National Climate Resilience Assessment for Iraq

Temperature

The climate of Iraq can be categorised into three distinct climate zones. A warm desert climate predominates in around 70% of the country’s territory, including the western and southern regions, where temperatures can exceed 50 °C during the summer months. This desert climate is marked by high temperatures as well as large temperature differences between day and night and between winter and summer. In contrast, the mountainous northeast of Iraq experiences a Mediterranean climate, characterised by cold winters with snowfall at higher altitudes and mild summers, with temperatures generally not exceeding 35 °C. Between the mountainous and the desert areas lies a transitional zone with a so-called steppe, or semi‑arid climate, characterised by hot summers and mild winters. Most of Iraq’s energy infrastructure is situated in the Mediterranean and semi‑arid climate zones, aligning with the country’s population distribution.

Mean temperatures in Iraq have rapidly increased in the past decades. Over the 2000‑2023 period, the country experienced an average rate of 0.48 °C of warming per decade, which is 0.11 °C higher than the world average (0.37 °C). As a result of warming, cooling degree days (CDDs) continued to increase at a rate of 16 CDDs per decade in Iraq, despite being already at a very high level of over 2 300 CDDs in 2000. Although heating degree days (HDDs) decreased over the same period, the reduction in HDDs has not outpaced the increase in CDDs, with a reduction of around 5 HDDs per decade. With almost 2 500 CDDs in 2021, Iraq ranked among the top 20 countries with the highest number of CDDs per year. The increasing demand for air conditioning and refrigeration, driven by rising temperatures and population growth, is expected to put additional strains on the country’s already vulnerable electricity network.

Iraq is expected to face drastic and escalating warming until the end of the century, especially under a high-emissions scenario (Above 3 °C). According to climate models from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),1 in a low-emissions scenario (Below 2 °C), Iraq’s land surface temperature is expected to increase by 2.8 °C by the end of the century compared with pre‑industrial levels (1850‑1900). In this scenario, all governorates of Iraq would warm by at least 2.5 °C. In a high-emissions scenario (Above 3 °C), the country could face much more severe warming, with land surface temperatures increasing by 5.6 °C by the end of the century compared with 1850‑1900. In this scenario, all governorates are expected to see temperature rises of at least 5.0 °C, with some southern governorates experiencing increases up to 5.8 °C.

Rising temperatures are a major concern for the electricity network, posing a threat to electricity security as Iraq’s network is already under considerable strain due to population growth as well as the impacts from a series of conflicts. Conflicts and war have severely affected Iraq’s energy sector in the past decades. The Gulf War in 1990‑1991 caused the destruction of 75% of the country’s installed capacity, decreasing the capacity from 9.3 gigawatts (GW) to 2.3 GW. During the war against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the 2010s, it was estimated that 4.5 GW of generating capacity suffered damage and one-fifth of the transmission network was rendered inoperable.

The country still has not fully recovered from these damages, resulting in a gap between the available capacity for electricity generation and the nameplate installed capacity. According to the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity, the installed nameplate capacity stands around 41 GW while available capacity totals around 18 GW. While the generation capacity is increasing due to repairs on existing infrastructure and the commissioning of new gas and oil power plants, it still falls short of meeting growing electricity demand. In addition, inefficiencies in natural gas production resulted in a high reliance on imports from Iran to address demand.

