; whereas the constitutional referendum also allows the negotiated provisions of the Arusha Agreement to be removed, which can reduce inclusiveness and entail further serious consequences for political stability in Burundi; whereas despite the changes to the constitution President Nkurunziza announced he would not run in the 2020 elections;

D.  whereas, according to Amnesty International, during the official campaign period there were frequent reports of arrests, beatings and intimidation of those campaigning for a ‘No’ vote; whereas the referendum took place in a context of continuing repression, prompting Burundi’s Catholic bishops to say that many citizens live in fear, so much so that people do not dare to say what they think for fear of reprisals;

E.  whereas as the UNCI has pointed out, political violence, arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial executions, beatings, hate speech and various other abuses continue to plague the population; whereas Imbonerakure, the youth league of the ruling political party, continue to perpetrate human rights violations and employ various intimidation tactics, such as setting up roadblocks and checkpoints in some provinces, extorting money, harassing passers-by, and arresting people they suspected of having links to the opposition, many of whom have been detained, raped, beaten and tortured, some dying from the treatment;

F.  whereas during the referendum period in 2018, rights organisations reported cases of shrinking civic space and degrading media space, both at a national and local level; whereas local NGOs and human rights defenders have increasingly been threatened and targeted by the government since 2015, while press freedom and the conditions in which journalists are working have steadily deteriorated; whereas private media and journalists have already paid a high price in the battle with the government, including being the targets of arrests, summary executions and enforced disappearances, or sometimes being labelled criminal or even terrorist by the government;

G.  whereas Reporters Without Borders ranks Burundi 159th out of 180 in its 2018 World Press Freedom Index;

H.  whereas many human rights activists have been served lengthy prison sentences, most notably Germain Rukuki, who works for the Association of Catholic Jurists of Burundi and has been sentenced to 32 years, or remain detained awaiting trial, such as Nestor Nibitanga; whereas restrictive laws to control local and international NGOs have been approved; whereas some organisations have been forced to suspend their activities and others to close permanently, such as the ITEKA League, the FOCODE and ACAT; whereas many leaders and human rights defenders have been exiled, while those who are still present are under constant pressure or facing arrest; whereas Emmanuel Nshimirimana, Aimé Constant Gatore and Marius Nizigama have been sentenced to prison terms of between 10 and 32 years, while Nestor Nibitanga may face 20 years; whereas the journalist Jean Bigirimana has now been missing for almost two years, and is one of the crisis’s many victims of enforced disappearances;

I.  whereas in October 2017, ICC judges authorised the ICC prosecutor to open an investigation regarding crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court allegedly committed in Burundi or by nationals of Burundi outside Burundi between 26  April 2015 and 26  October 2017; whereas with effect from 27 October 2017, Burundi became the first nation to leave the ICC following the Court’s decision in April 2016 to open a preliminary investigation into violence and human rights abuses and possible crimes against humanity in Burundi, while the regime continues to kill with impunity in the country;

J.  whereas the presence of Burundian troops in peacekeeping missions enables President Nkurunziza’s regime to conceal the reality of internal problems and present Burundi as a stabilising factor in other countries in crisis, at a time when Burundi itself is experiencing an unprecedented crisis marked by gross violations of human rights; whereas by doing so Burundi is gaining a huge amount of money, which is not being redistributed in favour of the population; whereas no peaceful, free, democratic and independent elections can be possible without disbanding the Imbonerakure militia;

K.  whereas Burundi is in a state of continuing socio-economic deterioration and in penultimate place in the global GDP per capita ranking; whereas around 3,6 million Burundians (30 % of the population) are in need of assistance and 1,7 million remain food insecure; whereas this situation of poverty is worsened by the introduction of a ‘voluntary’ contribution for the 2020 elections, which is often forcibly collected by Imbonerakure and amounts to around 10 % or more of a civil servant’s monthly salary;

L.  whereas at the 30th African Union summit and the 19th East African Community summit, the African Union and the East African Community respectively expressed their commitment to a peaceful resolution of the political situation in Burundi through an inclusive dialogue on the basis of the Arusha Agreement of 28 August 2000;

M.  whereas a number of bilateral and multilateral partners have suspended their financial and technical assistance to the Government of Burundi in view of the situation in the country; whereas the EU has suspended direct financial support to the Burundian administration, including budget support, but is maintaining support to the population and its humanitarian assistance;

N.  whereas the EU and the USA have adopted targeted and individual sanctions against Burundi; whereas on 23 October 2017 the Council renewed the EU’s restrictive measures against Burundi and extended them until 31 October 2018; whereas these measures consist of a travel ban and asset freeze against targeted individuals whose activities have been deemed to undermine democracy or obstruct the search for a political solution to the crisis in Burundi;

O.  whereas the UN Human Rights Council adopted the outcome of the Universal Periodic Review of Burundi on 28 June 2018 during its 38th session; whereas Burundi accepted 125 of the Review’s 242 recommendations, notably rejecting those calling for practical steps to improve the country’s human rights record;

P.  whereas the Constitutional Court has upheld the results of the referendum of 17 May 2018 and rejected a petition filed by the opposition alleging intimidation and abuse;

1.  Expresses its deep concern about endemic impunity and human rights violations, including summary executions, torture, enforced disappearances and arbitrary detention; reminds Burundi of its obligation, as a member of the UN Human Rights Council, to resume and fully cooperate with the UNCI on Burundi and the team of three UN experts, and to grant country access to the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders;

2.  Calls on the Government of Burundi to fully respect the Arusha Agreement as the main instrument for peace and stability in the country; calls on the Government of Burundi to respect its international legal obligations regarding human and civil rights, and to promote and protect the rights of freedom of expression and association enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Burundi is a State party;

3.  Denounces once again the intimidation, repression, violence and harassment of journalists, opposition supporters and human rights defenders; calls on the Burundian authorities to respect the rule of law and fundamental human rights, such as freedom of expression and freedom of the media, and to immediately and unconditionally release Germain Rukuki, Nestor Nibitanga, Emmanuel Nshimirimana, Aimé Constant Gatore and Marius Nizigama, five human rights defenders who have been detained solely for their human rights work but stand accused by the authorities of undermining the internal security of the state; demands that the Burundian authorities launch investigations with regard to the situation of the journalist Jean Bigirimana;

4.  Condemns Burundi’s decision to withdraw from the ICC; supports the continuation of the ICC’s preliminary investigation into the extensive crimes and acts of repression in Burundi; calls for the EU to continue to push for accountability for the crimes committed in Burundi; expects Burundi to resume and continue its cooperation with the ICC, in view of the fact that the fight against impunity, prosecution of all human rights violations, and accountability remain necessary steps for resolving the crisis and for a lasting peaceful solution;

5.  Welcomes the UNCI on Burundi’s oral briefing and commends its vital work in documenting the ongoing human rights crisis in the country;

6.  Underlines its concern about the humanitarian situation, which is marked by 169 000 internally displaced persons, 1,67 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, and more than 410 000 Burundians seeking refuge in neighbouring countries; commends the host countries for their efforts and calls on governments in the region to ensure that the return of refugees is voluntary, based on informed decisions and carried out in safety and dignity;

7.  Regrets, however, the slow progress of the inter‑Burundian dialogue led by the East African Community and the lack of engagement by the Government of Burundi in that regard, and calls on all parties, in particular the Burundian authorities, to commit to the urgent resumption of the inter-Burundian dialogue, which should be organised within a truly inclusive framework and with no preconditions;

8.  Calls for a renewed and coordinated approach between the AU, the EU, the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the UN as a whole; regrets the fact that the Government of Burundi is not taking into consideration the reports of the UN Secretary-General, the resolutions of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, the AU decision of January 2018 or the mediation efforts of the ECA; encourages bilateral and multilateral partners and the Government of Burundi to continue their dialogue with a view to the Government of Burundi creating conditions conducive to the resumption of assistance; calls for all Burundian stakeholders to participate actively in this process; reiterates its support for the mediation process with the backing of the AU and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General;

9.  Commends the assistance provided by bilateral and multilateral partners in alleviating the humanitarian situation, and calls on the international community to continue to provide support to respond to the humanitarian needs in the country; encourages the Commission to provide additional direct support to the population in 2018; stresses that a return to a classical mode of cooperation requires a return to the rule of law and democracy, including the fight against impunity and the protection of Burundian citizens;

10.  Is worried that the ongoing political crisis may turn into an ethnic conflict through the use of propaganda, statements inciting to hatred or calls for violence, equating opponents, members of civil society, journalists and Tutsis with ‘enemies of the regime’ who must be eliminated; urges all sides in Burundi to refrain from any behaviour or language that may further aggravate violence, deepen the crisis or affect regional stability in the long run;

11.  Remains deeply concerned that the new constitution adopted by referendum on 17 May 2018 could start to dismantle the carefully negotiated provisions defined in the Arusha Agreement that helped to put an end to Burundi’s civil war;

12.  Reaffirms its support for the EU’s decision, following the consultation with the Burundian authorities under Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, to suspend direct financial support to the Government of Burundi, and welcomes the EU’s adoption of travel restrictions and asset freeze measures against those seeking to undermine peace efforts or human rights;

13.  Demands an end to be put to any further payment to the Burundian troops and various contingents from Burundi engaged in UN and AU peacekeeping missions; takes note of the announcement by President Nkurunziza that he will not run for another term in 2020; calls on the international community to closely follow the situation in Burundi, irrespective of President Nkurunziza’s statement about the 2020 elections;

14.  Recalls the VP/HR’s strong declaration of 8 May 2018 on the launch of the final preparatory phase for the constitutional referendum of 17 May 2018; regrets the lack of a consensual approach between the various societal and political groups in Burundi, the lack of official public information on the key elements of the draft Constitution, and the close control of journalists and the media;

15.  Reminds the Government of Burundi that the conditions for holding inclusive, credible and transparent elections in 2020 imply the right to freedom of expression, access to information and the existence of a free area in which human rights defenders can speak out without intimidation or fear of reprisals;

16.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Government and Parliament of Burundi, the ACP-EU Council of Ministers, the Commission, the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the EU Member States, the member countries and institutions of the African Union, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

(1) OJ C 265, 11.8.2017, p. 137. (2) OJ C 399, 24.11.2017, p. 190. (3) Texts adopted, P8_TA(2017)0004. (4) Texts adopted, P8_TA(2017)0310. (5) OJ L 73, 18.3.2016, p. 90. (6) OJ L 257, 2.10.2015, p. 1. (7) OJ L 257, 2.10.2015, p. 37. (8) OJ L 264, 30.9.2016, p. 29.

European Parliament legislative resolution of 5 July 2018 on the draft Council implementing decision on the launch of automated data exchange with regard to DNA data in Croatia (06986/2018 – C8-0164/2018 – 2018/0806(CNS))

P8_TA(2018)0306 A8-0225/2018

(Consultation)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Council draft (06986/2018),

–  having regard to Article 39(1) of the Treaty on European Union, as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam, and Article 9 of Protocol No 36 on transitional provisions, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C8-0164/2018),

–  having regard to Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime(1), and in particular Article 33 thereof,

–  having regard to Rule 78c of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A8-0225/2018),

1.  Approves the Council draft;

2.  Calls on the Council to notify Parliament if it intends to depart from the text approved by Parliament;

3.  Asks the Council to consult Parliament again if it intends to substantially amend the text approved by Parliament;

4.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council and the Commission.

(1) OJ L 210, 6.8.2008, p. 1.

European Parliament legislative resolution of 5 July 2018 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) and amending Regulations (EU) No 515/2014, (EU) 2016/399 and (EU) 2016/1624 (COM(2016)0731 – C8-0466/2016 – 2016/0357A(COD))	P8_TA(2018)0307 A8-0322/2017
CORRIGENDA COR01

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2016)0731),

–  having regard to Article 294(2), Article 77(2)(b) and (d) Article 87(2)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C8‑0466/2016),

–  having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 27 April 2017(1),

–  having regard to the decision by the Conference of Presidents on 14 September 2017 to authorise the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs to split the above-mentioned Commission proposal and to draw up two separate legislative reports on the basis thereof,

–  having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 69f(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 25 April 2018 to approve that position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Budgets (A8-0322/2017),

1.  Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2.  Approves the joint statement by Parliament and the Council annexed to this resolution;

3.  Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

4.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 5 July 2018 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2018/… of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) and amending Regulations (EU) No 1077/2011, (EU) No 515/2014, (EU) 2016/399, (EU) 2016/1624 and (EU) 2017/2226

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2018/1240.)

ANNEX TO THE LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

Joint statement by the European Parliament and the Council

The costs for the operation and maintenance of the ETIAS Information System, the ETIAS Central Unit and the ETIAS National Units, will be covered entirely by the revenues generated by the fees. The fee should therefore be adapted as necessary, having regard to the costs. This includes both costs incurred by EU Member States and those incurred by Schengen Associated Countries in this regard, in accordance with the provisions of the ETIAS Regulation. The costs incurred in connection with the development of the ETIAS Information System, the integration of the existing national border infrastructure and the connection to the National Uniform Interface as well as the hosting of the National Uniform Interface and the set-up of the ETIAS Central Unit and ETIAS National Units, including those incurred by EU Member States as well as Schengen Associated Countries, will be borne by the Internal Security Fund (Borders and Visa) respectively its successor(s).

Therefore, these costs should not be considered for the calculation of the contribution of the Schengen Associated Countries to ETIAS under the respective Association Agreement and the relevant specific arrangements for the participation of the Schengen Associated Countries in the agencies. This should be taken into account in particular in the context of the negotiations on the successor(s) to the Internal Security Fund (Borders and Visas) and the specific arrangements for the participation of the Schengen Associated Countries therein.

The European Parliament and the Council call on the Commission to present a proposal on the specific arrangements provided for in Article 95 of this Regulation without delay after its adoption.

(1) OJ C 246, 28.7.2017, p. 28.

European Parliament legislative resolution of 5 July 2018 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/794 for the purpose of establishing a European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) (COM(2016)0731 – C8-0466/2016 – 2016/0357B(COD))

P8_TA(2018)0308 A8-0323/2017

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2016)0731),

–  having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 88(2)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C8‑0466/2016),

–  having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the decision by the Conference of Presidents on 14 September 2017 to authorise the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs to split the above-mentioned Commission proposal and to draw up two separate legislative reports on the basis thereof,

–  having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 69f(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 25 April 2018 to approve that position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A8-0323/2017),

1.  Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2.  Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

3.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 5 July 2018 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2018/... of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/794 for the purpose of establishing a European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS)

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2018/1241.)

European Parliament legislative resolution of 5 July 2018 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and amending Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002, Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1305/2013, (EU) No 1306/2013, (EU) No 1307/2013, (EU) No 1308/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, (EU) No 652/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Decision No 541/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (COM(2016)0605 – C8-0372/2016 – 2016/0282A(COD))

P8_TA(2018)0309 A8-0211/2017

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2016)0605),

–  having regard to Article 294(2) and Articles 42, 43(2), 46(d), 149, 153(2)(a), 164, 168(4)(b), 172, 175, 177, 178, 189(2), 212(2), 322(1) and 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and to Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C8‑0372/2016),

–  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs on the proposed legal basis,

–  having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the opinion of the European Court of Auditors No 1/2017 of 26 January 2017(1),

–  having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committees responsible under Rule 69f(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 19 April 2018 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Rules 59 and 39 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Budgetary Control under Rule 55 of the Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Budgetary Control and the opinions of Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development, the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Development, the Committee on Fisheries, and the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A8-0211/2017),

1.  Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2.  Takes note of the statements by the Commission annexed to this resolution;

3.  Approves the joint statement of the Parliament, the Council and the Commission annexed to this resolution;

4.  Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

5.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 5 July 2018 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/… of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046.)

Annex I to the legislative resolution

Statement in relation to Article 38 Publication of information on recipients and other information:

“The Commission will support through networks with the Member States the exchange of good practices as regards the publication of information on recipients of Union funds implemented under shared management. The Commission will take into due consideration the lessons learnt in view of preparing the next Multiannual Financial Framework."

Statement in relation to Article 266 Specific provisions regarding building projects:

"The Commission and the EEAS will inform the European Parliament and the Council, in the context of the working document referred to in Article 266, on any sale and acquisition of building, including those below the threshold set in that Article."

Annex II to the legislative resolution

Joint Statement on the discharge procedure and the date of adoption of the final EU accounts:

"The European Parliament, the Council and the Commission will – in cooperation with the European Court of Auditors – set out a pragmatic calendar for the discharge procedure.

In that context, the Commission confirms that it will strive to adopt the EU consolidated annual accounts for the financial year 2017 by 30 June 2018 provided that the European Court of Auditors transmits all findings concerning the reliability of these EU accounts, and all consolidated entities' accounts, by 15 May 2018, and its draft annual report by 15 June 2018.

The Commission also confirms that it will strive to provide its replies to the European Court of Auditors' Annual report for the financial year 2017 by 15 August 2018 provided that the European Court of Auditors transmits its draft observations to the Commission by 1 June 2018."

(1) OJ C 91, 23.3.2017, p. 1.

