Behavioral Advertising and Consumer Welfare

Eduardo Schnadower Mustri, Idris Adjerid, and Alessandro Acquisti

Federal Trade Commission Conference on Marketing and Public Policy, 2024

☐ Behavioral advertising:

Behavioral advertising:
Privacy invasive
7

Behavioral advertising:
☐ Privacy invasive
But good for consumer welfare

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Digital Advertising Business Guidance Request for Information

Posted by the Federal Trade Commission on Jun 3, 2022

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Your Voice in Federal Decision Making





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August 2, 2022

Federal Trade Commission Office of the Secretary 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Suite CC-5610 (Annex B) Washington, DC 20580

RE: Request for Information on Digital Advertising Guidelines, P114506

For decades, digital advertisements have powered the growth of online services by supporting and subsidizing publishers that provide free and low-cost services to consumers. Not only has this enabled consumers to experience a wide variety of online services, but it also has delivered significant intrinsic monetary value to consumers. For instance, an economic analysis published by researchers from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology ("MIT") found that

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- ∐ ...

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☐ Value: indirect and direct
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☐ Johnson et al (2024)
VS
Lefrere et al (2024): No significant effect of GDPR on EU news/media websites' content quantity and quality
\square Cheyre et al (2024): Negligible (and only temporary) effect on ATT on availability and quality of apps in the iOS ecosystem

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Ц

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- But that tells us mainly about search costs not net consumer utility
 - Little is known about relationship b/n behavioral advertising and other variables (e.g. vendor quality, product price, ...) that also affect consumer welfare
 - Large body of empirical work on online advertising but limited focus on consumers
 - Most recent consumer-oriented studies focus on search advertising or on platform/campaign-specific ads (e.g Sahni & Zhang 2023, Wan et al 2023, Lee & Musolff 2023, Farronato et al. 2023, and Yu 2024)

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- To understand the impact of behavioral advertising on consumer welfare, we need a holistic, counterfactual empirical approach
 - Two online pre-registered experiments
 - Study 1 (n = 487)
 - Study 2 (n = 490)

This paper

- Focus
 - Compare
 - Objective product/vendor metrics (e.g. vendor quality, product price)
 - Self-reported product/vendor metrics (e.g. participants' perceived novelty, perceived relevance)
- Two online pre-registered experiments
 - Study 1 (n = 487)
 - Study 2 (n = 490)
- Focus
 - Compare
 - Objective product/vendor metrics (e.g. vendor quality, product price)
 - Self-reported product/vendor metrics (e.g. participants' perceived novelty, perceived relevance)
 - Across:

Design

- 1. Products behaviorally targeted to participants (via display ads), vs
- 2. Competitor products from online searches (organic products; google.com), vs 3. Random products

Stage 1: Ad URL Collection

Intermediate Stage


Stage 2: Questionnaire


 RAs collect basic information from the ads: price, website, brand, description, product category.

- RAs search for similar products.
- Participants are presented with a up to 9 products in randomized order: one for

each valid ad they provided, and their

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
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
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https://www.benadryl.ca : Home : Products :

BENADRYL® Allergy Liqui-Gels

Fast-acting BENADRYL® LIQUI-GELS® are dye free and provide fast, effective symptom relief of your allergies and allergic reactions. 20 capsules, 40 capsules.



(3)

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Three conditions within-subject

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Three conditions within-subject



Behaviorally targeted product (display ad)



Competitor product (organic search result)



Random product

Random product

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
Behaviorally targeted product (display ad)



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Three conditions within-subject



targeted product (display ad) • Objective product and vendor metrics

Competitor product (organic search result)

Three conditions within-subject

Table 1. Distribution of BBB Ratings by study and experimental condition.

(A) Study 1					
Grade	Ad (%)	Search (%)			
A+ to B-	671 (57%)	881 (75%)			
C+ to D-	65 (5%)	57 (5%)			
F	224 (20%)	71 (6%)			
NR/NOT FOUND	209 (18%)	160 (14%)			
Total	1169 (100%)	1169 (100%)			



Random product

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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for logs of prices by study and experimental condition.

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Summary (so far)

- Study 1 results were surprising
 - Products displayed in behaviorally targeted ads were associated higher prices and lower-quality vendors relative to competitor products in Search results
 - But, why?


