Algorithmic Collusion of Pricing and Advertising on E-commerce Platforms


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The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania


October 2024









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- Firms need to make pricing and advertising decisions.
- Firms use ML/AI algorithms to price and bid.



Background



FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

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Business Blog

Price fixing by algorithm is still price fixing

By: Hannah Ganten-Monheit and Ken Merber March 1. 2024 (3 🔾 🗇

Landbords and property managers can't collude on rental pricing. Using new technology to do it doesn't change that antiruat fundamental. Regardless of the industry you're in, if your business uses an algorithm to determine prices, a brief filed by the FTC and the Department of Justice offers a helpful guideline for antitrust compliance; your algorithm can't do anything that would be lilegal (I done by a real person.

Today, the FTC and Department of Justice took action to fight algorithmic collusion in the residential housing market. The agencies filled a joint legal brief IE explaining that price fixing through an algorithm is still price fixing. The brief highlights key aspects of competition law important for businesses in every industry: (1) yoo can't use an algorithm to evade the law banning price-fixing agreements, and (2) an agreement to use shared pricing recommendations, lists, calculations, or

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Background

Justice Department Sues RealPage for Algorithmic Pricing Scheme that Harms Millions of American Renters

Freing, August 23, 2024



For Immediate Release Office of Public Affairs

RealPage's Pricing Algorithm Violates Antitrust Laws

The Jastice Department, together with the Attempy General & North Carolina, Colfornia, Colorado, Connecticut, Minnaente, Oregon, Tennesse, and Washington, Field a civil antitruut lawaiti today against ResiPage for. for its unlinet lu scheme to docrease competition among tandioristin apartment pricing and to monopalize the market for commercial revenue monogeneme todawee that landbadds use to price againments. ResiPagen alleged conduct deprives renters of the banefits of competition on apartment lawing terms and harms millions of Amencans. The lawsuit was field today in the LS. District Court for the Middle District of Aroth Carolina and Alleges toth ResiPage voluted Sections 1 and 2 et the Sherman Act:

The <u>compaint</u> alleges that RealPage contracts with consering landicide who agree to share with RealPage nonsublic, compatible y annitive information about thread and the and other lease terms to train and run RealPage's algorithmic pricing software. This software then generates recommendations, including on apartment innial pricing and other terms, fire participants plantism is based on the indice compatibility exercise interview. The compatibility exercises are also a software in the interview of the compatibility of the analysis of the indice of the indice of the exercise interview. The compatibility of the alloges that is a free market, these lendicids would otherwise be compating independently to attract enterter based on pricing, discounts, concessioned, issue terms, and other dimensions of apartment leasing. RealPage also uses this scheme, and is substantial data.

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ResearchQuestions:

- 1. Howdoreinforcementlearning(RL)algorithmsinfluence competitionbids,prices,andprofits?
- 2. Whencanalgorithmicpricingbebeneficialforconsumers?ls thereanysupportingempiricalevidence?

Overview


- Part 1: Contributions and Intuition
- Part 2: Conditions for Beneficial Algorithmic Pricing
- Theoretical Model Setup
- Reinforcement Learning Simulation of Pricing and Bidding
- Part 3: Empirical Analysis: Beneficial Algorithmic Pricing on Amazon.com

- Conclusion and Managerial Implications

Contributions

- Recent research:
- Calvano et al., 2020; Hansen et al., 2021; Johnson et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2023 -

Competing algorithms learn to tacitly collude on higher prices.



Calvano et al. (2020) Protecting consumers from collusive prices due to Al. Science

Contributions

- Algorithms still collude when pricing and bidding.
- However, algorithmic prices can be lower when consumers consider fewer products.
- Empirically estimate using Amazon data:
- Negative interaction of consumer consideration size and algorithms on prices.

- In 52% of Electronics keyword markets, algorithms can generate lower prices.

ModelSetup

- Platform displays products in
- sponsored positions
- and organic positions



- Platform displays products in
- sponsored positions
- and organic positions
- Sellers price and bid
- similar products within the same keyword
- different ASINs
- Platform displays products in




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- Heterogeneous consumers
 - consider different numbers of products
 - Platform displays products in
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


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
- similar products within the same keyword
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
AlgorithmicPricingandBidding

Reinforcementlearning(RL)algorithmslearnto maximizeprofits via dynamic exploration/exploitation of pricesandadvertisingbids .