European Parliament legislative resolution of 5 July 2018 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice, and amending Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 and Council Decision 2007/533/JHA and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 (COM(2017)0352 – C8-0216/2017 – 2017/0145(COD))

P8_TA(2018)0310 A8-0404/2017

(Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2017)0352),

–  having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 74, Articles 77(2)(a) and (b), Article 78(2)(e), Article 79(2)(c), Article 82(1)(d), Article 85(1), Article 87(2)(a) and Article 88(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C8‑0216/2017),

–  having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to the provisional agreement approved by the committee responsible under Rule 69f(4) of its Rules of Procedure and the undertaking given by the Council representative by letter of 7 June 2018 to approve Parliament’s position, in accordance with Article 294(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Rule 59 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs and the opinion of the Committee on Budgets (A8-0404/2017),

1.  Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

2.  Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

3.  Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

Position of the European Parliament adopted at first reading on 5 July 2018 with a view to the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2018/... of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA), and amending Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 and Council Decision 2007/533/JHA and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011

(As an agreement was reached between Parliament and Council, Parliament's position corresponds to the final legislative act, Regulation (EU) 2018/1726.)

European Parliament resolution of 5 July 2018 on the mandate for the trilogue on the 2019 draft budget (2018/2024(BUD))

P8_TA(2018)0311 A8-0247/2018

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Article 314 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

–  having regard to the draft general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2019, which the Commission adopted on 23 May 2018 (COM(2018)0600),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002(1),

–  having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1311/2013 of 2 December 2013 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2014-2020(2) and its subsequent amendment by Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2017/1123 of 20 June 2017(3),

–  having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 2 December 2013 between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management(4),

–  having regard to its resolution of 15 March 2018 on general guidelines for the preparation of the 2019 budget, Section III – Commission(5),

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 20 February 2018 on the 2019 budget guidelines (06315/2018),

–  having regard to Rule 86a of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and the opinions of the other committees concerned (A8-0247/2018),

Draft budget 2019 - reinforcing solidarity and preparing for a sustainable future

1.  Recalls that in its resolution of 15 March 2018 Parliament identified the following priorities for the 2019 EU budget: sustainable growth, innovation, competitiveness, security, the fight against climate change and the transition to renewable energy and migration, and also called for a particular focus on young people;

2.  Underlines that the EU must be a frontrunner in implementing the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) through their mainstreaming into all EU policies;

3.  Recalls that the 2019 EU budget will be the last under the current parliamentary term and will be negotiated in parallel with the negotiations on the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) and the reform of EU own resources; recalls also that the UK has committed to contribute to, and participate in, the implementation of the Union annual budgets for 2019 and 2020 as if it had remained in the Union after March 2019;

4.  Welcomes the Commission proposal and believes that it corresponds broadly to Parliament’s own priorities; intends to further reinforce key programmes and ensure an appropriate level of financing corresponding to the latter; notes the increase of 3,1 % in commitment appropriations and the lower percentage of GNI as compared to 2018 both for commitment appropriations (1 % as compared to 1,02 %) and payment appropriations (0,9 % as compared to 0,92 %);

5.  Welcomes the proposed reinforcements to Horizon 2020, the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), Erasmus+ and programmes contributing to increase the security of EU citizens; points, however, to the need to further reinforce support for SMEs, which are key to enabling economic growth and job creation, and to dedicate appropriate resources to the digitalisation of EU industry and the promotion of digital skills and digital entrepreneurship, as well as to programmes supportive of young people, and specifically ErasmusPro; recalls its conviction that the Erasmus+ budget for 2019 needs to be at least doubled;

6.  Welcomes the launch of Discover EU, the distribution of 15 000 Interrail tickets to 18-year-old Europeans in 2018, as well as the Commission proposal of EUR 700 million for the MFF 2021-2027, which fits well with the EU’s ambitions to promote learning mobility, active citizenship, social inclusion and solidarity among all young people; regrets that the Commission did not propose any appropriations for 2019 and 2020; is determined to continue the Preparatory Action in 2019 and 2020;

7.  Takes note of the Commission’s pre-assessment of the continuation of the Preparatory Action on the Child Guarantee scheme; underlines the reference made therein to a possible larger-scale implementation under the European Social Fund; suggests that the opportunity of a third implementation phase be taken in order to prepare for this larger-scale implementation under the ESF+;

8.  Regrets the fact that the increase for the EU programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (COSME), in comparison with the 2018 budget, is only 2,3 % (EUR 362,2 million in commitment appropriations), and that the proposed payment appropriations are lower by 0,6 %; recalls that this is a successful programme which has far more applicants than recipients of funding; stresses that SMEs are an important driver of employment, economic growth and competitiveness in the EU, represent the backbone of the European economy, and have the capacity to create growth and jobs; urges, as a top priority, that this be reflected in sufficient funding for SME programmes and a further increase in appropriations for COSME given the success of this programme;

9.  Commends the role of the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) in reducing the investment gap in the EU; calls, in the framework of an optimal regional and sectorial balance, for reinforcement of the social dimension of EFSI deployment, including innovation in healthcare and medicine, social infrastructure, environmental protection, sustainable transport, renewable energy and energy storage infrastructures; reiterates its long-standing position that any new initiatives within the MFF must be financed by new appropriations and not to the detriment of the existing programmes; reiterates also its commitment to reinforce Horizon 2020 and CEF so as to reverse as far as possible the cuts made to those programmes to finance the extension of EFSI in the 2019 budget;

10.  Notes the commitment to a renewed EU defence agenda, namely through the agreement on the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), as a first stage of the European Defence Fund; believes that this shared commitment will contribute to achieving economies of scale and greater coordination among Member States and businesses, allowing the EU to retain its strategic autonomy and become a genuine world player;

11.  Notes that the Commission has proposed an increase for the Youth Employment Initiative (YEI) of EUR 233 million, in line with financial programming; reaffirms once again that Parliament did not agree to any frontloading of the 2018-2020 top-up resulting from the MFF mid-term revision (MTR); maintains that the budgetary authority retains in full its prerogatives as regards deciding the levels of funding of all programmes, including those which have been subject to the MFF MTR; underlines the importance of sincere cooperation between the institutions, and calls on all actors concerned to retain trust throughout the 2019 budgetary procedure;

12.  Remains committed to the fight against unemployment and against youth unemployment in particular; believes in this respect that the YEI should be further strengthened, thus reflecting the need to step up EU funding in order to achieve the Pillar of Social Rights, in spite of the complexities involved in reprogramming YEI and ESF programmes in case of modifications of the YEI envelope; recognises that youth unemployment has not been adequately addressed across the EU, with youth unemployment still higher than 2007 levels; calls on the Commission to guarantee that Member States do not replace their own policies and funding with YEI funding to fight youth unemployment but, rather, use it as a complement; emphasises the fact that both vocational training and apprenticeship constitute efficient practices to tackle youth unemployment; stresses that mobility through Erasmus Pro strongly stimulates benchmarking for implementation of best practices;

13.  Stresses that in 2019 cohesion policy programmes will be at cruising speed, and emphasises Parliament’s commitment to ensuring adequate appropriations for these programmes; welcomes the fact that almost all of the managing authorities for the 2014-2020 programmes have now been designated; points out that the unacceptable delays in the implementation of operational programmes have been to a large extent due to the late designation of those authorities; calls on the Member States to ensure that the implementation of the programmes is accelerated so as to catch up with the delays, and to seek the Commission’s assistance in this respect;

14.  Takes note of the reports on the functioning of regional and cohesion policy in the Union and the economic challenges facing lagging regions, which recurringly point out shortcomings as regards efficiency and results;

15.  Take notes of the fact that the Commission proposal would enable reaching the target of 20 % of the budget being dedicated to climate spending in 2019; regrets, however that the Commission has not followed up on Parliament’s request regarding offsetting the lower allocations made during the first years of the MFF; considers this proposal to be insufficient since in total only 19,3 % of the EU budget 2014-2020 would be dedicated to climate-related measures, which would prevent the EU from meeting its target of climate mainstreaming of at least 20 % during 2014-2020, also if it again allocates only 20 % of the budget to climate protection in 2020; regrets that the Commission has not been able to present draft budgets that are aligned with the commitments and targets set by the Union in this field in the European Council conclusions of 7-8 February 2013; believes that more should be done through the development of an action plan within programmes having massive potential, as for example under Horizon 2020, CEF, European Social Fund (ESF), European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF), European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) or LIFE+, as these programmes allow notably for investments in energy efficiency and renewable energy; recalls the Court of Auditors' reasoned criticism as regards the methodology deployed by the Commission, and calls for swift improvements in this light and in this regard;

16.  Welcomes the commitment of the Commission to improve the biodiversity tracking methodology; disapproves, however, the proposed decrease of the total contribution to biodiversity protection to 8,2 %, which is in contrast to the objective of halting and reversing the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services by 2020;

17.  Believes that ensuring the security of the Union's citizens and addressing the challenges of migration and refugees remain two top Union priorities in 2019; deems it crucial to maintain spending in these areas at a level that is adequate to respond to the needs raised by the migration and refugee crisis in the African continent, especially in the Sahel, as well as in the Levant countries and the Mediterranean sea; considers that the necessary solidarity among Member States in order to manage the flow of migration, in particular once the revision of the Dublin Regulation has been adopted, has to be reflected in the EU budget; notes that the 2019 draft budget integrates the budgetary implications of the Commission’s proposal;

18.  Emphasises that several important legislative initiatives under negotiation or in the early stages of implementation, such as the revision of the Dublin Regulation, the establishment of the Entry/Exit System and the European Travel Information and Authorisation System, the upgrading of the Schengen Information System and the initiative on interoperability of EU information systems for security, borders and migration management, are expected to have significant budgetary implications for the 2019 budget, and underlines the importance of adequate financing to match the Union’s ambition in these areas; encourages the Commission to engage in an open and proactive dialogue with the budgetary authority on the above initiatives, in order to allow it to adjust appropriations, where necessary and without prejudging, during the annual budgetary procedure, the outcome of ongoing legislative procedures;

19.  Regrets the Commission’s proposal for the funding of the second tranche of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRT) and the subsequent agreement reached between Member States in the Council on 29 June 2018; supports the continuation of the FRT, but maintains that, as also proposed by the Commission on 14 March 2018, the EU budget should contribute to its financing to the sum of EUR 1 billion, with Member States contributing EUR 2 billion by means of bilateral contributions, in order to leave sufficient margins under the MFF special instruments for unforeseen events in the last two years of the current MFF, as well as the financing of other priorities; also maintains that as the FRT has been a new initiative within this MFF, it should be funded by fresh appropriations; regrets that, despite Parliament's clear request to be fully associated with the decision-making process relating to the extension of the FRT, inter alia to avoid the repetition of the procedure of its setting-up, no negotiations on the financing of the second tranche of the FRT have so far taken place between Parliament and the Council; informs Member States that Parliament has every right to assume its role as an arm of the budgetary authority of the Union and that it will do so, as already announced on previous occasions;

20.  Notes that the draft budget for 2019 leaves very limited margins or no margin under the MFF ceilings throughout Headings 1a, 1b, 3 and 4, as a consequence of the limited flexibility of the current MFF in terms of responding to new challenges and accommodating new initiatives; expresses its intention to further mobilise the flexibility provisions under the revised MFF as part of the amending process;

21.  Remains concerned at the possible reconstitution of a backlog of unpaid bills towards the end of the current MFF period; notes the moderate increase of 2,7 % in payment appropriations over the 2018 budget, mainly due to the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), Internal Security Fund (ISF) and FRT; notes the proposed margin of EUR 19,3 billion under the payment ceiling; invites the Commission to remain vigilant on the evolution of payments, so as to allow the budgetary authority to take the necessary measures to avoid an abnormal backlog in due time; is convinced that the credibility of the EU is also linked to its ability to ensure an adequate level of payment appropriations in the EU budget in order to deliver on its commitments;

Subheading 1a – Competitiveness for growth and jobs

22.  Notes that in comparison with 2018, the Commission proposal for 2019 corresponds to an increase in commitments under Subheading 1a of +3,9 %, to EUR 22 860 million; notes that Horizon 2020, CEF, Large Infrastructure Projects and Erasmus+ account for an important part of this increase as their commitment appropriations have risen by 8,5 %, 36,4 %, 7,8 % and 10,4 % respectively; underlines, however, that these increases are mostly in line with the financial programming and thus do not constitute additional reinforcements;

23.  Recalls that programmes related to research and innovation, such as Horizon 2020, are essential for the creation of jobs and competitiveness within Europe; urges the Commission to reflect this within its priorities; calls for an appropriate level of funding for programmes related to research and innovation; stresses that in particular, Member States facing economic and financial difficulties should be supported in this area;

24.  Recalls that new initiatives in the past few years such as EFSI (I and II), Wifi4EU and the EDIDP have come at the expense of several programmes under Subheading 1a which were severely impacted by redeployments, namely Horizon 2020, CEF, Galileo, ITER, Copernicus and the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS);

25.  Stresses that Erasmus+ remains the leading programme for fostering youth mobility at all levels of education and vocational training and encouraging young people to take part in European democracy; recalls that administrative efforts need to be made to increase access to Erasmus+ and that the volume of eligible applications is by far exceeding the current budget; believes, therefore, that the envelope of Erasmus+ should be able to meet the eligible demand for this programme, notably that linked to lifelong learning;

26.  Notes with concern the discussions on the financing of the European Solidarity Corps (ESC), which confirmed Parliament’s fear that new initiatives would come at the expense of existing well-performing programmes; notes as well with concern the precedent set by the outcome of the trilogue procedure, which fails to provide clarity on the sources of financing of the initiative, leaving further clarification to the annual budgetary procedure; expects the Commission to implement the agreement in a way that fully reflects the discussions in trilogue and the spirit of the agreement;

27.  Welcomes the fact that the agreement reached on the financing of the EDIDP foresees much lower cuts to Subheading 1a programmes than those initially proposed by the Commission; is, however, concerned that the Council appears to put more emphasis on maintaining margins than on providing sufficient funding for what it identifies itself as high priorities;

28.  Welcomes the allocation of EUR 500 million to the EDIDP for 2019 and 2020; notes that, according to EPRS estimates, the lack of cooperation between national industries in this field costs the EU EUR 10 billion per year; considers that defence is a clear example of how greater effectiveness could be achieved by transferring certain competences and actions currently performed by the Member States and the corresponding appropriations to the EU; emphasises that this would result in the demonstration of European added value and would make it possible to limit the overall burden of public expenditure in the EU;

29.  Welcomes the proposal for the creation of the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking, which will promote the latest high performance computing and data infrastructure and support the development of its technologies and application across a wide range of fields, to the benefit of scientists, industry and the public sector;

Subheading 1b – Economic, social and territorial cohesion

30.  Notes that total commitment appropriations for Subheading 1b amount to EUR 57 113,4 million, representing an increase of 2,8 % compared to the 2018 budget; further notes that the proposed amount of EUR 47 050,8 million in payment appropriations is 1,1 % higher than in 2018;

31.  Welcomes the fact that the implementation of the 2014-2020 programmes is reaching full speed, and reiterates that any ‘abnormal’ buildup of unpaid bills must be avoided in the future; also welcomes the fact that the great majority of the national managing authorities have now been designated; calls on the Commission and the Member States to resolve any outstanding issues in order for the implementation to proceed smoothly;

32.  Recalls that, as a result of revised forecasts by the Member States, Amending Budget 6/2017 reduced the payment appropriations under Subheading 1b by EUR 5,9 billion; sincerely hopes that both the national authorities and the Commission have improved their estimates of payment needs in the 2019 budget and that the proposed level of payment appropriations will be fully executed;

33.  Underlines that in times of rapid technological development – including in fields such as AI – the divide between fast developing regions and lagging ones might widen if the impact of the Structural Funds is not enhanced by conditionalities of efficiency;

34.  Notes the Commission’s proposal to fund the continuation of the YEI, as well as the proposed mobilisation of EUR 233,3 million from the Global Margin for commitments; recalls that any increase in the dedicated allocation for the YEI should be matched with the corresponding amounts from the ESF; recalls the commitment made by the Commission at the conciliation on the 2018 budget to swiftly present the revision of the Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) in order to include the 2018 increase for the YEI; underlines that the Commission has not lived up to its commitment, and requests it to explain in detail the reasons for the delay in the presentation of the CPR revision;

35.  Commits to adopting the new YEI and ESF legislation rapidly in order to facilitate an ambitious increase in YEI appropriations in 2019 without undermining other programmes running under the ESF in Member States, potentially by relieving Member States of their obligation to match ESF appropriations dedicated to youth employment, under the strict condition that the proposed modifications would neither allow Member States to be excused from the financial commitments they have already made in this area, nor imply a decrease in general terms of EU budget appropriations dedicated to the fight against youth unemployment;

Heading 2 – Sustainable growth: natural resources

36.  Takes note of the proposed EUR 59 991,1 million in commitments (+1,2 % compared to 2018) and EUR 57 790,4 million in payments (3 %) for Heading 2; notes that EAGF expenditure for 2019 is estimated at EUR 44 162,5 million, which is lower than in the 2018 budget (by EUR -547,9 million);

37.  Notes that the Commission has left a EUR 344,9 million margin under the ceiling of Heading 2; points to the fact that increased volatility of agricultural markets, such as experienced with the Russian ban, might justify recourse to this margin; calls on the Commission to ensure that the margin left under the ceilings is sufficient to address any crises that may arise;