The rising electricity demand in Iraq is driven by high summer temperatures and rapid population growth. In 2022, the Ministry of Electricity estimated that peak demand could exceed 34 GW, indicating that almost half of electricity demand could not be met given the actual generation capacity. Network losses of 50‑60% rank among the highest in the world and further aggravate the situation, leading to frequent power cuts and scheduled brownouts, particularly during the summer months. As a result, citizens heavily rely on private neighbourhood diesel generators to supplement grid supply and to mitigate some of the most acute shortages during summer months. These generators contribute to poor air quality and lead to significant costs. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimated that in 2018, an upper-middle-class household consuming about 16 000 kilowatt-hours annually relied on the grid for approximately 75% of its electricity needs, with the remaining 25% of consumption supplemented by neighbourhood generators. The costs for electricity from these generators rank among the highest globally. For our example household, this means that the cost for electricity from generators can account for as much as 97.5% of its total electricity expenses for 25% of consumed electricity. When combining the costs of electricity from both the grid and neighbourhood generators, the household paid an average price that was eight times higher than the average residential electricity price in the Middle East region. Rebuilding and developing the grid while taking into consideration climate resilience is essential in addressing the challenge of rising temperatures in combination with population growth, and the vast potential of economic development in Iraq.

Iraq is expected to face more frequent and intense heatwaves according to IPCC climate projections. In pre‑industrial times (1850‑1900), relatively cooler parts in the northeast of the country experienced around 40 days with maximum temperature above 35 °C per year and around 14 days with temperatures above 40 °C. In the hottest southern regions, up to 154 days with maximum temperatures above 35 °C and up to 110 days above 40 °C were observed. The number of days with extreme temperature is expected to rise. In a low-emissions scenario (Below 2 °C), Iraq could experience 27 more days with maximum temperature above 35 °C and 33 more days with maximum temperature above 40°C by the end of the century compared with pre‑industrial levels. In a high-emissions scenario (Above 3 °C), the increase could reach 49 and 62 additional days, respectively. The increase in days with extreme temperatures is especially pronounced in the historically relatively cooler northeastern parts of the country.

Extreme heat is already putting a strain on Iraq’s electricity network today. In June 2022, grid failure caused by temperatures exceeding 51 °C left millions of people without electricity in the southern governorates of Basra, Dhi Qar and Maysan. Power cuts during summer months are observed regularly. In June 2024, the Iraqi government reduced public sector working hours to alleviate the burden of extreme heat on citizens and employees, but also to rationalise electricity consumption during peak heat hours. According to climate projections, the electricity grid will face more extreme temperatures until the end of the century. While Iraq’s electricity network is already facing extreme heat and temperatures above 40 °C, the number of days with extreme temperatures above 40 °C is projected to increase across scenarios. In a low-emissions scenario (Below 2 °C), around 90% of the electricity grid would face between 20 and 40 additional days with maximum temperature above 40 °C by the end of the century compared with pre‑industrial levels (1850‑1900). In a high-emissions scenario (Above 3 °C), the entire current electricity network would face at least 40 additional days with maximum temperature above 40 °C, with almost 40% of the grid facing between 60 and 80 additional days with maximum temperature above 40 °C. The increasing exposure of the grid to extreme heat is also observable in absolute terms: In a high-emissions scenario (Above 3 °C), almost 70% of the electricity network could face at least 100 days with maximum temperatures exceeding 40 °C.

If climate change is not mitigated, extreme temperatures and heatwaves can also pose additional challenges to electricity generation by lowering the efficiency of natural gas-fired power plants, which account for almost 50% of electricity generation in the country. Natural gas combustion and combined-cycle power plants can be affected by high ambient temperatures, as their performance is linked to air mass flow, which decreases when ambient temperatures rise. For instance, a study on a natural gas combined-cycle power plant in Türkiye showed that an increase in ambient temperature from 8 °C to 23 °C reduced electricity generation capacity from around 228 megawatts (MW) to 197 MW and led to a slight fall in efficiency, from 43.3% to 42.7%. Furthermore, as ambient temperatures increase, gas power plants requiring cooling become less efficient, compounding the impact on overall performance. In a low-emissions scenario (Below 2 °C), 90% of current installed capacity of natural gas-fired power plants would be exposed to an additional 20 to 40 days with maximum temperature above 40 °C compared with pre‑industrial levels (1850‑1900) by the end of the century. In a high-emissions scenario (Above 3 °C), the entirety of natural gas-fired power plants would be exposed to at least 40 additional days of maximum temperature above 40 °C, with around 24% of natural gas capacity experiencing at least 60 additional days of maximum temperature above 40 °C.