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
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- ☐ But, why?
- Post hoc conjecture: Varian 1980 ("A model of sales")

Vendors distribution

Top 15 websites in Search results (links count)






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
- Products displayed in behaviorally targeted ads were associated higher prices and lower-quality vendors relative to competitor products in Search results
- ☐ But, why?
- ☐ Post hoc conjecture: Varian 1980 ("A model of sales") ☐ Can this be a long-term equilibrium?

Figure 1. Distribution of the top 15 vendors across studies and experimental conditions.



Notes. N for study 1 = 1169 links per condition; N for study2 = 1185 links per condition.

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Grade	Ad (%)	Search (%)			
A+ to B-	700 (59%)	944 (80%)			
C+ to D-	71 (6%)	48 (4%)			
F	175 (15%)	71 (6%)			
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Note. Random condition is not shown, as random products were drawn from ads seen by other participants; therefore, prices in the random condition come from the same distribution.

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Study 2: Prices (identical products only)

Table 3. Summary of price comparison results for identical products by study.

Measure	Study 1	Study 2
Products with no price dispersion	15.73%	21.25%
The lowest price was in Search	52.16%	48.71%
The lowest price was in Ad	32.11%	30.04%
Total	100%	100%

Additional results

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- Results robust to multiple specifications (including regressions controlling for product
 F.E., vendor F.E., participants characteristics,)
- Latent Utility Analysis (LUA): welfare_{search} > welfare_{targeted}
- Behaviorally targeted ads are associated with higher relevance relative to random products (Study 1)
- But effect goes away after controlling for participants' prior product searches (Study
 2)
- Display ads, Google search, Chrome

Limitations

☐ Results may not extend to social media ads or ads on other platforms (e.g. Amazon), or mobile ads

Thank you

- Search results heavily dominated by large vendors barrier to entry for small sellers,
 which can use behavioral display ads to reach consumers
- Behaviorally targeted ads associated with higher prices, and lower quality vendors, relative to search results
- Do behavioral ads meaningfully reduce search costs? Unclear
- SSRN: Alessandro Acquisti
 Bing/Google: economics of privacy
- www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/

Extra slides

"Behavioural

targeting is not only good for consumers [...] it's a rare win for everyone. [...] It ensures that ad placements display content that you might be interested in rather than ads that are irrelevant and uninteresting. [...] Advertisers achieve [...] a greater chance of selling the product. Publishers also win as [...] behavioral targeting increases the value of the ad placements."

"Rehavioural

Extra extra slides

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"Behavioural Finite budget Frame 1 Frame 2 Finite budget and attention and attention Consumers Consumers Competition **Publishers Publishers** Data Economy Data Economy Oligopoly Intermediaries: Intermediaries: Reduce search costs Extract surplus Competition Merchants Merchants

David Nelson, Operations & IT Director, Unanimis.co.uk

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- For instance: Janssen et al (2022) vs
- Lefrere et al (2022); Cheyre et al (2023)

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
Ц	Value:	indirect	and	direct

-]

☐ The value consumers derive from OBA (online behavioral advertising) is more often posited than empirically demonstrated ☐ Value: indirect and direct ☐ Industry: OBA provides relevant products and services, saving time and money (Dehling et al, 2019) Behaviorally targeted ads do tend to receive higher click-through rates than non targeted ones ☐ But that tells us about *search costs* — not net consumer utility Little is known about the relationship OBA has with factors such as quality, price, or novelty of product offers, which may also affect consumers' enjoyment of a product ☐ Most studies are not designed to address this question, because they take an ad campaign-centric perspective

- E.g., Yan et al, 2009, Bart et al, 2012, Bleier, & Eisenbeiss, 2015, Van Doorn & Hoekstra, 2013 among many others
- ☐ To better understand the impact of OBA on consumer welfare, we need a counterfactual approach that takes a consumer-centric perspective: comparing various components of consumer utility across alternative online offers consumers may find online
- E.g., price, product quality, vendor quality, and so forth


Consumer welfare may increase thanks to OBA through better matching (Esteban & Hernandez, 2007; Gal-Or & Gal-Or, 2005)
However, prices may be higher under targeting for subsets of consumers (Iyer et al, 2005; Esteban & Hernandez, 2007; Gal-Or & Gal-Or, 2005)
In fact, consumer welfare may be decreased by OBA if consumer's reservation prices are revealed (Marotta et al, 2021; Varian, 1996)