38.  Notes that some measures related to the Russian ban and included in the 2018 budget will not be extended (e.g. for fruit and vegetables where the market situation is still difficult), while market difficulties can still be found in the dairy sector; awaits the Commission’s letter of amendment, expected in October, which should be based on updated information on EAGF funding in order to verify the real needs in the agricultural sector; underlines that cases where market intervention is needed under the EAGF remain limited and represent only a relatively small part of the EAGF (around 5,9 %);

39.  Stresses that part of the solution for combating youth unemployment lies in adequately supporting young people in rural areas; regrets that the Commission has not proposed increasing the budget line for young farmers;

40.  Underlines that the implementation of the EMFF is accelerating and should approach cruising speed in 2019, following a slow start at the beginning of the programming period; welcomes the increase in commitments for the LIFE+ programme (+6 %), in line with financial programming; notes that the European Environment Agency (EEA) will assume additional responsibilities in the period 2019-2020 for environmental monitoring and reporting, as well as for the verification of CO2 emissions from heavy duty vehicles;

Heading 3 – Security and Citizenship

41.  Notes that a total of EUR 3 728,5 million in commitment appropriations is proposed for Heading 3, which represents a 6,7 % increase over 2018, and that the total for payment appropriations is EUR 3 486,4 million, i.e. a 17 % increase over last year’s proposals; underlines, however, that these increases follow years of declining funding levels and that overall funding for different key areas such as migration, border management or internal security still represents only 2,3 % of total proposed EU spending in 2019; questions the proposed EUR 281,2 million in commitments for supporting legal migration to the Union and promoting the effective integration of third-country nationals and enhancing fair and effective return strategies, which represents a 14,4 % decrease over 2018; calls on the Commission to provide further explanations as to the reasons for this cut;

42.  Notes that, for the fourth consecutive year, all margins under the Heading 3 ceiling are exhausted, proving that as things stand today the EU budget is not fully equipped to deal with the scale and depth of the present migration and security challenges facing the Union; welcomes, in this regard, the proposed mobilisation of the Flexibility Instrument for an amount of EUR 927,5 million in commitment appropriations;

43.  Expects the pressure on some Member States’ migration and asylum systems, as well as on their borders, to remain high in 2019, and urges the Union to remain vigilant regarding any future, unpredictable needs in these areas; calls in this regard for the reinforcement of the means of control at the external borders, and in this context for an adequate funding and staffing of the EU agencies dealing with these issues, and reaffirms that tackling the root causes of the migration and refugee crisis represents a long-term sustainable solution, along with stabilisation of the EU’s neighbourhoods, and that investments in the countries of origin of migrants and refugees are key to achieving this objective;

44.  Welcomes the European Council’s request of 28 June 2018 to further strengthen Frontex through increased resources and an enhanced mandate; asks for further information as to how many staff will be sent by the Member States and how many staff will be needed directly by the agency itself; invites the Commission to adapt its draft budget accordingly in the autumn amending letter; welcomes as well the additional EUR 45,6 million awarded to support Greece and Spain in their management of the flow of arriving migrants on their territory; underlines that effective border control must be accompanied with proper care of arriving migrants;

45.  Notes that the instrument allowing the provision of emergency humanitarian support within the Union will expire in March 2019; invites the Commission, against the backdrop of persisting humanitarian needs of refugees and asylum seekers in certain Member States, to assess whether a reactivation and replenishment of this instrument would be appropriate; highlights the need for greater solidarity towards those countries in which arrivals and asylum seekers are concentrated; underlines, in the meantime, the importance of the continued availability of funding through the emergency assistance mechanisms under the AMIF, notably for the continued support of Greece; considers that financial support should also be granted to Italy; calls, therefore, on the Commission to state the reasons which led it not to propose this; recalls that Italy is the only Member State where a majority of the population consider that they have not benefited from membership of the European Union; regrets the sharp decrease in commitment appropriations for the second AMIF component, 'Supporting legal migration to the Union and promoting the effective integration of third-country nationals and enhancing fair and effective return strategies';

46.  Believes that in the context of a wide range of security concerns, including changing forms of radicalisation, cybercrime, violence and terrorism that surpass individual Member States’ capacity to respond, the EU budget should encourage cooperation on security-related matters with the help of established EU agencies; in this context, questions how this high-risk security context is reconcilable with the proposed significant decrease of commitment appropriations (-26,6 %) for the ISF; highlights that spending in this area is efficient only when obstacles to intra-European cooperation and targeted information sharing are removed while fully applying any relevant data protection in line with EU legislation; regrets that the Commission has still not presented a proposal which would provide for the expression of financial solidarity at EU level to victims of acts of terrorism and their families, and calls on the Commission to do the necessary to ensure that such aid is put in place rapidly;

47.  Takes note of the proposed revision of the legal base of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, which, once adopted, is expected to have a major budgetary impact in the last two years of the current MFF, with EUR 256,9 million to be borne by Heading 3 alone; insists that it is only logical that this significant upgrading of a key Union policy should be financed through new and additional means; warns against the use of redeployments, which are clearly at the expense of other valuable, well-functioning policies and programmes;

48.  Reconfirms Parliament’s strong support for Union programmes in the areas of culture, justice, fundamental rights and citizenship; welcomes the proposed increase for the Creative Europe Programme; insists, furthermore, on sufficient funding for the Europe for Citizens programme and the European Citizens’ Initiatives, particularly in the run-up to the European elections;

49.  Recalls Parliament’s support for the rights, equality, citizenship and justice programmes; underlines that the EU must maintain its commitment to enforcing women's and LGBTI rights;

50.  Welcomes the increase in commitment appropriations for the Food and Feed programme, which should allow the Union to manage effectively any outbreaks of serious animal diseases and plant pests, including the recent epidemic of avian influenza that hit several Member States in recent years;

51.  Calls on the Commission to provide adequate budget funding to raise the profile of the 2019 European Parliament elections and increase the effectiveness of media coverage thereof, and in particular to promote knowledge of the ‘Spitzenkandidaten’, the candidates for the Commission presidency;

Heading 4 – Global Europe

52.  Takes note of the overall increase in proposed financing for Heading 4, amounting to EUR 11 384,2 million (+13,1 % compared with the 2018 budget) in commitment appropriations; notes that this increase is linked primarily to the financing of the second tranche of the FRT, for which the Commission proposes mobilising the Global Margin for commitments (EUR 1 116,2 million); notes that this proposal would result in an absence of margin under the ceiling of Heading 4;

53.  Calls on the Member States to provide higher contributions to the Africa Trust Fund, the 'Madad' Fund, and the European Fund for Sustainable Development, in order to support stabilisation in crisis regions, provide aid to refugees, and foster social and economic development on the African continent and in the countries of the European neighbourhood;

54.  Remains convinced that the challenges that the EU’s external action is faced with call for sustained funding exceeding the current size of Heading 4; maintains that new initiatives should be funded with fresh appropriations and that all flexibility options should be fully used; opposes, however, the proposed financing of the FRT extension and the related deal reached in the Council on 29 June 2018, as they would substantially limit both the funding possibilities of other priority areas within Heading 4 and the instrumental role of the EU budget in reaching out to people in need and promoting fundamental values;

55.  Welcomes the increases aimed at migration-related projects linked to the Central Mediterranean Route, as well as the moderate increase for the Eastern component of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) and the reallocation of priorities under the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) to the Middle East; calls for the allocation of sufficient financial resources to UNRWA, in order to ensure continuous support for Palestinian refugees in the region, in light of the recent US decision to withdraw its contribution to the agency;

56.  Welcomes the increased support for regional actions in the Western Balkans; is, however, of the opinion that support for political reforms should be further stepped up; regrets the increased support for political reforms in Turkey (IPA II) and questions its alignment to the budgetary authority’s decision to reduce the appropriations on this line for the current budgetary year; reiterates its position in which it called for funds destined for the Turkish authorities under the IPA II to be made conditional on improvements in the field of human rights, democracy and the rule of law; calls for the appropriations on this line, if no progress is made in these fields and being aware of the limited space for manoeuvre, to be predominantly redirected to civil society actors with a view to implementing measures supportive of the objectives relating to the rule of law, democracy, human rights and media freedoms; supports the overall downward trend for political reforms in the allocations for Turkey;

57.  Underlines the noticeable decrease in the amount to be provisioned in the 2019 budget to the Guarantee Fund for external actions managed by the European Investment Bank (EIB), as well as the substantial reduction of the planned amount of macrofinancial assistance (MFA) grants, due to a lower amount of outstanding EIB loans than previously estimated, as well as to a lower disbursement of MFA loans compared to the latest financial programming;

58.  Reaffirms its full support for the pledges made by the EU at the Brussels conferences on Syria, confirming those made previously; agrees with the reinforcement of the ENI and of humanitarian aid by EUR 120 million each in order to meet this pledge in 2019;

59.  Reiterates its support for the allocation of adequate financial resources to EU strategic communication aimed at tackling disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks, as well as the promotion of an objective image of the Union outside its borders;

Heading 5 – Administration

60.  Notes that Heading 5 expenditure is increased by 3,0 % compared to the 2018 budget, up to EUR 9 956,9 million (+EUR 291,4 million) in commitment appropriations; notes that, as for the previous budgetary exercise, the increase is mostly driven by the evolution of pensions (+ EUR 116,7 million), representing 20,2 % of Heading 5 expenditure; observes that the share of expenditure on administration in the draft budget remains unchanged at a level of 6,0 % in commitment appropriations;

61.  Acknowledges the efforts made by the Commission to integrate all possibilities for savings and rationalisations in non-salary-related expenditure for its own budget; notes that the evolution of the Commission’s expenditure (+ 2,0 %) is mostly due to the automatic adaptation of salary expenditure and contractual commitments; further notes the Commission’s internal redeployment of staff to fulfil its new priorities;

62.  Notes that the effective margin is EUR 575,2 million under the ceiling after the offsetting of EUR 253,9 million for the use of the contingency margin mobilised in 2018; considers the margin to be important in nominal terms, and believes it reflects the efforts made by the Commission, in particular to freeze the evolution of non-salary expenditure; believes that an additional effort to stabilise or reduce the Commission's administrative expenditure could lead to the postponement of important investments or jeopardise the proper functioning of the administration;

Pilot projects - preparatory actions

63.  Stresses the importance of pilot projects (PPs) and preparatory actions (PAs) as tools for the formulation of political priorities and the introduction of new initiatives that might turn into standing EU activities and programmes; intends to proceed with the identification of a balanced package of PP-PAs, reflecting the political priorities of Parliament and taking into account a proper and timely pre-assessment by the Commission; notes that in the current proposal, the margin in some headings is limited or even non-existent, and intends to explore ways to make room for possible PP-PAs in ways that are not detrimental to other political priorities;

Agencies

64.  Notes the overall increase in the draft budget 2019 of the allocations for the decentralised agencies, of +10,8 % (without taking into account assigned revenues) and +259 posts; welcomes the fact that for the majority of the agencies their own budget increases while the EU contribution decreases; notes in this regard that Parliament is currently exploring the possibilities of further extending the fee-financing of decentralised agencies; notes with satisfaction that agencies with ‘new tasks’ (ESMA, eu-LISA and FRONTEX) are granted a significant increase in appropriations and establishment plan staff; calls for further financial support for the agencies that are dealing with migration and security challenges; believes that Europol and Eurojust should be further strengthened and that EASO should receive adequate financing for its transformation into the European Asylum Agency;

65.  Reiterates its position that the 5 % staff reduction target has been successfully reached and underlines that in the light of the Court of Auditors’ rapid case review, this practice did not necessarily meet the expected results; believes that the decentralised agencies need to be assessed using a case-by-case approach; welcomes the endorsement by all institutions of the recommendations of the Interinstitutional Working Group;

66.  Welcomes the creation of two new EU bodies to be considered as decentralised agencies, respectively the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the European Labour Authority (ELA); notes that appropriations corresponding to the ELA have been put into reserve pending the finalisation of the legislative procedure; notes that the EPPO has its seat in Luxembourg, and asks it to submit to the two branches of the budgetary authority all information on its buildings policy pursuant to the Financial Regulation; considers that new agencies have to be created by allocating fresh resources and new posts, while avoiding any kind of redeployment unless it is clearly demonstrated that certain activities are entirely transferred from the Commission or other existing bodies, such as Eurojust, to the new agencies; notes that Eurojust remains competent to deal with PIF cases, in close cooperation with EPPO, while being fully engaged in ensuring operational support to Member States in the fight against organised crime, terrorism, cybercrime and migrant smuggling; recalls the provisions laid down in the Common Approach for newly created decentralised agencies;

67.  Expects the negotiations on the 2019 budget to be based on the principle that both branches of the budgetary authority make a commitment to start the negotiations at the earliest possible stage and to fully exploit the timespan of the whole conciliation period, while providing a level of representation that ensures a genuine political dialogue;

o
o   o

68.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

ANNEX

JOINT STATEMENT ON THE DATES FOR THE BUDGETARY PROCEDURE AND MODALITIES FOR THE FUNCTIONING OF THE CONCILIATION COMMITTEE IN 2018

A.  In accordance with Part A of the annex to the interinstitutional agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission agree on the following key dates for the 2019 budgetary procedure:

1.  The Commission will endeavour to present the Statement of Estimates 2019 by late May;

2.  A trilogue will be called on 12 July in the morning, before the adoption of the Council’s position;

3.  The Council will endeavour to adopt its position and transmit it to the European Parliament by week 37 (third week of September), in order to facilitate a timely agreement with the European Parliament;

4.  The European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets will endeavour to vote on amendments to the Council’s position by the end of week 41 (mid-October) at the latest;

5.  A trilogue will be called on 18 October in the morning, before the reading of the European Parliament;

6.  The European Parliament’s Plenary will vote on its reading in week 43 (Plenary session of 22-25 October);

7.  The Conciliation period will start on 30 October. In agreement with the provisions of Article 314(4)(c) TFEU, the time available for conciliation will expire on 19 November 2018;

8.  The Conciliation Committee will meet on 7 November in the morning hosted by the European Parliament and on 16 November hosted by the Council and may resume as appropriate; the sessions of the Conciliation Committee will be prepared by trilogue(s). A trilogue is scheduled on 7 November in the morning. Additional trilogue(s) may be called during the 21-day conciliation period, including possibly on 14 November (Strasbourg).

B.  The modalities for the functioning of the Conciliation Committee are set out in Part E of the annex to the above-mentioned interinstitutional agreement.

(1) OJ L 298, 26.10.2012, p. 1. (2) OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 884. (3) OJ L 163, 24.6.2017, p. 1. (4) OJ C 373, 20.12.2013, p. 1. (5) Texts adopted, P8_TA(2018)0089.