Algorithmic Decision-Making vs Competition Benchmark




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


Will the Results Generalize to Different Algorithms? YES!



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
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EmpiricalAnalyses:

ConsumerConsiderationSize × AlgorithmUsage

Algorithms and Consideration Size Interaction

- Negative interaction of consideration size and algorithm usage on pricing.
- Algorithm index is imputed from pricing correlation (*Chen et al., 2016*).



Summary


- Algorithmic pricing can benefit consumers when the consideration set is small.
- The results of beneficial algorithmic pricing can generalize to different algorithms with an exploration feature.


- We find empirical evidence for these benefits on Amazon.com.
- We consider the platform's strategic response and find that algorithms can create a win-win-win scenario for consumers, sellers, and the platform itself.


Thank You

Email: zhaohc@wharton.upenn.edu ronber@wharton.upenn.edu











Micro foundation Asymmetric sellers Back


RL Can Benefit Consumers



RL Benefits Sellers




Would RL Always Lead to Lower Prices? YES!




Mechanism: Bid Coordination

- RL can coordinate on lower bids, reducing costs and lowering prices.



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Algorithms Learn to Price and Bid



- With a probability of $1 - \epsilon_t$, the algorithms exploit.

- With a probability of $\epsilon_t = e^{-\beta t}$, the algorithms explore, where $\beta > 0$ is the

experimentation parameter

Micro Foundation of ϑ

- At each position, consumers compare

- the expected incremental utility of continuing their search to the next position, and the cost *s*.
- Consumers search the first position but not the second

$$\log (1 + \delta_1) - 0 > s > \log (1 + \delta_1 + E [\delta_2^2 | \delta_1]) - \log (1 + \delta_1)$$

- Consumers search the second

 $\log (1 + \delta_1 + E [\delta_2^2 | \delta_1]) - \log (1 + \delta_1) > s$ Micro Foundation of ϑ

- Then ϑ and $1 - \vartheta$ can be expressed as

 $F_{s} \left(\log \left(1 + E \left[\delta_{1}^{2} \right] \right) \right) - F_{s} \left(\log \left(1 + \delta_{1} + E \left[\delta_{2}^{2} \left| \delta_{1} \right] \right) - \log \left(1 + \delta_{1} \right) \right) \vartheta =$

 $F_s(\log (1 + E[\delta_1^{\circ}]))$

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Model Details

- Identification:
- Unobserved quality follows AR(1), $\xi_{jt} = \eta_{jt} + \rho \cdot \xi_{jt-1}$.
- Contemporaneous shock of the unobserved quality is uncorrelated with previous period organic rank *r*_{*jt*-1}


$$\left(\begin{array}{c}\eta_{jt}\cdot\xi_{jt-1}\\\eta_{jt}\cdot r_{jt-1}\end{array}\right)=0$$

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
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By Category Price

Automotive **Cell Phones & Accessories** Beauty & Personal Care Toys & Games Pet Supplies Kitchen & Dining Grocery & Gourmet Food Clothing, Shoes & Jewelry Health & Household Office Products Tools & Home Improvement Patio, Lawn & Garden Baby Sports & Outdoors Home & Kitchen




By Category Algorithm Usage Index




Compute RL Crossing Condition

- For every keyword k, estimate consumer consideration size p_k^* .

- Use demand estimates from keyword k and the RL simulation to find the crossing condition p⁻k.
- If p[^]_k > p⁻_k, then algorithms can be beneficial in keyword market k.




Compare Estimates With RL Crossing Condition



- Algorithms can lead to beneficial outcomes in 52% of Electronics markets.
- Regulation can be useful in markets with consumers considering more

products. back Summary

Compare Estimates With RL Crossing Condition



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- The platform has two revenue channels:



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- We consider two incentive-based instruments for the platform:



CommissionRate ReservePrice back

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- The platform should adjust commission rate, not adjust auction reserve price.




CommissionRate ReservePrice back

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
Reserve Price

- Adjusting auction reserve price leads algorithms to coordinate on lower bids.




Commission Rate

- Adjusting commission rate recoups ad revenue from commissions.



Total Surplus

- When consumer search costs are high, algorithms increase total welfare.



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