☐ Welfare may also be decreased by OBA due to annoyance and privacy concerns (Johnson

2013; Gal-Or et al, 2018)

OBA can increase click-through rates (Bleier, & Eisenbeiss, 2015; Yan et al, 2009), purchase intentions (Van Doorn & Hoekstra, 2013; Bart et al, 2012), purchase probability (Manchanda et al, 2006;



- ☐ Two online experiments
- ☐ Study 1 (n = 487)
- \square Study 2 (n = 490) (Replication and extension)
- ☐ Pre-registered
- Focus

We compare "objective" product/vendor metrics (e.g. vendor quality, product price, and so forth) as well as participants' "self-reported" product/vendor metrics (e.g. perceived novelty, perceived relevance, and so forth) for products that were behaviorally targeted to participants, vs competitor products found via online searches, vs random products

brand , descri ption, product category.

 RAs search for similar products.
 assigned products and are asked questions about their preference.

re pre.

Stage 1: Ad URL Collection

Intermediate Stage

 RAs collect basic information from the ads: price, website, Stage 2: Questionnaire

preference.

with a up to 9 products in randomized order: one for each valid ad they provided,

and their respective competitors and randomly

sites selected based on criteria brand, description, product from Balebako et al, 2012) category.

• RAs search for similar products.

ગ up to

Stage 1: Ad URL Collection

Intermediate Stage

 Participants visit randomly selected websites (from pool of RAs collect basic information from the ads: price, website, Stage 2: Questionnaire

questions about their preference.

products in randomized order: one for each valid ad they provided, and their respective competitors and randomly

Stage 1: Ad URL Collection


- Participants visit randomly selected websites (from pool of sites selected based on criteria from Balebako et al, 2012)
- Participants use the experiment interface to collect and submit URLS for <u>ads</u> <u>displayed</u> to them (focus: physical products)


Intermediate Stage

- RAs collect basic information from the ads: price, website, brand, description, product category.
- RAs search for similar products.
- Participants are presented with a up to 9 products in

Stage 2: Questionnaire

randomized order: one for each valid ad they provided, and their respective competitors and randomly





How do we ensure that ads served to our sample of participants have high likelihood of being behaviorally targeted?

Pre-, during-, post-study checks

- 1. Pre-study analysis and selection of websites
- 2. During-study recruitment (Chrome)
- 3. During-study automated scripts and survey
- 4. Post-study analysis

ADVERTISEMENT



FEELWHOA!





lise predect only as directed. (B J&JCI 2022.

Stage 1: Ad URL Collection

Intermediate Stage

Stage 2: Questionnaire

- Participants visit randomly selected websites (from pool of sites selected based on criteria from Balebako et al, 2012)
- Participants use the experiment interface to collect and submit URLS for ads displayed to them


 Scripts+RAs use URLS to collect objective metrics for products (focus: physical products)

and vendors associated with ads

 Participants are presented with a up to 9 products in randomized


order: one for each valid ad they provided, and their respective competitors and randomly assigned products and are asked questions about their preference.

- Are products and prices collected through our scripts the same as those that would have been shown to participants?
- In a nutshell, yes