European Parliament recommendation of 5 July 2018 to the Council on the 73rd session of the United Nations General Assembly (2018/2040(INI))

P8_TA(2018)0312 A8-0230/2018

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Charter of the United Nations,

–  having regard to the UN resolution adopted on 3 April 2006 by the General Assembly establishing a Human Rights Council,

–  having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 21, 34 and 36 thereof,

–  having regard to the EU Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World in 2016 and the European Union’s policy on the matter,

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, its preamble and Article 18, and to the UN Human Rights Conventions and the optional protocols thereto,

–  having regard to its recommendation to the Council of 5 July 2017 on the 72nd session of the United Nations General Assembly(1),

–  having regard to the UN resolution adopted on 3 May 2011 by the General Assembly on the participation of the European Union in the work of the United Nations, which grants the EU the right to intervene in the UN General Assembly, to present proposals and amendments orally, which will be put to a vote at the request of a Member State, and to exercise the right to reply,

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 July 2017 on the EU priorities for the 72nd UN General Assembly,

–  having regard to the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants of 19 September 2016,

–  having regard to the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2009), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2010), 1960 (2011), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013) and 2242 (2015) on Women, Peace and Security,

–  having regard to the key principles enshrined in the Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy of June 2016, particularly those pertaining to the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the inviolability of state borders which are equally respected by all participating states,

–  having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2017 on the Annual Report on the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy(2),

–  having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

–  having regard to Rule 113 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A8-0230/2018),

A.  whereas the EU and its Member States remain fully committed to multilateralism, global governance, the promotion of UN core values as an integral part of the EU’s external policy, and the three pillars of the UN system: Human Rights, Peace and Security, and Development; whereas a multilateral system founded on universal rules and values is best suited to addressing crises, challenges and threats; whereas the very future of the multilateral system is facing unprecedented challenges;

B.  whereas EU’s Global Strategy reflects the level of today’s global challenges, which require a strong and more efficient UN and a deepening of cooperation at Member State level both within the EU and the UN;

C.  whereas EU Member States need to make every effort to coordinate their action in the organs and bodies of the UN system and speak with one voice based on international human rights law and the core values of the EU; whereas this cooperation needs to be based on common efforts to prevent the further escalation of ongoing conflicts and to support their solution, to promote effective disarmament and arms control, in particular as far as nuclear arsenals are concerned, to implement the SDGs and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, and to contribute to a rule-based international order, following the mandate contained in Article 34.1 TEU;

D.  whereas the global political order and the security environment are rapidly evolving and require global responses; whereas the United Nations remain at the core of the multilateral system of cooperation between its Member States to meet these challenges and is best suited to addressing international crises, global challenges and threats;

E.  whereas the world is facing a range of global challenges related to ongoing and emerging conflicts and their consequences, such as climate change and terrorism, which need to be tackled on a global scale; whereas the current structure of the UNSC is still based on an outdated political scenario and its decision-making process does not adequately reflect a changing global reality; whereas the EU and its Member States were instrumental in shaping the global UN 2030 Agenda, and the EU remains committed to being a front-runner in mobilising all means of implementation and a strong follow-up, monitoring and review mechanism to ensure progress and accountability; whereas this is reflected in the EU’s external action and other policies across EU financial instruments;

F.  whereas the three pillars of the UN: Peace and Security, Development, Human Rights and the Rule of Law are inseparable and mutually reinforcing; whereas the UN’s original purpose of maintaining peace has been challenged by continuous complex crises;

G.  whereas the UN’s burdensome bureaucratic procedures and complex and rigid structure have sometimes hindered the proper functioning of the institution and its ability to give a rapid response to crises and global challenges;

H.  whereas responding successfully to global crises, threats and challenges requires an efficient multilateral system, founded on universal rules and values;

I.  whereas the international order based on cooperation, dialogue, and human rights is being called into question by several nationalist and protectionist movements around the world;

J.  whereas the ever growing number of tasks for the UN system demands adequate financing by its Member States; whereas there is a growing gap between the organisation’s needs and the funding provided to it; whereas, in view of the intention of the United States to cut its contributions to the UN budget, the EU and its Member States remain collectively the single largest financial contributor and should actively support the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) in his efforts to secure the proper functioning and financing of the UN, with the primary aims of eradicating poverty, promoting long-term peace and stability, defending human rights, combating social inequalities, and providing humanitarian assistance to populations, countries and regions that are confronted with all types of crises, whether natural or human-made; whereas EU contributions to the UN should be more visible; whereas UN agencies, including the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), have suffered important financial cuts; whereas the current overall level of funding of the UN remains inadequate in order to allow the organisation to implement its mandate and to face the current global challenges;

K.  whereas democracy, human rights, and the rule of law are coming under increasing threat in different regions of the world, and civil society space is shrinking in many UN Member States; whereas human rights defenders and civil society activists are facing increasing threats and risks around the world for their legitimate work;

L.  whereas the promotion and protection of human rights is at the heart of multilateralism and a central pillar of the UN system; whereas the EU is a strong supporter of all human rights, which are universal, indivisible, interdependent and inter-related; whereas the EU is one of the most dedicated defenders and promoters of human rights, fundamental freedoms, cultural values and diversity, democracy and the rule of law; whereas these values are coming under increasing threat in different regions of the world; whereas human rights defenders and civil society activists are facing increasing threats and risks for their legitimate work and are facing increasing reprisals for interacting with UN bodies and mechanisms; whereas the international community and the EU must step up their efforts to provide protection and support for human rights defenders, and uphold international norms of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; especially with regard to the rights of those belonging to minority groups or those in vulnerable situations including women, children, young people, ethnic, racial or religious minorities, migrants, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), people with disabilities, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people and indigenous peoples;

1.  Recommends the following to the Council:

2.  Instructs its President to forward this recommendation to the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the EU Special Representative for Human Rights, the European External Action Service, the Commission and, for information, the United Nations General Assembly and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

(1) Texts adopted, P8_TA(2017)0304. (2) Texts adopted, P8_TA(2017)0493. (3) European Parliament recommendation of 1 March 2018 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on cutting the sources of income for jihadists – targeting the financing of terrorism, Texts adopted, P8_TA(2018)0059. (4) World Health Organisation, World Report on Violence and Health, Geneva, 2002, p. 154; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Discussion paper 2: The Nature, Scope and Motivation for Sexual Violence Against Men and Boys in Armed Conflict, paper presented at the UNOCHA Research Meeting on the Use of Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict: Identifying Gaps in Research to Inform More Effective Interventions, 26 June 2008. (5) As set out in his first statement to the UNSC on 10 January 2017. (6) OJ C 215, 19.6.2018, p. 202.

European Parliament resolution of 5 July 2018 on the migration crisis and humanitarian situation in Venezuela and at its terrestrial borders with Colombia and Brazil (2018/2770(RSP))

P8_TA(2018)0313 RC-B8-0315/2018

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its previous resolutions on Venezuela, in particular those of 27 February 2014 on the situation in Venezuela(1), of 18 December 2014 on the persecution of the democratic opposition in Venezuela(2), of 12 March 2015 on the situation in Venezuela(3), of 8 June 2016 on the situation in Venezuela(4), of 27 April 2017 on the situation in Venezuela(5), of 8 February 2018 on the situation in Venezuela(6), and of 3 May 2018 on the elections in Venezuela(7),

–  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,

–  having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

–  having regard to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

–  having regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,

–  having regard to the statement of 8 February 2018 by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Ms Fatou Bensouda,

–  having regard to the statement of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on Venezuela of 31 March 2017,

–  having regard to the report by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) entitled ‘Human rights violations in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela’ of 22 June 2018,

–  having regard to the joint statement of 28 April 2017 by the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, and the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention,

–  having regard to the G7 Leaders’ statement of 23 May 2018,

–  having regard to the declarations of the Lima Group of 23 January 2018, 14 February 2018, 21 May 2018, 2 June 2018 and 15 June 2018,

–  having regard to the declaration of 20 April 2018 by the Organisation of American States (OAS) on the worsening humanitarian situation in Venezuela,

–  having regard to the report of the General Secretariat of the OAS and the panel of independent international experts on the possible commission of crimes against humanity in Venezuela of 29 May 2018,

–  having regard to the report published by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) on 12 February 2018 entitled ‘Democratic Institutions, the Rule of Law and Human Rights in Venezuela’, and to the IACHR resolution of 14 March 2018,

–  having regard to the declarations of 26 January 2018, 19 April 2018 and 22 May 2018 by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) on the latest developments in Venezuela,

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 13 November 2017, 22 January 2018, 28 May 2018 and 25 June 2018,

–  having regard to the statement of the Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Management, Christos Stylianides, on the official mission to Colombia in March 2018,

–  having regard to the statement of 23 April 2018 by its Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group,

–  having regard to Rule 123(2) and (4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the situation of human rights, democracy and rule of law in Venezuela continues to deteriorate; whereas Venezuela is facing an unprecedented political, social, economic and humanitarian crisis, characterised by insecurity, violence, human rights violations, deterioration of the rule of law, lack of medicine and social services, loss of income and increasing poverty rates, which is resulting in a mounting death toll and increasing numbers of refugees and migrants;

B.  whereas a growing number of people in Venezuela, in particular vulnerable groups such as women, children and sick people, are suffering from malnutrition as a consequence of limited access to quality health services, medicines, food and water; whereas 87 % of the population of Venezuela is affected by poverty, with the extreme poverty level standing at 61,2 %; whereas maternal mortality has increased by 60 % and infant mortality by 30 %; whereas in 2017, cases of malaria increased by 69 % compared with the previous year, this being the largest increase worldwide, and whereas other diseases such as tuberculosis and measles are on the point of becoming epidemics;

C.  whereas, regrettably, despite the readiness of the international community, the Venezuelan Government remains obstinate in its denial of the problem and its refusal to openly receive and facilitate the distribution of international humanitarian aid;

D.  whereas the economic situation has significantly worsened; whereas the International Monetary Fund has projected that hyperinflation in Venezuela will soar to 13 000 % in 2018, up from an estimated 2 400 % in 2017, resulting in price increases of, on average, almost 1,5 % every hour;

E.  whereas an OHCHR report published on 22 June 2018 highlights the Venezuelan authorities’ failure to hold to account the perpetrators of serious human rights violations, which include killings, the use of excessive force against demonstrators, arbitrary detentions, ill-treatment and torture; whereas impunity in favour of security officers suspected of the extrajudicial killings of demonstrators also appears to be rife;

F.  whereas according to the report presented on 29 May 2018 by the Panel of Independent International Experts designated by the OAS, seven crimes against humanity have been committed in Venezuela, dating back at least as far as February 2014, and the government itself has been responsible for the current humanitarian crisis in the region; whereas the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) announced the launch of a preliminary investigation into alleged crimes committed in Venezuela since April 2017;

G.  whereas the elections held on 20 May 2018 were conducted without complying with the minimum international standards for a credible process and failed to respect political pluralism, democracy, transparency and the rule of law; whereas this places additional constraints on efforts to resolve the political crisis; whereas the EU, together with other democratic bodies, does not recognise the elections or the authorities put in place by this illegitimate process;

H.  whereas the current multidimensional crisis in Venezuela is generating the largest population displacement in the region; whereas according to the UNHCR and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the total number of Venezuelans to have left the country has increased dramatically, from 437 000 in 2005 to over 1,6 million in 2017; whereas around 945 000 Venezuelans left the country between 2015 and 2017; whereas in 2018 the total number of people who have left the country since 2014 has exceeded 2 million; whereas there has been a 2 000 % increase in the number of Venezuelan nationals seeking asylum worldwide since 2014, reaching more than 280 000 by mid-June 2018;

I.  whereas 520 000 Venezuelans in the region have accessed alternative legal forms of stay; whereas more than 280 000 Venezuelans have claimed refugee status worldwide; whereas the number of Venezuelan applicants for international protection in the EU increased by over 3 500 % between 2014 and 2017; whereas it is estimated that more than 60 % of Venezuelans remain in an irregular situation;

J.  whereas according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), Colombia is hosting the biggest share of displaced people, with over 820 000 Venezuelans living on its territory; whereas Cúcuta and Boa Vista, which are situated on the border with Venezuela, are experiencing a major influx of people, who are often in terrible health and nutrition conditions; whereas Peru, Chile, Argentina, Panama, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Uruguay, Bolivia and Paraguay are also facing influxes of great numbers of refugees and migrants; whereas maritime routes are becoming increasingly significant, particularly to Caribbean islands such as Aruba, Curaçao, Bonaire, Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana; whereas European countries, in particular Spain, Portugal and Italy, are also being increasingly affected; whereas host countries are coming under increasing strain in terms of providing assistance to new arrivals;

K.  whereas Colombian national and local authorities are working commendably to grant the enjoyment of basic human rights, such as to primary education and basic health services, to those fleeing Venezuela, regardless of their status; whereas in Colombia, local communities, religious institutions and ordinary people alike are welcoming Venezuelan migrants in the spirit of fraternity, and are demonstrating great resilience and solidarity;

L.  whereas on 7 June 2018 the Commission announced a package of EUR 35,1 million in emergency aid and development assistance to support the Venezuelan people and the neighbourhood countries affected by the crisis; whereas this financial contribution will be added to the EUR 37 million that the EU has already committed to humanitarian aid and cooperation projects in the country; whereas as of 13 June 2018 there is a 56 % funding gap in the UNHCR supplementary appeal for USD 46,1 million;

M.  whereas every month more than 12 000 Venezuelans enter the Brazilian state of Roraima, around 2 700 of whom stay in the city of Boa Vista; whereas Venezuelans already represent more than 7 % of the population of this city, and at the current rate there will be more than 60 000 Venezuelans living there by the end of the year; whereas this demographic influx is putting enormous pressure on the city’s public services, in particular public health and education; whereas Roraima is one of the poorest states of Brazil, with a very narrow labour market and a shallow economy, which is another obstacle to the integration of refugees and migrants;

N.  whereas Parliament sent an ad hoc delegation to the Venezuelan borders with Colombia and Brazil from 25 to 30 June 2018 to assess the impact of the crisis on the ground;

1.  Is deeply shocked and alarmed by the devastating humanitarian situation in Venezuela, which has resulted in many deaths and an unprecedented influx of refugees and migrants to neighbouring countries and beyond; expresses its solidarity with all Venezuelans forced to flee their country because of the lack of very basic living conditions, such as access to food, drinking water, health services and medicines;

2.  Urges the Venezuelan authorities to acknowledge the ongoing humanitarian crisis, prevent its further deterioration, and promote political and economic solutions to ensure the safety of all civilians and stability for the country and the region;

3.  Demands that the Venezuelan authorities allow unimpeded humanitarian aid into the country as a matter of urgency to prevent the aggravation of the humanitarian and public health crisis, and in particular the reappearance of diseases such as measles, malaria, diphtheria and foot-and-mouth disease, and that they grant unhindered access to international organisations wishing to assist all affected sectors of society; calls for the rapid implementation of a short-term response to counter malnutrition among the most vulnerable groups, such as women, children and sick people; is extremely worried about the number of unaccompanied children crossing the borders;

4.  Commends the Colombian Government for its prompt reaction and the support it has provided to all incoming Venezuelans; also praises Brazil and other countries in the region, in particular Peru, regional and international organisations, private and public entities, the Catholic Church and ordinary citizens in the region as a whole for their active help and solidarity vis-à-vis Venezuelan refugees and migrants; calls on the Member States to provide immediate protection-oriented responses to Venezuelan refugees or migrants on their territory, such as humanitarian visas, special stay arrangements or other regional migratory frameworks, with the relevant protection safeguards; calls on the Venezuelan authorities to facilitate and speed up the issuance and renewal of identification documents to their own nationals, whether in Venezuela or abroad;

5.  Calls on the international community, including the EU, to establish a coordinated, comprehensive and regional response to the crisis and to step up their financial and material assistance to recipient countries by fulfilling their commitments; warmly welcomes the EU humanitarian aid allocated to date and calls, as a matter of urgency, for additional humanitarian support to be released via emergency funds, in order to meet the rapidly increasing needs of people affected by the Venezuelan crisis in the neighbouring countries;

6.  Reiterates that the current humanitarian crisis stems from a political one; urges the Venezuelan authorities to ensure that all human rights violations, including violations against civilians, are immediately halted, and that all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom of assembly are fully respected; urges the Venezuelan authorities to respect all democratically elected institutions, notably the National Assembly, release all political prisoners and uphold democratic principles, the rule of law and human rights; calls on the European External Action Service to do its utmost to facilitate the international mediation efforts needed to open up spaces for a viable solution to the current humanitarian and political crisis;

7.  Calls for the holding of fresh presidential elections in accordance with internationally recognised democratic standards and the Venezuelan constitutional order, within a transparent, equal, fair and international monitoring framework, with no limitations on political parties or candidates and with full respect for the political rights of all Venezuelans; stresses that the legitimate government resulting from such elections must urgently address the current economic and social crisis in Venezuela and work towards national reconciliation;

8.  Recalls that any sanctions adopted by the international community should be targeted and reversible and do no harm whatsoever to the Venezuelan population; welcomes the swift adoption of additional targeted and revocable sanctions, as well as the arms embargo imposed in November 2017; reiterates that these sanctions have been imposed on high-ranking officials for grave human rights violations, for undermining democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela and for conducting the illegitimate elections of 20 May 2018, which were given no international recognition and which took place without an agreement on the date or conditions, and in circumstances which did not allow the participation of all political parties on an equal footing; recalls the possibility of extending these sanctions to those responsible for the heightened political, social, economic and humanitarian crisis, in particular President Nicolás Maduro, in accordance with its previous resolutions;

9.  Reiterates that those responsible for grave human rights violations must be held to account; fully supports the preliminary investigations of the ICC into the extensive crimes and acts of repression perpetrated by the Venezuelan regime, and calls for the EU to play an active role in this regard; fully supports the call of the Panel of Independent International Experts designated by the Secretary General of the OAS and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to establish a commission of inquiry into the situation in Venezuela and to deepen the involvement of the ICC;

10.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Government and National Assembly of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the governments and parliaments of the Republic of Colombia, the Republic of Brazil and the Republic of Peru, the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly, the Secretary-General of the Organisation of American States and the Lima Group.

(1) OJ C 285, 29.8.2017, p. 145. (2) OJ C 294, 12.8.2016, p. 21. (3) OJ C 316, 30.8.2016, p. 190. (4) OJ C 86, 6.3.2018, p. 101. (5) Texts adopted, P8_TA(2017)0200. (6) Texts adopted, P8_TA(2018)0041. (7) Texts adopted, P8_TA(2018)0199.

