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Computer Science > Computers and Society

arXiv:1305.2978 (cs)
[Submitted on 14 May 2013]

Title:Evolution of Cooperation in an Incentive Based Business Game Environment

Authors:Sanat Kumar Bista, Keshav P Dahal, Peter I Cowling
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Abstract:This paper discusses our investigation into the evolution of cooperative players in an online business environment. We explain our design of an incentive based system with its foundation over binary reputation system whose proportion of reward or punishment is a function of transaction value and the players past history of cooperation. We compare the evolution of cooperation in our setting with non-incentive based environment and our findings show that the incentive based method is more suitable for the evolution of trustworthy players.
Comments: Global Design to Gain a Competitive Edge. Vol. 1. Springer, 2008
Subjects: Computers and Society (cs.CY); Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT)
Cite as: arXiv:1305.2978 [cs.CY]
  (or arXiv:1305.2978v1 [cs.CY] for this version)
  https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1305.2978

Submission history

From: Sanat Bista [view email]
[v1] Tue, 14 May 2013 00:17:50 UTC (93 KB)
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