https://adclick.g.doubleclick.net/pcs/click?xai=AKAOjsvZZVpOLihVxRmiABVAEXFZyW0LkFirRqfteABDXNw5kyQbBV-WDq1ZRxR1P84mNw9kDMDIVHfV7Nh1uKQYUFvqGk8yZ0uc9kINIOCSfoMMQDHNyzz2A8zSRbu3eBM 9bArhhHIDK w&sai=AMfl-YRRFNOj9WrlbKIqdEtBKWjYBj2TcxQpnGjpkUYWzwJAs57z3gs6WxZAQBlAYRz35021XJBa5I1uOpbPiZBQkAhDNzUIK0gc3bUBSvpW-7Y&sig=Cg0ArKJSzARIyDjAUjzA&fbs aeid=[gw fbsaeid]&urlfix=1&nx=168&ny=102&dim=300x250&adurl=https://pdc.bidswitch.net/tracking markup/8FmP7rDTqVFOFW3ocGc8N yY kQgTm-9blmdmae5bDUgIlQBv1F7InMwdCpP5lzGc2LjiDkrrLf5u9pPSWdBdJ64va0KVYv-6n1blORgVneWCdkgArv6ycG3O1RkV2r1p1eFwj1a2brmiM4Xvh8WkUDrDq4lZw6aKG2iC9EnkNdsxZV6qw4gsorN9sd3n4 4MkDth9lb7WXOKwhwnzWZE7lszteNnvHRbaDg2o5EpiAg 71tJI38ReQkZekLlEZOIdL4jDMN01vhOyB93f5SmZRhJPzNiE-W8n2XdJ7iXplCgq57sXKj3KyC4meqUKMeGsuVzSy5f1sWHW0JkX Dx9JzIplaqL6ly9RcY8F80j9uV8v AfCpYYa28u0pjNE28t6z0Q3fsMjm5poj0VJzphB4ra0tAwM5F4W444AGyjd7fTsZUsY8Bb0qwvanp2R1PSNPMPskgqvkQjoPTsnWWfloB1XzrtgM6-3PzEuCXhQLrMEiaIx0s3WTwLcK37yG215GxR7dCGXX5Zic8q-ExisPBr9FUnCL7oE2HeIbXO1KSl9yNW64eKirjbg4bdirez8zsHh063OCs1lcyWj/16.01/http%253A%252F%252Finsight.adsrvr.org%252Ftrack%252Fclk%253Fimp%253D0fd055e1c5cd-47f2-b78e-9edc7375a4e7%2526ag%253D7hyc9of%2526sfe%253D149ea364%2526sig%253DxBLEDDeYzZQAM16aTXVZgJgS33b0hz9vZ2zaHixodI.%2526crid%253Dzvspnp6l%2526cf%253D30 43693%2526fq%253D0%2526t%253D1%2526td s%253Dwww.cnn.com%2526rcats%253D%2526mcat%253D%2526mst e%253Dcnn.com%2526mfld%253D4%2526mssi%253D%2526mfsi%253D%2526sv%253Dtrustx%2526uhow%253D42%2526agsa%253D%2526wp%253D%2524%257BCLEARING P R ICE%257D%2526rgz%253D15213%2526dt%253DPC%2526osf%253DWindows%2526os%253DWindows10%2526br%253DChrome%2526svpid%253D74%2526rlangs%253Den%25 6mlang%253D%2526did%253D%2526rcxt%253DOther%2526tmpc%253D28.66%2526vrtd%253D%2526osi%253D%2526osv%253D%2526daid%253D%2526dnr%253D0%2526vpb %253D%2526c%253DCg1Vbml0ZWQgU3RhdGVzEgxQZW5uc3lsdmFuaWEaAzUwOCIKUGl0dHNidXJnaDgBUAGAAQGIAQGQAQE.%253DChwKB25zdnJoN2gQyioiDgjl4JKI AR IEbm9uZTABCjsKHWNoYXJnZS1hbGxUVERDdXN0b21Db250ZXh0dWFsIhoI2v ARINdHRkY29udGV4dHVhbAo7CiJjaGFyZ2UtYWxsSW50ZWdyYWxLZXl3b3JkQmxhY2tsaX NOI hUI1f ARIIaW50ZWdyYWwKNgodY2hhcmdlLWFsbEludGVncmFsQnJhbmRTYWZldHkiFQj5 8BEghpbnRlZ3JhbApHCidjaGFyZ2UtYWxsSWFzRGlzcGxheVZpZXd hY

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Stage 1: Ad URL Collection

 Participants visit randomly selected websites (from pool of sites selected based on criteria from Balebako et. al, 2012)

Intermediate Stage

 Participants use the experiment interface to collect and submit URLS for ads displayed to them (focus: physical products)

Stage 2: Questionnaire

 Scripts+RAs use URLS to collect objective metrics for products and vendors associated with ads

Stage 1: Ad URL Collection

- Scripts+RAs search (Google) for the same products, and collect objective metrics for those sold by competitor vendors
- Participants are presented with three triads of products (total 9 products) in randomized order.
 "Subjective metrics" for each

Intermediate Stage

product are captured through a questionnaire • Each triad consists in:

- One "Ad" product
- One "Search" (competitor) product
- One "Random" product

Stage 2: Questionnaire

- Participants visit randomly selected websites (from pool of sites selected based on criteria from Balebako et. al, 2012)
- Participants use the experiment interface to collect and submit URLS for ads displayed to them (focus: physical products)