European Parliament resolution of 5 July 2018 on guidelines for Member States to prevent humanitarian assistance from being criminalised (2018/2769(RSP))

P8_TA(2018)0314 B8-0314/2018

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Council Directive 2002/90/EC of 28 November 2002 defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence(1) (‘Facilitation Directive’),

–  having regard to the Council Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA of 28 November 2002 on the strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence (2) (‘Framework Decision’),

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 27 May 2015 establishing an EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling (2015-2020) (COM(2015)0285),

–  having regard to the Commission staff working document of 22 March 2017 on the REFIT evaluation of the EU legal framework against facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence: the Facilitators Package (Directive 2002/90/EC and Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA) (SWD(2017)0117),

–  having regard to its resolution of 18 April 2018 on progress on the UN Global Compacts for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and on Refugees(3),

–  having regard to the study entitled ‘Fit for purpose? The Facilitation Directive and the criminalisation of humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants’, published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies in 2016,

–  having regard to the study by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on the criminalisation of migrants in an irregular situation and of persons engaging with them, published in 2014,

–  having regard to the Issue Paper of the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights of 4 February 2010 entitled ‘Criminalisation of migration in Europe: Human rights implications’,

–  having regard to the UN Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, adopted by means of resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000 at the 55th session of the UN General Assembly (‘UN Smuggling Protocol’),

–  having regard to the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants of 24 April 2013 entitled ‘Regional Study: management of the external borders of the European Union and its impact on the human rights of migrants’,

–  having regard to the question to the Commission on guidelines for Member States to prevent humanitarian assistance being criminalised (O‑000065/2018 – B8‑0034/2018),

–  having regard to the motion for a resolution of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs,

–  having regard to Rules 128(5) and 123(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas in the EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling (2015-2020), the Commission stressed the need ‘to ensure that appropriate criminal sanctions are in place while avoiding risks of criminalisation of those who provide humanitarian assistance to migrants in distress’ and to improve the existing EU Facilitators Package, comprising the Facilitation Directive and the accompanying Framework Decision;

B.  whereas Article 1(2) of the Facilitation Directive provides for a non-binding humanitarian assistance exemption, giving Member States the option not to criminalise facilitation when it is humanitarian in nature;

C.  whereas in its resolution of 18 April 2018 on progress on UN Global Compacts for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and on Refugees, Parliament called for the non-criminalisation of humanitarian assistance, for greater search and rescue capacities for people in distress, for greater capacities to be deployed by all states, and for the support provided by private actors and NGOs in carrying out rescue operations at sea and on land to be acknowledged;

D.  whereas in its staff working document on the REFIT evaluation of the Facilitators Package, the Commission highlighted that a reinforced exchange of knowledge and good practices between prosecutors, law enforcement and civil society could contribute to improving the current situation and prevent criminalisation of genuine humanitarian assistance;

E.  whereas Article 1(1)(b) of the Facilitation Directive does not impose an obligation on Member States to refrain from punishing the facilitation of irregular stay when there is no element of intention of financial gain, and whereas the Framework Decision does not include mandatory provisions preventing the punishment of acts performed for humanitarian purposes or in emergency situations;

1.  Recalls that under the Facilitation Directive and the accompanying Framework Decision, Member States are required to implement legislation introducing criminal sanctions against the facilitation of irregular entry, transit and residence;

2.  Expresses concern at the unintended consequences of the Facilitators Package on citizens providing humanitarian assistance to migrants and on the social cohesion of the receiving society as a whole;

3.  Underlines that in line with the UN Smuggling Protocol, acts of humanitarian assistance should not be criminalised;

4.  Notes that actors involved in humanitarian assistance that supports and complements life-saving actions undertaken by the competent authorities of Member States must remain within the remit established for humanitarian assistance by the Facilitation Directive, and that their operations must take place under the control of the Member States;

5.  Regrets the very limited transposition by Member States of the humanitarian assistance exemption provided for in the Facilitation Directive and notes that the exemption should be implemented as a bar to prosecution, to ensure that prosecution is not pursued against individuals and civil society organisations assisting migrants for humanitarian reasons;

6.  Calls on Member States to transpose the humanitarian assistance exemption provided for in the Facilitation Directive and to put in place adequate systems to monitor the enforcement and effective practical application of the Facilitators Package, by collecting and recording annually information about the number of people arrested for facilitation at the border and inland, the number of judicial proceedings initiated, the number of convictions, along with information on how sentences are determined, and reasons for discontinuing an investigation;

7.  Urges the Commission to adopt guidelines for Member States specifying which forms of facilitation should not be criminalised, in order to ensure clarity and uniformity in the implementation of the current acquis, including Article 1(1)(b) and 1(2) of the Facilitation Directive, and stresses that clarity of parameters will ensure greater consistency in the criminal regulation of facilitation across Member States and limit unwarranted criminalisation;

8.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the Council, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

(1) OJ L 328, 5.12.2002, p. 17. (2) OJ L 328, 5.12.2002, p. 1. (3) Texts adopted, P8_TA(2018)0118.

European Parliament resolution of 5 July 2018 on the adequacy of the protection afforded by the EU-US Privacy Shield (2018/2645(RSP))

P8_TA(2018)0315 B8-0305/2018

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Articles 6, 7, 8, 11, 16, 47 and 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the EU Charter),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation)(1) (GDPR), and to Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA(2),

–  having regard to the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 6 October 2015 in Case C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner(3),

–  having regard to the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 21 December 2016 in Cases C-203/15 Tele2 Sverige AB v Post- och telestyrelsen and C-698/15 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Tom Watson and Others(4);

–  having regard to Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 of 12 July 2016 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU-US Privacy Shield(5),

–  having regard to the Opinion 4/2016 of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) of 30 May 2016 on the EU-US Privacy Shield draft adequacy decision(6),

–  having regard to the Opinion 01/2016 of the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (WP29) of 13 April 2016 on the EU-US Privacy Shield draft adequacy decision(7) and the WP29 Statement of 26 July 2016(8),

–  having regard to the Report from the Commission of 18 October 2017 to the European Parliament and the Council on the first annual review of the functioning of the EU-US Privacy Shield (COM(2017)0611) and the Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the document (SWD(2017)0344),

–  having regard to the WP29 document of 28 November 2017 entitled ‘EU-US Privacy Shield – First Annual Joint Review’(9),

–  having regard to the letter of response by the WP29 of 11 April 2018 on the reauthorisation of Section 702 of the US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),

–  having regard to its resolution of 6 April 2017 on the adequacy of the protection afforded by the EU-US Privacy Shield(10),

–  having regard to Rule 123(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in its judgment of 6 October 2015 in Case C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner invalidated the Safe Harbour decision and clarified that an adequate level of protection in a third country must be understood to be ‘essentially equivalent’ to that guaranteed within the European Union by virtue of Directive 95/46/EC read in the light of the EU Charter, prompting the need to conclude negotiations on a new arrangement so as to ensure legal certainty on how personal data should be transferred from the EU to the US;

B.  whereas, when examining the level of protection afforded by a third country, the Commission is obliged to assess the content of the rules applicable in that country deriving from its domestic law or its international commitments, as well as the practice designed to ensure compliance with those rules, since it must, under Article 25(2) of Directive 95/46/EC, take account of all the circumstances surrounding a transfer of personal data to a third country; whereas this assessment must not only refer to legislation and practices relating to the protection of personal data for commercial and private purposes, but must also cover all aspects of the framework applicable to that country or sector – in particular, but not only, law enforcement, national security and respect for fundamental rights;

C.  whereas transfers of personal data between EU and US commercial organisations are an important element of transatlantic relations in light of the ever-increasing digitisation of the global economy; whereas these transfers should be carried out in full respect of the right to the protection of personal data and the right to privacy; whereas one of the fundamental objectives of the EU is the protection of fundamental rights, as enshrined in the EU Charter;

D.  whereas Facebook, a signatory to the Privacy Shield, has confirmed that the data of 2,7 million EU citizens were among those improperly used by political consultancy Cambridge Analytica;

E.  whereas in its Opinion 4/2016 the EDPS raised several concerns regarding the draft Privacy Shield; whereas in this same opinion the EDPS welcomes the efforts made by all parties to find a solution for transfers of personal data from the EU to the US for commercial purposes under a system of self-certification;

F.  whereas in its Opinion 01/2016 on the EU-US Privacy Shield draft adequacy implementing decision the WP29 welcomed the improvements brought about by the Privacy Shield compared with the Safe Harbour decision while also raising strong concerns about both the commercial aspects and access by public authorities to data transferred under the Privacy Shield;

G.  whereas on 12 July 2016, after further discussions with the US administration, the Commission adopted its Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250, declaring the adequate level of protection for personal data transferred from the Union to organisations in the United States under the EU-US Privacy Shield;

H.  whereas the EU-US Privacy Shield is accompanied by several unilateral commitments and assurances from the US administration explaining, inter alia, the data protection principles, the functioning of oversight, enforcement and redress and the protections and safeguards under which security agencies can access and process personal data;

I.  whereas in its statement of 26 July 2016, the WP29 welcomes the improvements brought by the EU-US Privacy Shield mechanism compared to the Safe Harbour and commended the Commission and the US authorities for having taken into consideration its concerns; whereas the WP29 nevertheless indicates that a number of its concerns remain, regarding both the commercial aspects and the access by US public authorities to data transferred from the EU, such as the lack of specific rules on automated decisions and of a general right to object, the need for stricter guarantees on the independence and powers of the Ombudsperson mechanism, or the lack of concrete assurances of not conducting mass and indiscriminate collection of personal data (bulk collection);

J.  whereas in its resolution of 6 April 2017, the Parliament, while acknowledging that the EU-US Privacy Shield contains significant improvements regarding the clarity of standards compared to the former EU-US Safe Harbour, also considers that important issues remain as regards certain commercial aspects, national security and law enforcement; whereas it calls on the Commission to conduct, during the first joint annual review, a thorough and in-depth examination of all the shortcomings and weaknesses and to demonstrate how these have been addressed so as to ensure compliance with the EU Charter and Union law, and to evaluate meticulously whether the mechanisms and safeguards indicated in the assurances and clarifications by the US administration are effective and feasible;

K.  whereas the report from the Commission to the Parliament and the Council on the first annual review on the functioning of the EU-US Privacy Shield and the Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying this document, while acknowledging that the US authorities have put in place the necessary structures and procedures to ensure the correct functioning of the Privacy Shield and concluding that the United States continues to ensure an adequate level of protection for personal data transferred under the Privacy Shield, have made ten recommendations to the US authorities in order to address issues of concern regarding not only the tasks and activities of the US Department of Commerce (DoC) as administrator responsible for the monitoring of the certification of Privacy Shield organisations and enforcement of the Principles, but also those issues related to national security, such as the re-authorisation of Section 702 of FISA, or the appointment of a permanent Ombudsperson and the fact that members of the Privacy Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) are still not in office;

L.  whereas the opinion of the WP29 of 28 November 2017 entitled ‘EU-US Privacy Shield – First Annual Joint Review’, following the first annual joint review, acknowledges the progress of the Privacy Shield in comparison with the invalidated Safe Harbour Decision; whereas the WP29 recognises the efforts made by the US authorities and the Commission to implement the Privacy Shield;

M.  whereas the WP29 has identified a number of important unresolved issues of significant concern, regarding both the commercial issues and those relating to access by the US public authorities to data transferred to the US under the Privacy Shield (either for law enforcement or national security purposes) that need to be addressed by both the Commission and the US authorities; whereas it has requested that an action plan be set up immediately to demonstrate that all these concerns will be addressed, and at the latest at the second joint review;

N.  whereas, in the event of no remedy being brought to the concerns of the WP29 within the given timeframes, the members of the WP29 will take appropriate action, including bringing the Privacy Shield adequacy decision to national courts for them to make a reference to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling;

O.  whereas an action for annulment (Case T-738/16 La Quadrature du Net and Others v Commission) and a referral by the Irish High Court in the case between the Data Protection Commissioner of Ireland and Facebook Ireland Limited and Maximilian Schrems (Schrems II case) have been brought before the CJEU; whereas the referral takes note that mass surveillance is still going on and analyses whether there is effective remedy in US law for EU citizens whose personal data is transferred to the United States;

P.  whereas on 11 January 2018 the US Congress reauthorised and amended Section 702 of FISA for six years without addressing the concerns of the Commission joint review report and the opinion of the WP29;

Q.  whereas, as part of the omnibus budget legislation signed into law on 23 March 2018, the US Congress enacted the Clarifying Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act, which facilitates law enforcement access to the contents of communications and other related data by allowing US law enforcement authorities to compel production of communications data even if they are stored outside the United States, and by allowing certain foreign countries to enter into executive agreements with the United States in order to permit US service providers to respond to certain foreign orders seeking access to communications data;

R.  whereas Facebook Inc., Cambridge Analytica and SCL Elections Ltd are companies certified within the Privacy Shield framework and as such benefited from the adequacy decision as a legal ground for the transfer and further processing of personal data from the European Union to the United States;

S.  whereas, as per Article 45(5) GDPR, where available information reveals that a third country no longer ensures an adequate level of protection, the Commission shall repeal, amend or suspend its adequacy decision;

1.  Highlights the persisting weaknesses of the Privacy Shield as regards the respect of fundamental rights of data subjects; underlines the increasing risk that the CJEU may invalidate Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1250 on the Privacy Shield;

2.  Takes note of the improvements compared to the Safe Harbour agreement, including the insertion of key definitions, stricter obligations related to data retention and onward transfers to third countries, the creation of an Ombudsperson to ensure individual redress and independent oversight, checks and balances ensuring the rights of data subjects (PCLOB), external and internal compliance reviews, more regular and rigorous documentation and monitoring, the availability of several ways to pursue legal remedy, and the prominent role for national data protection authorities in the investigation of claims;

3.  Recalls that the WP29 set a deadline of 25 May 2018 to solve the outstanding issues, failing which it might decide to bring the Privacy Shield to national courts in order for them to refer the matter to the CJEU for preliminary ruling(11);

Institutional issues / Nominations

4.  Regrets that it has taken so long to designate the two additional Members coupled with the nomination of the Chairman of the PCLOB and urges the Senate to scrutinise their profiles in order to ratify the designation so as to restore the independent agency to quorum status and enable it to fulfil its missions of preventing terrorism and ensuring the need to protect privacy and civil liberties;

5.  Expresses its concern that the absence of a chair and a quorum has limited the PCLOB’s ability to act and to fulfil its obligations; highlights that during a sub-quorum period the PCLOB may not initiate new advice or oversight projects, or hire staff; recalls that the PCLOB has not yet issued its long-awaited report on the conduct of surveillance under Executive Order 12333 to provide information on the concrete operation of this Executive Order and on its necessity and proportionality with regard to interferences brought to data protection in this context; notes that this report is highly desirable considering the uncertainty and unforeseeability of how Executive Order 12333 is used; regrets that the PCLOB did not issue a new report on Section 702 FISA before it was reauthorised in January 2018; considers that the sub-quorum status seriously undermines the compliance and oversight guarantees and assurances made by the US authorities; urges the US authorities, therefore, to nominate and confirm new Board Members without delay;

6.  In light of the fact that Presidential Policy Directive 28 (PPD 28) is one of the central elements on which the Privacy Shield is built, calls for the release of the PCLOB report on PPD 28, which is still subject to Presidential privilege and has thus not yet been published;

7.  Reiterates its position that the Ombudsperson mechanism set up by the US Department of State is not sufficiently independent and is not endowed with sufficient effective powers to carry out its tasks and provide effective redress to EU citizens; stresses that the exact powers of the Ombudsperson mechanism need to be clarified, especially with regard to his/her powers vis-à-vis the intelligence community and the level of effective remedy of his/her decisions; regrets that the Ombudsperson can only request action by and information from US governmental bodies, and cannot order the authorities to cease and discontinue unlawful surveillance, or to permanently destroy information; points out that, while there is an acting Ombudsperson, to date the US administration has still not appointed a new permanent Ombudsman, which does not contribute to mutual trust; takes the view that in the absence of an appointed independent, experienced and sufficiently empowered Ombudsperson, the US assurances with regard to the provision of effective redress to EU citizens would be null and void;

8.  Acknowledges the recent confirmation by the Senate of a new Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Chairman and four FTC Commissioners; deplores that until said confirmation four of the five FTC seats had remained vacant, considering that the FTC is the competent agency for enforcement of the Privacy Shield principles by US organisations;

9.  Stresses that the recent revelations regarding the practices of Facebook and Cambridge Analytica highlight the need for proactive oversight and enforcement actions which are not only based on complaints but which include systematic checks of the practical compliance of privacy policies with the Privacy Shield principles throughout the certification lifecycle; calls on the competent EU data protection authorities to take appropriate action and suspend transfers in cases of non-compliance;

Commercial issues

10.  Considers that in order to ensure transparency and avoid false certification claims, the DoC should not tolerate US companies making public representations about their Privacy Shield certification before it has finalised the certification process and has included them on the Privacy Shield list; is concerned by the fact that the DoC has not made use of the possibility provided in the Privacy Shield to request copies of the contractual terms used by certified companies in their contracts with third parties to ensure compliance; considers therefore that there is no effective control over whether certified companies actually comply with the Privacy Shield provisions; calls on the DoC to undertake proactively and on a regular basis ex officio compliance reviews to monitor the effective compliance of companies with the Privacy Shield rules and requirements;

11.  Considers that the various recourse procedures for EU citizens may prove to be too complex, difficult to use, and therefore less effective; notes that, as underlined by the companies providing independent recourse mechanisms (IRMs), most of the complaints are brought directly to the companies by individuals seeking general information on the Privacy Shield and the processing of their data; recommends therefore that the US authorities offer more concrete information on the Privacy Shield website in an accessible and easily understandable form to individuals regarding their rights and available recourses and remedies;

12.  In view of the recent revelations of misuse of personal data by companies certified under the Privacy Shield, such as Facebook and Cambridge Analytica, calls on the US authorities responsible for enforcing the Privacy Shield to act upon such revelations without delay in full compliance with the assurances and commitments given to uphold the current Privacy Shield arrangement and, if needed, to remove such companies from the Privacy Shield list; calls also on the competent EU data protection authorities to investigate such revelations and, if appropriate, suspend or prohibit data transfers under the Privacy Shield; considers that the revelations clearly show that the Privacy Shield mechanism does not provide adequate protection of the right to data protection;