The combination of rising temperatures and aridity can significantly heighten the risk of wildfires in Iraq. Over the past two decades, nearly all governorates have experienced more frequent fires, with the northern and northeastern regions of the country witnessing the highest levels of burned area. From 2000 to 2019, Iraq saw an annual increase of 71.7 square kilometres in burned areas, posing a growing threat to energy operations, infrastructure and assets. 

Precipitation

Iraq experiences great regional variation in annual precipitation across the three different climate zones. The mountainous northeastern part of the country experiences between 400 millimetres (mm) and 1 000 mm of yearly precipitation, whereas the desert regions only receive around 50 mm to 200 mm. The transitional area between the mountains and the desert experiences around 200 mm to 400 mm of annual rainfall. In the past decade, the average yearly precipitation decreased while extreme weather events, such as heavy rainfall and drought, became more frequent. The country is also at high risk of desertification and experiences sand and dust storms.

According to IPCC climate projections, precipitation in Iraq is expected to decrease in the north and increase in the south by the end of the century compared with pre‑industrial levels (1850‑1900). In a low-emissions scenario (Below 2 °C), the change in total precipitation ranges from ‑11% in some northern parts of Iraq to +13% in some southern parts by the end of the century. In a high-emissions scenario (Above 3 °C), the changes in precipitation are more pronounced and range from ‑21% in some parts of the north to +32.5% in some parts of the south. 

As precipitation patterns become more variable and extreme, the risk of droughts is rising. A recent study focused on the drought conditions in Iraq, Syria and Iran over the period from July 2020 to June 2023. The study found that severe three-year droughts in Iraq are no longer rare events, but they can be expected to occur at least once every decade. As temperatures continue to increase, the likelihood of similar droughts increases further, posing significant challenges to water resources. Water shortages are already a major issue in Iraq. In 2019, the Ministry of Water Resources estimated that the country’s river levels had fallen by 40% in the past two decades. In addition to a changing climate, the water crisis is driven by several factors including rising domestic demand; water resource management challenges, particularly in the agriculture sector; damaged infrastructure; and the construction of upstream dams in neighbouring countries. Iraq’s primary water resources are surface waters from the Tigris and Euphrates rivers as well as their tributaries. Both rivers originate in Türkiye, flow through Syria, and then continue southeast through Iraq before discharging into the Gulf. As a result, around 70% of Iraq’s freshwater supply depends on water sources from neighbouring countries. The construction of new dams in these countries has exacerbated Iraq’s vulnerability to water shortages. The country’s water availability is significantly impacted by water management practices in these neighbouring countries and by the effects of climate change in the region.

Hydropower constitutes a minor share of Iraq's overall power generation (<1%) but is sensitive to changes in precipitation patterns. A reduction in precipitation can lower the capacity factor of hydropower plants due to the complex hydrological processes that influence streamflow, water availability, run‑off and evaporation. As precipitation and run‑off decrease throughout the century due to climate change, hydropower generation is expected to decline. Most hydropower plants are located in northeastern regions of Iraq, where precipitation is projected to decrease. If no additional resilience measures are implemented on time, IEA analysis shows that capacity factors of hydropower plants in Iraq are projected to decline. All scenarios (Below 2 °C, Around 3 °C and Above 3 °C) project a decrease of at least 8% in hydropower capacity factor in 2021‑2060, reaching a 17% decrease in a high-emissions scenario (Above 3 °C) in 2061‑2100 compared with 1971‑2010.