- Scripts+RAs use URLS to collect objective metrics for products and vendors associated with ads
- Scripts+RAs search (Google) for the same products, and collect

- objective metrics for those sold by competitor vendors
- Participants are presented with three triads of products (total: 9 products) in randomized order. Subjective metrics for

- each product are captured through a questionnaire Each triad consists in:
- One "Ads" product
- One "Search" product
- One "Random" product

 For each participant, we compare objective and subjective product/vendor metrics across three conditions

"Ads" products

 From the landing pages the participants would have seen had clicked on the ad

□ Objective metrics

Vendor name
Vendor industry
Vendor quality (BBB, SiteJabber)
Product type
Product description
Product price (from product page)
Self-reported metrics (1-7 Likert scales from marketing, economics, and information systems literatures)
Perceived product quality
Perceived price fairness
Perceived relevance
Perceived novelty/familiarity with vendor, product, and brand

☐ Purchase intention☐ Four measures (PI1, PI2, PI3, PI4) and their composite

Results

- Study 1
- Descriptive statistics
- Study 2 (Replication and extension)
- Descriptive statistics
- Latent utility analysis (LUA)

Study 1: Participants

- □ N = 487 (Prolific); Spring/Summer 2021
- ☐ Provided 1,169 valid ad links, leading to 3,507 data points
- US based (39 States)
- ☐ Gender: 41% F

- ☐ Age: Min 18, Max 75, Mean 36 (11.44)
- ☐ 91% have at least a degree, 9% completed high school. 56% are full time employees, 15% are students
- ☐ 91 participants had ad blockers, 22 TOR or VPN; 70 used opt-outs; 115 used at least one kind of privacy technology

Table 1. Distribution of BBB Ratings by study and experimental condition.

	(A) Study 1	
Grade	Ad (%)	Search (%)
A+ to B-	671 (57%)	881 (75%)
C+ to D-	65 (5%)	57 (5%)
F	224 (20%)	71 (6%)
NR/NOT FOUND	209 (18%)	160 (14%)
Total	1169 (100%)	1169 (100%)

 $\chi^2(3)=73.71$, p<0.001

Study 1: Prices

SiteJabber results confirm BBB results: average rating of websites in Ads (M=3.41, SD=1.09) was inferior to that for websites in Search results (M=3.54, SD=0.90) (p<0.01)

Table 2. Descriptive statistics for logs of prices by study and experimental condition.

(A) Study 1					
Туре	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev	Median
Ad	-1.83	10.37	4.15	1.69	3.89
Search	-2.20	10.40	4.05	1.59	3.78
Total	-2.20	10.40	4.11	1.64	3.82

☐ Of the 1,169 original ads, 635 were for products that were sold by multiple vendors

☐ For that subset, we can directly compare prices

Table 3. Summary of price comparison results for identical products by study.

Measure	Study 1
Products with no price dispersion	15.73%
The lowest price was in Search	52.16%
The lowest price was in Ad	32.11%
Total	100%

□ Average price saving from conducting a product search is roughly 10% (p<0.001)

 Products were, on average, not very relevant, even in the Ad condition

 There is no difference in relevance between ad and competitor, but the random is significantly less relevant

Condition	Mean (St. Dev)
Ad	4.01 (2.05)
Competitor	3.94 (2.08)
Random	3.58 (1.98)

Statistical test	Value (std. error)	
RMAnova F	23.76**	
Contrast (Ad vs Competitor)	-0.06 (0.11)	
Contrast (Ad vs Random)	-0.43** (0.11)	

* P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01

 Perceived quality of the product is just above the median Likert value

• Values are similar across conditions

Condition	Mean (St. Dev)
Ad	4.81 (1.32)
Competitor	4.70 (1.24)
Random	4.68 (1.21)

Statistical test		Value (std. error)	
	RMAnova F	2.06	
1	Contrast (Ad vs Competitor)	-0.11 (0.07)	
	Contrast (Ad vs Random)	-0.13 (0.07)	

* P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01

	Product type Vendor		Brand
Condition	Mean (St. Dev)	Mean (St. Dev)	Mean (St. Dev)
Ad	5.00 (1.85)	3.42 (2.48)	3.11 (2.34)
Competitor	4.93 (1.82)	4.19 (2.56)	2.78 (2.23)
Random	4.51 (2.06)	3.00 (2.34)	2.83 (2.21)