13.  Is seriously concerned about the change in the terms of service of Facebook for non-EU users outside the United States and Canada who have so far enjoyed rights under EU data protection law, and who now have to accept Facebook US instead of Facebook Ireland as the data controller; considers that this constitutes a transfer of personal data of approximately 1,5 billion users to a third country; seriously doubts that such an unprecedented large-scale limitation of the fundamental rights of users of a de-facto monopoly platform is what was intended with the Privacy Shield; calls on EU data protection authorities to investigate this matter;

14.  Expresses its strong concern that, if the issue is not tackled, such misuses of personal data by various entities that aim to manipulate political opinion or voting behaviour can pose a threat to the democratic process and its underlying idea that voters are able to make informed, fact-based decisions for themselves;

15.  Welcomes and supports calls for the US legislator to move towards an omnibus privacy and data protection act;

16.  Recalls its concerns about the lack of specific rules and guarantees in the Privacy Shield for decisions based on automated processing/profiling, which produce legal effect or significantly affect the individual; acknowledges the intention of the Commission to order a study to collect factual evidence and further assess the relevance of automated decision-making for data transfers under the Privacy Shield; calls on the Commission to provide for specific rules concerning automated decision-making to provide sufficient safeguards if the study recommends this; takes note in this regard of the information provided from the joint review that automated decision-making may not take place on the basis of personal data that have been transferred under the Privacy Shield; deplores that, according to the WP29, ‘the feedback from the companies remained very general, leaving unclear whether these assertions correspond to the reality of all companies adhering to the Privacy Shield’; further stresses the applicability of the GDPR under the conditions of Article 3(2) GDPR;

17.  Stresses that further improvements should be made with regard to the interpretation and handling of HR data due to the different reading of the notion ‘HR data’ by the US Government on the one hand and the Commission and the WP29 on the other; agrees fully with the WP29’s call on the Commission to engage in negotiations with the US authorities in order to amend the Privacy Shield mechanism on this issue;

18.  Reiterates its concern that the Privacy Shield principles do not follow the EU model of consent-based processing, but allow for opt-out / right to object only in very specific circumstances; urges therefore, in the light of the joint review, that the DoC work with European Data Protection Authorities to provide more precise guidance as regards essential principles of the Privacy Shield such as the Choice Principle, the Notice Principle, onward transfers, the controller-processor relationship and access, which are much more aligned with the rights of the data subject under Regulation (EU) 2016/679;

19.  Reiterates its concerns about the rejection by Congress in March 2017 of the rule submitted by the Federal Communications Commission relating to ‘Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services’, which in practice eliminates broadband privacy rules that would have required Internet Service Providers to get consumers’ explicit consent before selling or sharing web browsing data and other private information with advertisers and other companies; considers that this is yet another threat to privacy safeguards in the United States;

Law Enforcement and National Security issues

20.  Considers that the term ‘national security’ in the Privacy Shield mechanism is not specifically circumscribed in order to ensure that data protection breaches can be effectively reviewed in courts to ensure compliance with a strict test of what is necessary and proportionate; calls therefore for a clear definition of ‘national security’;

21.  Takes note that the number of targets under Section 702 of FISA has increased due to changes in technology and communication patterns as well as an evolving threat environment;

22.  Regrets that the US did not seize the opportunity of the recent reauthorisation of FISA Section 702 to include the safeguards provided in PPD 28; calls for evidence and legally binding commitments ensuring that data collection under FISA Section 702 is not indiscriminate and access is not conducted on a generalised basis (bulk collection) in contrast with the EU Charter; takes note of the Commission’s explanation in its Staff Working Document that surveillance under Section 702 FISA is always based on selectors and does not therefore allow for bulk collection; adds its voice therefore to the call made by the WP29 for an updated report from the PCLOB on the definition of ‘targets’, on the ‘tasking of selectors’ and on the concrete process of applying the selectors in the context of the UPSTREAM programme to clarify and assess whether bulk access to personal data occurs in that context; deplores that EU individuals are excluded from the additional protection provided by the reauthorisation of FISA Section 702; regrets that the reauthorisation of Section 702 contains several amendments that are merely procedural and do not address the most problematic issues, as also raised by the WP29; calls on the Commission to take the forthcoming WP29 analysis on FISA Section 702 seriously and to act accordingly;

23.  Affirms that the reauthorisation of section 702 of the FISA act for six more years calls into question the legality of the Privacy Shield;

24.  Reiterates its concerns about Executive Order 12333, which allows the NSA to share vast amounts of private data gathered without warrants, court orders or congressional authorisation with 16 other agencies, including the FBI, the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Department of Homeland Security; regrets the lack of any judicial review of surveillance activities conducted on the basis of Executive Order 12333;

25.  Highlight the persisting obstacles concerning redress for non-US citizens subject to a surveillance measure based on section 702 FISA or Executive Order 12333 due to the procedural requirements of ‘standing’ as currently interpreted by the US courts, in order to enable non-US citizens to bring legal actions before US courts against decisions affecting them;

26.  Expresses its concern about the consequences of Executive Order 13768 on ‘Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States’ for judicial and administrative remedies available to individuals in the US, because the protections of the Privacy Act no longer apply to non-US citizens; takes note of the Commission’s position that the adequacy assessment does not rely on the protections of the Privacy Act and that therefore this Executive Order does not affect the Privacy Shield; considers that Executive Order 13768 does however indicate the intention of the US executive to reverse the data protection guarantees previously granted to EU citizens and to override the commitments made towards the EU during the Obama Presidency;

27.  Expresses its strong concerns regarding the recent adoption of the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act or CLOUD Act (H.R. 4943), which expands the abilities of American and foreign law enforcement to target and access people’s data across international borders without making use of the mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) instruments, which provide for appropriate safeguards and respect the judicial competences of the countries where the information is located; highlights that the CLOUD Act could have serious implications for the EU as it is far-reaching and creates a potential conflict with the EU data protection laws;

28.  Considers that a more balanced solution would have been to strengthen the existing international system of MLATs with a view to encouraging international and judicial cooperation; reiterates that, as set out in Article 48 GDPR, mutual legal assistance and other international agreements are the preferred mechanism to enable access to personal data overseas;

29.  Deplores that the US authorities have failed to proactively fulfil their commitment to provide the Commission with timely and comprehensive information about any developments that could be of relevance for the Privacy Shield, including the failure to notify the Commission of changes in the US legal framework, for example with respect to President Trump’s Executive Order 13768 ‘Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States’ or the repeal of the privacy rules for internet service providers;

30.  Recalls that, as indicated in its resolution of 6 April 2017, neither the Privacy Shield Principles nor the letters from the US administration provide clarifications and assurances demonstrating the existence of effective judicial redress rights for individuals in the EU in respect of use of their personal data by US authorities for law enforcement and public interest purposes, which were emphasised by the CJEU in its judgment of 6 October 2015 as the essence of the fundamental right in Article 47 of the EU Charter;

Conclusions

31.  Calls on the Commission to take all the necessary measures to ensure that the Privacy Shield will fully comply with Regulation (EU) 2016/679, to be applied as from 25 May 2018, and with the EU Charter, so that adequacy should not lead to loopholes or competitive advantage for US companies;

32.  Deplores that the Commission and the competent US authorities did not restart discussions on the Privacy Shield arrangement and did not set up any action plan in order to address as soon as possible the deficiencies identified, as called for by the WP29 in its December report on the joint review; calls on the Commission and the competent US authorities to do so without any further delay;

33.  Recalls that privacy and data protection are legally enforceable fundamental rights enshrined in the Treaties, the EU Charter and the European Convention of Human Rights, as well as in laws and case law; emphasises that they must be applied in a manner that does not unnecessarily hamper trade or international relations, but cannot be ‘balanced’ against commercial or political interests;

34.  Takes the view that the current Privacy Shield arrangement does not provide the adequate level of protection required by Union data protection law and the EU Charter as interpreted by the CJEU;

35.  Considers that, unless the US is fully compliant by 1 September 2018, the Commission has failed to act in accordance with Article 45(5) GDPR; calls therefore on the Commission to suspend the Privacy Shield until the US authorities comply with its terms;

36.  Instructs its Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs to continue to monitor developments in this field, including on cases brought before the CJEU, and to monitor the follow-up to the recommendations made in the resolution;

o
o   o

37.  Instruct its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the Council of Europe.

(1) OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1. (2) OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 89. (3) ECLI:EU:C:2015:650. (4) ECLI:EU:C:2016:970. (5) OJ L 207, 1.8.2016, p. 1. (6) OJ C 257, 15.7.2016, p. 8. (7) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2016/wp238_en.pdf (8) http://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/press-material/press-release/art29_press_material/2016/20160726_wp29_wp_statement_eu_us_privacy_shield_en.pdf (9) WP 255 available at http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=612621 (10) Text adopted, P8_TA(2017)0131. (11) https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/document.cfm?doc_id=48782

European Parliament resolution of 5 July 2018 on the adverse effects of the US Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) on EU citizens and in particular ‘accidental Americans’ (2018/2646(RSP))

P8_TA(2018)0316 B8-0306/2018

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to Article 7, Article 8 and Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,

–  having regard to Article 8 and Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights,

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation)(1),

–  having regard to Directive 2014/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on the comparability of fees related to payment accounts, payment account switching and access to payment accounts with basic features(2),

–  having regard to Council Directive 2014/107/EU of 9 December 2014 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation(3),

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 11 October 2016 on tax transparency,

–  having regard to the Commission communication of 5 July 2016 on further measures to enhance transparency and the fight against tax evasion and avoidance (COM(2016)0451),

–  having regard to its recommendation of 13 December 2017 to the Council and the Commission following the inquiry into money laundering, tax avoidance and tax evasion(4),

–  having regard to its resolution of 6 July 2016 on tax rulings and other measures similar in nature or effect(5),

–  having regard to the OECD Common Reporting Standard (CRS), approved by the OECD Council on 15 July 2014,

–  having regard to the questions to the Commission and the Council on the adverse effect of FATCA on EU citizens and in particular ‘accidental Americans’ (O-000052/2018 – B8-0033/2018 and O-000053/2018 – B8-0032/2018),

–  having regard to Rules 128(5) and 123(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A.  whereas its Committee on Petitions was seized with a petition from a collective of European citizens raising concerns about the adverse effects of FATCA, its implementing intergovernmental agreements (IGAs) and the extraterritorial impact of citizenship-based taxation (CBT);

B.  whereas, since the entry into force of FATCA and the related IGAs concluded between Member States and the US, EU financial institutions, under the threat of franchise-destroying penalties in the US, including a 30 % withholding tax, now have to disclose detailed information on accounts held by presumed ‘US persons’ to the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS), via their national governments; whereas this could constitute a breach of EU data protection rules and fundamental rights;

C.  whereas the aim of FATCA is to prevent tax evasion by ‘US persons’ and whereas it requires foreign financial institutions to search for ‘US persons’ by looking at a variety of indicators, such as birthplace in the US, a US telephone number and indications of a power of attorney over the account to a person with a US address, against which the individual is required to prove that he or she is not a ‘US person’;

D.  whereas this use of indicators, enforced by FATCA, may result in the arbitrary exposure and punishment of individuals who might, in reality, have no substantive ties to the US; whereas, in practice, FATCA involves a large group of individuals, such as dual EU‑US citizens and their non-US family members, and in particular the so-called ‘accidental Americans’ who, by accident of birth, inherited US citizenship, but who maintain no ties to the US, having never lived, worked or studied in the US and who do not hold US social security numbers;

E.  whereas the Commission has acknowledged that FATCA and the related IGAs have had the unintended effect of hindering access to financial services in the EU for US citizens and any person presenting indicia suggesting that he or she may be subject to FATCA (‘US person’);

F.  whereas the lives and livelihoods of thousands of law-abiding EU citizens and their EU families are being very seriously affected by FATCA on a daily basis, as those falling within the definition of ‘US persons’ have their savings accounts frozen and are denied access to all banking services, including life insurance, pensions and mortgages, due to the reluctance of financial institutions to follow costly FATCA reporting; whereas, in addition, their EU family members are seeing their personal data shared with the US and their access to EU banking services curtailed (e.g. joint accounts and/or mortgages);

G.  whereas ‘accidental Americans’ who do not want to be affected by FATCA are obliged to formally renounce their US citizenship, which is a very cumbersome process for which a US social security number or a US international tax identification number is required which, inter alia, most ‘accidental Americans’ do not possess;

H.  whereas American internet platforms such as AirBnB, Tripadvisor and Amazon are required to collect taxpayer information from all EU citizens who make use of these online services, and hand it over to the US federal tax authority, the IRS; whereas the objective of this practice is to establish whether the user is a US citizen and, therefore, to determine if the earnings made through these platforms are subject, in the context of FATCA, to US tax reporting; whereas this practice is clearly not in line with EU data protection rules;

I.  whereas Directive 2014/92/EU (Payment Accounts Directive) obliges Member States to ensure that credit institutions do not discriminate against consumers on the basis of their nationality or place of residence;

J.  whereas the deadline for Member States to transpose the Payment Accounts Directive was 18 September 2016;

K.  whereas, in its resolution of 6 July 2016 on tax rulings and other measures similar in nature or effect, Parliament took note of a significant lack of reciprocity between the US and the EU in the framework of the FATCA agreement;

L.  whereas FATCA and the OECD Common Reporting Standard (CRS) on the automatic exchange of tax information are essential tools to fight corruption, cross-border tax fraud and tax evasion;

M.  whereas the French National Assembly published a report in October 2016 following its bipartisan fact-finding mission to investigate the extraterritorial effects of certain US laws, including FATCA, recommending that the French Government either negotiate an amendment to its tax treaty with the US or request that US legislators amend US laws in order to allow French ‘accidental Americans’ to exit the US system and relinquish their unwanted US citizenship on a no‑fees, no‑filings, no-penalties basis; whereas a commission was recently set up specifically to look into the extraterritorial taxation of French ‘accidental Americans’ by the US, and resolutions were tabled in November 2017 in both the Senate and the National Assembly on this particular issue; whereas on 15 May 2018 the French Senate adopted a resolution, by unanimous vote, inviting the government to take immediate measures to ensure that the right of French ‘accidental Americans’ to a bank account is respected, that the discriminatory practices adopted by French banks in the wake of FATCA cease, and that an information campaign is launched immediately to inform French citizens living in the US about the implications of US nationality and tax laws; whereas the resolution requests furthermore that a strong diplomatic effort be made to find a solution for French ‘accidental Americans’ that would allow them to relinquish their unwanted US citizenship on a no‑fees, no‑filings, no‑penalties basis and that the US honour its promise of reciprocity pursuant to which France agreed to sign its IGA;

N.  whereas the US and Eritrea are the only two countries in the world that have adopted citizen-based taxation, and Eritrea has been condemned by the UN for its efforts to enforce its ‘diaspora tax’;

O.  whereas in 2017 the US adopted a significant tax reform, which did not, however, abolish the citizen-based taxation principle for individuals, but did introduce territory‑based taxation for US multinational corporations;

1.  Calls on the Member States and the Commission to ensure that the fundamental rights of all citizens, in particular those of ‘accidental Americans’, are guaranteed, especially the right to a private and family life, the right to privacy and the principle of non‑discrimination, as laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and in the European Convention on Human Rights;

2.  Calls on the Member States to ensure the full and correct transposition of the Payment Accounts Directive, in particular Article 15 and Article 16 thereof, and to guarantee the right for all EU citizens to have access to a payment account with basic features, irrespective of their nationality;

3.  Calls on the Commission to expedite its analysis of national transposition measures of the Payment Accounts Directive and to include in its assessment the situation of ‘accidental Americans’, dual citizens and US citizens legally resident in the EU, paying due attention to any discrimination by financial institutions against taxpayers legally residing in the EU and qualifying as ‘US persons’ for the purpose of FATCA;

4.  Urges the Commission to initiate without delay infringement procedures in the event of established breaches in the implementation of the Payment Accounts Directive, and to report back to Parliament and the Council on the measures taken to ensure the proper implementation of the said directive;

5.  Stresses the importance of providing an adequate level of protection for personal data transferred to the US under FATCA, in full compliance with national and EU data protection law; calls on the Member States to review their IGAs and to amend them, if necessary, in order to align them with the rights and principles of the GDPR; urges the Commission and the European Data Protection Board to investigate without delay any infringement of EU data protection rules by Member States whose legislation authorises the transfer of personal data to the US IRS for the purposes of FATCA, and to initiate infringement procedures against Member States that fail to adequately enforce EU data protection rules;

6.  Calls on the Commission to conduct a full assessment of the impact of FATCA and the US extraterritorial practice of CBT on EU citizens, EU financial institutions and EU economies, taking into account ongoing efforts in France and other Member States, and to explain if a serious discrepancy exists between EU citizens and/or residents in different Member States, especially as regards EU data protection rules and fundamental rights standards as a result of FATCA and ‘US indicia’; calls on the Commission to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the status of FATCA reciprocity, or the lack thereof, across the EU, and compliance by the US with its obligations under the various IGAs signed with Member States;

7.  Calls on the Commission to assess and, if necessary, take action to ensure that the EU fundamental rights and values enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, such as the right to privacy and the principle of non-discrimination, as well as EU data protection rules, are respected in the context of FATCA and the automatic exchange of tax information with the US;

8.  Regrets the inherent lack of reciprocity of IGAs signed by Member States, especially in terms of the scope of information to be exchanged, which is broader for Member States than it is for the US; calls on all Member States to collectively suspend the application of their IGAs (or the sharing of all information other than that in respect of accounts held in the EU by US citizens resident in the US) until such time as the US agrees to a multilateral approach to the automatic exchange of information (AEOI), by either repealing FATCA and joining the CRS or renegotiating FATCA on an EU‑wide basis and with identical reciprocal sharing obligations on both sides of the Atlantic;

9.  Calls on the Commission and the Council to present a joint EU approach to FATCA in order to adequately protect the rights of European citizens (in particular ‘accidental Americans’) and improve equal reciprocity in the automatic exchange of information by the US;

10.  Calls on the Council to mandate the Commission to open negotiations with the US on an EU-US FATCA agreement, with a view to ensuring the full reciprocal exchange of information, upholding the fundamental principles of EU law, as well as the Payment Accounts Directive, and allowing EU ‘accidental Americans’ to relinquish their unwanted US citizenship on a no‑fees, no‑filings, no‑penalties basis;

11.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

(1) OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1. (2) OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 214. (3) OJ L 359, 16.12.2014, p. 1. (4) Texts adopted, P8_TA(2017)0491. (5) OJ C 101, 16.3.2018, p. 79.