Water shortages also pose a significant threat to Iraq’s oil and gas extraction, a critical sector for the country, which continues to rely heavily on hydrocarbon revenues and holds some of the world’s largest oil and natural gas reserves. In 2019, the IEA estimated that the country requires 8 million barrels per day (mb/d) of water by 2030 for its oil production, up from 5 mb/d in 2019. One measure to meet this increasing demand for water in oil production is the Common Seawater Supply Project (CSSP). The project is aimed at enhancing water transport from the Gulf to southern oil fields and was expected to address and mitigate water stress by 2023. Several postponements have pushed the first phase of the project to 2028, extending the risk of water shortages in oil production. In February 2022, for instance, Basra Oil Company reported that existing water supplies would meet only a fraction of its production needs in Iraq’s major oil fields in the south, leading to oil output falling below OPEC+ quotas2. In addition to water shortages, oil and gas extraction in the southern parts of Iraq face increasing salinity levels caused by reduced river levels, allowing seawater from the Gulf to infiltrate upstream. In 2018, salt levels in a river used for operations in a refinery near the city of Basra were four times higher than normal, leading to a three-day shutdown of the refinery. Water shortages surged in 2018 with over 100 000 people hospitalised due to poor quality of drinking water. To address the challenge of drinking water scarcity in the region, the Iraqi government announced a large-scale water desalinisation project around the city of Basra in 2023, planned to have a daily production capacity of 1 million cubic metres and to provide drinking water to around 4 million people.

Paradoxically, the risk of flooding in Iraq is also expected to rise in the future. Climate change is causing more extreme precipitation events. When intense rainfall follows prolonged periods of drought, the ground is likely unable to absorb heavy rainfalls rapidly enough, creating high surface run‑off which can contribute to flash floods and river overflows. Already today, Iraq is ranked among the ten most exposed countries to river floods according to the INFORM Risk Index 2024. In a low-emissions scenario (Below 2 °C), maximum one-day precipitation is expected to increase by more than 10% nationally and by almost 24% in a high-emissions scenario (Above 3 °C) by the end of the century. The increase in maximum one-day precipitation indicates heightened risk of heavy rains and flooding.

The increasing flood risk poses a serious threat to the energy sector. Floods and excessive precipitation can impact energy infrastructure, especially the electricity grid and operations, such as refining activities. In April 2024, refining output at one refinery in the north of Iraq dropped by almost 20% during a ten-day period due to heavy rainfalls. In a low-emissions scenario (Below 2 °C), around 60% of the current refining capacity of 1 mb/d and more than 50% of the current electricity grid would be exposed to an increase of at least 10% in one-day maximum precipitation by the end of the century compared with pre‑industrial levels. In a high-emissions scenario (Above 3 °C), more than 85% of the refining capacity and more than 65% of the grid would be exposed to an increase of more than 20%. Iraq is already facing heavy rainfalls and flooding today; in 2023, heavy rains destroyed parts of the electricity network in central Iraq and led to the death of three citizens due to electrocution. 

Other climate risks

While Iraq’s coastline on the Gulf is relatively narrow, spanning about 58 kilometres (km), increasing sea level rise poses a concern. Given that the southern parts of Iraq are flat and low-lying areas, they are highly susceptible to flooding from rising sea levels. This risk is further exacerbated by the deltaic areas of Tigris and Euphrates. Basra, one of the largest cities in the country, could be largely inundated by 2050 as a result of rising sea levels. Critical infrastructure such as major ports, roads, socio‑economic activities and, therefore, energy infrastructure are clustered in the coastal areas and face an increasing risk of sea level rise. Rising sea levels further aggravate the risk of water salinisation in Iraq’s southern parts where some of the country’s biggest oilfields and refineries are located.