Statistical test	Value (std. error)	Value (std. error)	Value (std. error)
RMAnova F	13.27**	29.27**	3.26*

Contrast (Ad vs Competitor)	-0.05 (0.1)	0.78** (0.16)	-0.33* (0.14)
Contrast (Ad vs Random)	-0.48** (0.1)	-0.40* (0.16)	-0.27* (0.14)

^{*} P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01

Price fairness was slightly above the neutral point

•	We observe no significant differences between
	the ads and the other conditions

 The High Anova F value comes from the difference between Competitor and Random: 0.37** (0.11)

* P < 0.05, *	** P	<	0.01
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Condition	Mean (St. Dev)
Ad	4.45 (1.85)
Competitor	4.66 (1.77)
Random	4.29 (1.81)

Statistical test	Value (std. error)
RMAnova F	5.31**
Contrast (Ad vs Competitor)	0.20 (0.11)
Contrast (Ad vs Random)	-0.16 (0.11)

• Purchase intentions are, on average, low

 They are not different between ad and competitor but are significantly lower for the random condition

Condition	Mean (St. Dev)
Ad	3.16 (1.86)
Competitor	3.05 (1.78)
Random	2.79 (1.72)

Random ads were therefore less relevant (as expected)

* P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01

Statistical test	Value (std. error)
RMAnova F	15.84**
Contrast (Ad vs Competitor)	-0.10 (0.09)
Contrast (Ad vs Random)	-0.37** (0.09)

Variable/Contrast Ads vs	Search	Random
Purchase intention	Negative	Negative**
Price fairness	Positive	Negative
Perceive product quality	Negative	Negative
Relevance	Negative	Negative**
Familiarity with product type	Negative	Negative**
Familiarity with vendor	Positive**	Negative*
Familiarity with brand	Negative*	Negative*

* P < 0.05, ** P < 0.01

Vendors from Search results are more popular. Ads enable smaller vendors to gain visibility

However, they present brands that are more familiar to participants

Price fairness and perceived quality of product are similar across conditions

Random products have lower purchase intentions, relevance, and familiarity than Ad products

Note: Products in the Ad condition are not "more" relevant, but rather slightly less irrelevant (Mean_Ad 1-7 Likert: 4.01


[2.05])

From Study 1 to Study 2

- ☐ Some Study 1 results were surprising
- Products displayed in targeted ads were associated with higher purchase intentions, relevance, and familiarity relative to Random (*not surprising*), but not to Search
- ☐ However, they also tended to be associated with higher prices and lower-quality vendors ☐ But, why?

Top 15 websites in Ads (links count)

Top 15 websites in Search results (links count)




Highly skewed distributions in both displayed Ad and Search results Log monthly visits of websites that appeared in Ads (M=15.68, SD=3.05) are much lower than those in Search results (M=17.75, SD= 3.34): t(801) = -9.16, p < 0.001)

Some Study 1 results were surprising
 Products displayed in targeted ads were associated with higher purchase intentions, relevance, and familiarity relative to Random (not surprising), but not to Search However, they also tended to be associated with higher prices and lower-quality vendors
Dessible interpretation (post hoc): separating equilibrium <i>a la</i> Varian (1980)'s "model of sales," generated by high competition in search
Are the results robust? Do participants take into account vendor quality when expressing purchase intentions? If they do, how does that affect their (latent) utility?
🛮 Study 2
Replication (same design, new sample) \square Extension: Asked participants purchase intentions both before and after providing vendor ratings

Study 2

- ☐ N = 490 (Prolific, US-based sample); Spring 2022
- ☐ Study 1 results wholly replicated

Figure 1. Distribution of the top 15 vendors across studies and experimental conditions.



Notes. N for study 1 = 1169 links per condition; N for study2 = 1185 links per condition.

Table 1. Distribution of BBB Ratings by study and experimental condition.

	(A) Study 1		
Grade	Ad (%)	Search (%)	
A+ to B-	671 (57%)	881 (75%)	
C+ to D-	65 (5%)	57 (5%)	
F	224 (20%)	71 (6%)	
NR/NOT FOUND	209 (18%)	160 (14%)	
Total	1169 (100%)	1169 (100%)	
(B) Study 2			
Grade	Ad (%)	Search (%)	
A+ to B-	700 (59%)	944 (80%)	
C+ to D-	71 (6%)	48 (4%)	
F	175 (15%)	71 (6%)	
NR/NOT FOUND	239 (20%)	122 (10%)	
Total	1185 (100%)	1185 (100%)	

Table 2. Descriptive statistics for logs of prices by study and experimental condition.