European Parliament resolution of 5 July 2018 with recommendations to the Commission on a Statute for social and solidarity-based enterprises (2016/2237(INL))

P8_TA(2018)0317 A8-0231/2018

The European Parliament,

–  having regard to its declaration of 10 March 2011 on establishing European statutes for mutual societies, associations and foundations,

–  having regard to Article 225 and Article 50 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

–  having regard to its resolution of 19 February 2009 on ‘Social Economy’(1),

–  having regard to its resolution of 20 November 2012 on ‘Social Business Initiative – Creating a favourable climate for social enterprises, key stakeholders in the social economy and innovation’(2),

–  having regard to its resolution of 10 September 2015 on ‘Social Entrepreneurship and Social Innovation in combating unemployment’(3),

–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 7 December 2015 ‘The promotion of the social economy as a key driver of economic and social development in Europe’(4),

–  having regard to the Communication from the Commission of 13 April 2011 entitled ‘Single Market Act - Twelve levers to boost growth and strengthen confidence ‘Working together to create new growth’’ (COM(2011)0206),

–  having regard to the Communication from the Commission of 25 October 2011 entitled ‘Social Business Initiative - Creating a favourable climate for social enterprises, key stakeholders in the social economy and innovation’ (COM(2011)0682),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) No 346/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(5),

–  having regard to Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(6), and, in particular, to Article 2(1) thereof,

–  having regard to Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council(7), and, in particular, to Article 20 thereof,

–  having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 1435/2003(8),

–  having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2013 with recommendations to the Commission on the Statute for a European mutual society(9),

–  having regard to the July 2011 study commissioned by Parliament's Committee on Employment and Social Affairs entitled 'The role of mutual societies in the 21st century',

–  having regard to the report of the Commission Expert Group on Social Entrepreneurship (GECES) of October 2016 on “Social enterprises and the social economy going forward”(10),

–  having regard to the study commissioned by the European Parliament Policy Department C of February 2017 entitled ‘A European Statute for Social and Solidarity-Based Enterprise”,

–  having regard to Rules 46 and 52 of its Rules of Procedure,

–  having regard to the report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and the opinion of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (A8-0231/2018),

A.  whereas the terms ‘social enterprise’ and ‘solidarity-based enterprise’ are often used as synonyms, although the enterprises they denote are not invariably the same and can differ greatly from one Member State to another; whereas the concept of ‘social enterprise’ relates essentially to traditional social economy organisations, such as cooperatives, mutual organisations, associations and foundations; whereas the boundaries of the concept of ‘social enterprise’ are giving rise to important discussions among social scientists and lawyers; whereas it seems imperative to move without delay towards better recognition of the concept of ‘social and solidarity-based enterprise’ by establishing a basic legal definition that could make a solid contribution to the efforts made by the European Union and Member States to develop social and solidarity-based enterprises so they can also take advantage of the internal market;

B.  whereas the social and solidarity-based economy makes a major contribution to the Union economy; whereas Parliament highlighted in its resolutions of 19 February 2009, 20 November 2012 and 10 September 2015, that the social and solidarity-based economy provides employment for more than 14 million people, which represents around 6,5% of workers in the EU and 10% of EU undertakings; whereas this sector has proved particularly resilient to the economic and financial crisis and has potential for social and technological innovation, decent, inclusive, local and sustainable job creation, fostering economic growth, environmental protection and strengthening social, economic and regional cohesion; whereas social and solidarity-based enterprises highlight new ways of addressing social problems in a quickly changing world; whereas the social and solidarity-based economy continues to develop and is thus a driver of growth and employment and should be encouraged and supported;

C.  whereas there are substantial differences among Member States in the way they regulate social and solidarity-based enterprises and the organisational forms available to social entrepreneurs under their legal systems; whereas the distinctive organisational forms that social and solidarity-based enterprises adopt depend on the existing legal frameworks, on the political economy of welfare provision and solidarity, and on the cultural and historical traditions in a Member State;

D.  whereas in some Member States specific legal forms have been created either by adapting the cooperative model, mutual, association, or foundation and others or through the introduction of legal forms that recognise the social commitment taken on by a plurality of entities and that include some features specific to social and solidarity-based enterprises; whereas in other Member States no specific legal form for social and solidarity-based enterprises has been created and they thus operate using pre-existing legal forms, including legal forms used by conventional companies, such as the limited liability company or the public limited company; whereas in some Member States the legal form social and solidarity-based enterprises may adopt can be optional; whereas it should be noted that even when specific legal forms have been devised for them, social and solidarity-based enterprises frequently opt for other legal forms that better suit their needs and their objectives;

E.  whereas the adoption of diverse legal frameworks for social and solidarity-based enterprises in many Member States confirms the development of a new kind of entrepreneurship based on the principles of solidarity and accountability and that is more focused on social added value creation, local connections and the promotion of a more sustainable economy; whereas this diversity also confirms that social entrepreneurship is an innovative and beneficial field;

F.  whereas Parliament emphasised, in its resolution of 10 September 2015 on social entrepreneurship and social innovation in combating unemployment, that social innovation relates to the development and implementation of new ideas, whether they be products, services or social organisation models, that are designed to meet new social, territorial and environmental demands and challenges, such as the ageing population, depopulation, balancing work and family life, managing diversity, tackling youth unemployment, the integration of those most excluded from the labour market, and combating climate change;

G.  whereas, in light of this diversity of legal forms available for the creation of social and solidarity-based enterprises across Member States, there is no consensus in the European Union at this point in time for setting up a specific form of social and solidarity-based enterprise; whereas Parliament has already stressed the importance of developing new legal frameworks at Union level, but has always made the point that these should be optional for enterprises in relation to national frameworks and preceded by an impact assessment to take into account the existence of various social business models across the Member States; whereas Parliament has also stressed that any measures should demonstrate Union-wide added value;

H.  whereas social dialogue is crucially important both in terms of realising the objective of the social market economy, which is full employment with social progress, and in terms of competitiveness and fairness in the EU single market; whereas social dialogue and consultation with the social partners in EU policy-making represent a major social innovation;

I.  whereas the fact that there is a choice in the available legal forms has the advantage of permitting social and solidarity-based enterprises to shape their structure in the manner which suits them best in the circumstances in question, the tradition where they have their roots and the type of business they wish to conduct;

J.  whereas notwithstanding the above, it is possible to derive from national experience at Member State level some distinctive features and criteria that a social and solidarity-based enterprise should fulfil, regardless of the legal form it adopts, if it is to be considered as such an enterprise; whereas it seems desirable to establish at Union level a common set of features and criteria in the form of minimum standards with a view to creating a more efficient and consistent legal framework for such enterprises and to ensure that, despite their diversity, all social and solidarity-based enterprises have a common identity regardless of the Member State of incorporation; whereas such institutional features should help to allow social and solidarity-based enterprises to continue to have an advantage over alternative ways of organising the provision of services, including social services;

K.  whereas in its communication of 25 October 2011 (‘Social Business Initiative’) the Commission defined a social enterprise as ‘an operator in the social economy whose main objective is to have a social impact rather than make a profit for their owners or shareholders. It operates by providing goods and services for the market in an entrepreneurial and innovative fashion and uses its profits primarily to achieve social objectives. It is managed in an open and responsible manner and, in particular, involves employees, consumers and stakeholders affected by its commercial activities’;

L.  whereas for the purposes of Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013, ‘social enterprise’ means an undertaking, regardless of its legal form, which:

M.  whereas in its resolution of 10 September 2015, Parliament noted that social and solidarity-based economy enterprises, which do not necessarily have to be non-profit organisations, are enterprises whose purpose is to achieve their social goal, which may be to create jobs for vulnerable groups, provide services for their members, or more generally create a positive social and environmental impact, and which reinvest their profits primarily in order to achieve those objectives; whereas social and solidarity-based enterprises are characterised by their commitment to upholding the following values:

N.  whereas the above definitions are compatible and bring together the features shared by all social and solidarity-based enterprises regardless of the Member State of incorporation and the legal form they have chosen to adopt pursuant to national law; whereas such features should constitute the baseline for a cross-cutting and more definitive legal definition of ‘social enterprise’ universally agreed and applied at Union level;

O.  whereas social and solidarity-based enterprises are private organisations independent from public authorities;

P.  whereas social and solidarity-based enterprises operate in the market in an entrepreneurial fashion; whereas this implies that they carry on activities of an economic nature;

Q.  whereas rural areas offer significant opportunities for social and solidarity-based enterprises, and whereas, therefore, it is essential that appropriate infrastructure should be available throughout rural regions;

R.  whereas education and training must be priority areas in fostering an entrepreneurial culture among young people;

S.  whereas the mutual societies operating in the healthcare and social assistance sectors in the Union employ 8,6 million people and provide support to 120 million citizens; those mutual societies have a market share of 24 % and generate over 4 % of the Union GDP;

T.  whereas the contribution to social value creation must be the main purpose of a social and solidarity-based enterprise; whereas those social and solidarity-based enterprises should expressly pursue the aim of benefiting the community at large or a specific group of people, transcending membership; whereas the social purpose pursued by social and solidarity-based enterprises should be clearly indicated in their documents of establishment; whereas the notion of social and solidarity-based enterprise should not be confused with that of corporate social responsibility (CSR), even though commercial enterprises with significant CSR activities can have a strong interconnection with social business; whereas social and solidarity-based enterprises are not to have as their aim traditional commercial profit creation but, instead, use any added value created for the further development of projects aimed at improving the environment for their target groups;

U.  whereas digitalisation, ambitious climate change goals, migration, inequalities, community development, especially in the marginalised areas, social welfare and health services, needs of persons with disabilities and the fight against poverty, social exclusion, long-term unemployment and gender inequality and specific environmental tasks offer great potential for social entrepreneurship; whereas most social and solidarity-based enterprises operate in the market in an entrepreneurial fashion, accepting economic risks;

V.  whereas social and solidarity-based enterprises should conduct a socially useful activity; whereas they may be active in a wide spectrum of activities; whereas social and solidarity-based enterprises have typically engaged in the delivery of services intended to improve living conditions for the community, in particular services to support individuals in precarious circumstances or affected by socio-economic exclusion and to facilitate work integration for disadvantaged groups; whereas, in light of the social value created and their ability for reintegrating long-term unemployed people, to further social cohesion and economic growth, there has been a common trend in national legislation to enlarge the range of activities in which social and solidarity-based enterprises are entitled to engage, provided that they are of general interest and/or have a social utility, such as the provision of community services, including the educational, health, cultural, housing, leisure and environmental fields;

W.  whereas social and solidarity-based enterprises provide a business model for the 21st century which balances financial and social needs; whereas social and solidarity-based enterprises are generally associated with social, technological and economic innovation, as a result of the expansion of their activity in new fields of production of goods or of delivery of services, including environmental, health, cultural, educational, and recreational services, and/or the introduction of innovative production or work organisation methods, designed to meet new social, territorial and environmental demands and challenges, such as the ageing population, depopulation, work-life balance, managing diversity, tackling youth unemployment, the integration of those most excluded from the labour market and combating climate change;

X.  whereas, by virtue of their social and integrative character, social and solidarity-based enterprises offer employment to those groups of workers most commonly excluded from the labour market, and whereas they contribute significantly to reintegrating long-term unemployed people and to combating unemployment generally, thereby furthering social cohesion and economic growth;

Y.  whereas the social economy, given the particular nature of its component enterprises and organisations, its specific rules, its social commitments, and its innovative methods, has shown on many occasions that it can be resilient in the face of economic adversity and that it has the potential to rise above crises more rapidly;

Z.  whereas, in small and medium-sized enterprises in particular, employee financial participation often serves a social purpose, as demonstrated by the 'best practice' example of the successful reintegration of long-term unemployed people in Spain through the 'Sociedad Laboral (SL)' company model, whereby job-seekers can use their unemployment benefit to set up a company, and so create more jobs, with the state providing support and advice on management issues;

AA.  whereas social and solidarity-based enterprises are not necessarily non-profit organisations and can also be for-profit, provided that their activities fully satisfy the criteria for obtaining the European Social Economy Label; whereas this, notwithstanding the main focus of social and solidarity-based enterprises, should be, above all, on social values and on having a positive and durable impact on society’s well-being and economic development rather than making a profit for their owners, members or shareholders; whereas in this context a severe constraint on distribution of profits and assets among members or shareholders, also known as ‘asset lock’, is essential to social and solidarity-based enterprises; whereas a limited distribution of profits could be allowed, having regard to the legal form adopted by the social and solidarity-based enterprise, but the procedures and rules covering that distribution should be established in a way so as to always ensure that it does not undermine the primary social objective of the enterprise; whereas, in any case, the largest and most significant proportion of profits made by a social and solidarity-based enterprise should be reinvested or used otherwise with a view to maintaining and achieving its social purpose;

AB.  whereas for it to be effective, the non-distribution constraint should cover a number of aspects, notably the payment of periodic dividends, the distribution of accumulated reserves, the devolution of residual assets at the entity’s dissolution, the transformation of the social and solidarity-based enterprise into another type of organisation, if this is permitted, and the loss of the status of such an enterprise; whereas the non-distribution constraint could also be indirectly violated by the payment of remuneration to employees or directors that is unjustifiable and above market levels;

AC.  whereas social and solidarity-based enterprises should be managed in accordance with democratic governance models involving employees, customers and stakeholders affected by the activity in decision-making; whereas this participatory model represents a structural procedure to control the actual pursuit of the organisation's social goals; whereas members’ power in decision-making should not be based only or primarily on the capital stake they may hold, even when the legal form adopted for the social and solidarity-based enterprise is that of a commercial company;

AD.  whereas social and solidarity-based enterprises can adopt the legal form of a commercial company in some Member States; whereas the possibility of such companies to be recognised at EU level as social and solidarity-based enterprises should be made dependent on fulfilling certain requirements and conditions to resolve the potential contradictions between the company form and the social and solidarity-based enterprise model;

AE.  whereas the treatment of employees in social and solidarity-based enterprises should be comparable to that of employees of traditional business enterprises;

AF.  whereas the positive impact of social and solidarity-based enterprises on the community may justify the adoption of concrete actions in their support, such as the payment of subsidies and the adoption of favourable tax and public procurement measures; whereas those measures should in principle be considered as being compatible with the Treaties, since they aim at facilitating the development of economic activities or areas mainly intended to have a positive impact on society and the ability of these enterprises to raise funds and make profits is distinctively more limited than that of commercial enterprises;

AG.  whereas Regulation (EU) No 346/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(11) lays down the conditions and requirements for the establishment of European social entrepreneurship funds;

AH.  whereas the Union should create a certificate or label for social and solidarity-based enterprises in order to give such enterprises more visibility and foster a more coherent legal framework; whereas it is essential that public authorities check and ensure that a given undertaking fulfils the requirements to be issued a label as a social and solidarity-based enterprise before it is granted one and could thus take advantage of any measure established at EU level to their advantage; whereas a social and solidarity-based enterprise should have this certificate revoked in the event that it fails to respect those requirements and its legal obligations;

AI.  whereas social and solidarity-based enterprises should issue a social report on an annual basis in which they give account, at least, of their activities, results, involvement of stakeholders, allocation of profits, salaries, subsidies and other benefits received;

1.  Highlights the vital importance of the approximately 2 million social and solidarity-based enterprises in Europe(12), which employ more than 14.5 million people(13), and their invaluable contribution to quality job creation, social and regional cohesion and continued economic growth in the internal market;

2.  Calls on the Commission to introduce at Union level a European Social Economy Label to be awarded to enterprises based on the social economy and solidarity based on clear criteria designed to highlight the specific characteristics of such undertakings and their social impact, increase their visibility, encourage investment, facilitate access to funding and to the single market for those willing to expand nationally or to other Member States, while at the same time respecting legal forms and frameworks in the sector and in Member States.