Furthermore, sand and dust storms are regularly observed in Iraq, and their number and intensity increased in the past 20 years. Between 1980 and 2015, Baghdad experienced an average of 7.9 days of major dust storms annually. In the first half of 2022, the city experienced ten such events, each lasting between two and four days. As a result, thousands of people in Iraq needed medical attention in May 2022. In addition to the occurrence of these extreme events, the number of dusty days3 in Iraq increased from 243 to 272 days a year in the past two decades and could reach around 300 dusty days annually by 2050. Desertification, land degradation and droughts are all factors contributing to the increase of dusty days and the occurrence of sand and dust storms. Apart from devastating health impacts, these extreme weather events can have significant impact on the economy. In the energy sector, sand and dust storms can cause damage to energy assets and infrastructure, driving up maintenance needs and associated cost and potentially bringing operations to halt. In May 2022, the General Company for Ports of Iraq suspended its maritime operations due to a sandstorm. Export terminals in the Basra Gulf saw a decline of 90 000 barrels per day in federal exports that month due to poor visibility and slowed tanker loading. As Iraq’s economy relies heavily on these exports, sand and dust storms could significantly impact the country’s revenue streams.

Sand and dust storms may also affect solar photovoltaic (PV) power generation as Iraq plans on developing 12 GW of solar PV capacity by 2030, which would represent 23% of future total installed capacity. Sand and dust storms reduce the efficiency of solar PV modules and reduce electricity output by up to 62%. A study conducted in Baghdad in 2022 showed that solar radiation intensity was reduced by up to 55%, causing power generation from solar PV modules to fall. Even three days after the storm, power generation was decreased by up to 34% compared with the day before the sandstorm. Airborne dust not only scatters and absorbs solar radiation but also accumulates on solar PV modules, further diminishing their performance. To mitigate these impacts, solar PV project developers should integrate resilience approaches into the planning and development process of solar PV sites to prevent decreased power generation, including regular cleaning protocols for the solar PV modules, as well as potential damage from sand and dust storms.

In 2021, Iraq submitted its first nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) for the time frame 2021‑2030. The NDC highlights the energy sector as one of the most sensitive and vulnerable sectors to climate change in the country. To enhance the national ability to address the impacts of climate change, the NDC puts an emphasis on increasing the resilience of the energy sector through adaptation programmes and simultaneous mitigation efforts. The proposed adaptation measures for the energy sector include, among others, modifying the specifications of electrical equipment to withstand rising temperatures; using nature-based solutions such as planting vegetation around energy production sites; enhancing the efficiency of transportation and distribution; and adopting innovative technologies to better cope with rising temperatures.

To facilitate the implementation of the provisions of the UNFCCC, Iraq has worked to establish several national entities and units. The Iraqi Ministry of Environment created the National Unit for Climate Change, now called the National Centre for Climate Change (NCCC), a national body responsible for implementing the requirements of UNFCCC. The Permanent National Committee for Climate Change (PNCCC) was established in 2011 and consists of the Prime Minister’s Office Advisory Committee, Iraqi ministries involved in climate change adaptation and mitigation, municipalities, research institutions, and civil society organisations. Together, the PNCCC and the NCCC aim to strengthen Iraq’s institutional capacity to promote climate change adaptation activities.

In 2020, Iraq launched the process to develop the country’s National Adaptation Plan (NAP) with assistance from the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The PNCCC is involved in the NAP development process on a policy guidance and strategic level, whereas the NCCC contributes on an operational and co‑ordination level. In addition, two task forces are to be established in order to deliver on the process by working on the technical inter‑ministerial levels. One task force will form on a sectoral level, establishing working groups for specific sectors, such as water resources and water security, renewable energy, and a risk reduction working group for natural events resulting from climate change and sea level rise. The sectoral task force is complemented by a cross-sectoral task force dealing with overarching issues, such as climate finance. The development of Iraq’s NAP is still in progress, but it marks an important step in the country’s climate policy framework aimed at prioritising adaptation actions and enhancing climate resilience.

To strengthen the climate resilience of Iraq’s particularly vulnerable electricity system, prioritising distributed power generation can be a key measure. Decentralising power generation enables diversification across multiple locations, reducing the risk of disruptions caused by impact on or damage to a single site. This would need to be accompanied by investments that allow parts of the grid to be able to island - separate from the main grid in the event of widespread disruptions - to ensure distributed electricity production can continue to provide demand reliability. These approaches can also help Iraq’s energy system to be resilient and responsive to other disruptions beyond those induced by extreme weather.