		(A) Study 1		
Туре	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev	Median
Ad	-1.83	10.37	4.15	1.69	3.89
Search	-2.20	10.40	4.05	1.59	3.78
Total	-2.20	10.40	4.11	1.64	3.82
		(B) Study 2		
Туре	Min	Max	Mean	St. Dev	Median
Ad	-1.30	13.76	4.53	1.89	4.37
Search	0.00	10.96	4.28	1.69	4.05
Total	-1.31	13.76	4.41	1.80	4.22

Note. Random condition is not shown, as random products were drawn from ads seen by other participants; therefore, prices in the random condition come from the same distribution.

Study 2: Prices (identical products only)

Table 3. Summary of price comparison results for identical products by study.

Measure	Study 1	Study 2
Products with no price dispersion	15.73%	21.25%
The lowest price was in Search	52.16%	48.71%
The lowest price was in Ad	32.11%	30.04%
Total	100%	100%

Study 2: Other results

- ☐ Self-reported metrics: Patterns in Study 1 results confirmed
- ☐ Both higher relevance and purchase intention for Ads products (relative to random) disappear after controlling for participants' prior searches

- ☐ When provided information about vendor quality, participants' purchase intentions change (lower quality vendors are associated with lower purchase intentions)
 - Assume that measures of purchase intentions are driven by latent, unobserved utility
 - ☐ Assume that a participant expresses a positive intention to purchase if her expected (unobserved) utility is >0
 - As price fairness, quality, familiarity, relevance, vendor quality, etc. have been shown to influence purchase intentions (Dursun et al, 2011; Laroche et al, 1996; Campbell, 1999; Alalwan, 2018), we expect the differences in purchase intentions across conditions to be impacted by differences in the variables we captured

☐ We use a latent utility model to estimate differences in expected consumer utility across the experimental conditions

- \square Before revealing vendor quality: utility_{Ad} > utility_{Search} > utility_{Random}
- \square After revealing vendor quality: utility_{Search} > utility_{Ad} > utility_{Random}

	(1)	(2)
Coefficient/DV	PI3	PI4
Log(Price)	-0.22**	-0.30**
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Quality	0.26**	0.20**
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Relevance	1.05**	0.88**
	(0.08)	(0.07)
Familiarity with product type	-0.03	-0.07
	(0.05)	(0.05)
Familiarity with Brand	0.13***	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Familiarity with Vendor		0.16**
		(0.03)
Use of Privacy Enhancing Technologies		
BBB Rating (base category: B- to A+)		
B- to A+	Base ca	ategory
C- to D+		-0.46
		(0.32)
F		-1.20**
		(0.26)
No Rating		-0.12
		(0.21)
N	3555	3555

Notes. Robust standard errors clustered by participant in parenthesis.

All models include controls for product category and participant characteristics.

^{*} p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01

Table 6. Average welfare differences across conditions and PI Questions (Study 2).

\$3.53
\$8.43
-\$0.54
\$9.77
,

Robustness tests

☐ Results robust to:

Other specifications
Time delay
Usage of privacy technologies

Limitations

- Only display ads, and only Google searches
- Purchase intentions, not actual purchase behavior
- However, studies have shown that purchase intentions are in fact a good proxy (Morwitz et al., 2007; Pavlou & Fygenson, 2006).
- Our measures of product quality are driven by an impression of the participant based on limited information
- ☐ We opted not to use product ratings, since they are a poor measure of objective product quality (Köcher & Köcher, 2018)
- Our results may not extend to social media ads or ads on other platforms (e.g. Amazon), or mobile ads

Findings and implications

- ☐ Search results heavily dominated by large vendors barrier to entry for small sellers
- ☐ Both search results and targeted display ads distributions exhibit high concentration towards the top websites. However, targeted display ads come from lesser-known, smaller vendors
- Ads are associated with higher purchase intentions, relevance, and familiarity relative to Search
- ☐ But this effect goes away after controlling for prior product searches
- Ads are also associated with higher prices, and lower quality vendors

Thank you

☐ In a nutshell: (direct) impact of targeted display ads on consumer welfare? Nuanced