3.  Considers that the European Social Economy Label should be available for private organisations and entities that strictly satisfy the legal requirements for a social and solidarity-based enterprise in all of their activities, regardless of the legal form of their incorporation in a Member State; notes that the label should be optional for the undertaking;

4.  Considers that the European Social Economy Label should be voluntary for the enterprises but must be recognised by all Member States;

5.  Considers that the legal requirements for acquiring and maintaining the European Social Economy Label should be identified by reference to certain features and common criteria, in particular those laid down in the annex to this resolution;

6.  Stresses that, given the rising demand for social services, social and solidarity-based enterprises in the Union are becoming increasingly important in providing social services to support people at risk of, or experiencing, poverty and social exclusion; stresses that social and solidarity-based enterprises should not replace, but should rather play a complementary role to, publicly-provided social services; draws attention to the importance of social and solidarity-based enterprises, providing social, health or education services and specific environmental tasks in cooperation with local authorities and volunteers; highlights that social and solidarity-based enterprises can potentially solve certain social challenges through a bottom-up approach;

7.  Points out that social and solidarity-based enterprises provide employment opportunities for persons with disabilities as well as for persons from other disadvantaged groups;

8.  Points out that social and solidarity-based enterprises have a strong local and regional basis, which gives them the advantage of being more aware of specific needs and of being able to offer the products and services required in the area, thus improving economic, social and territorial cohesion;

9.  Notes that social and solidarity-based enterprises can contribute to greater gender equality and a reduction in the gender pay gap;

10.  Highlights the necessity of offering employment to those most commonly excluded from the labour market, by reintegrating long-term unemployed people and combating unemployment in general;

11.  Is of the opinion that a mechanism involving Member States should be established, through which entities that fulfil the relevant legal requirements can obtain the European Social Economy Label; any legal entity governed by private law and fulfilling the legal criteria should be entitled to the EU label, regardless of whether the Member State of incorporation has a special legal form for social and solidarity-based enterprises;

12.  Considers that a mechanism should be established in close cooperation with Member States for the protection of the European Social Economy Label and the prevention of the establishment and operation of ‘false’ social and solidarity-based enterprises; this mechanism should ensure that enterprises bearing the European Social Economy Label are monitored regularly regarding their compliance with the provisions set out in the label; considers that effective and proportionate penalties should be established by the Member States to ensure that the label is not improperly obtained or used;

13.  Considers that social and solidarity-based enterprises bearing the European Social Economy Label should be recognised as such in all Member States, according to the types of activity in which they engage, and should enjoy the same benefits, rights and obligations as enterprises incorporated under the law of the Member State in which they operate;

14.  Stresses the need for a broad and inclusive Union definition, highlighting the importance of the principle that a substantial percentage of the profits made by the undertaking should be reinvested or otherwise used to achieve social and solidarity-based enterprises’ social purpose; highlights the particular challenges faced by social cooperatives and work-integration social enterprises (WISEs) when carrying out their mission of helping those most commonly excluded from the labour market, and stresses the need for such organisations to be included under the new label;

15.  Considers that the minimum criteria and legal requirements for acquiring and maintaining a European Social Economy Label must be a socially useful activity which should be defined at Union level; points out that this activity should be measurable in terms of social impact in fields like social integration of vulnerable people, labour market integration of those at risk of exclusion in quality and sustainable jobs, reduction of gender inequalities, tackling marginalisation of migrants, improving equal opportunities through health, education, culture and decent housing, and fighting poverty and inequalities; stresses that social and solidarity-based enterprises must comply in their own performance with best practices in terms of working and employment conditions;

16.  Stresses that the cost of, and the formalities involved in, obtaining the label should be kept to a minimum, to avoid putting social and solidarity-based enterprises at any disadvantage with special regard to small and medium-sized social and solidarity-based enterprises; accordingly, Union-wide common criteria must be simple, clear and based on substantive rather than formal factors, and relevant procedures must not be burdensome; notes that while reporting obligations are a reasonable tool to verify that social and solidarity-based enterprises continue to be entitled to the European Social Economy Label, the frequency of such reports and obligatory information to be included must not be excessively burdensome; observes that the costs of a labelling or certification process could be limited if the central administration were carried out at the level of national authorities who could, in cooperation with social and solidarity-based enterprises, transfer the administration and handling of the label to an independent national body following the pan-European definition of criteria for social and solidarity-based enterprises;

17.  Calls on the Commission and Member States to actively promote the European Social Economy Label and advertise the social and economic benefits of social and solidarity-based enterprises, including quality job creation and social cohesion;

18.  Points out that implementing a corporate social responsibility strategy as part of a business plan is not enough for an enterprise to be classified as social and solidarity-based enterprises and therefore highlights the importance of drawing a clear distinction between a social and solidarity-based enterprise and an enterprise engaged in corporate social responsibility;

19.  Calls on the Commission to ensure that its policies reflect a commitment to create a favourable environment for social and solidarity-based enterprises; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to carry out, in cooperation with Member States and the social enterprise sector, a comparative study of the various national and regional legal frameworks governing social and solidarity-based enterprises throughout the EU, and of the operating conditions for social and solidarity-based enterprises and of their characteristics, including their size and number and their field of activities, as well as of the various national certification, status and labelling systems;

20.  Underlines that social and solidarity-based enterprises have a long history in the majority of Member States and have established themselves as vital and important market players;

21.  Believes that investment priorities for social economy and social and solidarity-based enterprises should not be limited to social inclusion, but should include employment and education, to reflect the wide range of economic activities in which they are present;

22.  Calls for the ‘Erasmus for young entrepreneurs’ programme to be continued, for its budget to be used effectively and for information about the programme to be made easily accessible;

23.  Calls for the procedures for setting up social and solidarity-based enterprises to be simplified, so that excessive red tape does not pose an obstacle to social entrepreneurship;

24.  Calls on the Commission to establish, in cooperation with Member States, a list, which should be subject to review, of the existing legal forms in Member States and that have the characteristics of social undertakings and to maintain that list updated while respecting the historic and legal specificities of social and solidarity-based enterprises.

25.  Calls on the Commission to better incorporate the social economy in Union legislation to establish a level-playing field for social and solidarity-based enterprises on the one hand and other forms of enterprises on the other;

26.  Emphasises the importance of networking among social and solidarity-based enterprises, and calls on the Member States to encourage the transfer of knowledge and best practices within the Member States (for example by setting up national contact points) and throughout the Union, involving not only the social and solidarity-based enterprises themselves but also traditional businesses, academia and other interested parties; calls on the Commission, in the context of the Expert Group on Social Entrepreneurship and in cooperation with Member States, to continue collecting and sharing information on existing good practices, and to analyse both qualitative and quantitative data on the contribution of social and solidarity-based enterprises both to the development of public policy and to local communities;

27.  Stresses that the Commission and Member States, as well as regional and local authorities, should mainstream the social and solidarity-based enterprise dimension in relevant policies, programmes and practices;

28.  Strongly emphasises that the rules on how social and solidarity-based enterprises operate must respect the principles of fair competition and must not permit unfair competition, in order to allow proper functioning of traditional small and medium-sized enterprises.

29.  Calls on the Commission to examine existing Union law and to submit, where appropriate, legislative proposals aimed at establishing a more coherent and complete legal framework in support of enterprises based on the social economy and solidarity, specifically, but not only, in the fields of public procurement, competition law and taxation, so that such undertakings are treated in a manner that is consistent with their particular nature and contribution to social cohesion and to economic growth; considers that such measures should be made available to enterprises having obtained the European Social Economy Label, which guarantees the respect of the criteria to be considered a social and solidarity-based enterprise; considers that such legislative proposals could in particular make it easier for social and solidarity-based enterprises to cooperate and transact with other such enterprises cross-border;

30.  Calls on the Commission and Member States to take tangible steps to unblock and attract increased public and private funding needed by social and solidarity-based enterprises, including promotion of a European Social Economy Label;

31.  Calls for a public online multilingual European platform for social and solidarity-based enterprises, through which they could obtain information and exchange ideas on establishment, EU funding opportunities and requirements, participation in public procurement and possible legal structures;

32.  Considers it appropriate that the Commission examine the possibility of establishing a line of financing to support innovation in enterprises based on the social economy and solidarity, in particular when the innovative character of the activity carried out by the undertaking makes it difficult for it to ensure sufficient financing under normal market conditions; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take tangible steps to make it easier for enterprises based on the social economy and solidarity to attract the funds they need to continue functioning;

33.  Emphasises the need to support social and solidarity-based enterprises by providing them with sufficient funding, as financial sustainability is vital to their survival; highlights the need to foster financial support offered by private investors and public entities to social and solidarity-based enterprises at regional, national and Union level, with special attention to financing innovation, calls on the Commission to strengthen the social dimension of existing Union funding in the context of the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021-2027, such as the European Social Fund, the European Regional Development Fund and the Employment and Social Innovation Programme, in order to promote the social economy and social entrepreneurship; calls on the Commission to strengthen the implementation of the European Programme for Employment and Social Innovation (EaSI) and its Microfinance and Social Entrepreneurship axis, and to increase awareness in the financial sector of the characteristics and the economic and social benefits of social and solidarity-based enterprises; considers it necessary, furthermore, to support, in general, alternative means of funding, such as venture capital funds, start-up funding, microcredit and crowdfunding, to increase investments in the sector, based on the European Social Economy Label;

34.  Calls for Union funds to be used effectively, and stresses that access to those funds needs to be made easier for beneficiaries, not least in order to support and bolster social and solidarity-based enterprises in their primary objective of making a social impact rather than profit maximisation, which ultimately offers a return on investment for society in the long-term; calls on the Commission to review in the context of the next MFF 2021-2027 the regulatory framework for social investment funds to facilitate access to the financial market for social and solidarity-based enterprises; calls, in this context, for an effective European campaign to cut red tape and to promote a European Social Economy Label;

35.  Notes in this regard that the social economy still faces difficulties in accessing public procurement, such as barriers related to size and financial capability; reiterates the importance of effective implementation of the public procurement reform package by Member States in order to achieve greater participation by such enterprises in tendering procedures for public contracts, by better disseminating procurement rules, criteria and information on tenders, and by improving the access to contracts for such enterprises, including social clauses and criteria, simplifying procedures and drawing up tenders in a way that makes them more accessible to smaller operators;

36.  Acknowledges the importance of providing financial support for enterprises in the social and solidarity-based economy; calls on the Commission to take into account the specificities of social and solidarity-based enterprises when they receive state aid; proposes facilitating access to funding following the example of the categories set out in Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014(14);

37.  Notes that, as well as funding, the provision of educational and training services for individuals employed by social and solidarity-based enterprises especially to foster entrepreneurial skills and basic economic know-how in running an enterprise, as well as providing specialist support, and streamlining administration, are pivotal in enhancing the growth of this sector; invites the Member States to put in place policies aimed at establishing favourable fiscal treatment for social and solidarity-based enterprises;

38.  Calls on the Commission and Member States to engage in the collection of both quantitative and qualitative data, and analyses on social and solidarity-based enterprises and their contribution to public policy within and across countries, taking into account the specificities of these enterprises, and using suitable and relevant criteria, with a view to improving policy and strategy making and developing tools to support them in their development;

39.  Requests the Commission to submit, on the basis of Article 50 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, a proposal for a legislative act on the creation of a European Social Economy Label for enterprises based on the social economy and solidarity, following the recommendations set out in the Annex hereto;

40.  Considers that the financial implications of the requested proposal should be covered by the Union and the Member States;

41.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution and the accompanying recommendations to the Commission and the Council, and to the governments and parliaments of Member States.

ANNEX TO THE RESOLUTION:

RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO THE CONTENT OF THE PROPOSAL REQUESTED

Recommendation 1 (creation of the European Social Economy Label and qualifying undertakings)

The European Parliament considers that the legislative act to be adopted should aim to create a ‘European Social Economy Label’, which will be optional for enterprises based on the social economy and solidarity (social and solidarity-based enterprises), regardless of the legal form they decide to adopt in accordance with national legislation.

The European Parliament considers that the European Social Economy Label should only be awarded to enterprises complying with the following criteria in a cumulative manner:

(a)  the organisation should be a private law entity established in whichever form available in Member States and under EU law, and should be independent from the State and public authorities;

(b)  its purpose must be essentially focused on the general interest or public utility;

(c)  it should essentially conduct a socially useful and solidarity-based activity, i.e. via its activities it should aim to provide support to vulnerable groups, to combat social exclusion, inequality and violations of fundamental rights, including at the international level, or to help protect the environment, biodiversity, the climate and natural resources;

(d)  it should be subject to an at least partial constraint on profit distribution and to specific rules on the allocation of profits and assets during its entire life, including at dissolution; in any case, the majority of the profits made by the undertaking should be reinvested or otherwise used to achieve its social purpose;

(e)  it should be governed in accordance with democratic governance models involving its employees, customers and stakeholders affected by its activities; members’ power and weight in decision-making may not be based on the capital they may hold;

The European Parliament considers that nothing prevents conventional undertakings from being awarded the European Social Economy Label if they comply with the above-mentioned requirements, in particular regarding their object, the distribution of profits, governance and decision-making.

Recommendation 2 (mechanism for the certification, supervision and monitoring of the European Social Economy Label)

The legislative act should establish a mechanism of certification and of supervision and monitoring of the legal label with the involvement of Member States and representatives of the social economy; such a mechanism is essential to protect the legal label of enterprise based on the social economy and solidarity’ and preserve its intrinsic value. The European Parliament considers that this control should involve organisations representative of the social enterprise sector.

Penalties for the infringement of the relevant rules could range from a mere admonition to the withdrawal of the label.

Recommendation 3 (recognition of the European Social Economy Label)

The European Social Economy Label should be valid in all Member States. An enterprise bearing that label should be recognised as a social and solidarity-based enterprise in all Member States. The label should allow any undertaking bearing it to carry out its main activity in other Member States under the same requirements as national undertakings bearing that label. They should enjoy the same benefits, rights and obligations as social and solidarity-based enterprises incorporated under the law of the Member State in which they operate.

Recommendation 4 (reporting obligations)

The legislative act should require social and solidarity-based enterprises willing to maintain the label to issue on an annual basis a social report on their activities, results, involvement of stakeholders, allocation of profits, salaries, subsidies, and other benefits received. In this regard, the Commission should be authorised to produce a model to help social and solidarity-based enterprises with this endeavour.

Recommendation 5 (guidelines regarding good practices)

The legislative act should also authorise the Commission to establish guidelines regarding good practices for social and solidarity-based enterprises in Europe. Such good practices should include, in particular, the following:

(a)  models of effective democratic governance;

(b)  consultation processes for the establishment of an effective business strategy;

(c)  adaptation to social needs and to the employment market, particularly at the local level;

(d)  wage policy, professional training, health and safety at work and quality of employment;

(e)  relations with users and clients and the response to social needs not covered by the market or the State;

(f)  the situation of the enterprise with regard to diversity, non-discrimination and equal opportunities for men and women among their members, including positions of responsibility and leadership;

Recommendation 6 (list of legal forms)

The legislative act should include a list of legal forms in Member States of enterprises and undertakings qualifying for the European Social Economy Label. Such list should be reviewed regularly.

In order to ensure transparency and effective cooperation between the Member States, that list should be published on the European Commission website.

Recommendation 7 (revision of existing legislation)

The Commission is invited to review existing legal acts and to submit, where appropriate, legislative proposals establishing a more coherent and complete legal framework in support of social and solidarity-based enterprises;

Recommendation 8 (on the eco-system for social and solidarity-based enterprises and cooperation between Member States)

The Commission should ensure that its policies reflect the commitment to create an eco-system for social and solidarity-based enterprises. The Commission is invited to take account of the fact that social and solidarity-based enterprises have a strong local and regional influence, which gives them the advantage of being more aware of specific needs and able to offer products and services, most of them community-based, as well as to enhance social and territorial cohesion. The Commission is invited to take steps to promote cooperation between social enterprises and solidarity-based enterprises across national and sectoral boundaries so as to nurture the exchange of knowledge and practices in such a way as to support the development of such enterprises;

(1) Texts adopted, P6_TA(2009)0062. (2) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2012)0429. (3) Texts adopted, P8_TA(2015)0320. (4) 13766/15 SOC 643 EMPL 423. (5) Regulation (EU) No 346/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2013 on European social entrepreneurship funds (OJ L 115, 25.4.2013, p. 18). (6) Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on a European Union Programme for Employment and Social Innovation ("EaSI") and amending Decision No 283/2010/EU establishing a European Progress Microfinance Facility for employment and social inclusion (OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 238). (7) Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, p. 65). (8) Council Regulation (EC) No 1435/2003 of 22 July 2003 on the Statute for a European Cooperative Society (SCE) (OJ L 207, 18.8.2003, p. 1). (9) Texts adopted, P7_TA(2013)0094. (10) http://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/newsroom/cf/itemdetail.cfm?item_id=9024 (11) Regulation (EU) No 346/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2013 on European social entrepreneurship funds (OJ L 115, 25.4.2013, p. 18). (12) https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/social-economy_en (13) http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=738&langId=en&pubId=7523, p. 47 (14) Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty (OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, p. 1).