Diversification of energy sources can further help in building a climate-resilient energy system. Given the current challenges in Iraq’s energy sector, expanding renewable energy will be key in improving energy security. The Ministry of Electricity has adopted a future vision for low-carbon energy that will require significant investments in clean energy across several key areas. This vision includes implementing combined-cycle technology to improve efficiency, converting heavy-fuel electric power stations to use natural gas, and increasing the share of clean energy sources to approximately 25% of total energy generation by 2030. Iraq plans to install 12 GW of solar PV by 2030, with projects capable of generating 7.5 GW already awarded. In 2022, the Central Bank of Iraq additionally announced it would provide approximately USD 750 million of subsidised loans to individual and private companies in order to encourage the installation of solar energy systems on a smaller scale. Iraq’s initiatives to increase the share of renewable technologies in its power mix will enhance its ability to manage climate-related disruptions and energy supply challenges. For instance, increased adoption of wind and solar PV, which have lower water needs compared with traditional thermal power plants, can bolster the resilience of power systems against droughts and water shortages.

To further diversify energy supply and improve resilience, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)4 and Iraq launched an electrical grid interconnection project in 2023. The project plans to implement a dual-circuit transmission line linking the city of Arar in Saudi Arabia with Yusufiya in western Baghdad, transferring an initial capacity of 1 000 MW. It also involves constructing a 400 kilovolt (kV) dual-circuit transmission line that will connect the Al Zour Substation in Kuwait with the Al Faw Substation in Iraq, providing 500 MW of electricity to meet the electricity needs of the Basra governorate in the south of Iraq. The initiative aims to enhance the stability and reliability of power systems in the region, making the network more resilient to potential disruptions, especially in the summer months when peak electricity demand is expected to further increase due to rising temperatures. In 2024, the Iraqi Cabinet approved further measures to enhance electricity supply, to advance the national power infrastructure, and to address the electricity peak demand in summer periods. The measures include the authorisation for further supply contracts between the Ministry of Electricity and private sector companies as well as the authorisation of the Minister of Finance to secure a loan agreement for the supply and installation of five 132 kV substations.

In addition to climate and energy policies, Iraq has been working on disaster risk management to improve climate resilience. In Iraq’s last readiness report on the implementation of the Sendai Framework in 2017, Iraq announced that a national programme for disaster risk reduction is under preparation and as of 2024, Iraq is working with the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) on a national strategy to mitigate the risk of disasters in the country. UNDRR disaster risk profiles for countries can provide a comprehensive view of climate change hazards and risks.

Iraq has recognised the importance of considering climate change and the impacts on the energy sector, notably the electricity sector, in its policies. However, policies and national frameworks are still evolving, and further policy measures will be essential to build climate resilience in Iraq’s energy sector. The completion of the NAP and the inclusion of energy-specific measures as well as the government’s support in collecting and disseminating climate information and data as well as providing risk and impact assessments in the energy sector can act as a starting point.

Further government efforts to bring climate resilience considerations into the core of decision-making on energy projects, such as rebuilding and developing the electricity grid and planning new generation facilities, are essential. Key to this integration is the investment in infrastructure capable of withstanding the impacts of climate change while also securing against physical and cyberthreats. Mainstreaming climate-resilient approaches in guidelines, regulations and project approval processes further catalyses action. The government could, for instance, recommend or mandate climate risks and impact assessments for project developers in project planning, default to more resilient technologies (such as energy-efficient technologies for desalination) and enhance the robustness of energy infrastructure in the face of the physical impacts of climate-related disasters. Government-led resilience measures can encourage both energy suppliers and consumers to take action while also sending strong signals to investors about the sector’s commitment to climate resilience.